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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,
Supreme Court Case No. 42999

'

Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross Respondent,
vs.

ADA COUNTY, A POLITICAL
SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, AND ADA COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,
Defendants-Respondents-Cross Appellants.

CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada.

HONORABLE GEORGE D. CAREY

ERIC S. ROSSMAN

KIRTLAN G. NAYLOR

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

BOISE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO

000001

Date: 6/8/2015

Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County

Time: 12:35 PM

ROA Report

Page 1 of 11

User: TCWEGEKE

Case: CV-OC-2013-02730 Current Judge: George Carey

.

I

Richard Thomas Wright vs. Ada County, etal.

Richard Thomas Wright vs. Ada County, Ada County Board Of County Commissioners, David Case, Jim Tibbs
Date

Code

User

2/12/2013

NCOC

CCPINKCN

New Case Filed - Other Claims

Mike Wetherell

COMP.

CCPINKCN

Complaint Filed

Mike Wetherell

SMFI

CCPINKCN

(4) Summons Filed

Mike Wetherell

2/19/2013

NOTC

CCVIDASL

Notice of General Appeance for Defendant
(Naylor for Ada County Ada County Board of
Commissioners Da~id Case and Jim Tibbs)

Mike Wetherell

2/22/2013

AFOS

CCCHILER

(4) Affidavit Of Service (2/14/1~)

Mike Wetherell

3/5/2013

MOTN

CCHOLMEE

Motion to Dismiss

Mike Wetherell

MEMO

CCHOLMEE

Memorandum in Support of Motion

Mike Wetherell

NOHG

CCOSBODK

Notice Of Hearing' Re Motion To Dismiss (4.12.13 Mike Wetherell
@2:30pm)

HRSC

CCOSBODK

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/12/2013 02:30
PM) Motion To Dismiss

Mike Wetherell

4/5/2013

MEMO

CCHEATJL

Plaintiff's Memorandum In Opposition To
Defendants' Motion To Dismiss

Mike Wetherell

4/10/2013

MEMO

MCBIEHKJ

Memorandum in Reply to Opposition to Motion to Mike Wetherell ·
Dismiss

CHJS

DCOATMAD

Change Assigned Judge: Self Disqualification

Deborah Bail

DISF

DCOATMAD

Disqualification Of Judge - Self

Deborah Bail

3/13/2013

DCOATMAD

Judge

Notice of Reassignment

Deborah Bail

4/11/2013

HRVC

DCOATMAD

Mike Wetherell
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
04/12/2013 02:30 PM: Hearing Vacated Motion
To Dismiss

4/12/2013

DISF

DCDOUGLI

Disqualification Of Judge - Self

Deborah Bail

4/17/2013

CHJS

CCNELSRF

Change Assigned Judge: Self Disqualification

Ronald J. Wilper

DISF

CCNELSRF

Disqualification Of Judge - Self

Ronald J. Wilper

CCNELSRF
4/18/2013

Notice of Reassignment

Ronald J. Wilper

CHJS

DCJOHNSI

Change Assigned Judge: Self Disqualification

Thomas F. Neville

DISF

DCJOHNSI

Disqualification Of Judge - Self

Thomas F. Neville

DCJOHNSI

Notice of Reassignment

Thomas F. Neville

5/1/2013

NOTS

CCOSBODK

Notice Of Service

Thomas F. Neville

5/3/2013

CHJS

TCPAANMR

Change Assigned Judge: Self Disqualification

Lynn G Norton

DISF

TCPAANMR

Disqualification Of Judge - Self

Lynn G Norton

CHJS

TCPAANMR

Change Assigned Judge: Self Disqualification

Melissa Moody

DISF

TCPAANMR

Disqualification Of Judge - Self

Melissa Moody

CHJS

TCPAANMR

Change Assigned Judge: Self Disqualification

Richard D. Greenwood

DISF

TCPAANMR

Disqualification Of Judge - Self

Richard D. Greenwood

CHJS

TCPAANMR

Change Assigned Judge: Self Disqualification

Cheri C. Copsey

DISF

TCPAANMR

Disqualification Of Judge - Self

Cheri C. Copsey

CHJS

TCPAANMR

Change Assigned Judge: Self Disqualification

000002
Timothy Hansen

Date: 6/8/2015

Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County

Time: 12:35 PM

ROA Report

Page 2 of 11
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Case: CV-OC-2013-02730 Current Judge: George Carey
. Richard Thomas Wright vs. Ada County, etal.

Richard Thomas Wright vs. Ada County, Ada County Board Of County Commissioners, David Case, Jim Tibbs

.

Date

Code ;

User

5/3/2013

DISF

TCPAANMR

Disqualification Of Judge - Self

Timothy Hansen

5/6/2013

CHGA·

TCPAANMR

Judge Change: Administrative

Gerald Schroeder

MISC

TCPAANMR

Directive Reassigning Case to Senior District
Judge on Disqualification and Certificate of
Mailing

Gerald Schroeder

CCNELSRF

Judge

Notice of Reassignment

Gerald Schroeder

5/14/2013

MOTN

CCBOYIDR

Motion for First Disqualification of Judge

Gerald Schroeder

5/16/2013

ORDR

DCJOHNSI

Order of Disqualification (Schroeder)

Gerald Schroeder

CJWO

DCJOHNSI

Change Assigned Judge: Disqualification W/0
Cause

Patrick H. Owen

DCJOHNSI
5/21/2013

Notice of Reassignment

Patrick H. Owen

MISC

CCNELSRF

Directive Reassigning Case for Senior District
Judge On Disqualification

Patrick H. Owen

CHRE·

CCTAYSSE

Change Assigned Judge: Reassignment

Renae Hoff

CCNELSRF

Notice of Reassignment

Renae Hoff

5/28/2013

MODQ

CCMEYEAR

Motion To Disqualify Pursuant to IRCP

6/7/2013

ORDR

DCLYKEMA

Order Granting Motion to Disquality (Hon. Renae Renae Hoff
Hoff)

6/10/2013

MISC

TCPAANMR

Directive Reassigning Case To Senior District
Judge on Disqualification

Renae Hoff

CHGA

TCPAANMR

Judge Change: Administrative

George Carey

NOTR

TCPAANMR

Notice Of Reassignment

George Carey

MEMO

CCHOLMEE

Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum on
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Re Idaho
Supreme Court Ravenscroft Decision

George Carey

NOSV

CCHOLMEE

Notice Of Service

George Carey

6/24/2013

RESP

CCNELSRF

Plfs Response To Defs Supplemental .
Memorandum on Defs Moiton to Dismiss

George Carey

6/26/2013

NOTS

CCMEYEAR

Notice Of Service

George Carey

6/28/2013

NOTH.

TCWEATJB

Notice Of Hearing

George Carey

HRSC'

TCWEATJB

7/19/2013

NOTS.

CCTHIEKJ

Notice Of Service

7/22/2013

HRHD

CCPRICDL

George Carey
Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled
on 07/22/2013 01:30 PM: Hearing Held - Penny
Tardiff Court Reporter

7/25/2013

DEOP

DCLYKEMA

Memorandum and Order Concerning Defendants' George Carey
Motion to Dismiss

7/26/2013

NOTC

CCHEATJL

Notice Of Plaintiff's Intent To Seek Montary
Damages Against Defendants Case And Tibbs

George Carey

7/30/2013

ORDR

DCLYKEMA

Second Memorandum and Order Concerning
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

George Carey

6/20/2013

. Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss
07/22/2013 01:30 PM)

Renae Hoff

George Carey
George Carey
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Case: CV-OC-2013-02730 CurrentJudge: George Carey
Richard Thomas Wright vs. Ada County, etal.

Richard Thomas Wright vs. Ada County, Ada County Board Of County Commissioners, .David Case, Jim Tibbs
Date

Code

User

8/1/2013

ORDR

DCLYKEMA

Order Pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 16(b)

George Carey

8/5/2013

NOTS

CCMEYEAR

Notice Of Service

George Carey

8/6/2013

NOTS

CCSCOTDL

Notice Of Service

George Carey

8/22/2013

NOTS

CCMEYEAR

(2) Notice Of Service

George Carey

9/3/2013

NOTS

CCSWEECE

Defendants Notice Of Service RE Defendants
First Supplemented Responses to Plaintiffs First
Set of Interrogatories and Requests for
Production of Documents

George Carey

9/9/2013

STIP .

CCSWEECE

Stipulation for Protective Order

George Carey

9/10/2013

ORDR

DCLYKEMA

Order Re: Stipulation for Protective Order

George Carey

9/11/2013

NOTS

CCSWEECE

Notice Of Service of Discovery Responses

George Carey

9/24/2013

NOTS

CCMEYEAR

Notice Of Service

George Carey

9/26/2013

NOTS

CCMARTJD

Notice Of Service

George Carey

10/2/2013

NOTS

CCKHAMSA

Notice Of Service Of Discovery Requests

George Carey

10/8/2013

STIP

CCKHAMSA

Stipulation For Scheduling And Planning

George Carey

10/30/2013

MISC

CCHOLMEE

Plaintiff's Disclosure of Lay.and Expert Witnesses George Carey

11/1/2013

HRSC

DCLYKEMA

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 02/09/2015 09:00 George Carey
AM) 8 Days

11/13/2013

NOTS

CCKHAMSA

Notice Of Service

George Carey

MOTN

CCKHAMSA

Defendants' Motion To Compel Discovery
Responses Pursuant To IRCP Rule 37 (a)

George Carey

AFFD

CCKHAMSA

Affidavit Of Kirtlan G. Naylor In Support Of
Defendants' Motion To Compel Discovery
Responses Pursuant To IRCP Rule 37 (a)

George Carey

MEMO

CCKHAMSA

Memorandum In Support Of Defendants' Motion
To Compel Discovery Responses Pursuant To
IRCP Rule 37 (a)

George Carey

NOTS

CCKHAMSA

Notice Of Service

George Carey

NOHG

CCSCOTDL

Notice Of Hearing re: Defendants Motion to
Compel Discovery Responses (12-16-2013@
2:30PM)

George Carey

HRSC

CCSCOTDL

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel
12/16/2013 02:30 PM)

George Carey

12/9/2013

MEMO

CCREIDMA

George Carey

12/11/2013

NOTS

CCREIDMA

Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion to Compel Discovery
Responses
Notice Of Service of Discovery Requests

12/12/2013

REPL.

CCSWEECE

11/15/2013

Judge

Defendants Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Compel

George Carey
George Carey
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Case: CV-OC-2013-02730 Current Judge: George Carey
Richard Thomas Wright vs. Ada County, etal.

Richard Thomas Wright vs. Ada County, Ada County Board Of County Commissioners, David Case, Jim Tibbs
Date

Code

User

12/16/2013

DCHH

DCKORSJP

Hearing result for Motion to Compel scheduled
George Carey
on 12/16/2013 02:30 PM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Sue' Wolf
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Less than 100

12/17/2013

ORDR

DCLYKEMA

Memorandum and Order Concerning Defendants' George Carey
Motion to Compel

12/26/2013

NOTS

CCMARTJD

Notice Of Service

George Carey

1/10/2014

NOTS

TCLAFFSD

Notice Of Service Of Discovery Requests

George Carey

1/21/2014

NOTS

CCHEATJL

Notice Of Service

George Carey

MOTN

CCHEATJL

Motion To Transfer And Consolidate
(SC1322133_

George Carey

NOTO

CCHEATJL

Notice Of Taking Deposition Of Kelly Paananen

George Carey

NOTO.

TCLAFFSD

Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum Of
Defendant David Case

George Carey

NOTO

TCLAFFSD

Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum Of
Jim Tibbs

George Carey

NOTO

TCLAFFSD

Notice Of Taking Deposition Of Bethany Calley

George Carey

NOTO

TCLAFFSD

Notice Of Taking Deposition Of Terri Broome

George Carey

NOTO

TCLAFFSD

Notice Of Taking Deposition Of Rick Yzagurrie

George Carey

NOTO

TCLAFFSD

Notice Of Taking Deposition Of Larry Maneely

George Carey

NOTO

TCLAFFSD

Notice Of Taking Deposition Of Sue Axtman

George Carey

NODT

TCRUDZES

Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Tim George Carey
Wilson

NODT

TCRUDZES

Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of
Dona Dana

George Carey

NODT

TCRUDZES

Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of
Rich Wright

George Carey

NOTS

CCNELSRF

Notice Of Service

George Carey

NOTS

CCHEATJL

Notice Of Service

George Carey

AMEN

CCHEATJL

Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition Of Sue
Axtman

George Carey

2/4/2014

AFOS ·

CCHEATJL

Affidavit Of Service

George Carey

2/5/2014

MOTN
AFSM

CCBARRSA
CCBARRSA

Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Discovery Responses George Carey

NOHG

CCBARRSA

Notice Of Hearing (going to amend Notice of
Hearing)

George Carey

AMEN
HRSC

TCLAFFSD

Amended Notice Of Hearing (3.3.14 at 4:00 PM)

George Carey

TCLAFFSD

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel
03/03/2014 04:00 PM) Plaintiffs Motion to
Compel Discovery Responses

George Carey

1/23/2014

1/27/2014

1/29/2014

2/6/2014

Judge

01.30.14

Affidavit In Support Of Motion Plaintiffs Motion to George Carey
Compel Discovery Responses
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Case: CV-OC-2013-02730 Current Judge: George Carey
Richard Thomas Wright vs. Ada County, etal.

Richard Thomas Wright vs. Ada County, Ada County Board Of County Commissipners, David Case, Jim Tibbs
Date

Code

User

2/6/2014

NOSV·

CCHOLMEE

Notice Of Service

George Carey

2/10/2014

NOTS

CCHEATJL

(2) Notice Of Service

George Carey

2/11/2014

NOTS

CCNELSRF

(2) Notice Of Service

George Carey

AMEN

TCHOLLJM

Amended Notice Of Taking Videotaped
Deposition Duces Tecum Of Defendant David
Case

George Carey

2/19/2014

AMEN

CCREIDMA

Amended Notice of Taking Deposition of Bethany George Carey
Calley

2/26/2014

NOTS

CCMARTJD

Notice Of Service

George Carey

3/11/2014

NOTO

CCHOLMEE

Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition

George Carey

NOTO

CCHOLMEE

Second Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition

George Carey

MOTN

CCREIDMA

Plaintiffs Motion For Issuance of Subpoena
Duces Tecum Upon non-Resident of Idaho

George Carey

MEMO

CCREIDMA

Memorandum In Support of Plaintiffs Motion for
Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum upon
Non-Resident of Idaho

George Carey

NOTH

CCREIDMA

Notice Of Hearing (4/17/14 @4 pm)

George Carey

HRSC

CCREIDMA

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/17/2014 04:00
PM) Issuance of Subpoena Dl!ces Tecum Upon
Non-Resident of Idaho

George Carey

AFFD

CCREIDMA

Affidavit of Kimsberly L williams in Support of
George Carey
Plaintiffs Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces
Tecum Upon Non-Resident of Idaho

NOTS

CCREIDMA

Notice Of Service of Discovery Requests

George Carey

3/21/2014

NOTS'

TCHOLLJM

Notice Of Service Of Discovery Responses

George Carey

4/3/2014

NOTS

TCLAFFSD

Notice Of Service Of Discovery Requests

George Carey

4/15/2014

STIP

TCLAFFSD

Stipulation For Issuance Of Subpoena Duces
Tecum Upon Non-Resident Of Idaho

George Carey

4/16/2014

NOTS

TCLAFFSD

Notice Of Service Of Discovery Responses

George Carey

4/17/2014

HRVC

DCLYKEMA

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on

George Carey

Judge
I

3/17/2014

04/17/2014 04:00 PM: Hearing Vacated
Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Upon
Non-Resident of Idaho

ORDR

DCLYKEMA

Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Issuance of
Subpoena Duces Tecum Upon Non-Resident of
Idaho

George Carey

ORDR

DCLYKEMA

Order for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum
Upon Non-Resident of Idaho

George Carey

4/18/2014

NOTS

CCTHIEKJ

Notice Of Service

George Carey

5/2/2014

MOTN

CCTHIEKJ

Motion to Quash Plaintiffs Subpoena of Greg
George Carey
Bower and Written Objection Pursuant to I.R.C.P.
45(C) and Request for Protective Order Pursuant
to I.R.C.P. 26(c)
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User: TCWEGEKE

Case: CV-OC-2013-02730 Current Judge: George Carey
Richard Thomas Wright vs. Ada County, etal.

Richard Thomas Wright vs. Ada County, Ada County Board Of County Commissioners, David Case, Jim Tibbs
Date

Code

User

5/5/2014

HRSC

DCLYKEMA

AMEN

CCRADTER

5/6/2014

NOTS:

CCTHIEKJ

Notice Of Service

5/8/2014

NOSV

CCMURPST

Notice Of Service Re: Defendant's Supplemental George Carey
Response to Plaintiff's Eighth Set of Requests for
Production of Documents to Defendants

5/14/2014

MISC

CCRADTER

Second Amended Motion to Quash Plaintiff's
Subpoena of Dee Oldham and Written Objection
Pursuant to IRCP 45(C) and Request for
Protectice Order Pursuant to IRCP 26(c)

MEMO

CCWEEKKG

Plaintiff's Memorandum in Oppostition to
George Carey
Amended Motion to Quash Plainttifs Subpoena of
Dee Oldham

AFSM

CCWEEKKG

Affidavit In Support Of Motion Plaintiff's
Memorandum in Oppostition to Amended Motion
to Quash Plainttifs Subpoena of Dee Oldham

George Carey .

OPPO

CCSCOTDL

Plaintiffs Non Opposition to Second Amended
Motion to Quash Plaintiffs Subpoena of Dee
Oldham

George Carey

DCHH

DCOATMAD

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
George Carey
05/21/2014 04:00 PM: District Court Hearing Heh
Court Reporter: V Gosney
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: (Motion to Quash Plaintiff's Subpoena

5/21/2014 .

Judge
Hearing Scheduled (05/21/2014 at 04:00 PM Motion to Quash Plaintiff's Subpoena)

George Carey

Amended Motion to Quash Plaintiff's Subpoena of George Carey
Dee Oldham and Written Objection Pursuant to
IRCP 45(C) and Request for Protective Order
. Pursuant to IRCP 26(c)
George Carey

George Carey

25
ORDR

DCOATMAD

Order to Quash Plaintiff's Subpoenas of Dee
Oldham

George Carey

6/4/2014

STIP

TCLAFFSD

Stipulation To Dismiss Parties

George ca.rey

6/6/2014

NOTS·

CCHEATJL

Notice Of Service OF Discovery Responses

George Carey

6/9/2014

ORDR

DCLYKEMA

Order to Dismiss Parties (David Case and Jim
Tibbs)

George Carey

CDIS

DCLYKEMA

Civil Disposition entered for: Case, David,
Defendant; Tibbs, Jim, Defendant. Filing date:

George Carey

6/9/2014
6/12/2014

MOTN.

CCTHIEKJ

Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Amended
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial

AFSM

CCTHIEKJ

George Carey
Affidavit of Kimberly L Williams In Support Of
Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint and
Demand for Jury Trial

MEMO

CCTHIEKJ

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for
Leave to File Amended Complaint and Demand
for Jury Trial

George Carey

George Carey
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. Judge

Date

Code

User

6/16/2014

NOTD

CCHOLMEE

Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of
Dee Oldham

6/18/2014

AMEN

TCLAFFSD

Amended Notice of Hearing (7.7.14@ 10:00 AM) George Carey

HRSC

TCLAFFSD

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/07/2014 10:00
AM) Plaintiffs Motion For Leave To File
Amended Complaint & Demand For Jury Trial

6/23/2014

HRSC

CCHEATJL

6/26/2014

STIP

CCSCOTDL

7/1/2014

HRVC

DCLYKEMA

George Carey

George Carey

Second Amended Notice Of Hearing Scheduled George Carey
· (Motion 07/09/2014 10:00 AM) Motion For Leave
To File Amended Complaint
Stipulation for Leave to File Amended Complaint
and demand for Jury Trial

George Carey

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on

George Carey

07/09/2014 10:00 AM: H~aring Vacated Motion
For Leave To File Amended Complaint

ORDR

DCLYKEMA

Order Granting Leave to File Amended Complaint George Carey
and Demand for Jury Trial

CCHOLMEE

Amended Complaint Filed

George Carey

7/9/2014

AMCO
NOTC.

CCVIDASL

Notice of Taking Deposition Upon Oral
Examination of Sharon Ullman

George Carey

7/14/2014

NOTC

CCRADTER

Notice of Filing of Application for Utah Subpoena

George Carey

7/18/2014

ANSW

TCLAFFSD

Defendants Answer To Plaintiffs Amended
George Carey
Complaint And Demand For Jury Trial (Naylor for
Ada County)

7/21/2014

NOTD

CCMARTJD

Notice Of Taking Deposition

George Carey

NOTS

TCLAFFSD

Notice Of Service Of Discovery Responses

George Carey

7/23/2014

NOSV

CCHOLMEE

Notice Of Service

George Carey

7/24/2014

NOTS

CCGARCOS

George Carey
Defendants' Notice Of Service RE: Defendants'
Sixth Supplemented Responses to Plaintiffs First
Set of Requests for Production of Documents ·

7/25/2014

NOTC

CCMCLAPM

Notice of Vacating Deposition of Vernon L.
Bisterfeldt

George Carey

7/30/2014

NOTS

CCRADTER

Notice Of Service

George Carey

8/13/2014

MISC

CCRADTER

Plaintiffs First Supplemental Disclosure of Expert George Carey
Witnesses

8/15/2014

NOTC

TCMEREKV

Notice Of Continued Deposition Upon Oral
Examination Of Rich Wright

George Carey

8/20/2014

MISC

TCMEREKV

Plaintiffs Second Supplemental Disclosure Of
Expert Witnesses

George Carey

10/10/2014

MOTN

CCGARCOS

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

George Carey

STMT'

CCGARCOS

AFFD

CCGARCOS

7/2/2014

· ADA County's Statement of Undisputed Material
Facts
Affidavit of Kirtlan G. Naylor in Support of
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

George Carey
George Carey
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Richard Thomas Wright vs. Ada County, Ada County Board Of County Commissioners, David Case, Jim Tibbs
Date

Code ·

User

10/10/2014

MEMO

CCGARCOS

Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment

George Carey

NOTH

CCGARCOS

Notice Of Hearing RE: Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment (11/7/2014@ 1:30pm)

George Carey

STIP

CCGARCOS

Stipulation for Leave to File Over-Length Briefs

George Carey

10/17/2014

ORDR

DCLYKEMA

Order Allowing Parties to File Over-Length Briefs George Carey

10/23/2014

STIP ·

CCSCOTDL

Stipulation to Extend Mediation Deadline

George Carey

10/24/2014

AFFD

TCLAFFSD

Affidavit Of Richard Wright In Opposition To
Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment

George Carey

AFFD

TCLAFFSD

MEMO

TCLAFFSD

Affidavit Of Kimberly L Williams In Opposition To George Carey
Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment
Document sealed
Plaintiff's Memorandum In Opposition To
George Carey
Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment

DCHH

CCNELSRF

Hearing result for Motion to Compel scheduled
George Carey
on 03/03/2014 04:00 PM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter:
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery
Responses

DCHH

CCNELSRF

George Carey
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
07/07/2014 10:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hele
Court Reporter:
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Plaintiff's Motion For Leave To File
Amended Complaint & Demand For Jury Trial

DCHH

CCNELSRF

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
George Carey
05/21/2014 04:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hel1
Court Reporter:
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: (Motion to Quash Plaintiff's Subpoena

HRSC

TCHARDSL

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/07/2014 01 :30

10/31/2014

Judge

George Carey

PM)
ORDR

DCLYKEMA

Order Granting Stipulation to Extend Mediation
Deadline

George Carey

MEMO

TCMEREKV

Memorandum In Reply To Opposition To Motion
For Summary Judgment

George Carey

AFFD ·

·TCMEREKV

Affidavit Of Christopher D. Rich

George Carey

AMEN

TCMEREKV

Amended Notice Of Hearing RE: Motion For
Summary Judgment 11.7.14 @4:00 PM

George Carey

HRSC

TCMEREKV

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/07/2014 04:00

George Carey

PM)
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11/7/2014

DCHH

CCNELSRF

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
George Carey
11/07/2014 04:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hele
Court Reporter: Sue Wolf
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: 1000 or less Motion For Summary
Judgment

11/10/2014

RSPN

CCMCLAPM

Defendants Response to Inquiry Concerning
Defendants Status

George Carey

11/13/2014

MISC

Inquiry Concerning Defendants' Status

George Carey

CERT

DCLYKEMA
DCLYKEMA

Certificate Of Mailing

George Carey

MEMO

TCLAFFSD

Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum In
Opposition To Defendants' Motion For Summary
Judgment

George Carey

AFFD

TCLAFFSD

Affidavit Of Kimberly L Williams In Support To
Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum

George Carey

BREF

CCRADTER

Defendant's Supplemental Brief Regarding
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

George Carey

AFFD

CCRADTER

Supplemental Affidavit of Kirtlan G Naylor in
Support of Defendant's Supplemental Brief ~f
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Disress

George Carey

WITN
AFFD
MISC

CCTHIEKJ
CCRADTER
CCRADTER

Defendant's List of Lay Witnesses for Trial

George Carey

Affidav.it of Jacy Jones

George Carey

Plaintiffs First Supplemental Disclosure of Law
Witnesses

George Carey

CDIS

DCDANSEL

Civil Disposition entered for: Ada County,
Defendant; Ada County Board Of County
Commissioners, Defendant; Wright, Richard
Thomas, Plaintiff. Filing date: 1/5/2015

George Carey

HRVC

DCDANSEL

George Carey
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on
02/09/2015 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 8 Days

MEMO

DCDANSEL

Memorandum Concerning Defendant's Motion for George Carey
Summary Judgment

ORDR

DCDANSEL

Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary George Carey
Judgment

JDMT
STAT
CDIS

DCDANSEL
DCDANSEL
DCLYKEMA

Judgment

MECO

TCLAFFSD

Defendant's Memorandum of Cost And Attorney's George Carey
Fees

AFFD

TCLAFFSD

George Carey
Affidavit Of Kirtlan G. Naylor In Support Of
Defendant's Memorandum of Cost And Attorney's
Fees

TCLAFFSD

Plaintiffs Motion For Reconsideration

11/19/2014

12/11/2014

1/5/2015

1/16/2015

..

MOTN ·

Judge

STATUS CHANGED:

George Carey
closed

George Carey

George Carey
• Civil Disposition entered for: Ada County,
Defendant; Ada County Board Of County
Commissioners, Defendant. Filing date: 1/5/2015

George Carey
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1/16/2015

AFSM

TCLAFFSD

Affidavit Of Richard Wright In Support Of Motion
For Reconsideration

George Carey

AFSM

TCLAFFSD

Affidavit Of Kimberly L Williams In Support Of
Motion For Reconsideration

George Carey

MEMO

TCLAFFSD

Memorandum In Support of Plaintiff's Motion For George Carey
Reconsideration

NOTH'

TCLAFFSD

Notice Of Hearing

George Carey

HRSC

TCLAFFSD

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/06/2015 01 :30
PM) Motion For Reconsideration

George Carey

STAT.

TCLAFFSD

STATUS CHANGED: Closed pending clerk
action

George Carey

AMEN

CCRADTER

Amended No_tice of Hearing

George Carey

HRSC

CCRADTER

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/13/2015 01 :30
PM) Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration

George Carey

HRVC

CCRADTER

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
George Carey
02/06/2015 01 :30 PM: Hearing Vacated Motion
For Reconsideration

NOTH

CCGARCOS

Second Amended Notice Of Hearing

George Carey

CONT

CCGARCOS

Continued (Motion 02/13/2015 04:00 PM)
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration

George Carey

1/27/2015

NOHG

CCHEATJL

Notice Of Hearing (February 13 2015@4pm)

George Carey

1/30/2015

MEMO

TCLAFFSD

Defendant's Memorandum In Opposition To
Plaintiff's Motion For Reconsideration

George Carey

OBJT

TCLAFFSD

Plaintiff's Objection To Defendant's Memorandum George Carey
Of Costs & Attorney's Fees

REPL

CCGARCOS

Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration

George Carey

AFFD

CCGARCOS

Affidavit of Kimberly L. Williams in Support of
Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration

George Carey

DCHH

CCNELSRF

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on

George Carey

1/21/2015

1/22/2015

2/10/2015

2/13/2015

Judge

02/13/2015 04:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hel<
Court Reporter: redlich
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 500 pages

2/17/2015

2/19/2015
3/5/2015

MEMO

DCLYKEMA

Memorandum Concerning Motion to Reconsider

George Carey

ORDR

DCLYKEMA

Order Concerning Motion to Reconsider

George Carey

ORDR

DCLYKEMA

Memorandum and Order Concerning Costs

George Carey

JDMT

DCLYKEMA

Supplemental Judgment

George Carey

NOTA

TCLAFFSD

NOTICE OF APPEAL

George Carey

APSC ·

TCLAFFSD

Appealed To The Supreme Court

George Carey

NOTA

CCJOHNLE

NOTICE OF CROSS - APPEAL
[file stamped 03/04/2015]
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DEPUTY

Eric S. Rossman, ISB #4573
erossman@rossmanlaw.com
Erica S. Phillips, ISB #6009
ephillips@rossmanlaw.com
Kimberly L. Williams, ISB #8893
kwilliams@rossmanlaw.com
ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC
737 N. 7th Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 331-2030
Facsimile: (208) 342-2170
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,
Plaintiff,
-vsADA COUNTY, a political subdivision of the
State ofldaho, ADA COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, DAVID
CASE, an individual, as Commissioner and
agent of Ada County, and JIM TIBBS, an
individual, as Commissioner and agent of Ada
County,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO.
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1 3 027 3" O

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND
FOR JURY TRIAL
Fee Category: A-1
Filing Fee: $96.00

COMES NOW, Richard Wright, the above-named Plaintiff, and for cause of action
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against the Defendant, Ada County Board of County Commissioners, hereby COMPLAINS
AND ALLEGES as follows:
PARTIES

1.

Plaintiff Richard Wright at all times herein mentioned has been, and presently is, a

resident of Ada County, Idaho.
2.

Defendant Ada County Board of County Commissioners at all times herein

mentioned has been, and presently is, a governmental entity for the State of Idaho.
3.

Defendant David Case is an elected Commissioner to the Ada County Board of

County Commissioners.
4.

Defendant Jim Tibbs is an elected Commissioner to the Ada County Board of

County Commissioners.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE

5.

Jurisdiction is appropriate pursuant to Idaho Code§ 1-705.

6.

Venue is appropriate pursuant to Idaho Code§ 5-403 and §6-2105.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

7.

Wright was an Employee of Ada County from approximately February of2006 to

January 15th, 2013.
8.

In 2008 Wright was promoted to the position of Director of Administrative

Services.
9.

As Director of Administrative Services, Wright had supervisory responsibilities

over the Human Resources Department.
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 2
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10.

As Director of Administrative Services, Wright received complaints that a

manager within the Board of Commissioners' Office was harassing employees.
11.

As Director of Administrative Services, Wright was obligated to, and did in fact,

initiate, coordinate, and facilitate an investigation into the complaints of harassment. In doing
so, Wright provided necessary information to the Human Resources Manager, and to the
investigator he hired to assist in the investigation.
12.

The investigation resulted in a determination that harassment had occurred; the

employee investigated was given the option of resigning or being terminated and chose to resign.
13.

The employee that was investigated was, and is, a close personal friend of former

commissioner Vern Bisterfeldt, and current commissioners David Case and Jim Tibbs.
14.

The employee that was investigated actively participated in the election campaigns

for David Case and Jim Tibbs, and was personally invited by Case and Tibbs to attend their
swearing in ceremony.
15.

From the time Case joined the Board of Supervisors, he refused to interact with

Wright, going directly to the division managers whom Wright supervised.
16.

Case refused to meet with Wright despite Wright's repeated requests to meet and

discuss the running of Administrative Services.
17.

Case only went to Wright's office twice to address him directly. The first was to

request documentation on the Dynamis project, which Wright gladly provided as Wright had
previously expressed concerns about the project to the Board which Wright believed would align
with some of Case's concerns.
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 3
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18.

The second time Case went to Wright's office was to ask who had ordered the

investigation on the employee who had been investigated; when Wright tried to explain why the
investigation had been initiated, Case cut him off and demanded, "Who ordered the
investigation." Wright answered he had ordered the investigation.
19.

Prior to the November 2012 election, Tibbs publicly aligned himself with

Commissioner Case, Tibbs and Case met behind closed doors on numerous occasions before
Tibbs officially took office. Tibbs, like Case refused to meet with Wright, distancing himself
from Wright.
20.

On January 14, 2013, following his election to the Board, Case was sworn into

office. Case specifically requested Vern Bisterfeldt administer his oath of office.
21.

On January 14, 2013 Tibbs was sworn into office giving Case and Tibbs a

majority vote on the Board.
22.

On January 14, 2013 shortly after a private swearing in ceremony, and before the

public swearing in ceremony, the Board announced it was appointing Larry Maneely to the
newly created position of Chief of Staff, also announcing that funding would come from savings
from vacant positions. At the time of the announcement there were no vacant positions within
the Commissioners' Office or in the Department of Administration.
23.

On January 15, Wright was terminated. Case stated there were no performance

issues with Wright's work, but claimed his position was being eliminated as part of a
"reorganization" of the Department of Administration. Upon information and belief, Wright's is
the only position that was eliminated as part of the alleged "reorganization."
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 4
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24.

The decision to terminate Wright was not a unammous Board decision,

Commissioner Yzaguirre refused to sign the termination letter issued to Wright.
25.

At the time of his termination, Wright had pending with Ada County Human

Resources two applications for leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"). One
of the applications was approved and Wright's FMLA leave was granted.
26.

Wright inquired as to the status of his leave should his health care provider re-

certify his FMLA leave, the Board responded that his pay and benefits had only been extended as
a "courtesy" of the Board, and that he was still officially terminated.
27.

Commissioner Yzaguirre also refused to sign the Board's letters addressing

Wright's FMLA leave.
COUNT ONE
Termination in Violation of Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act
(Against All Defendants)

28.

Plaintiff hereby realleges the allegation contained in Paragraphs 1 through 27 as set

forth above, and incorporates the same herein by reference.
29.

Defendant at all times herein mentioned, was and now is an employer within the

meaning of the Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act§ 6-2103.
30.

From February 2006 to and through January 15, 2013, Plaintiff was employed by

Defendant and was an "employee" within the meaning of the Idaho Protection of Public Employees
Act.
31.

An employer is liable for wrongful termination where the motivation for the

termination contravenes the Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act.
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 5
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32.

An important right recognized by of the Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act is

that an employer may not discharge an employee on the basis of the employee initiation of, or
participating in, an investigation of illegal conduct.
33.

Defendant's termination of Plaintiffs employment because he initiated, coordinated,

facilitated, and provided necessary information during an investigation of an Ada County employee
accused of harassment, constituted a material breach of the aforementioned Idaho statute.
34.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's breach of the Idaho Protection of

Public Employees Act, Plaintiff has suffered damages in excess of $1,000,000 to be proven with
specificity at trial.
35.

Plaintiff is entitled to recover his attorneys fees and costs incurred in pursing this

matter pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121 and§§ 6-2105 - 6-2106.
36.

Plaintiff hereby reserves this paragraph for the inclusion of a claim for punitive

damages pursuant to Idaho Code§ 6-1604.
COUNT TWO

Violation of the Family Medical Leave Act (Against Defendant Ada County and Defendant
Ada County Board of County Commissioners)
37.

Plaintiff hereby realleges the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 3 6 as

set forth above, and incorporates the same herein by reference.
38.

Defendant is an employer within the meaning of the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. §

2611(4.)(A).
39.

Upon information and belief, Defendant employs at least fifty (50) employees at or

within seventy-five (75) miles of the worksite at which Plaintiff worked.
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 6
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40.

Because Plaintiff had worked for Defendant for more than twelve months and

worked more than 1,250 hours during the twelve-month period immediately preceding his
request for FMLA leave, Plaintiff was a "qualified employee" within the meaning of the
provisions of the FMLA.
41.

Defendant's actions in terminating Plaintiffs employment after notice of the need

for protected leave under the FMLA constitutes conduct in violation of the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. §
2615.
42.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's unlawful conduct, Plaintiff has

suffered damages in the form of lost income and lost employment benefits in an amount
exceeding $500,000.00 to be proven with specificity at trial.
43.

The termination of Plaintiffs employment was made without good faith and/or

without reasonable grounds for believing that the termination of Plaintiffs employment was not
a violation of the FMLA and therefore Plaintiff is entitled to liquidated damages pursuant to 29
U.S.C. § 2617(a)(l)(iii).
44.

Plaintiff is further entitled to an award of attorney fees for prosecuting this action

pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 2615 and Idaho Code§§ 12-120 and 12-121.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for Judgment, Order and Decree of this Court as follows:
1.

For judgment of the court awarding Plaintiff damages in excess of $1,000,000.00,

incurred as a result of Defendant's termination of Plaintiff in violation of the Idaho Public Employee
Protection Act.
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 7
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2.

For judgment of the court awarding Plaintiff damages in excess of$500,000.00 for

Defendant's violations of the Family Medical Leave Act.
3.

For prejudgment interest on all damages recovered at the rate set forth within

Idaho Code§ 28-22-104.
4.

For Plaintiffs reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in prosecuting this

action; and
5.

For such other and further relief as court deems just and necessary.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff hereby demands a jury trial pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b).
DATED this

12~

day of February, 2013.

By:
Eric S. Rossman
Attorneys for Plaintiff

\\OFFICESERVER\Rossman Law\Documents\Work\W\Wright, Rich\Pleadings\Complaint.doc
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
)

RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,

)

CASE NO. CV-OC-13-02730

)

Plaintiff,

v.

)
)

)
)

ADA COUNTY, A POLITICAL
)
SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO,)
ADACOUNTYBOARDOFCOUNTY
)
COMMISSIONERS, DAVID CASE, AN
)
INDIVIDUAL, AS COMMISSIONER AND )
)
AGENT OF ADA COUNTY, AND JIM
TIBBS, AN INDIVIDUAL, AS
)
COMMISSIONER AND AGENT OF ADA
)
COUNTY,
)
)
Defendants.
)

MEMMORANDUM AND
ORDER CONCERNING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION
TO DISMISS

This is an employment dispute, in which Plaintiff Richard Thomas Wright, a
former employee of Ada County, has brought a direct action against Defendants
Ada County, its Board of County Commissioners, and Commissioners David Case
and Jim Tibbs. In Count I he alleged that he was terminated in violation of the
Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act. LC. Sections 6-2101- 2109

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - 1
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("Whistleblower Act"). Count I alleged a claim against all defendants. In Count II
he alleged he was fired in violation of the Federal Family Medical Leave Act. 29
U.S.C. Sections 2601- 2654 ("FMLA"). Count II did not allege a claim against
Defendants Case and Tibbs.
In each count Mr. Wright seeks monetary damages.
The defendants have not filed an answer, but they have filed a motion to
dismiss all claims pursuant to IRCP 12(b)(6). Since the motion to dismiss involves
matters outside the only pleading now in the record, it will be treated as a motion
for summary judgment and will be disposed of pursuant to IRCP 56. IRCP 12(b);
Glaze v. Deffenbaugh, 144 Idaho 829, 831, 172 P.3d 1104 (2007)
The matters outside the pleading include the undisputed facts that Plaintiff
Wright did not file a petition for judicial review of the termination decision and that
the 28-day time period for filing such a petition has expired. LC. Sections 31-1506;
67-5273; Ravenscroft v. Boise County, _Idaho_, 301 P.3d 271 (2013).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS
Summary judgment "... shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." IRCP Rule 56(c). The trial court must liberally
construe the facts in the existing record in favor of the non-moving party and should
draw all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the non-moving party.
Anderson v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 658, 660, 651 P.2d 923 (1982). In this process the

r
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court must look to the totality of the motions, affidavits, depositions, pleadings, and
attached exhibits, not merely to portions of the record in isolation. Central Idaho

Agency v. Turner, 92 Idaho 306, 442 P.2d 442 (1968). Circumstantial evidence can
create a genuine issue of material fact. Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92
Idaho 865, 452 P.2d 361 (1969). All doubts must be resolved against the moving
party. Ashby v: Hubbard, 100 Idaho 67, 593 P.2d 402 (1979). The motion must be
denied "if the evidence is such that conflicting inferences can be drawn therefrom
and if reasonable [people] might draw different conclusions." Id.
Controverted facts are viewed in favor of the party resisting the motion for
summary judgment. When a jury has been requested, the non-moving party also is
entitled to the _benefit of every reasonable inference that can be drawn from the
evidentiary facts. Anderson v. Ethington. Thus the burden of a party, when faced
with a motion for summary judgment, is not to persuade the judge that an issue will
be decided in its favor at trial. Rather, it "simply must present sufficient materials
to show that there is a triable issue." 6 MOORE, TAGGART & WICKER, MOORE'S

FEDERAL PRACTICE ,r 56.11(3), at p. 56-243 (2d ed. 1988).
A triable issue exists whenever reasonable minds could disagree as to the
material facts or the inferences to be drawn from those facts. Petricevich v. Salmon

River Canal Co.; Snake River Equipment Co. v. Christensen, 107 Idaho 541, 691
P.2d 787 (Ct. App. 1984). Therefore, although a party carries the ultimate burden at
trial of proving facts to a standard of probability, the court in a summary judgment
proceeding does not weigh the evidence for probability. The court determines only

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - 3
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whether the evidence frames an issue upon which reasonable minds could disagree.
Beyond this threshold of reasonableness, weighing the evidence is a task reserved to
the trier of fact, who will have a first-hand opportunity to consider conflicting
evidence and observe the cross-examination of witnesses. Earl v. Cryovac, A

Division of W.R. Grace, 115 Idaho 1087, 1094, 772 P.2d 725 (Ct. App. 1989).
Nevertheless, in a case in which the non-moving party has the burden of
proof at trial, summary judgment is appropriate if that party fails to make a
showing of the existence of an element essential to its case, provided that an
adequate time for discovery has passed. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317
(1986); Sparks v. St. Luke's Regional Medical Center, 115 Idaho 505, 768 P.2d 768
(1988). A mere scintilla of evidence or only a slight doubt is insufficient to withstand
summary judgment. Corbridge v. Clark Equipment Co., 112 Idaho 85, 730 P.2d 85
(1986). "[T]he party opposing the motion must present more than a conclusory
assertion that an issue of fact exists." Coughlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133
Idaho 388, 401, 987 P.2d 300 (1999). The non-moving party cannot rest its case
upon mere speculation. Finolt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 897, 155 P.3d 695 (2007).
Furthermore an unsworn allegation in a pleading does not create a disputed issue of
fact in the face of affidavits or other materials provided for in the summary
judgment rule. IRCP Rule 56(e); Tafoya v. Fleming, 94 Idaho 3, 479 P.2d 483 (1971).
Summary judgment should be granted whenever, on the basis of the evidence before
the court, a directed verdict would be warranted or whenever reasonable minds
could not differ as to the facts. Snake River Equipment Co. v. Christensen.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - 4
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Just because the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment does
not necessarily mean that they have stipulated that there are no material issues of
fact, especially when the cross-motions are based on different theories. Eastern

Idaho Agricultural Credit Association v. Neibaur, 130 Idaho 623, 944 P.2d 1386
(1997).
DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
The Idaho Supreme Court recently held that a decision of a board of county
commissioners, discharging a county employee, is subject to the judicial review
procedures of the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act. Ravenscroft v. Boise

County,_ Idaho_, 301 P3d 271 (2013). The court applied the literal language of LC.
Section 31-1506(1) (since amended), which stated:
Unless otherwise provided by law, judicial review of any act, order or
proceeding of the board [of county commissioners] shall be initiated by the
person aggrieved thereby within the same time and in the same manner as
provided in chapter 52, title 67, Idaho code, for judicial review of actions.

The que·stions not answered by Ravenscroft are whether judicial review is the
sole remedy for discharge of a county employee, and if not, whether judicial review
is a necessary condition precedent to instituting an action for money damages for
discharge of a county employee?
In a pending Canyon County case, I analyzed the issues as follows:
I now believe that in most cases a former employee may institute a
petition for judicial review and also institute a separate lawsuit for monetary
damage. In the alternative a former employee simply may institute a lawsuit
for monetary damage without instituting a petition for judicial review.
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The Court of Appeals held some time ago that monetary damage is not
an available remedy in a judicial review proceeding. University of Utah
Hospital v. Board of Commissioners of Payette County, 128 Idaho 517, 915
P.2d 1375 (1996). The practice then arose of combining separate counts for
judicial !eview with counts for civil damage in a single complaint or petition.
A few years ago The Supreme Court announced a general rule that a claim
for monetary damage may not be combined in a single action with a petition
for judicial review, noting that a petition for judicial review is an appellate
proceeding, while a civil complaint for damage is an "original action." Euclid
Avenue Trust v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 306, 308-309, 193 P.3d 853 (2008).
The Supreme Court did not hold in Euclid Avenue, or in any other case
that I have found, that the mere availability of judicial review of an agency
action precludes a separate civil action for damages against the offending
agency. Just last year, for example, The Supreme Court addressed the
merits of a damage complaint by a former at-will employee of an agency
without suggesting that the availability of judicial review barred a separate
damage action. Arambarri v. Armstrong, 152 Idaho 734, 274 P.3d 1249
(2012).
Based on my continuing review of the applicable law, I conclude that
the availability of judicial review for agency employment action does not
preclude a separate damage action.
The second issue is whether filing a timely petition for judicial review
is a nec~ssary condition precedent to filing a civil action for damages arising
out of the same agency action .... [M]y limited research does not indicate that
there is a statutory, constitutional, or common law basis for such a theory.
The Arambarri case inferentially supports this conclusion.

Hemenway v. Canyon County, Canyon County Case No. CV-2009-13606
(Memorandum and Order Concerning Defendants' Motion to Reconsider entered
July 2013).
I continue to hold the opinion that in all cases a disgruntled former county
employee may-institute an original action against its employer alleging wrongful
termination without the necessity of also filing a timely petition for judicial review.
Even if I am incorrect in this view, the special natures of the Whistle blower Act
and of the FMLA lead to the conclusion that a timely petition for judicial review is
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not a condition precedent to a lawsuit under these statutes. Both the Whistle
Blower Act and the FMLA grant an employee rights he or she otherwise would not
have and a specific monetary claim for violation of those rights. LC. Section 6-2105;
29 U.S.C. 2617(a)(2). Neither act requires fulfillment of any condition precedent
other than filing within the applicable statute of limitations - 180 days for a
Whistleblower violation and two years for an FMLA violation. The fact that the
Whistleblower claim for relief, as well as the FMLA claim for relief, are special
'

.

creatures of specific enabling statutes, neither of which suggests that a petition for
judicial review is a necessary condition precedent, leads to the conclusion that a
monetary claim under either statute is totally independent of the judicial review
process. Compare, Van v. Portneuf Medical Center, 147 Idaho 552, 212 P.3d 982
(2009) (compliance with notice requirements of tort claims act not required as a
condition of maintaining a suit under the Whistle blower Act).
For both of the foregoing reasons the motion to dismiss based on failure to file
a petition for j"udicial review will be denied.
DISMISSAL OF CLAIMS AGAINST
DEFENDANTS CASE AND TIBBS PURSUANT TO IRCP 3(b)
Commissioner Tibbs and Commissioner Case are named as defendants in the
Whistleblower claim but not in the FMLA claim. Mr. Wright alleges that in their
capacity as county commissioners they performed some of the wrongful acts that
gave rise to his whistle blower claim. In the caption of the complaint both
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Commissioner Tibbs and Commissioner Case are designated as "an individual, as
commissioner and agent of Ada County."
IRCP 3(b) provides in part:
Any civil action for or against a person in an individual capacity shall
designate such person by name and any action against a person in a
representative capacity shall indicate the nature of the representative
capacity for which the person is made a party to the action. Provided, all civil
actions ~y or against a governmental unit or agency, or corporation, shall
designate such party in its governmental or corporate name only, and
individuals constituting the governing boards of governmental units, boards
or agencies or of corporations, shall not be designated as parties in any
capacity unless the action is brought against them individually ....
The designation in the caption of Mr. Tibbs and Mr. Case as commissioners
and agents of Ada County suggests that they are named in the complaint as officers
or agents of the governing board of a governmental unit. The plain language of
IRCP 3(b) would suggest that they should not have been named as parties to the
action.
Under the Whistleblower Act, however, an "employer" may not take adverse
action against an employee for a number of protected acts, including the acts
allegedly performed by Mr. Wright. The term "employer" as used in the act has a
special meaning. It includes the state of Idaho, or any political subdivision or
governmental entity eligible to participate in the public employees retirement
system, as well as "an agent of an employer." LC. Section 6-21034(a)(b). Clearly Ada
County is a statutory employer. Under the statutory definition, as agents of Ada
County Mr. Tibbs and Mr. Case also may be classified as "employers."
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The act provides that an employee such as Mr. Wright may bring a civil
action for actual monetary damages caused by a violation of the act. LC. Section 62105. The act does not specifically say what person or entity may be held liable for a
violation of the act. It does say, however, that it is the intent of the act to provide "a
legal cause of action for public employees who experience adverse action from their
employer as a result of reporting waste and violations of a law, rule or regulation."
LC. Section 6-2101. The Supreme Court has held a whistleblower claim is a
"statutory remedy against governmental employers." Van v. Portneuf Medical

Center, 147 Idaho at 558. The allegations against the defendants, if true, suggest
that Mr. Tibbs and Mr. Case acted as agents of Ada County. They qualify, therefore,
as statutory employers and in theory might be held liable for damages for violations
of the act.
During the course of the hearing on the motion to dismiss and in order to
clarify the position of the plaintiff, I asked the attorney for Mr. Wright whether it
was the intent of the complaint to name Mr. Tibbs and Mr. Case only in their
representative capacities or whether it was the intent of the complaint to make a
monetary claim for damages against them individually. She responded that at this
stage of the pr!)Ceedin.gs she was not sure.

Based on counsel's response the court could conclude that currently there is
no pending claim against Mr. Tibbs and Mr. Case individually. Consequently they
are named as parties in the complaint only because of their status as officers of a
governing board of a governmental unit in contravention of the language of IRCP
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Rule 3(b). In fairness to Mr. Wright, however, I will give him and his attorney seven
days from entry of this order to clarify whether he is seeking a judgment for
monetary damages against Mr. Tibbs and Mr. Case individually. Ifhe does not
respond or if advises the court that he is not seeking monetary damages against Mr.
Tibbs and Mr. Case, the claims against them will be dismissed and their names
stricken from the caption of the case .
. DISMISSAL OF CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS
CASE AND TIBBS BECAUSE OF INDEMNITY PROVISIONS
During oral argument the defendants contended that the claims against Mr.
Tibbs and Mr. Case should be dismissed because they are entitled to be indemnified
by the county under the Idaho Tort Claims Act. LC. Section 6-903. Assuming that
the statute applies to this case, notwithstanding the holding in Van v. Portneuf
Medical Center, supra, it is clear that statute was not intended to act as a bar to a
suit against persons acting as agents or employees of a governmental entity, since it
imposes on the governmental entity both a duty to indemnify its agents and a duty
to defend its agents.

DISMISSAL OF CLAIMS AGAINST
ADA COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
Under both the Whistleblowers Act and the FMLA the board probably
qualifies as an employer that may be liable for violations of either act. LC. Section
6-2103(4)(a)(b); 29 U.S.C. Sections 2611(4)(A), 2617.
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The Board, however, contends that it should be dismissed from the case,
because it is incapable of suing or being sued. This appears to be a matter of first
impression; at least I am unaware of any case that has considered the issue, even
though there have been numerous Idaho Supreme Court cases in which a board of
county commissioners has been named as a party. See, e.g., Burns Holdings, LLC, v.

Teton County Board of Commissioners, 152 Idaho 440, 272 P.3d 412 (2012) (judicial
review case); Hawkins v. Bonneville County Board of Commissioners, 151 Idaho 228,
254 P.3d 1224 (2011) (judicial review case); Ciszek v. Kootenai County Board of

Commissioners, 151 Idaho 123, 254 P.3d 24 (2011) (declaratory judgment case);
Cowles Publishing Company v. Kootenai County Board of County Commissioners,
144 Idaho 259, 159 P.3d 896 (2007) (public records case).
The defendants contend that the· case of Arthur v. Shoshone County
demonstrates that a board of county commissioners has no existence as an entity
capable of suing or being sued. The case held only that a board of county
commissioners was not a state government entity under the Administrative
Procedures Act. It specifically noted, however, that a board of county commissioners
was "a local government entity." Arthur v. Shoshone County, 133 Idaho 854, 859
993 P.2d 617 (Ct. App. 2000).
It is true that while the county itself has specific statutory authority to sue
and be sued under LC. Section 31-604, the board of county commissioners has not
been delegated identical statutory authority. Nevertheless, it has been granted
authority to direct and control the prosecution of all suits to which the county is a
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•

't

.'
party in interest.1.·c. Section 31-813. In addition, and perhaps more importantly,
the board has been granted residual authority to "do and perform all other acts and
things required by law not in this title enumerated, or which may be necessary to
the full discharge of the duties of the chief executive authority of the county
government." LC. Section 31-828. Given the broad residual authority and the lack of
ruling case law, I am not prepared to hold that the claims against the board of
county commissioners must be dismissed.
During oral argument the board suggested that it should be dismissed from
the case because it has no assets from which to pay an unfavorable judgment. I am
aware of no case holding that status as a judgment-proof defendant is a recognized
ground for dismissal of an action. In any event there is no evidence in the record
concerning the existence or non-existence of board assets.
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ORDER
It hereby is ordered as follows:
1. The motion to dismiss treated as a motion for summary judgment is

· denied as to Defendants Ada County and Ada County Board of County
Commissioners.
2. The plaintiff is given seven days from the date of entry of this order to
advise the court in writing whether it seeks through its complaint to
recover a money judgment against Commissioner Tibbs individually and
Commissioner Case individually. Thereafter the court will rule on the
IRCP 3(b) niotions of Mr. Tibbs and Mr. Case without additional
argument.

Dated July 25, 2013

~JU~-

George.Carey, Senior District ~Jdge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
'
\

.

RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,
Plaintiff,
V.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ADA COUNTY, A POLITICAL
)
SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO,)
ADA COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY
)
COMMISSIONERS, DAVID CASE, AN
)
INDIVIDUAL; AS COMMISSIONER AND )
AGENT OF ADA COUNTY, AND JIM
)
)
TIBBS, AN INDIVIDUAL, AS
COMMISSIONER AND AGENT OF ADA
)
·COUNTY,
)
Defendants.

CASE NO. CV-OC-13-02730

SECOND MEMMORANDUM
AND ORDER CONCERNING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION
TO DISMISS

)
)

This is an employment dispute, in which Plaintiff Richard Thomas Wright, a
former employee of Ada County, has brought a direct action against Defendants
Ada County, its Board of County Commissioners, and Commissioners David Case
and Jim Tibbs. In Count I he alleged that he was terminated in violation of the
Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act. LC. Sections 6-2101- 2109
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("Whistleblower Act"). Count I alleged a claim against all defendants. In Count II
he alleged he was fired in violation of the Federal Family Medical Leave Act. 29
U.S.C. Sections 2601- 2654 ("FMLA"). Count II did not allege a claim against
Defendants Case and Tibbs.
In its previous memorandum and order, the court stated that the plaintiff
would be given seven days from the date of entry of the order to advise the court in
writing whether he was seeking through his complaint to recover a money judgment
against Commissioner Tibbs individually and Commissioner Case individually.
Thereafter the court would rule on the IRCP 3(b) motions of Mr. Tibbs and Mr. Case
for dismissal ~ithout additional argument.
The plaintiff now has advised the court that he seeks to recover individual
money judgments against Commissioner Case and Commissioner Tibbs. Based on
that representation the court will not dismiss Mr. Case and Mr. Tibbs as parties
defendant. In making this ruling the court is not commenting on the validity or
invalidity of the plaintiffs claims against the Commissioners in their individual
capacities.
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ORDER

It hereby is ordered that the motion of Defendants Case and Tibbs to dismiss
the claims against them pursuant to IRCP 3(c) is denied.
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DEC 1::7 2013
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By MARTHA LYKE
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,

Plaintiff,

)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-OC-13-02730

)
)

V.

)

)

ADA COUNTY, A POLITICAL
)
SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO,)
ADACOUNTYBOARDOFCOUNTY
)
)
COMMISSIONERS, DAVID CASE, AN
INDIVIDUAL, AS COMMISSIONER AND )
)
AGENT OF ADA COUNTY, AND JIM
)
TIBBS, AN INDIVIDUAL, AS
)
COMMISSIONER AND AGENT OF ADA
COUNTY,
)

MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER CONCERNING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION
TO COMPEL

)

Defendants.

)

This is an employment dispute, in which Plaintiff Richard Thomas Wright, a
former employee of Ada County, has brought a direct action against Defendants
Ada County, its Board of County Commissioners, and Commissioners David Case
and Jim Tibbs individually. The defendants have moved to compel the identity of a
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witness, to which the plaintiff has objected. The defendants' motion to compel will
be granted.
IRCP 37(a) provides that "If a ... party fails to answer ail interrogatory submitted
under Rule 33 ... the discovering party may move for an order compelling an answer, ... "
"The trial court has broad discretion in determining whether or not to grant a motion to
compel. ... The burden of showing information is privileged, and therefore exempt from
discovery, is on the party asserting the privilege."' Nightengale v. Timmel, 151 Idaho 347,
351, 256 P.3d 755, 759 (2011).
The discovery dispute involves the plaintiffs response to interrogatories concerning
a person familiar with a memorandum from County Clerk Rich to Defendant Case. The
memorandum has been treated both as a fact relied upon in establishing the allegations
in the Complaint and also as a document describing, reflecting, memorializing, or
documenting a version of the facts. Nowhere in the answers to any of the interrogatories
is a person identified as having knowledge of the memorandum.
Counsel for the Defendants sent counsel for the Plaintiff an email noting the
reference to the memorandum and its absence from the documents in Plaintiffs discovery
responses. He asked Plaintiffs counsel to provide a copy of the memorandum. Plaintiffs
counsel replied that she did not have a copy of the memorandum but had learned of its
existence through a county employee. Defendants' counsel asked for the identity of the
county employee. Plaintiffs counsel eventually replied that the name of the county
employee was work product and gathered in anticipation of litigation.
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The defendants contend that the work product doctrine does not protect the name of
individual with knowledge of the facts supporting the complaint.
The Plaintiff agrees that the document is relevant to his claims, but he contends
that the identity of the person who provided the information is not relevant to any claim.
Plaintiff asserts that he did not intend to use the witness to authenticate the document,
and the witness is neither the author nor the possessor of the document. According to the
Plaintiff, how his counsel obtained knowledge of the existence of the document is not
relevant, is not admissible, and is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence. The only purpose for obtaining the information would be retaliation
against the individual providing the documentation.
The Plaintiff argues that while the Idaho Supreme Court has found that the
identities of witnesses are not privileged as work product, the content of statements made
by those witnesses is protected work product. The Plaintiff argues that all persons with
knowledge have been identified and thus he has fulfilled his obligation under the rules of
p.iscovery.
The Defendants contend that the plaintiff has failed to completely answer their
Interrogatories Nos. 1, No. 3, and No. 19, in failing to identify the individual. The
interrogatories ask:
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: State the name, address, and telephone
number of each and every person you may call as a witness at the trial of
this matter, and provide a summary of the facts to which each such person
may testify.
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INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Identify by name, address, and telephone
number each and every person or firm not previously identified in your
answers to the foregoing interrogatories who possesses or claims to possess
knowledge of any facts relating to this lawsuit including, but not limited to,
issues of liability and/or damages.

INTERROGATORY NO. 19: With respect to the allegations made in
Paragraph 33 of your Complaint, please state with specificity the following:
a. Each and every fact you rely upon in alleging that the Board of
Commissioners voted to terminate your employment because you
'initiated, coordinated, facilitated, and provided necessary
information during an investigation of an Ada County employee
accused of harassment.
b. The name, current address, and telephone number of each and every
person who has the knowledge of the facts described in your response
to subparagraph a. above; and
c. each and every document which describes, reflects, memorializes, or
otherwise documents the version of the facts stated by you m ,
response to subparagraph a. above and state the name, current
address, and telephone number of the custodian thereof.
The current Idaho work product doctrine is found in IRCP 26(b)(3). A primary
reason for adopting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of
-

Evidence in Idaho state courts has been to provide a uniform practice and procedure
throughout Idaho in both the state courts and the local federal district court. It has
been the policy of the Idaho Supreme Court to interpret state rules adopted from
federal rules as uniformly as possible with federal case law. Chacon v. Sperry Corp.,
111 Idaho 270, 275, 723 P.2d 814 (1986).
As noted above, the party seeking to invoke the protection of the lawyer-client
privilege or, as here, the work-product doctrine has the burden of establishing the
applicability of the protection to the facts of the particular case. Stewart Title
Guaranty Company v. Credit Suisse, 2013 WL 1385264 (D. Idaho); Kirk v. Ford Motor
Co., 141 Idaho 697, 704, 116 P.3d 27 (2005); Officemax Incorporated v. Nixon Peabody
LLP, Ada Cou,nty Case No. CV-OC-2012-09327 (Memorandum Decision entered May
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13, 2013). If the fact finder is unable to conclude from the evidence that the party
'

seeking to invoke the privilege or protection from discovery has met its burden, the
proper application of the rule is to deny the privilege or protection. See, Kirk v. Ford

Motor Co., 141 Idaho at 704 (however, the Supreme Court also held in Kirk that the
evidence in fact supported the claim of privilege).

The work-product doctrine, recognized by this Court of Hickman v. Taylor,
329 U.S. 495, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed.2d 451 (1947), reflects the strong public policy of
orderly prosecution and defense of legal claims ... the Court therefore recognized a
qualified privilege for certain materials prepared by an attorney 'acting for his client
in anticipation of litigation.' ... the work-product doctrine most frequently is
asserted as a bar to discovery in civil litigation ... At its core, the work-product
doctrine shelters the mental processes of the attorney, providing a privileged area
within which he can analyze and prepare his client's case.

United States v. Noble, 422 U.S. 225, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 2169-70, 45 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975).
The attorney work product doctrine provides protection for materials
prepared by an attorney in anticipation of litigation, sheltering 'the mental
processes of the attorney, (and) providing a privileged area within which he can
analyze and prepare his client's case.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 231 F.R.D. 343,
346 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (citing United States v. Noble).
The work product privilege, however, does not apply to the facts of a case or to the
identity of witnesses. Names and addresses of witnesses known by a party or his attorney
do not involve work product and ordinarily are discoverable. Sanders v. Ayrhart, 89 Idaho
302, 312 404 P.2d 589 (1965); Wiseman v. Schaffer, 115 Idaho 537, 539, 768 P.2d 800 (Ct.
App. 1989).
There is nothing in the facts of this case or the applicable law to suggest that the
Plaintiffs claim of work product protection of the witness's identity is well taken.
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Alternatively the Plaintiff contends that the identity of the person who provided
information about the memorandum is not relevant to any claim.
Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with these rules,
the scope of discovery is as follows: (1) Parties may obtain discovery regarding
any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in
the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party
seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the
existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books,
documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons
having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection
that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information
sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.
IRCP 26(b)(l).
It appears logical to the court that the identity of the person in question
"appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
Based on the foregoing analysis, the motion to compel will be granted.
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ORDER
It hereby is ordered that the Plaintiff shall respond within 10 days of entry of
this order to Interrogatories Nos. 1 and 3, or both, by providing the name of the
county employee/witness from whom Plaintiffs counsel learned of the memorandum
referenced in response to Interrogatory No. 19.
'

The issue of an award of attorney's fees and costs will be reserved to the
conclusion of the case.

Dated December

/6

, 2013

~ '%r J (l ~-=-George D. Carey, Seniorn:::udge

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - 7

000045

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 17th day of December 2013, I served via email a true and
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,
Case No. CV-OC-13-02730
Plaintiff,

ORDER TO DISMISS PARTIES
vs.
ADA COUNTY, a political subdivision of the
State ofldaho; ADA COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS; DAVID CASE, an
individual, as Commissioner and agent of Ada
County; and JIM TIBBS, an individual, as
Commissioner and agent of Ada County,
Defendants.

This matter having come before the Court on stipulation between these parties
filed in this matter; and the Court having found good cause;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the individual Defendants David Case and

.

Jim Tibbs are dismissed from this case with prejudice.

.,

DATED this

7 ~ay of June, 2014.
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the,,,.
day of June, 2014, I caused to be served
by U.S Mail a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon:
Eric S. Rossman
Erica S. Phillips
Kimberly L. Williams
Rossman Law Group, PLLC
737 N. 7th Street
Boise, ID 83702
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Kirtlan G. Naylor
Bruce J. Castleton
Nayar & Hales, P.C.
950 W. Bannock St., Ste. 610
Boise, ID 83702
Attorneys for Defendants
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By ELYSHIA HOLM!!$
DEPUTY

Eric S. Rossman, ISB #4573
erossman@rossmanlaw.com
Erica S. Phillips, ISB #6009
ephillips@rossmanlaw.com
Kimberly L. Williams, ISB #8893
kwilliams@rossmanlaw.com
ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC
737 N. 7th Street
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 331-2030
Facsimile: (208) 342-2170
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Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE~FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,
Plaintiff,
-vsADA COUNTY, a political subdivision of the
State ofldaho, ADA COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV OC 1302730

AMENDED COMPLAINT AND
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

----------------)
COMES NOW, Richard Wright, the above-named Plaintiff, and for cause of action
against the Defendant, Ada County Board of County Commissioners, hereby COMPLAINS
AND ALLEGES as follows:
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PARTIES

1.

Plaintiff Richard Wright at all times herein mentioned has been, and presently is, a

resident of Ada County, Idaho.
2.

Defendant Ada County Board of County Commissioners at all times herein

mentioned has been, and presently is, a governmental entity for the State of Idaho.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE

3.

Jurisdiction is appropriate pursuant to Idaho Code§ 1-705.

4.

Venue is appropriate pursuant to Idaho Code§ 5-403 and §6-2105.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

5.

Wright was an Employee of Ada County from approximately February of2006 to

January 15 1\ 2013.
6.

In 2008 Wright was promoted to the position of Director of Administrative

Services.
7.

As Director of Administrative Services, Wright had supervisory responsibilities

over the Human Resources Department.
8.

As Director of Administrative Services, Wright received complaints that a

manager within the Board of Commissioners' Office was harassing employees.
9.

As Director of Administrative Services, Wright was obligated to, and did in fact,

initiate, coordinate, and facilitate an investigation into the complaints of harassment. In doing
so, Wright provided necessary information to the Human Resources Manager, and to the
investigator he hired to assist in the investigation.
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10.

The investigation resulted in a determination that harassment had occurred; the

employee investigated was given the option of resigning or being terminated and chose to resign.
11.

The employee that was investigated was, and is, a close personal friend of former

commissioner Vern Bisterfeldt, and current commissioners David Case and Jim Tibbs.
12.

The employee that was investigated actively participated in the election campaigns

for David Case and Jim Tibbs, and was personally invited by Case and Tibbs to attend their
swearing in ceremony.
13.

From the time Case joined
the Board of Supervisors, he refused to interact with
I

Wright, going directly to the division !managers whom Wright supervised.
14.'

l

Case refused to meet with Wright despite Wright's repeated requests to meet and

I
discuss the running of Administrative Services.
15.

Case only went to Wright's office twice to address him directly. The first was to

request documentation on the Dynamis project, which Wright gladly provided as Wright had
previously expressed concerns about the project to the Board which Wright believed would align
with some of Case's concerns.
16.

The second time Case went to Wright's office was to ask who had ordered the

investigation on the employee who had been investigated; when Wright tried to explain why the
investigation had been initiated, Case cut him off and demanded, "Who ordered the
investigation." Wright answered he had ordered the investigation.
17.

In or about late September to early October of2012 Case discovered that a Hostile

Work Environment claim by a then present employee had been investigated, Case was upset
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upon learning of the investigation, which he also learned had been initiated at Plaintiffs
direction.
18.

Prior to the November 2012 election, Tibbs publicly aligned himself with

Commissioner Case, Tibbs and Case met behind closed doors on numerous occasions before
Tibbs officially took office. Tibbs, like Case, refused to meet with Wright, distancing himself
from Wright.
19.

On January 14, 2013, following his election to the Board, Case was sworn into

office. Case specifically requested Vern Bisterfeldt administer his oath of office.
20.

On January 14, 2013 Tibbs was sworn into office giving Case and Tibbs a

majority vote on the Board.
21.

On January 14, 2013 shortly after a private swearing in ceremony, and before the

public swearing in ceremony, the Board announced it was appointing Larry Maneely to the
newly created position of Chief of Staff, also announcing that funding would come from savings
from vacant positions. At the time of the announcement there were no vacant positions within
the Commissioners' Office or in the Department of Administration.
22.

On January 15, Wright was terminated. Case stated there were no performance

issues with Wright's work, but claimed his position was being eliminated as part of a
"reorganization" of the Department of Administration. Upon information and belief, Wright's is
the only position that was eliminated as part of the alleged "reorganization."
23.

The decision to terminate Wright was not a unanimous Board decision,

Commissioner Yzaguirre refused to sign the termination letter issued to Wright.
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24.

At the time of his termination, Wright had pending with Ada County Human

Resources two applications for leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"). One
of the applications was approved and Wright's FMLA leave was granted.
25.

Wright inquired as to the status of his leave should his health care provider re-

certify his FMLA leave, the Board responded that his pay and benefits had only been extended as
a "courtesy" of the Board, and that he was still officially terminated.
26.

Commissioner Yzaguirre also refused to sign the Board's letters addressing

Wright's FMLA leave.
COUNT ONE

Termination in Violation of Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act
(Against All Defendants)
27.

Plaintiff hereby realleges the allegation contained in Paragraphs 1 through 26 as set

forth above, and incorporates the same herein by reference.
28.

Defendant at all times herein mentioned, was and now is an employer within the

meaning of the Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act§ 6-2103.
29.

From February 2006 to and through January 15, 2013, Plaintiff was employed by

Defendant and was an "employee" within the meaning of the Idaho Protection of Public Employees
Act.
30.

An employer is liable for wrongful termination where the motivation for the

termination contravenes the Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act.
31.

An important right recognized by of the Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act is

that an employer may not discharge an employee on the basis of the employee initiation of, or
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participating in, an investigation.
32.

Defendants' termination of Plaintiffs employment because he initiated, coordinated,

facilitated, and provided necessary information during the investigation of an Ada County employee
accused of harassment, and/or the investigation of claims of hostile work environment of another
Ada County employee constituted a material breach of the aforementioned Idaho statute.
33.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's breach of the Idaho Protection of

Public Employees Act, Plaintiff has suffered damages in excess of $1,000,000 to be proven with
specificity at trial.
34.

Plaintiff is entitled to recover his attorneys fees and costs incurred in pursing this

matter pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121 and§§ 6-2105 - 6-2106.
35.

Plaintiff hereby reserves this paragraph for the inclusion of a claim for punitive

damages pursuant to Idaho Code§ 6-1604.

COUNT TWO
Violation of the Family Medical Leave Act (Against Defendant Ada County and Defendant
Ada County Board of County Commissioners)
36.

Plaintiff hereby realleges the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 35 as

set forth above, and incorporates the same herein by reference.
37.

Defendant is an employer within the meaning of the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. §

2611(4)(A).
38.

Upon information and belief, Defendant employs at least fifty (50) employees at or

within seventy-five (75) miles of the worksite at which Plaintiff worked.

AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 6

000054

39.

Because Plaintiff had worked for Defendant for more than twelve months and

worked more than 1,250 hours during the twelve-month period immediately preceding his
request for FMLA leave, Plaintiff was a "qualified employee" within the meaning of the
provisions of the FMLA.
40.

Defendant's actions in terminating Plaintiffs employment after notice of the need

for protected leave under the FMLA constitutes conduct in violation of the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. §
2615.
41.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's unlawful conduct, Plaintiff has

suffered damages in the form of lost income and lost employment benefits in an amount
exceeding $500,000.00 to be proven with specificity at trial.
42.

The termination of Plaintiffs employment was made without good faith and/or

without reasonable grounds for believing that the termination of Plaintiffs employment was not
a violation of the FMLA and therefore Plaintiff is entitled to liquidated damages pursuant to 29
U.S.C. § 2617(a)(l)(iii).
43.

Plaintiff is further entitled to an award of attorney fees for prosecuting this action

pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 2615 and Idaho Code§§ 12-120 and 12-121.
COUNT THREE

Negligent and/or Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

44.

Plaintiff hereby reiterates the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 43 as set

forth above, and incorporate the same herein by reference.
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45.

By its actions detailed herein above, Defendants have negligently and/or

intentionally caused Plaintiff to suffer extreme mental anguish and emotional distress which
distress has resulted in physical manifestations including sleeplessness, depression and anxiety.
46.

As a result of Defendants' negligent and/or intentional infliction of severe

emotional distress, Plaintiff has suffered damages in an amount exceeding $10,000, the exact
amount to be proven with specificity at trial.
[

4 7.

Plaintiff is entitled to recover her attorneys fees and costs incurred in prosecuting

this action pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-120(3) and 12-121.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for Judgment, Order and Decree of this Court as follows:
1.

For judgment of the court awarding Plaintiff damages in excess of $1,000,000.00,

incurred as a result of Defendant's termination of Plaintiff in violation of the Idaho Public Employee
Protection Act.
2.

For judgment of the court awarding Plaintiff damages in excess of$500,000.00 for

Defendant's violations of the Family Medical Leave Act.
3.

For judgment of the court awarding Plaintiff damages in excess of $25,000.00,

incurred as a result of Defendants' retaliatory discharge of Plaintiff in violation of the Idaho Public
Policy.
4.

For judgment of the court awarding Plaintiff damages in excess of $10,000.00,

incurred as a result of Defendant's negligent and/or intentional infliction of emotional distress.
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5.

For prejudgment interest on all damages recovered at the rate set forth within

Idaho Code§ 28-22-104.
6.

For Plaintiffs reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in prosecuting this

action; and
7.

For such other and further relief as court deems just and necessary.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff hereby demands a jury trial pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b).
DATED this

2,.~ day of July, 2013.
ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC

By:
Kimberly L. Williams
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 1,.~ day of July, 2014 I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing to be forwarded with all the required charges prepaid, by the method(s) indicated below to
the following persons:
Kirtlan G. Naylor
Bruce J. Castleton
NAYLOR& HALES, P.C.
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610
Boise, ID 83702

Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail
Facsimile 383-9516
Overnight Mail
Electronic Mail
kirt@naylorhales.com
bjc@naylorhales.com

(!

Kimberly L. Williams
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By STACEY LAFFERTY
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendant Ada C unty

IN THE DISTRICT OURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE O IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF .ADA
RICHARD THOMAS WRIG

Case No. CV-OC-13-02730
Plaintiff,

DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO
PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT
AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

vs.
ADA COUNTY, political subdi 'sion of the
State ofidaho; ADA COUNTY OARD OF
COMMISSIONERS
Defendants.

Defendant Ada

ounty, Ada County Board of County Commissioners1, by and

tltrough its attorneys ofrecord, aylor & Hales, P.C., answer Plaintiffs Amended Complaint and
Demand for Jury Trial on file he ein as follows:

1Ada County Board of County Commissioners is not a proper party as it is 11ot a
governmental entity that can bes ed. To the extent a responsive pleading is required in that regard,
this answer should fulfill that. Ho ever, Defendant does not waive the right to move to dismiss this
"party" a.ta later date.
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The Defi ndant denies each and every allegation contained in Plaintiffs

Amended Complaint not herein specifically and expressly admitted. The Defendant reserves the
right to amend this and any othe answer or denial stated herein, once they have had an opportunity
to complete discovery regardin the allegations contained in Plaintiffs Amended Complaint.

2.

Answe · g paragraph 1 of Plaintiffs Am.ended Complaint, Defendant denies

for lack of sufficient knowledg to answer the allegations contained therein.
3.

paragraph 2 ofPlaintiff's Amended Complaint, Defendant denies.

Further as set forth above, Ada C unty Board of County Commissioners is not the proper defendant.
Any reference to "Defendant"

oughout this pleading and f laintiff's Amended Complaint shall

only be in reference to Ada Co
4.

Answerin paragraphs 3-4 of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, entitled

"Jurisdiction and Venue," Defe dant acknowledges that this Court has jurisdiction over properly
pled matters involving Idaho

ode §§ 1-705, 5-403 and 6-2105; howeyer1 in making this

acknowledgment, Defendant do s not admit that any such matters are actually properly pled in
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, r that the facts set forth in Plaintiffs Amended Complaint actually
justify the exercise of such jurisd ction. To the extent this Court has jurisdiction over these matters

venue is proper.
5.

Answerin paragraph 5 ofPlaintiffs Amended Complaint, Defendant admits.

6.

Answerin paragraph 6 ofPlaintiffls Amended Complaint, Defendant admits

only that in June 2009 Plaintiff' right became the Director of Adtninistrative Services and that in
August 2009 he was reclassified

the Director of Administration. For all allegations referenced

after August 2009, Plaintiff's pro er title would be Director of Administration.
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7.

Answ · g paragraph 7 ofplaintiffs Amended Complaint, Defendant admits.

8.

Answe · gparagraph 8 ofPlaintiffs Amended Complaint, Defendant admits

only that as the Director of Ad 1inistrative Services and the Director of Administration, Wright
received complaints regarding a anager's behaviors and treatment ofemployees. Defendant denies
all remaining conclusions, cha cterizations, or allegations contained therein.
9.

Answeri g paragraph 9 ofPlaintiff's Amended Complaint, Defendant admits

only that the Director ofAdmini tration oversees the human resources division and that Ada County
Human Resources must prompt! investigate any reports of harassment. Defendant also admits that
as the Director of Administrat ve Services and the Director of Administration, Plaintiff gave
direction to the Human Resour es Manager that an investigation was to be conducted into the
complaints regarding the manag s behaviors. Defendant denies all remaining allegations contained
therei11.
10.

Answerin paragraph 10 ofPlaintiffs Amended Complaint, Defendant admits

there was an investigation that re ulted in a determination that harassment had occurred. Defendant
admits that at one point the emp oyee investigated was given the option of resigning, Defendant
admits that ultimately the em oyee investigated resigned. Defendant denies all remaining
allegations contained therein.
11.

Answerin paragraph 11 ofPlaintiffs Amended Complaint, Defendant admits

only that at some point the emplo ee was a personal friend of former Commissioner Vern Bisterfeldt
and denies all remaining allegati s contained therein.

12.

paragraph 12 ofPlaintiffs Amended Complaint~ Defendant admits

only that the employee t_hat was · estigated performed volunteer work in the election campaign for
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David Case and to a lesser exte tin the election campaign for Jim Tibbs and that the employee that
was investigated was invited o the swearing in ceremony. Defendant denies all remaining
conclusions, characterizations, r allegations contained therein.
13.

Answeri gparagraph 13 ofplaintiffs Amended Complaint, Defendant denies.

14.

Answe · paragraph 14 ofPlaintiff's Amended Complaint, Defendant denies.

15,

Answeri g paragraph 15 of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, Defendant lacks

sufficient knowledge to answer e allegations contained therein and therefore denies the same.
paragraph 16 ofPlaintiffs Amended Complaint, Defendant denies.

16.
17.

Answe ·

paragraph 17 ofPlaintiff's .Amended Complaint, Defendant admits

only that in or about late Septe her to early October of 2012, Commissioner Case learned that an
investigation of a then present e ployee had been conducted. Defendant admits Case was upset that
the investigation had been cond cted without his knowledge. Defendant admits that around that
satne time, Case also learned tha: Plaintiff had been instructed to and accordingly did direct that the
investigation was to be conducte . Defendant denies all remaining conclusions, characterizatio11s,
or allegations contained therein.
18.

paragraph 18 ofPlaintiff's Amended Complaint, Defendant admits

only that after the general electi n and before Tibbs officially took office, Case and Tibbs met on
several occasions. Defendant den es all remaining allegations and denies the characterization ofsaid
allegations.
19.

Answerin paragraph 19 ofPlaintiff's Amended Complaint, Defendant admits

only that on January 14, 2013 C e was sworn into office and that Vern Bistexfeldt administered
Case's oath of'office at the cerem nial swearing-in on the afternoon ofJanuary 14, 2013. Defendant
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denies for lack of sufficient kno ledge to answer the allegation that Case "specifically requested"
that Vern Bisterfeldt administer is oath of office. Defendant denies any remaining allegations
contained therein.
20.

Answerin paragraph20 ofPlaintiff's Amended Complaint, Defendant admits

only that on January 14, 2013 Ji Tibbs was sworn into office. Defendant denies all remaining
conclusions or allegations contai ed therein.

only that on January 14, 2013 it

announced that the Board was appoi.11ting Larry Maneely to the

newly created position of Chief f Staff. Defendant denies that the official Board announcement
included that funding would com from savings from vacant positions. Defendant admits only that
vacant positions existed around

at time and that those positions were not in the Office of the

County Commissioners or in the Department of Administration. Defendant denies all remaining
allegations contained therein,
22.

paragraph 22 ofPlaintiffs Amended Complaint, Defendant admits

only that on January 14, 2013 Pl intiff s position was eliminated as part of a. reorganization of the
Department of Administration a

Plaintiff's employment was tenninated. Defendant also admits

Case stated there were no perfo

ance issues with Plaintiff's work. Defendant admits that the

reorganization did not result · eliminating positions other than that of the Director of
Administration. Defendant denie all remaining allegations contained therein.
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Answerin paragraph 23 ofPlaintiff's Amended Complaint, Defendant admits.

only that as of January 15, 2013, da County had received the appropriate certification infonnation
regarding FMLA leave. Defen

t denies all remaining allegations contained therein.

only that Wright inquired as to h s employment status should his FMLA leave be re-certified and
extended by his health care pro ider, and the Board reiterated its prior correspondence that the
decision to reorganize the Dep

ent of Administration had not changed, Wright's position had
pay and benefits had been extended through the end of February

2013. Defendant denies all rema ing characterizations and allegations contained therein.
26.

Answerin paragraph 26 ofPlaintiff's Amended Complaint, Defendant admits

only that Commissioner Yzaguirr did not sign the Board I s letters addressing Wright's FMLA leave.

Defendant denies all remaining c aracterizations and allegations contained therein.
27.

Answerin paragraph27 ofFlaintiff'sAmendedComplaint,Defendant, which

pm-ports to repeat and incorporat prior allegations, to the extent any response is required thereto,
Defendant reasserts and incorpor tes by this reference its prior responses to all such allegations.
28,

Answe · paragraph28 ofPlaintiffsAmendedComplaint,Defendantadmits

Ada County is an employer as d

ed by I.C. § 6-2103.

29.

Answerin paragraph 29 ofPlaintiffs Amended Complaint, Defendant admits.

30.

Answerin

paragraphs 30-34 of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, the

statements made therein constitu e Plaintiff's legal conclusions and Defendant need not admit or
deny the same. More so, to the e tent any response is required, Defendant denies the same.
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Answerin paragraph 35 ofPlaintiffs Am.ended Complaint, Plaintiffreserved

this paragraph and does not mak any allegations and Defendant need not admit or deny the same.
More so, to the extent any respo e is required, Defendant denies the same.

paragraph 36 of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, which purports

32.

to repeat and incorporate prior all gations, to the extent any response is required thereto, Defendant
reasserts and incorporates by thi reference it.s prior responses to all such allegations.
33.

Answerin paragraph 37 ofPlaintiff's Amended Complaint, Defendant admits

Ada County is an employer with n the meaning of29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A).
34.

Answerin paragraph 38 ofPlaintiffs Amended Complaint, Defendant admits,

35.

Answerin

paragraphs 39-42 of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, the

statements made therein constitu e Plaintiff's legal conclusions and this Defendant need not admit
or deny the same. More so, to the xtent any response is required, these Defendant denies the same.
36.

Answerin paragraph 43 ofFlaintiff's Amended Complaint, Defendant denies.

37.

Answerin paragraph 44 of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, which purports

to repeat and incorporate prior all gations, to the extent any response is required thereto, Defendant
reasserts and incorporates by thi reference its prior responses to all such allegations.
38.

Answerin paragraph 45 ofFlaintiffs Amended Complaint, Defendant denies.

39.

Answerin paragraph 46 oiPlaintiffs Am.ended Complaint, Defendant denies.

40.

Answerin paragraph 47 ofPlaintiffs Amended Complaint, Defendant denies.

41.

Plaintiffs mended Complaint last contains what is commonly referred to

as the Plaintiffs ''Prayer for Reli f, '' to the ex.tent any answer is required thereto, Defendant denies
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the allegations contained therein, deny that the Plaintiff has stated any valid cause of action, or that
the Plaintiff is entitled to any of e relief requested therein.
FIRST DEFENSE

That Defendant h not been able to engage in sufficient discovery to learn all ofthe
facts and circumstances relating

the matters described in the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and

therefore request the Court to ennit Defendant to amend its Answer and assert additional
affinnative defenses or abandon ffirmative defenses once discovery has been completed.
SECOND DEFENSE
That the Plaintiff Amended Complaint fails to state a cause of action against the

Defendant upon which relief c

be granted and should therefore be dismissed pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6) of the Idaho Rules of Ci i1 Procedure.

THIRD DEFENSE
'

That some or all f the Plaintifl1s claims are barred by the applicable statute of

limitations.
FOURTH DEFENSE
That the Plaintiff' injuries and damages, if any, were proximately caused by the

negligent or careless misconduct

d acts or omissions of other persons or entities not parties to this

action, for whom the Defendant as no legal relationship with or responsibility.

FIFTH DEFENSE
as failed to act reasonably or to otherwise mitigate Plaintiffs
damages, if any.

DEFENDANT'S ANSWER T PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 8.

000066

JUL.18.2014 1:44PM

Ni

R & HALES, PC

NO. 454

P. 10

SIXTH DEFENSE

To the extent that e Plaintiff is asserting state law claims against Defendant, some
or all of such claims are barred b the failure of the Plamtiff to comply with the Idaho Tort Claims
Act.
SEVENTH DEFENSE

To the extent that J.e Plaintiff is asserting state law claims, the liability, ifany, ofthe
Defendant for any state law clai s or causes of action is limited pursuant to the provisions of the
Idaho Tort Claims Act. In asse · g this defense, Defendant is in no way conceding or admitting
liability.

EIGHTH DEFENSE
To the extent that the Plaintiff is asserting state law claims against the Defendant,
some or all of such claims are b

ed since they arise out of and/or stem from activities for which

the Defendant is immune from li bility by virtue of the provisions of the Idaho Tort Claims Act.
NINTH DEFENSE

Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for relief against the
Defendant entitling the Plaintiff o either punitive damages or equitable relief.
TENm DEFENSE

That the Defen

t is immune from liability for punitive damages, if any, by state

and federal law and/or courtrul' gs.
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ELEVENTH DEFENSE

The damages, if

y, as alleged by the Plaint'iff were caused by the superseding,

intervening conduct of other enti ies or individuals.

JURY DEMAND
Defendant, purs

t to Rule 38(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby

demands a trial by jury of the Pl intiffs action for damages.
ATIORNEY FEES

Defendant has be n required to retain attorneys in order to defend tbis action and is
entitled to recover reasonable att mey fees pursuant to federal and state law and applicable Rules
of Civil Procedure.
WHEREFORE, efendant prays for judgment against the Plaintiff as follows:

2.

That the D fend.ant be awarded its costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees

pursuant to LC. §§ 12-120 or 12 117 and Rule 54(d)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
ent be entered in favor of Defendant on all claims for relief.

3.

Thatjud

4.

For such o er and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable under

the circumstances.

DEFENDANT'S ANSWER T PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED
FOR JURY TRIAL - 10.
COMPLAINT AND DEMA

000068

JUL. 18. 2014 1:44PM
.,

'

.

N

NO. 454

)R & HALES, PC

P. 12

'
DATED this 18t dayofJuly,2014.
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.

ERTIFICATE

ERVICE

IHEREBYCER Y that on the 18th day of July, 2014, I caused to be served, by
the method(s) indicated, a true d correct copy of the foregoing upon:
Eric S. Rossman
Erica S. Phillips
Kimberly L. Willi
Rossman Law Gr p, PLLC
73 7 N. 7thStt"eet
Boise, ID 83702
Attorneys for Plai tiff

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax Transmission: 342-2170
-2l Email: erossman@rossmanlaw.com
ephillips@rossmanlaw.com
kwillliams@rossmanlaw.com
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Kirtlan G. Naylor
[ISB No. 3569]
Bruce J. Castleton
[ISB No. 6915]
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
Attorneys at Law
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 610
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516
Email: kirt@naylorhales.com; bjc@naylorhales.com

CHRISTOPHER U. 1-llCH Cl
By KATRINA THIESSEN
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendant Ada County

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

[j

RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,
Case No. CV-OC-13-02730
Plaintiff,
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
ADA COUNTY, political subdivision of the
State ofldaho; ADA COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS

0

--

:0
Cl

2

):::a

,-

Defendants.

Defendant Ada County, Ada County Board of County Commissioners, by and through its
attorneys of record, Naylor & Hales, P.C., hereby file its Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant
to I.R.C.P. 56. For reasons stated in its Memorandum of this Motion, the Motion should be granted
and Plaintiffs claims dismissed with prejudice.
Filed concurrently with this Motion are the Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Material
Facts, Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, and the Affidavit ofKirtlan G.
Naylor in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment.
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DATED this 10th day of October, 2014.
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 10th day of October, 2014, I caused to be served,
by the method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon:
Eric S. Rossman
Erica S. Phillips
Kimberly L. Williams
Rossman Law Group, PLLC
737 N. 7thStreet
Boise, ID 83702

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax Transmission: 342-2170
__x Email: erossman@rossmanlaw.com
ephillips@rossmanlaw.com
kwillliams@rossmanlaw.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

8745_49 Motionfor Summary Judgment.wpd
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Kirtlan G. Naylor
[ISB No. 3569]
Bruce J. Castleton
[ISB No. 6915]
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
Attorneys at Law
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 610
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516
Email: kirt@naylorhales.com; bjc@naylorhales.com

OCT 1 0 2014
CHRIS1 OPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By KATRINA THIESSEN
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendant Ada County

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,
Case No. CV-OC-13-02730

Cl

Plaintiff,

ADA COUNTY'S STATEMENT OF
UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS

vs.

Cl

ADA COUNTY, political subdivision of the
State ofldaho; ADA COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS
Defendants.

Pursuant to Idaho R. Civ. P. 56, Defendant Ada County, Ada County Board of County
Commissioners, by and through its attorneys of record, Naylor & Hales, P.C., hereby submit its
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts on summary judgment.

GENERAL FACTS
1:

The Defendant Ada County (the "County") is a body corporate and political

subdivision of the State of Idaho pursuant to Title 31, Idaho Code and Article XVIII of the Idaho
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Constitution. Ada County is governed by a three member Board of County Commissioners as
specified in Chapter 7, Title 31, Idaho Code.
2.

Plaintiff Richard Wright was hired in 2006 by Ada County as the Public Information

Officer, and later on or around June 17, 2009 Wright became the Director of Administrative
Services. Affidavit ofKirt/an G. Naylor in Support ofMotion for Summary Judgment, Exh. F, pp.
ADA 530-531. In August 2009, his position was reclassified as a result of the reorganization of
Administrative Services into the Department of Administration. Id. at ADA 529. From August 16,
2009 until his termination, Wright held the position of Director ofthe Department of Administration
in Ada County.
3.

On January 15, 2013, Wright's employment was terminated with Ada County.

Naylor Aff., Exh. G, p. ADA 537. The termination letter explains that the Board of Ada County
Commissioners intended to reorganize the Department of Administration and that as a consequence
Wright's position was being eliminated. Id.
4.

In 2012, two of the three seats on the Board of County Commissioners were up for

election. Dave Case ran against then-Commissioner Sharon Ullman in the primary election for her
seat. Naylor Aff., Exh. B (Case Depo, 58:22-24.) Ullman was defeated in the primary. Naylor Aff.,
Exh. B (Case Depo, 87:5-7); Naylor Aff., Exh. C (Tibbs Depo, 19:10-11.)
5.

After the 2012 primary election, then-Commissioner Vern Bisterfeldt resigned his

seat as Commissioner. Naylor Aff., Exh (Case Depo, 91 :1-3, 8-13.) In May 2012, Dave Case was
appointed to fill Bisterfeldt's seat on the Board. Id. at (Case Depo, 89:11-16.) At that time,
Commissioner Ullman still held her seat on the Board and was finishing her term. Rick Yzaguirre
was the third Commissioner at that time. See Id. at (Case Depo, 164:11-15.)
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6.

In the November 6, 2012 general election, Jim Tibbs and Dave Case were elected to

the Board of Ada County Commissioners. Mr. Tibbs started his term as a county commissioner upon
his swearing-in on January 14, 2013. Rick Yzaguirre remained the third Commissioner.
7.

After November 6, 2012 but prior to the commencement of his term in office, Jim

Tibbs began attending meetings and meeting with people at Ada County as often as possible in
preparation for his new position. Naylor Aff., Exh. C (Tibbs Depo, 51 :2-9, 59:4-60: 15 .) Mr. Tibbs
also began meeting with Commissioner Case to discuss their ideas on issues and ideas about
reorganization of some county operations. Naylor Aff., Exh. C (Tibbs Depo, 49:9-17, 50:12- 52:17,
53:3-54:16, 66:11-13, 68:6-13, 82:15-83:2); Naylor Aff., Exh. B (Case Depo, 162:19-163:1.) In
particular, they discussed potential changes to the structure of the landfill, the Department of
Administration, and the purchasing department. Naylor Aff., Exh. C (Tibbs Depo, 31 :6-10, 51 :1424); Naylor Aff., Exh. B(Case Depo, 154:23-155:2, 157:16-158:4.)
8.

As part of the intended reorganization of the Department of Administration, they

determined that they wanted the managers that reported to the Director of Administration to report
directly to the Commissioners and they wanted to move the Office of the Commissioners directly
under the supervision of the Commissioners. Naylor Aff., Exh. C (Tibbs Depo, 59:4-60: 15); Naylor

Aff., Exh. B (Case Depo, 155:1-156:7.)

With this reorganization, they felt the Director of

Administration position was not necessary. Naylor Aff., Exh. B (Case Depo, 180:25-181: 12); Naylor

Aff., Exh. C (Tibbs Depo, 56:14-22; 59:12-60:15, 62:14-23, 68:6-13, 103:1-16.)
9.

On January 15, 2013, the Commission eliminated the Director of Administration

position. Naylor Aff., Exh. B (Case Depo, 180:8-20.) That same day, Commissioners Case and
Tibbs met with Wright and informed him that the Commissioners were reorganizing the Department
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of Administration and that the position of Director of Administration had been eliminated and
terminated his employment. Naylor Alf, Exh. C (Tibbs Depo, 105:5-25.); See also SOF ~ 3.
10.

As ofthe time ofhis termination, Wright's salary and benefits were extended through

the end of January 2013. Naylor Alf, Exh. G, p. ADA 537. On January 18, 2013, Wright's salary
and benefits were extended until the end of February 2013. Naylor Alf, Exh. H, pp. ADA 498-499.
ADDITIONAL FACTS PERTINENT TO IDAHO WHISTLEBLOWER ACT CLAIM

11.

Wright alleges that his termination was in retaliation for the investigation into Dee

Oldham's conduct when she was an employee at the County. Naylor Alf, Exh. D (Wright Depo,
138:3-8, 15-17; 139:19-24; 140:9-20 ); Amended Complaint~~ 9, 32. In the alternative, Wright
alleges that his termination was in retaliation into the hostile work environment complaints received
from Jim Farrens, a county engineer. Amended Complaint~~ 17, 32.

Dee Oldham Investigations
12.

In 2009, an investigation was initiated in complaints from employees who reported

to Dee Oldham complaining that Ms. Oldham's conduct was creating a hostile work environment.

Naylor Alf, Exh. A, (Calley Depo, 46:4-9; 47:11-19.)
13.

Hostile work environment complaints fall under the County's policy prohibiting

general harassment. Naylor Alf, Exh. K, p. ADA 101.
14.

As a result of the investigation, Ms. Oldham signed a letter outlining performance

expectations for her future conduct as a manager. Naylor Alf, Exh. A, (Calley Depo, 48:10-18.)
There were n:o findings that Ms. Oldham violated any law, rule or regulation. See Id.
15.

In 2010, a second investigation was initiated regarding Ms. Oldham' s conduct based

on complaints made by employees who were dissatisfied with the way in which Ms. Oldham was
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treating them. Naylor Alf, Exh. A (Calley Depo, 48: 18-20; 49: 10-15.) This was considered a hostile
work environment complaint, pursuant to the county policy. Id.
16.

During the initial intake process, Human Resources was able to determine that the

complaint did not rise to a level of a hostile work environment. Naylor Alf, Exh. A (Calley Depo,
49:21-25.) They advised the Commissioners of this information. Id. at (Calley Depo, 50:2-9.)
17.

The Commissioners requested an investigation into whether Ms. Oldham's conduct

was contrary to the expectations set forth in the letter. Naylor Alf, Exh. A (Calley Depo, 50:7-12.)
Based on this request, Wright gave direction to the Human Resources Office to initiate an
investigation; an investigator was assigned. Id. at (Calley Depo, 50:10-12, 18-24.)
18.

The investigation concluded that were some sustained findings regarding some of Ms.

Oldham' s conduct that was not compliant with the expectation set out in the previous letter. Naylor

Alf, Exh. A (Calley Depo, 51: 1-3.) There was no finding that Ms. Oldham violated a law, rule or
regulation. Id.

Jim Farrens Investigation
19.

Jim Farrens, a County employee, submitted a letter to his supervisor raising concerns

about whether a third-party needed to be hired to handle something. Naylor Alf, Exh. A (Calley
Depo, 72:5-9.)

The issues resulting from this letter were handled as conflict resolution. Id. at

(Calley Depo, 72:10-13, 20-25.)
ADDITIONAL FACTS PERTINENT TO FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE ACT CLAIMS

20.

On January 2, 2013, Wright requested Family Medical Leave under the Family

Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Naylor Alf, Exh. H, p. ADA 515. His request was required to be
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supported by certification from his health providers. Id. at ADA 514-515. Wright's FMLA leave
would not be approved without the certification. Id.
21.

Wright's Certification from his Health Care Provider for his counseling services

identified the beginning and ending dates of Wright's incapacity as approximately December 2012
through February 2013. Id. at ADA 502-503. The Certification also gave an estimated treatment
schedule of one hour, twice per month for a total of two hours per month. Id.
22.

Wright's counselor did not mail her certification until January 11, 2013. Id. at ADA

518. On January 15, 2013, a Human Resources Specialist received the certification from Wright's
counselor. Id. at ADA 501.
23.

At the time of Wright's termination on January 15, 2013, Commissioner Dave Case

had no knowledge that Wright had requested FMLA leave or that certification would be provided
by Wright's health care provider. Naylor Alf., Exh. B, (Case Depo, 241 :24-242:2.)
24.

At the time of Wright's termination on January 15, 2013, Commissioner Jim Tibbs

had no knowledge that Wright had requested FMLA leave or that certification would be provided
by Wright's health care provider. Naylor Alf., Exh. C, (Tibbs Depo, 106:14-107:1.)
25.

At the time of Wright's termination on January 15, 2013, Commissioner Rick

Yzaguirre had no knowledge that Wright had requested FMLA leave or that certification would be
provided by Wright's health care provider. Naylor Alf., Exh. E, (Yzaguirre Depo, 85:1-13.)
26.

Wright did not inform the Commissioners of his illness or application for FMLA

leave. Naylor Alf., Exh. D, (Wright Depo, 97:2-6.) Wright testified he could not say whether there
was any evidence that the Commissioners were aware of the FMLA request at the time of his
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termination. Id., (Wright Depo, 97:17-24). Wright also testified that he did not know whether
Bethany Calley had informed the Commissioners of his application. Id.
27.

At the time of Wright's termination on January 15, 2013, Human Resources Manager

Bethany Calley had not informed the Commissioners about Wright's request for FMLA leave.
Naylor Aff., Exh. A, (Calley Depo, 85:10-13.)

28.

On January 18, 2013 the Commissioners became aware that Wright had sent two

FMLA leave requests prior to his termination and that the appropriate certification had been received
the same day as Wright's termination. Naylor Aff., Exh. H, p. ADA 499. The Commissioners
decided to extended Wright's salary and benefits to coincide with what would have been the end of
Wright's requested FMLA leave. Id. at ADA 498-499. Wright's position remained eliminated. Id.
29.

The Director of Administration primary job responsibilities included overseeing the

human resources program for the County, overseeing the employee benefits program, overseeing the
risk management program, researching and analyzing insurance plans, managing the County's SelfInsurance Reserve Fund/supervising staff in a number of areas, and office management functions
for the Commissioner's Office. Naylor Aff., Exh. I, pp. ADA 1-2. At the time of elimination, the
salary for the Director of Administration was $93,663. Naylor Aff., Exh. F, p. ADA 525.
30.

The County created the Chief of Staff position to act as a liaison with other

government entities and private entities and represent the County at meetings, act as a liaison to the
legislature, to keep the Commissioners abreast of current legislation potentially impacting Ada
County, and to spearhead other special projects. Naylor Aff., Exh. J, pp. 646-647; Naylor Aff., Exh.
B, (Case. Depo, 222:11-223:25.) The job responsibilities of the Chief of Staff and Director of

ADA COUNTY'S STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS- 7.

000078

Administration were different. Naylor Aff., Exh. B (Case Depa, 201:15-24). On January 14, 2013
the Commissioners appointed Larry Maneely to the Chief of Staff position. At that time, the salary
for that position was $85,000 per year. Id.
31.

The Commissioners considered the Chief of Staff position and the Director of

Administration positions to be completely different. Naylor Aff., Exh. B, (Case Depa, 181 :16-23;
201:10-21.); Naylor Aff., Exh. C, (Tibbs Depa, 56:14-22.)
DATED this 10th day of October, 2014.
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.

By~--=----'-=~--.:!l~,,_~~~~~~~~
Kirtl
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Attached as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of portions of testimony and

exhibits from the Deposition of Jim Tibbs.
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Attached as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of portions of testimony and

exhibits from the Deposition of Richard Wright.
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Attached as Exhibit E is true and correct copy of portions of testimony and

exhibits from the Deposition of Rick Yzaguirre.
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Bethany Calley

1

A.

2

Q.

Wright v. Ada County, et al.

No.
'Okay.

Other than those three incidents, is

3

there ever any other occasions where you expressed to

4

anyone any concern about Rich's performance?

5

A.

No.

6

Q.

Did you ever express to anybody any concern

7

about Rich's precluding you from talking to anyone?

8

A.

No.

9

Q.

Did you ever develop a concern about Rich

10

precluding you or interfering with you speaking

11

directly with the Board?

12

A.

No.

13

Q.

Was there ever an occasion where you

14

developed a concern about Rich providing inaccurate

15

information to the Board?

16

A.

No.

17

Q.

Were you HR manager when Dee Oldham was

18

employed with the County?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

What position was she employed in?

21

A.

She was the BOCC's office manager.

22

Q.

And to whom did she report?

23

A.

To the Board of County Commissioners.

24

Q.

Did she report to Rich?

25

A.

Well, she reported to the Board -- I would

[45]
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April 2, 2014

Wright v. Ada County, et al.

1

have to look at dates -- but the Board of County

2

Commissioners.

3

And, again, I would need to look at the dates.

4

Q.

And then a structure change was made.

Were you asked at any point or were you

5

involved or notified of any investigations relating to

6

Dee Oldham's performance?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

When was the first investigation?

9

A.

The first investigation was in 2009.

10

Q.

Who complained?

11

A.

I have to say that I would need to pull the

12

investigation to recall the names.

13
14

If I could, please, offer one thing, just as
One thing with me with memory, when it's to

15

specifics like this, I'm definitely someone who has to

16

go back and do some research and read things often.

17

memory is compounded by a brain situation due to a

18

hemorrhagic stroke.

19

that requires me to go back and research and look at

20

things.

21

So, if I slip with memory on those types of details, I

22

can definitely do the research and look at things back

23

and get the information if needed.

24
25

Q.

My

So, I have some damage in there

And I can definitely come back with things.

So, sometimes you have some recall issues as

i t relates to particular issues?

[46]
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1

A.

Yeah.

2

Q.

But if you do testify in the deposition as to

3

your recollection, you're confident that that is

4

correct and accurate testimony?

5

A.

Yes, yes.

6

Q.

Again, all I'm asking you to do in the

7

deposition is testify to the best of your recollection.

8

'A.

9

Q.

Okay?

10

A.

Absolutely, yes.

11

Q.

Do you recall, were the reports or complaints

12

Uh-huh.

initiated by people who reported to Dee Oldham?

13

A.

Yes, I do recall that.

14

Q.

Do you recall the general nature of the

15

complaints?

16

A.

17

I do recall that the general nature of the

complaint was claiming a hostile work environment.

18

Q.

Was an investigation initiated in 2009?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

Who initiated the investigation?

21

A.

That, at the time, was when Rich was the

22

director.

23

process, we'd have taken the information to Rich, Rich

24

would give us direction to do the investigation.

25

Q.

I was the HR manager.

And, so, under that

So, he ordered a request of the

[47]
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1
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Wright v. Ada County, et al.

investigation?

2

A.

Uh-huh.

3

Q.

Yes?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

Who actually carried out the investigation?

6

A.

Kim Osborn, our employee relations advisor.

7

Q.

And what was the outcome of that

8

I'm sorry.

investigation?

9

A.

It was founded.

10

Q.

What, if any, disciplinary action was taken?

11

A.

A letter went to the file and performance

12

expectations were set by the then chairman of the

13

Board, Fred Tillman.

14
15
16
17

18
19

Q.

Do you recall what Dee Oldham's response was

to the disciplinary action that was taken?
A.

No.

I was not directly involved in those

meetings.
Q.

Was there a subsequent investigation against

Dee Oldham?

20

A.

There was another investigation in 2010.

21

Q.

Who initiated that investigation?

22

A.

I'm sorry, do you mean the complainant or --

23

Q.

Yes.

24

A.

That was from her staff, employees who

25

reported to her.

I do recall a name on that as far as

[48]
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1

the staff member that I believe originally came forward

2

was Dea Kellom.

3

County.

4

Q.

And she no longer works for the

And were any of these individuals that made

5

the complaint leading to the second investigation the

6

same individuals who filed the complaint relating to

7

the first investigation?

8
9
10
11

12

A.

Ms. Kellom would not have been.

I don't

recall the other employees.
Q.

What was the general nature of the complaints

in 2010?

A.

Just dissatisfied with the way in which Dee

13

was treating them, initially sort of -- the complaint

14

was dealing again with hostile work environment type of

15

a complaint.

16

Q.

17

Similar allegations to what were dealt with

in 2009?

18

A.

Correct.

19

Q.

How was that -- or who initiated that

20
21

investigation?

A.

In that process, during the intake process

22

from the original complaint, we were able to determine

23

that i t did not necessarily raise to a level of hostile

24

work environment, just from the intake interviews from

25

the complainants.

So, I advised Rich of that

[ 49]
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information.

2

We then met with each of the Commissioners

3

and let them know of the information that we had.

4

did express concern that while this wasn't hostile work

5

environment, i t did appear _that there potentially were

6

issues that were not compliant with the instructions

7

given in the previous letter of reprimand.

8

they did want to have further inquiry done based upon

9

that issue on that side of things.

10

it.

12

conduct a formal investigation.

14

And, so,

So, they requested that we look further into

11

13

They

So, Rich gave us the direction at that point to

Q.

Rich Wright gave you the direction to

initiate a second investigation?

15

A.

Uh-huh.

16

Q.

Yes?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

And who performed that investigation?

19

A.

That one was conducted by Bart Hamilton.

20

Q.

Who is Bart?

21

A.

Bart Hamilton is our internal investigator.

22

Q.

And Bart performed an investigation and

23

developed an investigation report?

24

A.

Correct.

25

Q.

What were the conclusions?

[50]
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Bethany Calley

1

A.

Wright v. Ada County, et al.

The conclusions on that were some sustained

2

findings in regards to actions that weren't compliant

3

with the expectations set in the reprimand letter.

4
5

6

Q.

How was that handled once his report and

recommendation was provided?

A.

That information then was provided to Rich

7

and the Board.

8

regards to employment options in regards to Dee's

9

future employment and options that might be available

10

And then consideration was given in

for her.

11

Q.

What were those options?

12

A.

I would -- I would have to look at the file

13

to remember exactly, but we had researched options

14

within Ada Cou~ty that might be some matches for Dee to

15

remain with the County.

16

Q.

17

County?

18

A.

She did not.

19

Q.

Do you recall why?

20

A.

I would have to look at the file to look at

And did she continue to remain with the

21

exactly how the actions were written, but it's my

22

recollection, I believe, that her separation was as a

23

result of not responding to the letter of reprimand

24

previously.

25

Q.

Was she fired?

[51]
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1

Q.

Okay.

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

When did the next conversation with Dave Case

4
5

Any conversations with Dave Case?

occur?
A.

Okay.

We had met with the Board.

Jim

6

Farrens had written a letter in regards to his position

7

on a situation and whether someone, third-party, needed

8

to be hired to handle something.

9

asked for release by the media.

10

And that was then

We had a meeting with the Board, discussed

11

the item, and determined that the way that the -- the

12

concerns that were being raised could be

13

handle i t as a conflict resolution.

14

would be provided to Jim to meet directly with the

15

Board via the Board liaison for that department or

16

office.

17

we would

And an opportunity

And, so, that was the context of that

18

meeting, was talking about that letter, what were the

19

options, how would we address this, would it be

20

released or how would i t be handled.

21

the decision was handle this as a conflict resolution,

22

we will reach out to Jim, offer a meeting in order to

23

meet live with him and hear what his concerns were, and

24

see if we could come up with some resolution for him on

25

the situation.

So, ultimately

[72]
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2013, Rich Wright had received approval for FMLA leave?

2

MR. NAYLOR:

3

THE WITNESS:

4

Q.

Object to the form.
Correct.

(BY MR. ROSSMAN)

As of January 15, 2013, he

5

had provided notice of an injury that he believed

6

warranted FMLA leave; correct?

7

A.

Pardon me, what was the date that you said?

8

Q.

January 15.

9

A.

Correct.

10

Q.

As of January 15, 2013, had you had any

11

discussion with any Commissioners regarding Rich's

12

application for FMLA leave?

13

A.

No.

14

Q.

Had a Commissioner communicated with you its

15

intent or the Commission's intent to eliminate Rich's

16

position, would you have notified them about Rich's

17

request for FMLA leave?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

That's one of the purposes for involving HR

20

in such a decision; correct?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

Did you believe that the elimination of

23

Rich's position was a violation of the Family Medical

24

Leave Act in January of 2013?

25

MR. NAYLOR:

Object to the form.

Foundation.
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And did you understand she was going

door to door to support your campaign?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

Did you appreciate the help that Dee was

5

providing you?

6

A.

7

anybody.

8

Q.

Including Dee?

9

A.

Including Dee.

10

Q.

Was she a valuable participant in your

11

I appreciated the help I could get from

campaign?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

Was Larry a valuable participant in your

14

campaign?

15
16

A.

My recollection of Larry was -- again,

I --

17

When we talk about him, there's only one

18

time that i t really sticks out in my mind where I

19

even recall him assisting, and that was when I had

20

a -- a Viewpoint interview with Sharon regarding

21

the Dynamis deal just before the primary.

22

Q.

23

primary?

24

A.

Sharon Ullman.

25

Q.

Did you know Larry Maneely before that?

And who were you running against in the
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2
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3

Wright v. Ada County, et al.

Yeah.

(BY MR. ROSSMAN) Or excuse me,

12:48 a.m.

4
5

A.

Yes.

Q.

And so the election results had already

)

6

come in and Sharon Ullman had lost, correct?

7

A.

That's correct.

8

Q.

And is i t about that time that you saw

9

this -- this document?

10

A.

No.

11

Q.

Okay.

12

A.

The next day.

13

Q.'

The 17th of May, 2012?

14

A.

Yeah.

15

Q.

How did you see this document?

16

A.

I don't recall if Roger showed it to me

17

or -- or what.

18

document.

19
20

Q.

When did you see this document?

I just -- I recall seeing the

Do you recall having a discussion with

Roger about the document?

21

A.

Not specifically.

I -- I just kind of

22

thought to myself, you know, I wish she hadn't done

23

that.

24

Q.

Why did you think that to yourself?

25

A.

Well, it's just -- I think it's a matter
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1

A.

I did not.

2

Q.

Did you ever have an occasion to discuss

3

with Dee the loss of her job?

I

4

A.

No.

5

Q.

You don't recall ever talking to Dee

6

I don't recall.

about losing her job and the circumstances?

7

No.

A.

I -- it wasn't my business, and

8

and I guess I felt if she wanted to talk to me

9

about it, she would, and I don't recall her ever

10

discussing it.

11

Q.

12

How did you become appointed to the --

Vern Bisterfeldt's position?

13

A.

I -- through the republican central

14

committee.

15

governor, and -- and he -- he selected me to

16

replace him.

17
18

I was one of three names given to the

Q.

Who were the other two name -- two

A.

Dan Dunham, and I can't remember the

names?

19
20

gentleman's first name.

21

Brown.

I think his last was

He was a trustee for CWI.

22

Q.

Do you know where you were in that list?

23

A.

In the rankings?

24

Q.

Yes.

25

A.

Third.
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And Vern was the sitting

commissioner that was being replaced, correct?

3

A.

Correct.

4

Q.

And did you consider that a benefit or a

5

positive that the sitting commissioner was calling

6

the governor to make a recommendation for the spot?

7

A.

Yeah, yeah.

8

Q.

Okay.

9

10
11

So when did you take office?

When did you first become employed with the County?
A.

I believe i t was May 29th, 28th,

somewhere around there.

The last week in May.

12

Q.

2012?

13

A.

2012.

14

Q.

Did you go through an orientation?

15

A.

You know, I was kind of --

16
17

18

Yes, I did.
Q.

You were going to say you were

kind of something.

19
20

Okay.

What -- what were you saying?
A.

I was kind of thrown in the mix of

21

everything.

22

that morning, and I had to bring myself up to speed

23

on all of the -- all of the things that we needed

24

to vote on that morning.

25

We had a business meeting first thing

I don't recall when the orientation was.

[91]
Associated Reporting and Video Inc.
208.343.4004

EXHIBIT B

000096

Dave Case

February 13, 2014

Wright v. Ada County, et al.

1

don't think The Guardian was there, but they picked

2

i t up.

They always --

3

Q.

4

The Statesman?

5

A.

6

Why did you provide that letter to

Number 1, first off, I didn't believe -And the timeline, you need to understand

7

the timeline.

8

referring to came after I had submitted the letter

9

to the media.

10

This investigation that you're

So having that in mind, before I

11

submitted the letter to the media, I went to Jim

12

Farrens and asked him about it.

13

what his thoughts were and his -- his intention.

14

And I asked him -- when he told me, I asked him if

15

he -- if he would allow me to release that to the

16

media, and he gave me permission to do so.

17
18

Q.

And I asked him

So your testimony is Jim Farrens gave

you permission to release that to the media?

19

A.

That's correct.

20

Q.

Did you read the investigation report?

21

A.

Well, the investigation report came

Q.

And did it indicate in the investigation

22
23

later.

24

report that Jim Farrens agreed that he'd allowed

25

you to release that letter?
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1

Q.

Okay.

2

A.

I -- I can't at this point.

3

Q.

So you can't identify one example of a

Well, tell me one -- one example.

4

situation where you talked to the department

5

managers and felt Rich had not conveyed --

6

accurately conveyed information to them?

7

A.

Not as I sit here today.

8

Q.

Did you document anywhere

9

A.

No.

10

Q.

-- such an example?

11

A.

No.

12

Q.

Did you ever talk to Rich about whether

13

or not he was accurately communicating information

14

to department heads?

15

A.

No.

16

Q.

Did any of the department heads, prior

17

to January 15, 2013, express any concern about

18

getting accurate information?

19

A.

Prior to when?

20

Q.

January 15, 2013.

21

A.

No.

22

Q.

When did you first start talking to Jim

23

Tibbs about eliminating the position of director of

24

administration?

25

A.

It was after the general election.
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1

Q.

So after November 6th, 2013 -- '12?

2

A.

Yeah, sometime in there.

3

4

I don't know

the date.

Q.

So prior to November 6, 2012, you hadn't

5

talked to anybody about eliminating Rich's

6

position?

7

A.

8

VIDEOGRAPHER:

9

That's pretty
Can we hold on for one

minute?

10

MR. ROSSMAN:

11

VIDEOGRAPHER:

Yes.
Just one moment.

12

signal for some reason.

13

MR. NAYLOR:

14
15

I lost the

Do you want to go off the

record for a second?
MR. ROSSMAN:

16

Yeah.

(Discussion held off the record.)

17

MR. ROSSMAN:

18

Q.

19

pending.

We'll go back on the record.

(BY MR. ROSSMAN) There's a question
Let's have the court reporter read --

20

Well, I'll just read it to you since

21

I've got it right in front of me and there's no

22

objection.

23

Prior to November 6th, 2012, you hadn't

24

talked to anybody about eliminating Rich's

25

'
position.
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Again, I'd ask what time frame you're

referring to.
Q.

When you're talking to HR about the

at-will doctrine.

A.

Well, I talked to HR and -- and -- and

6

my attorneys about this topic through the course of

7

the six months I was in there.

8
9

Q.

Do you recall there being an occasion

where Rick Yzaguirre and Sharon Ullman asked legal

10

to provide an opinion regarding whether Rich's

11

position should be at-will or at the pleasure of

12

the commissioners?

13

A.

I don't recall.

14

Q.

Prior to November 6, 2013, had you

15

contemplated in any way eliminating Rich -- Rich's

16

position?

17

MR. NAYLOR:

18

THE WITNESS:

19

Q.

Objection; asked and answered.

No.

(BY MR. ROSSMAN) So as of November 6,

20

2013, had you developed an understanding or belief

21

as to what you intended to do with Rich's position

22

after the swearing-in ceremony?

23
24
25

A.

I knew that there were areas that we

wanted to reorganize.

Q.

What areas?
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Department of Administration, the

2

landfill.

3

regarding purchasing.

4

well, we -- bringing the commission staff directly

5

underneath the authority of the commission.

6

I had a conversation with Bob Perkins
I think at that point --

I think that was it.

7

Q.

Why was that a concern for you?

8

A.

Because as i t stood, we had a Department

9

of Administration director who was supervising the

10

commissioners' office manager that had a direct

11

communication to that individual where a lot of

12

some of the business being done is not any business

13

of the director of Department of Administration.

14

That individual had the opportunity to

15

ask and the employee would be in a compromised

16

position to be required to answer.

)

17

Q.

Rich was over -- as the director of the

18

Department of Administration, he was over all the

19

various departments, correct?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

So what information did you wish to pass

22

to the department heads that you did not want Rich

23

to know about?

24

A.

25

It wasn't anything in particular I

didn't want Rich to know about.

What I wanted was
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1

the department heads direct -- reporting directly

2

to the board.

3

Q.

Why?

4

A.

Because there's important issues when i t

5

comes to personnel when you have a -- a county that

6

has 1,600 people.

7

going on.

8
9

10

We need to be aware of what's

There's purchasing.
of large-scale purchasing.

We -- we do a lot

And the landfill was in

dysfunction.

11

Q.

How was the landfill in dysfunction?

12

A.

They weren't responsive to the public.

13

There were a lot of internal problems and issues

14

that had to be corrected that weren't getting done.

15

Q.

The landfill had a director, correct?

16

A.

That's correct.

17

Q.

Who was the director?

18

A.

Ted Hutchinson.

19

Q.

Did you ever talk to Ted Hutchinson

20

about the problems at the Landfill Department prior

21

to January 15, 2013?

22

A.

Didn't really have the opportunity.

23

Q.

Why didn't you have the opportunity?

24

A.

The liaison to that department was

25

Sharon Ullman.
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Did you ever have a conversation with

2

Rich about the problems with the Department of --

3

of Landfill prior to January 15, 2013?

4

A.

Rich Wright?

5

Q.

Rich Wright.

6

A.

Regarding the landfill?

7

Q.

Yes.

8

A.

I don't recall.

9

Q.

Was Rich over the landfill?

10

A.

No.

11

Q.

Who was over the landfill?

12

A.

Ted Hutchinson.

13

Q.

Okay.

14

And was

Dave Logan was over operations, correct?

15

A.

That's correct.

16

Q.

What discussion did you have with --

17

18
19
20

Or what did you learn from Bob Perkins
regarding the Department of Purchasing?

A.

Part of the reorganization we looked at

was if --

21

We were looking at Bob Perkins'

22

department because he does the purchases for the

23

County.

24

operations, and the question we had is would i t be

25

better to have purchasing underneath operations

A lot of those purchases came through
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where they are dealing closer in hand.

Q.

Okay.

Thought about moving purchasing

under the Operations Department?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

Was that ever done?

Did you ever move

6

the purchasing department under the Department of

7

Operations?

8

A.

No.

9

Q.

Why not?

10

A.

Well, again, this was -- these were

11

thoughts that we were thinking about.

12

progressed, we were heavily involved right after

13

the election in the mediation of the Dynamis, which

14

took up a lot of time.

15
16
17
18

As things

So I didn't get back with Bob about i t
at that time.

Q.

To this date, have you moved purchasing

under operations?

19

A.

No.

20

Q.

Why not?

21

A.

Because of the lawsuit.

22

Q.

What about the lawsuit has prevented you

23

from moving purchasing under operations?

24

A.

Well, I consulted with my attorneys.

25

Q.

Were you -- were you advised not to make
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MR. NAYLOR:

2
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3

counsel.

4

Q.
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Object to the form.
Again, upon the advice of

(BY MR. ROSSMAN) On the advice of

5

counsel, the commission has not acted to make any

6

further organizational changes?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

As of November 16 -- or November 6,

9

2012 -- November 16, 2012, excuse me, had you

10

encountered or had you considered whether or not

11

you wanted to retain Rich with the County?

12

A.

As of that date?

13

Q.

Yes.

14

A.

No.

15

Q.

Had you considered or evaluated whether

16

or not you wanted to hire someone else to report to

17

the board?

18

A.

No.

19

Q.

At some point in time, did you begin

20

having discussions with Jim Tibbs about

21

reorganizing the County?

22

,

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

When did you start doing that?

24

A.

Well, again, i t was -- I believe i t was.

25

After the general election, probably
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around the first part of December.

2

Q.

Who initiated those discussions?

3

A.

You know, I don't think i t was initiated

4

by really either one of us.

5

sit down and talk.

We just would -- would

6

Q.

Where would you sit down and talk?

7

A.

Variety of places: my office, lunch,

8

where we'd go to lunch at.

9

Q.

How often were you meeting in your

10

office during the month of December 2012 with Jim

11

Tibbs?

12

A.

Well, typically if he would come up --

13

and it wasn't a meeting as far as a planned

14

meeting.

15

election, he was constantly in the building

16

attending meetings, trying to get familiarized with

17

the process.

18

He was constantly

after the general

Typically, after a meeting was over, if

19

there was some extra time, he would come into my

20

office and sit down and we'd talk.

21

Q.

There's been reference by -- or

22

observations by others that they felt you were

23

meeting daily with Jim Tibbs.

24

25

Would you agree or disagree with those
representations?
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I don't know that

It -- i t could have been daily.

And when you met with Jim Tibbs in your

office, would you close the door?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

Did you have any desire to share the

7

discussions you were having with Jim Tibbs with

8

Rick Yzaguirre?

9

A.

No.

10

Q.

Why not?

11

A.

Again, if you go back to the six months

12

that I was there prior to the new swearing-in, the

13

dynamics of the commission were that Rick and

14

Sharon were keeping me in the dark on County

15

business.

16

Q.

What County business did Rick keep you

17

in the dark on while you were a sitting

18

commissioner?

19

A.

You want one specific?

20

Q.

Any issue.

21

A.

The Jim Farrens investigation.

22

Q.

Anything else?

23

A.

I -- I would go into meetings on a daily

24

meeting, and there would be a topic on the table

25

that Jim and Sharon were obviously versed on, and I
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What was discussed in executive session

2

on January 14, 2013, about eliminating Rich's

3

position?

4
5

MR. NAYLOR:
evidence.

6
7

MR. ROSSMAN:
question.

8
9

10

Objection; assumes facts not in

Q.

Okay.

Let me rephrase the

Withdraw it.
(BY MR. ROSSMAN) Did you discuss during

executive session at any time the elimination of
Rich's position?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

When?

13

A.

Prior to bringing Rich -- bringing Rich

14

into the room.

15

Q.

On January 15, 2013?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

What was discussed?

18

A.

We discussed -- the three commissioners

19

discussed that the -- of the reorganization and

20

that i t would be eliminating Rich's position.

21

Q.

What did Rick Yzaguirre say?

22

A.

Rick was not on board with it.

He

23

viewed Rich as a friend, and he thought highly of

24

Rich.

25

Q.

How did you express i t to -- to Rick
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1

during executive session that you intended to

2

eliminate Rich's position?

3

A.

4

We just felt

we

We expressed i t in that we wanted the

5

managers to report -- be reporting directly to the

6

board that were under Rich and that we didn't feel

7

that his position was necessary.

8
9

10

Q.

Because you were having the department

heads report directly to the board, you didn't feel
Rich's position was any longer necessary.

11

Is that correct?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

But you hired Larry Maneely as the chief

14

of staff the day before, correct?

15

A.

That's correct.

16

Q.

Were the department heads reporting to

17

Larry Maneely?

18

A.

No, they were not.

19

Q.

Was Larry Maneely performing many of the

20

same functions that Rich Wright was performing?

21

A.

No.

22

Q.

None of them?

23

A.

No.

24

Q.

Have you looked at Larry Maneely's job

25

description?
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2013?

2

A.

No.

3

Q.

Did you ask HR to perform any type of

4

analysis in determining that salary?

5

A.

No.

6

Q.

Did you review the HR policy and

7

protocol for developing a salary when you created

8

that $85,000-a-year salary?

9

A.

No.

10

Q.

You've referred to the termination of

11

Rich employ

12

elimination of a position.

13

or Rich's employment as being an

Is that correct?

14

A.

That's correct.

15

Q.

And you believe that the

16

responsibilities that Larry Maneely performs are

17

completely different than what Rich was performing?

18

A.

That's correct.

19

Q.

There's not one responsibility that

20

Larry's performing that Rich performed?

21

A.

No.

22

Q.

Did you consider anybody else for this

23

chief of staff position other than Larry Maneely?

24

A.

No.

25

Q.

Did you consider Rich for this chief of
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tasks most directly."

2

Is that correct?

3

A.

That's correct.

4

Q.

You don't agree with the next sentence?

5

A.

No.

6

Q.

"These functions could work under the

7

direction of the chief of staff to accomplish the

8

BOCC's larger goals."

9

A.

No, I don't agree with it.

10

Q.

Why don't you agree with it?

11

A.

Because the chief of staff's position,

12

in my mind, was created to be a liaison with the

13

the other government entities that we deal with; to

14

be a liaison to the legislature, to keep us abreast

15

on current legislation that is -- is being proposed

16

down there and for us to be able to act upon it.

17

We have

constantly have projects

18

throughout the year in order to better the vision

19

of the County as well as provide a more positive

20

image of the County on things that we need to do.

21

And that was kind of a special projects type of

22

position.

23

So the -- the gist of the position, in

24

my mind, was interface with government entities

25

that we didn't have the time to do.
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So other than interfacing with

2

government entities, what is Larry Maneely doing as

3

part of his job?

4

A.

Well, I thought I just explained i t all.

5

Q.

Tell me every other duty he has other

6

than interfacing with other government entities

7

when the commissioners can't -- don't have time to

8

appear.

9

A.

Well, he -- he goes to meetings that are

10

outside meetings with other government entities to

11

act on behalf --

12

Well, let me rephrase that.

13

behalf, but to go to the meetings, come back and

14

brief us so that we can know what actions we need

15

to take.

16

Q.

Anything else?

17

A.

Special projects.

Not act on

At the direction of

18

the board, we have him do special projects.

19

have the National County Month coming

20

in April, and that's -- he's assigned to -- to head

21

that up.

22

Q.

Anything else?

23

A.

No, not that I can recall.

24

Q.

Does he supervise any employees?

25

A.

No, he does not.

We

coming up
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1

was a policy at the County regarding the manner in

2

which a layoff is to occur?

3

4
5

6
7

8
9

10
11

MR. NAYLOR:

Objection; calls for a legal

conclusion.
THE WITNESS:

That's something that you

would discuss with HR.
Q.

(BY MR. ROSSMAN) Had you ever seen the

layoff policy of the County?

A.

No.

I leave that to them for their

expertise.
Q.

As you sit here today, are you aware

12

that there is a layoff policy in the employee

13

handbook?

14

A.

No.

15

Q.

One of the reasons --

16

That's one of the reasons for consulting

17

with HR before making an employment termination

18

determine -- decision?

19

Isn't that correct?

20

A.

That's correct.

21

Q.

To make sure that you're complying with

22

policy, correct?

23

A.

That's correct.

24

Q.

At the time that you terminated Rich's

25

employment, were you aware that he had submitted a
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request for family medical leave?

2

A.

No.

3

Q.

Had you asked?

4

A.

No.

5

Q.

Is that another reason why you'd want to

6

consult with HR before making a termination

7

decision is to make sure that there aren't any FMLA

8

or federal regulatory problems?

9

MR. NAYLOR:

10

THE WITNESS:

11

Q.

12

Object to the form.

Yes.

(BY MR. ROSSMAN) But you did not consult

with HR before firing Rich, correct?

13

A.

That's correct.

14

Q.

And you subsequently found out that he

15

had not only applied for but had submitted medical

16

certifications in support of a family medical leave

17

request, correct?

18

A.

After the fact, yes.

19

Q.

After you fired him?

20

A.

Correct.

21

Q.

And you also understood that HR had

22

indicated to him, notified him, that he's -- his

23

request for FMLA leave had been approved, correct?

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

And you understood that that had
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1

head from your observation of this e-mail or of

2

this document?

3

4
5
6

MR. NAYLOR:

Object to the form; calls for

speculation.
Q.

(BY MR. ROSSMAN) What was your

impression when you read this document?

7

Withdraw the last question.

8

A.

I was surprised.

9

Q.

Why were you surprised?

10

A.

Well, Sharon Ullman was out of office.

11

Dave Case and I won.

12

that somebody would write an e-mail like this.

13
14

Q.

And I guess I was surprised

When you say "like this," is i t the tone

of the e-mail that kind of surprised you?

15

A.

It is, yeah, the tone.

16

Q.

Does i t appear that she was --

17

From your review of this particular

18

document, did i t give you an indication that Dee

19

was resentful over the loss of her job with the

20

County?

21

A.

22

MR. NAYLOR:

23
24
25

Yes.
Object to the form;

speculation.
Q.

impression?

(BY MR. ROSSMAN) That was your

I'm asking your impression.
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landfill department?

2
3

February 12, 2014

A.

After being sworn in, Dave Case and I

Q.

Why did you decide to put him over at

did.

the landfill department?

A.

My understanding is that some years ago,

7

the landfill was under operations.

8

the Dynamis issue, i t was moved and became a

9

stand-alone department, and we thought i t was best

10
11

12

to move i t back to operations.

Q.

Okay.

Was there any increase in his

compensation to account for the additional duties?

13

A.

To who?

14

Q.

Dave Logan.

15

A.

Yes.

16

17

And because of

I think there was a small -- a

small amount that he was given.
Q.

Do you ever recall having any discussion

18

with Dee Oldham about becoming re-employed with the

19

County?

20

A.

No.

21

Q.

Do you recall anyone having a discussion

22

with Dee Oldham about becoming re-employed with the

23

County?

24

A.

No.

25

Q.

You were not a commissioner during the
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1

A.

No.

2

Q.

Why are they called liars' lunches?

3

A.

You should ask Vern that.

4

Q.

Do you have an understanding?

5

A.

It was more about swapping fishing

6

stories, a bunch of old guys getting together,

7

former County employees, social.

8

that Vern came up with.

9

Q.

It was a name

Was there a point in time at which you

10

began to have discussions with Dave Case about

11

reorganizing the County once you took office?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

When did you first start discussing that

14

with Dave?

15

A.

After the general election.

16

Q.

So after November, what, 6th of 2012?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

Was anyone else involved in those

19

discussions?

20

A.

Not that I'm aware of.

21

Q.

Did you ever have a discussion with Vern

22

Bisterfeldt about reorganizing the County?

23

A.

No.

24

Q.

Roger Simmons?

25

A.

No.
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Prior to the general election, do you

2

recall having discussions with Larry Maneely about,

3

should you be elected, potentially coming to work

4

with the County?

5

A.

Prior to when?

6

Q.

Prior to November 6th, 2012.

7

A.

No.

8

Q.

Do you recall having a discussion with

9

10

anyone about hiring Larry Maneely prior to
November 6th, 2012?

11

A.

No.

12

Q.

Who was present at the discussions that

13

you had with Dave Case after the general election

14

about reorganizing the County?

15

A.

Just Dave and I.

16

Q.

Where were you located?

17

A.

Sometimes we were in his office;

18

19
20

sometimes we were at a restaurant.

Q.

Anyone else ever participate in these

meetings?

21

A.

No.

22

Q.

When you were in Dave's office, would

23

you typically close the door when you had these

24

discussions?

25

A.

Most of the time.

Not all the time, but
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most of the time.

Q.

2

How many of these conversations did you

3

have with Dave between November 6th and

4

January 14th, 2013?

5

A.

Oh, gosh, I don't know.

I --

After the election, I spent as many days

6

7

as I could in the County building talking not just

8

to Dave but to a lot of other -- a lot of other

9

folks.

10
11

12
13
14
15
16

Q.

Perceptions of others that you were

meeting almost daily with Dave behind closed doors?
A.

It might have been daily.

I was here --

I tried to be here every day.

Q.

What were you and Dave discussing about

reorganizing the County?
A.

We had some concerns about the landfill.

17

Also had some concerns about the Department of

18

Administration.

19
20
21

Q.

What were your concerns about the

landfill?
A.

Because of the Dynamis issue.

It was a

22

stand-alone -- stand-alone department, and we

23

thought that maybe that needed to -- a little more

24

supervision.

25

Q.

we

Were you concerned about the Dynamis
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situation when you took office?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

Did you feel i t was improperly handled

4

by the commission?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

Was that one of your platforms of your

7

campaign?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

Was there anyone in particular that you

10

felt was responsible for the way the Dynamis

11

project was handled?

12

A.

I thought that the entire County

13

commission at the time that the project was

14

initiated was responsible.

15

Q.

Who would that include?

16

A.

Sharon Ullman, Rick Yzaguirre, Fred

17
18

Tillman, I think.
Q.

Did you, prior to January 15, 2013, have

19

any understanding or belief that Rich Wright had

20

done anything improperly relating to the Dynamis

21

project?

22

A.

No.

23

Q.

So you never held the opinion that Rich

24

was somehow responsible or partially responsible

25

for any of the improprieties relating to the
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Dynamis project?

2

A.

No.

3

Q.

Okay.

So what discussions were you

4

having with Dave about how to reorganize the

5

landfill following your swearing-in?

6

A.

It was just a reassignment of -- back to

7

operations where i t originally was under the

8

supervision of Dave Logan and remove i t from that

9

stand-alone department status.

10

Q.

Prior to January 14, 2013, had you had

11

any discussions with Dave Logan about reorganizing

12

the landfill department?

13
14
15

A.

You know, I might have.

I don't -- I

don't remember i t specifically.
Q.

Had you or, to your knowledge, Dave Case

16

made any proposal to him that he reassume

17

responsibility for that department?

18

A.

I don't remember having that discussion.

19

Q.

So your recollection is between

20

November 6th, 2012, and January 14, 2013, these

21

almost-daily discussions you were having, Dave

22

really principally related to the landfill issue

23

and reorganizing the DOA, the Department of

24

Administration?

25

MR. NAYLOR:

Object to the form.
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1
2

Wright v. Ada County, et al.

(BY MR. ROSSMAN) Was there anything else

that was being discussed?

3

A.

Bronco football, fishing, family issues.

4

Q.

Any other County business that was being

5

discussed?

A.

6

We bounced ideas off -You know, I say bounced ideas off each

7
8

other.

9

thought about certain issues.

10
11

We asked each other questions about what we
That's -- that was

about it.

Q.

At some point, was there a discussion

12

between you and Dave Case about -- in reorganizing

13

the Department of Administration, laying off Rich

14

Wright?

15
16

A.

Not laying off.

Eliminating the

position.

17

Q.

Is there a difference, in your mind?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

What is the difference?

20

A.

The difference is that you keep the

21

existing position and you lay them off and hire

22

somebody else to replace him.

23

with the position, you're doing away with the

24

position and nobody replaces him.

25

Q.

If you're doing away

So he's not getting laid off if you're
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MR. NAYLOR:

2
3

Object to the form.

I'm going to instruct you not to answer
that.

4

Q.

5

understanding.

6

Wright v. Ada County, et al.

(BY MR. ROSSMAN) I'm asking your

MR. NAYLOR:

No.

You're asking following

7

the conversation, did he arrive at this conclusion,

8

which infers what was discussed in the meeting.

9

MR. ROSSMAN:

10

his conclusion.

11

communication.
MR. NAYLOR:

13

MR. ROSSMAN:

14

Q.

16
17
18
19
20

I'm asking for

I'm not asking for any

12

15

Oh, come on.

Then just ask the conclusion.
I did.

(BY MR. ROSSMAN) What was your

conclusion?

A.

That the position would be eliminated as

part of a reorganization.

Q.

And what was your conclusion as to what

would happen to Rich Wright?
A.

Well, he didn't really have anywhere

21

else to go.

22

option of resigning or termination.

23
24
25

Q.

We asked him if he -- gave him the

Did Rich Wright have a personnel file

with the County?
A.

I assume so.
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A.

6

I'm only aware of one layoff, and that

was due to budgetary reasons and that was in 1978.
Q.

4
5

Wright v. Ada County, et al.

So when you first
Who first proposed the idea of

eliminating Rich Wright's position?
A.

I don't know if Dave suggested i t or if

7

I suggested i t or we kind of came to the conclusion

8

at about the same time.

9

Q.

So you don't know who originally

10

suggested it?

11

A.

No.

12

Q.

What was the reason why either of you

13

proposed to eliminate Rich Wright's position?

14

A.

I didn't think i t was necessary.

15

Q.

Why didn't you think i t was necessary?

16

A.

When I attended the meetings --

17

And I will say that the County was very

18

generous to me, that before I was sworn in I was

19

allowed to attend meetings and saw the interaction

20

between the department heads and -- and the

21

commissioners.

22

And I noticed that every time that there

23

was a Department of Administration issue, whether

24

human resources, employee benefits, purchasing,

25

risk management, media relations, that the managers
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1

n~ver spoke to the commission.

2

Wright.

3

4

Q.

Wright v. Ada County, et al.

It was always Rich

And I didn't agree with that.
You felt like the managers should

approach the commission as well?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

Did you ever discuss with Dave Case

7

reorganizing the Department of Administration to

8

have the department managers report or provide some

9

reporting to the commission as well as Rich Wright?

10
11

12

A.

We wanted -- I wanted to talk directly

to the managers.
Q.

Is there any other reason why you were

13

discussing with Dave Case eliminating Rich Wright's

14

position?

15

A.

Can't remember any.

16

Q.

Part of Rich's responsibilities was to

17

communicate with the Board of Commissioners,

18

correct?

19

A.

Yes, I suppose so.

20

Q.

And you noticed that he was

21

periodically -- anytime there was an issue with any

22

of the departments, he was speaking on behalf of

23

the department?

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

You understood that was part of his
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1

employees that reported to him regarding his

2

effectiveness at performing his position?

3

A.

Prior to his --

4

Q.

Prior to firing him.

5

A.

No, I did not.

6

Q.

Did you ever take a survey or do any

7

research to determine the quality of his

8

contribution to the County government?

9

A.

I did not.

10

Q.

Did you ask anybody about the quality or

11

importance of his contribution to the County

12

government?

13

A.

I did not.

14

Q.

Other than feeling that the department

15

heads should be communicating directly to the

16

board, was there any other reason why you felt his

17

position should be eliminated?

18

A.

19

Just
This was based totally on my

20

observations of what I observed in the meetings and

21

my style of management, and that was the reason why

22

I supported the -- the idea of reorganizing the

23

department.

24
25

Q.

Did you ever go watch him to perform any

of the other responsibilities of his job other than
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1

Q.

Could i t have been in November?

2

A.

Well, yeah.

I mean, i t might have been

3

towards the middle, late November.

4

yes.

5

Q.

6

this with him?

7

A.

How did Dave respond when you discussed

Very

8
9

10

I mean, yes,

Well, we were both receptive to each
other's ideas.

We both had similar ideas, so we

both were very receptive to each other's ideas.

Q.

11

Explain that to me.

What does that

12

mean, you were both receptive to each other's ideas

13

after the general election?

14

A.

Well, we would ask -- ask each other,

15

"Well, what do you think about this?

16

impression?

17

better?

18

do you think?"

19

off each other.

What is your

Do you think this could be done any

Is there a need to make any changes?

What

You know, just bouncing questions

20

Q.

You agreed -- or you liked Dave Case?

21

A.

You say I liked him?

22

Q.

You liked him during that period of

24

A.

Oh, sure.

25

Q.

You had, in fact, kind of aligned your

23

time?
Yes.
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1

"Well, what do you think about this idea?"

2
3

"Well, yeah, but what about this?"

And

we would

4

I guess i t was more of a brainstorming

5

session.

6

Q.

7

Wright v. Ada County, et al.

Did you ever discuss any options other

than eliminating Rich's position?

8

A.

As far as the reorganization

9

Q.

As far as his job.

10

A.

To do what we wanted to do, to hold the

11

managers accountable and deal with them one-on-one,

12

we didn't -- we didn't really see any other options

13

but to eliminate the position.

14
15

Q.

Did you ever consider Rich for any other

positions within the County?

16

A.

No.

17

Q.

Did you become aware at any time prior

18

to January 14, 2013, that Dave Case had seen the

19

investigation files relating to Dee Oldham?

20

A.

No.

21

Q.

Did you become aware at any time prior

22

to that date that Dave Case had requested the

23

investigation file for Dee Oldham?

24

A.

25

MR. NAYLOR:

No.
Object to the form; misstates
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1

correspondence with Vern Bisterfeldt leading up to

2

your swearing-in?

3

A.

Vern and computers?

4

Q.

Yes.

5

A.

I don't think so.

6

Q.

How about Roger Simmons?

7

A.

The only time I can remember

8

communicating with a computer with Roger is because

9

of Kristi's business, and i t had to do with that.

10

She would send drafts of campaign materials.

11

would approve them or not.

12

That would be really -- that's the only

13

reason that we would communicate through the

14

computer.

15

I

Q.

So you wanted to hit the ground running

16

on January 14, 2013, with some changes at the

17

County, correct?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

What were those changes?

20

A.

The reorganization of the Department of

.

21

Administration, the reassignment of the landfill

22

back to operations, the assignment of the

23

commissioners' staff away from the

24

the Department of Administration to directly under

25

the Board of Commissioners, the hiring of Larry

move i t from
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2
3

4

Wright v. Ada County, et al.

I think that's about i t for one day.
Q.

Okay.

Reassigning the landfill was to

put i t under Dave Logan, correct?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

Dave Logan, as you've testified before,

7

actively participated in your campaign, correct?

8

A.

9

he did or not.

10
11

12

When you say "actively," I don't know if
You know, I talked to Dave.

I

asked him operations questions.
Q.

During your campaign, he showed up at

meetings regarding your campaign, didn't he?

13

A.

Dave Logan?

14

Q.

He didn't?

15

A.

No.

16

Q.

He was showing up at liars' lunches,

17

correct?

18

A.

I've seen him at liars' lunch.

19

Q.

You hired Larry Maneely, correct?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

And Larry contributed to your -- or

22

No, he didn't.

I don't remember seeing him there.

participated in your campaign, correct?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

When was Benny Poole hired?

25

A.

I think three or four months later.

It
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Q.

Wright v. Ada County, et al.

Was there some urgency in eliminating

2

Rich Wright's position?

3

MR. NAYLOR:

4

Q.

(BY MR. ROSSMAN) Go ahead.

5

A.

Yes.

Objection; asked and answered.

We wanted to get the -- the

6

restructuring of the Department of Administration

7

started right away, and that was the urgency of it.

8

9

Q.

And the restructuring of the Department

of Administration involved laying off Rich Wright,

10

correct?

11

A.

No.

12

Q.

Okay.

13

A.

Having the managers report directly'to

There was more to it than that.
What more was there?

14

the commissioners and also directing the commission

15

staff to be directly under the commission instead

16

of the Department of Administration.

17

Q.

Okay.

So other than eliminating Rich

18

Wright's position and having the department heads

19

report directly to the board, was there anything

20

else that was involved in reorganizing the

21

Department of Administration?

22

MR. NAYLOR:

23

Q.

24

A.

At that time, no.

25

Q.

At any time?

Objection; asked and answered.

(BY MR. ROSSMAN) Go ahead.
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Jim Tibbs

February 12, 2014

Wright v. Ada County, et al.

1

Q.

Where else would i t go?

2

A.

Operations.

3

Q.

Who is the director of operations?

4

A.

Dave Logan.

5

Q.

During January 15th, 2013, you and

6

Dave Case met with Rich Wright to eliminate his

7

position, correct?

8

A.

To

9

Q.

To inform him that i t had been

10

eliminated?

11

A.

Yes, that we were reorganizing the

12

department and that we were eliminating his

13

position.

14

Q.

Did you tell him anything other than

15

that as to why he was no longer going to be

16

employed with the County?

17

A.

I don't remember saying anything else to

19

Q.

Was i t effective immediately?

20

A.

Yes.

18

him.

And

21

Although, there is -- there was a

22

severance package that went along with that.

23

Q.

What was the severance package?

24

A.

I think he would receive two-week -- and

25

I could be wrong, but two weeks' pay.

[105]
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Jim Tibbs

1

February 12, 2014

Q.

Wright v. Ada County, et al.

When you met in executive session and

2

discussed hiring Larry Maneely and eliminating

3

Rich's position, was Bethany present?

4

5
6
7
8

9

MR. NAYLOR:

Object to the form.

Object to

the form; misstates the testimony.
MR. ROSSMAN:
question.
Q.

Okay.

Let me withdraw the

Let me rephrase it.
(BY MR. ROSSMAN) When you met in

executive session on January 14, 2013, was Bethany

10

present?

11

A.

I can't remember if she was or not.

12

Q.

Was anyone from HR present?

13

A.

I can't remember.

14

Q.

Did you know that Rich had provided

15

notice to the Department of human resources that he

16

had an illness?

17

A.

No.

18

Q.

Did you know that he had submitted

19

paperwork for FMLA approval?

20

A.

No.

21

Q.

Did you know he had been approved for

22

FMLA leave?

23

A.

No.

24

Q.

Did you know that medical certifications

25

had been submitted by two providers?
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Jim Tibbs

1

A.

2

MR. NAYLOR:

3

Q.

4

Wright v. Ada County, et al.

No.

Object to the form.

(BY MR. ROSSMAN) Did you make any effort

to find out before eliminating his position?

5

A.

No.

6

Q.

Did anyone make any effort to find out

7

8
9

before eliminating his position?
MR. NAYLOR:

Object to the form;

speculation.

10

Q.

(BY MR.. ROSSMAN) To your knowledge.

11

A.

To my knowledge, no.

12

Q.

Do you know, as you sit here today, that

13

Rich had submitted a request for FMLA leave?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

Prior to the date that you notified him

16

of his position being eliminated?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

Has the County taken any steps to

19

re-employ him?

20

A.

Not that I'm aware of.

21

Q.

Donna Dana has testified that she was

22

consulted after Rich left for showing too much

23

emotion.

24
25

Did you have any knowledge of that?
A.

No.
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Richard Thomas Wright

February 11, 2014

Wright v. Ada County, et al.

1

A.

I am positive.

2

Q.

Was Dave Case involved in the

3

instigation of the Jim Farrens investigation?

4

A.

No.

5

Q.

That was with Commissioner Yzaguirre,

6

correct?

7

A.

The investigation regarding the Jim

8

Farrens situation came about as a result of some

9

public comments that were made to the media.

The

10

board called a meeting with myself, Bethany Calley,

11

the human resources manager, and wanted to know

12

what had happened and how to proceed.

13

Jim Farrens had submitted a letter to

14

the County, as I recall, making some claims that

15

were employment-related as well.

16

how --

17

And that is

In that meeting, the executive session,

18

is where everybody sat around a table and

19

strategized as to how the Jim Farrens investigation

20

would be conducted and how we would respond.

21

I took no official action on the Jim

22

Farrens situation outside of that executive session

23

meeting.

24

Q.

25

Well, isn't it true that you met with

Jim Farrens and Commissioner Yzaguirre about Jim

[73]
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Richard Thomas Wright

1
2

February 11, 2014

Wright v. Ada County, et al.

those other issues, the counseling issues?
A.

It was not the standard protocol for the

3

employee to report directly to the commissioner

4

their FMLA status.

5

certified for was a mental health issue, and I

6

certainly wouldn't talk about that with everybody.

7

Q.

Okay.

The FMLA status that I was

So is the answer to my question

8

that you don't have any evidence that the three

9

commissioners knew about your counseling request

10

for FMLA prior to this e-mail?

11

MR. ROSSMAN:

Object to the form.

12

THE WITNESS:

I have evidence that the human

13

resources manager knew about it, and by policy,

14

that's all that's required.

15
16

Q.

(BY MR. NAYLOR) Okay.

So just to make

the record clear, I need you to --

17

If you can, do you have any evidence

18

that the commissioners knew about your FMLA request

19

for your mental health counseling prior to this

20

letter of January 24th?

21

MR. ROSSMAN:

22

23
24
25

Object to the form.

Go ahead.
THE WITNESS:

I can't say.

I don't know if

Bethany Calley informed them or not.

Q.

(BY MR. NAYLOR) Okay.

And isn't i t your
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Richard Thomas Wright

February 11, 2014

1

A.

It is.

2

Q.

Okay.

3

Wright v. Ada County, et al.

So you're not sure --

I mean, at that point, you're

4

speculating that i t could have just been because

5

you were part of the old regime that you were --

6

your job was in jeopardy, correct?

7

8
9

A.

I was most concerned about the

retaliation for Dee -- from Dee.
Q.

Is one of the reasons you were concerned

10

about your job simply because you were loyal to the

11

old regime?

12

A.

No.

13

Q.

Okay.

14
15

So that's false, what you wrote

there, correct?
A.

You -- you have to understand that the

16

retaliation for Dee is directly connected to the

17

old regime; i.e., Sharon Ullman.

18
19

Q.

follow along.

20
21

Let me read i t to you again, and you can

It says, "And simply because I was
employed and was loyal to the old regime."

22

MS. WILLIAMS:

23

MR. NAYLOR:

24
25

Object; asked and answered.
There's no question pending

yet, ma'am.
THE WITNESS:

It was probably a poor choice

[138)
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Richard Thomas Wright

1

February 11, 2014

Wright v. Ada County, et al.

of words on my part when I wrote this.

2

Q.

(BY MR. NAYLOR) So just being part of

3

the old regime was not a concern for you to be

4

fired?

5

MS. WILLIAMS:

6

Q.

(BY MR. NAYLOR) Correct?

7

A.

My relation to the old regime as i t

8
9

10

connected to Dee Oldham.

Q.

And what about Dynamis?

What did that

have to do with your termination?

11

A.

12

with it.

13

Q.

14

Object to the form.

I don't know that i t had anything to do

Well, you say here, "Any involvement I

might have had with Dynamis."

15

A.

Uh-huh.

16

Q.

So what

17

A.

As a connection through the old regime;

18
19

i.e., Sharon and Rick.

Q.

Okay.

So when you wrote this, you said,

20

"Those activities tells me that he has plans to

21

terminate me in retaliation of Dee Oldham's

22

situation, any involvement I might have had with

23

Dynamis, and simply because I was employed at the

24

old regime."

25

And today you interpret all of those --
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Richard Thomas Wright

Wright v. Ada County, et al.

1

you explain all of those as simply the Dee Oldham

2

concern, correct?

3

4
5

A.

Today I interpret that as my mindset at

the time, correct.

Q.

Okay.

So at the time, you had no

6

concern for your job because of your involvement

7

with the Dynamis project, correct?

8

A.

Correct.

9

Q.

Okay.

And today, as you sit here today,

10

you don't believe that your involvement with the

11

Dynamis project had anything to do with your

12

termination, do you?

13

A.

No.

14

Q.

And simply because you were loyal to

15

Sharon Ullman and Rick Yzaguirre, do you believe

16

that that has any -- was any factor in your

17

termination?

18

A.

My loyalty to them because of the Dee

19

Oldham investigation, yes.

20

factor.

21

Q.

I believe that was a

But separate from the Dee Oldham

22

in~estigation, your involvement with Commissioners

23

Ullman and Yzaguirre had nothing to do with your

24

termination, correct?

25

A.

Correct.
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Rick Yzaquirre

Q.

1

February 10, 2014

Wright v. Ada County, et al.

Were you aware at the time that Rich's

2

employment was terminated that he had submitted a

3

request for family medical leave?

4

A.

No.

5

Q.

Had anyone told you that?

6

A.

No.

7

Q.

Had anyone told you that he had been

8

approved for family medical leave?

9

A.

No.

10

Q.

Did you understand that he had an

11

illness at that point in time?

12

MR. NAYLOR:

13

THE WITNESS:

14

Q.

Object to the form.
No.

(BY MR. ROSSMAN) Did you have an

15

understanding that he was scheduled for eye

16

surgery?

17

A.

Yes, I knew that.

18

Q.

How did you become aware of that?

19

A.

Rich told me.

20

Q.

When did he tell you that?

21

A.

Going to Seattle.

22

He was going out of town.

When?

23

Q.

Yeah.

24

A.

Probably a good two weeks prior to

25

going.
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Printed: 02/19/2013

!Personnel lnform'atioOs
Employee Name

Address

WRIGHT RICHARD THOMAS
Dept/ Div
15 / 101 Administration/Administration
Birthdate

Payroll Class
1-Admln

Sex Race
M White

Marital Status
Single
Pay Band
2

Class Code Class Title
76
Director of Administration

jpetails of Changes

2;

..

Employee# Retirement Code
56863
Regular

Employee Status
At Will

FLSA Exmt

7K

D

Rate of Pay
$92125.00 per year

Supp. Income

7K

D

Annual Hrs Annual Pay
2080
$92,125.00

'7
New PCN: 1500001

Wage Type Rate of Pay
Salary
$93,663.00

Addi. Income
$1,658.00

o

tr

Action: Merit Increase
Effective Date: 09/09/2012
Work Hours Type
Full Time

Job No.

Est. Annual Hrs Annual Pay
2080
$93,663.00

Pay Period Amt
$3,602.42

Budget Impact Amt
$1,538.00
1.64%

Addi. Income
$1,658.00
Wage% Increase
1.67%

Class Code
76

l~ene~al Remarks

-;:;;..,

'

tz±

1.67% Merit; 1.80% One-time pay

.,

Employee Approval

~

I

I

a

Ada County Commissioners
David Lynn Case Approved on 9/14/2012
Richard L. Yzaguirre Approved on 9/17/2012
Sharon M. Ullman Approved on 9/20/2012

Appointing Authority

Human Resources Director

Owana Sue Axtman Approved on 9/4/2012

Richard Thomas Wright Acknowledged on 9/13/2012

ADA 525
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Printed: 02/19/2013

PCN: 1500001

Employee Name

Address

WRIGHT RICHARD THOMAS
Payroll Class
2-Staff\Part Time

Dept/ Div
15 / 101 Administration/Administration
Birthdate

Marital Status
Single

Sex Race
M White

Pay Band
0

Class Code Class Title
76
Director of Administration

!~?tails of£hanges

0: .

Employee# Retirement Code
56863
Regular

Employee Status
At Will

FLSA Exmt

7K

D

Rate of Pay
$80000.00 per year

Action: Reclassification
Effective Date: 08/16/2009
Employee Status
AtWill

Retirement Code
Regular

Payroll Class
1-Admin

Addi. Income

Work Hours Type
Full Time

Annual Hrs Annual Pay
2080
$80,000.00

Pay Period Amt
$3,076.92

Pay Band
2
Sheriff's Pay Plan

Est. Annual Hrs Annual Pay
2080
$80,000.00

Supp. Income

o

New PCN: 1500001
Class Code Class Title
76
Director of Administration

FLSA Exemption
Administrative

Wage Type Rate of Pay
Salary
$80,000.00

Job No.

7K

Step / College I Longevity

D
Budget Impact Amount
Not Available

Wage % Increase
0.00%

lGep~ral Remarks
':). . ,
.
.
,
_.
,
This reclassification is a result of the reorganization of Administrative Services to the Department of Administration. No salary
Increase. The mid-year approval is attached.

j.Authorlzatlons

Employee Approval

·I

I

Ada County Commissioners
Fred D. Tilman Approved on 8/18/2009
Richard L. Yzaguirre Approved on 8/19/2009
Sharon M. Ullman Approved on 8/19/2009

Appointing Authority

Human Resources Director

Bethany Ann Calley Approved on 8/17/2009

Bethany Ann Calley for Richard Thomas Wright Acknowledged c
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Wt

., ,., •

.......

ti(

Printed: 09/15/2006 11: 11 am
-=·· 7

·-

•

WRIGHT RICHARD THOMAS
Dept/ Div
09 I 000 Commissioners

Step/Longevity/College Payroll Class
2-Staff\Part Time
Sex Race
M White

Marital Status
Single
Pay Band
4

Class Code Class Title
935
Public Information Officer

Lg:tall~otfh?"Jt~S: ;dr

·s

.,

, ;

·cu

• , , • · fl"

T::r6:fH f M ~,

FLSA Exmt

Employee Status

rt

...

iMI

Action: Transfer Hire
Effective Date: 09/17/2006

Employee Name
WRIGHT RICHARD THOMAS
Soc. Sec. No.

Job No.
2034

Annual Hrs Annual Pay
0
ta'J f I t

.,.

•

'

·1

I

Address

Date of Birth Sex
M

Retirement Code
Regular

7K

D

Rate of Pay
$55,000.00 per year

tl

ti

Employee# Retirement Code
56863
Regular

Race
White

Marital Status
Single

Class Code Class Title
935
PUB INF OFFICER

Replaced Employee Name
Keeping Same Position

Pay Band
4

Employee Status
At Will

Prior County Emp Payroll Class
[ZJ
2-Staff\Part Time
Wage Type
Salary

FLSA Exemption Work Hours Type
Full Time
Administrative

Rate of Pay
$60,888.00

Est. Anni Hrs Annual Pay
2080
$60,888.00

Supp. Income

Pay Period Amt
$2,341.85

Inter Dept Transfer Sick Hrs Transferred

~q-envral:~erhark~:h :)_ ..-•M#s?"'l':)". n'"w

Sheritrs
Pay Plan

Budget Impact Amt Wage Inc.
$5,888.00
9.67%
10.71%

7K

D

Step I Longevity/ College

Comp Hrs Transferred Vac Hrs Transferred

0
,;;1.. "I)· di._--; -,

. -- ..

~-= .•···-·- ,

\«

6

o··

1

-~

'.-

I

Transfer to Dept 6 in new FY. All accrued sick and vacation transfers with the employee. This action includes a special salary
increase of $5,888.

/
110 ote"t+•iee:5:<• nr11

~

mi'dtti

,·1,:rlo11-,·y

~

.,.es »

+

e W

#a

d SWht rt II ft

.,

Employee Approval

Ada County Commissioners
Richard L Yzaguirre Approved on 9/15/2006

Appointing Authority

Human Resources Director

Dala L Mahaffey Approved on 9/11/2006

Derek S Voss Acknowledged on 9/14/2006

•••• ere

4-
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Employee Name

Printed: 06/25/2009 07:45 am

,:

itt

rt b' ··~·

{oti,}56:,e IS

Address

Wright Richard Thomas
Dept/ Div
15 / 101 Administrative Services/Administration
Birthdate

Sex Race

Job No.

~ 1

=

:¥~-

C

>
~

Pay Band

Payroll Class

Employee #

7K

Employee Status

Marital Status

Class Code Class Title

IOetalls of C.hanaes._ .

Step I Longevity/ College

FLSA Exmt Rate of Pay

;#

l'trt

btr

Annual Pay

r#-

Action: Transfer Hire
Effective Date: 06/17/2009

-M

=

:h : ... ; :

New PCN: 1500001

~

Employee Name
WRIGHT RICHARD THOMAS
Date of Birth Sex

Retirement Code
Regular

Race
White
Class Code Class Title
DIR ADMIN SVCS
78

Est. Anni Hrs Annual Pay
2080
$80,000.00

Pay Period Amt
$3,076.92

Marital Status
Single

Employee Status
At Will

Pay Band
2

Addi. Income

Supp. Income

Inter DDTransfer Sick Hrs Transferred

~l

Prior County Emp Payroll Class
1-Admin

l2J

FLSA Exemption Work Hours Type
Administrative
Full Time

Replaced Employee Name
Derek Voss
Rate of Pay
$80,000.00

:: .,,

Sheriffs
Pay Plan

Una,·alloblc

Wage Type
Salary

7K

D

Step / College I Longevity

Comp Hrs Transferred Vac Hrs Transferred

Budget Impact Amt Wage Inc.
$33,492.00 [1.87%
20.32%

, +

*

;1

Employee Approval

Ada County Commissioners

Appointing Authority

Human Resources Director

Dala L. Oldham Approved on 6/23/2009

Richard Thomas Wright Acknowledged on 6/24/2009
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Notice of Personnel Action
Personnel Information
Last Name

Middle

First

Wright, Richard T.

City

Address

Department I Division

Commissioners 9.000,
Commissioners 9.000
Birthdale
Soc. Sec. No.

Zip Code

State

Step I Longevity I
College
I I

PayroN / Budget Class

Employee Control No. I
Retirement Code

Sex/Race

Marital Status

Employee Status I 7K

I
I

I
Class Title

Class Code I Job
No.

Pay Band / FLSA
Exempt

Rate of Pay

Annual Pay

I

I

$0.00 Per

$0

Details of Changes

Effective Date: 02/06/2006
Action: New Hire/
Employee Status:

At Will

Employee Name: Last,

Wright,

First - Middle
Richard - Thomas

Employee Notes ID:
Address
Ci . State Zi

Sex:
Race:
Marital Status:

Male
White
S

Sheriffs Pay Plan (only):

Step:
Post Cert/College Credit:
Longevity:
7K·
To Pay Band:
To class title:
To class code:
To Payroll Class:
FLSA Exempt:
Retirement Code:

(Sheriff or Juvenile only)
2
Public Information Director

935

y

R

Hours sick time (up to 48 hours reinstated)
Is this an Interdepartmental Transfer? No
Work Hours: Full Time
Wage Type:

Annual

$55000 per year
$2115.38 per Pay Period (HR Budget Only)
Additional Income:

ADA 535

EXHIBIT F

000145

'

I

COMMISSIONERS'
OFFICE

ADA COUNTY

200 W. Front Street, 3rd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 287-7000
Fax (208) 287-7009
bocc1@adaweb.net
www.adaweb.net

January 15, 2013

RE:

Employment with Ada County

Dear Rich:
The purpose of this correspondence is to inform you that the Board of Ada County
Commissioners intend to reorganize the Ada County Department of
Administration. We regret to inform you that as a consequence of this process
your position is being eliminated. Commissioner Yzaguirre will meet with you to
enable you to retrieve your personal effects this evening.
Please be advised that after today's date you are not required to report to work.
Ada County will, however, continue your salary and benefits through the end of
this month.
Thank you for your service to Ada County.
Sincerely,

Commissioner

- v~
C\

--

.fi1:£T(G~
~~ss1oner
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''

ADA COUNTY

COMMISSIONERS'
OFFICE
200 W. Front Street, 3rd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 287-7000
Fax (208) 287-7009
boccl@adaweb.net
www.adaweb.net

January 24. 2013

Sent via email: richtwright@mac.com

Rich Wright

Dear Rich:
Bethany Calley brought your email dated January 23, 2013 to our attention today. As our
prior correspondence indica~d, the Board made the decision on January 14, 2013 to
reorganize the Department of Administration. At that time, your position was eliminated.
As a courtesy to you we extended your pay and benefits through the end of February. The
decision to reorganize the Department of Administration has not changed.
It is our understanding that Ms. Calley has already answered your payroll concerns.
Should you have any additional questions please do not hesitate to contact the Board
directly.
Sincerely,

(D,JJL~

J--· 'v

______

missioner
....__

JvJ...

mmissioner

Commissioner
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COMMISSIONERS'
OFFICE

ADA COUNTY

200 W. Front Street, 3rd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 287-7000
Fax (208) 287-7009
boccl@adaweb.net
www.adaweb.net

January 18, 2013
VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL
&U.S.MAIL
Rich Wright

RE:

FMLA Requests

Dear Rich:
On January 18, 2013, it came to our attention that you sent two FMLA requests to Cassie Danell
in the Department of Administration on January 2, 2013. As Lasik eye sw·gery does not meet the
FMLA definition of serious health condition, this request for FMLA leave is denied. Your
second request for FMLA leave was for time to attend counseling. In response to Ms. Danell's
request, your counselor sent the appropriate certification infonnation on January 15, 2013.
Based on the statement from your counselor, you have requested FMLA leave beginning in
December through February for two one hour appointments a month. As the form attached
indicates, this request is grantpd and we are extending your pay and benefits through the month
of February to cover the requested FMLA leave. This extension of pay and benefits does not
change the fact that due to departmental reorganization, your position has been eliminated.
Should you have any questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact the Board directly.
.

.

Commissioner

Encls.

ADA499
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,,

..

Designation Notice
(Family and Medical Leave Act)
To: Rich Wright
From: Cassie Danell, Human Resources Specialist
Date:1/18/2013
We have reviewed your request for leave under the FMLA and any supporting documentation that you have
provided. We received your most recent information on 1/15/2013 and determined:

1'8:1 Your leave qualifies under the FMLA.

Leave taken for the reason listed on the request wlll be
designated as FMLA leave for the following dates: 12/20/2012 through 2/28/2013.
The FMLA requires that you notify us as soon as practicable if dates of scheduled leave change or are
extended, or were initially unknown. Based on the information you have provided to date, we are providing
the following information about the amount of time that will be counted toward your leave entitlement:

D Provided there is no deviation from your anticipated leave schedule, the following number of hours,
days, or weeks will be counted toward your leave entitlement:

days.

1'8:1 Because the leave you need will be unscheduled, it is not possible to provide the hours, days, or
weeks that will be counted toward your FMLA entitlement at this time. You have the right to
request this information once in a 30-day period (if leave was taken in the 30-day period).
Please be advised:
Ada County requires you to use paid leave (sick leave, compensatory [comp] time, and vacation leave,
in that order) before unpaid leave is taken under the FMLA. You may elect to keep a balance of 16
hours of accrued sick leave for future use or to exhaust all sick leave during your FMLA leave.

D You will be required to provide return to work documentation to be restored to employment.

If such

documentation is not received in a timely manner, your return to work may be delayed until
documentation is provided.
_ _ _ ,.,..,,_,

•

.~ ..

..o · -

.. ~ - w - • • •

• • •••

•••••

,,,, ......

_._,ct~------

D Additional information is needed to determine if your request qualifies under the FMLA.
D The certification you have provided is not complete and sufficient to determine whether the FMLA
applies to your leave request. You must provide the information listed below no later than
I I
, unless it is not practicable under the particular circumstances despite your diligent
good faith efforts, or your leave may be denied.

D We are exercising our right to have you obtain a second or third medical opinion at our expense.

.

·---··---

We will provide further details at a later time.
,_ . ,.... _. ..,...._ ........ ~ .. '"'.

D Your FMLA Leave request Is not approved.
'"~'\'•'

,,,,,..,r,••,., _ _ _ __

D The FMLA does not apply to your leave request.
.... .

~

- - ,.,-1 ........... - - " '

D You have exhausted your FMLA! leave entitlement In the applicable 12-month period.
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Certification of Health Care Provider
Empioyee's Serious Health Condition
(f=amily and Medical Leave Act)
l
Please retum to:
~ County Department of Administration
Human Resources Division, Attn: Employee Relations Advisor
200 Front Street, Boise, ID, 83702
orFAXto(208)287-6999

w.

-=o~

~

_. ·ffl.~~:1.jt~J~~:-t~ilrt[~

lnatructlona to the EMPLOYEE: The frMLA pem,its Ada County to require that you submit a Umely, complete,
and sufficl•nt medical certification to support a request for FMLA leave due to your own serious health condition. If
requested by Ada County, your response is required to obtain or retain the benefit of FMLA protections. Failure to
provide a complete and sufficient medlcjal certification may result in a denial of your FMLA request. Ada County
must give you at least 15 calendr.day~ rett.m-this form,
--- -·- --. . .. . -Employee Name

R1dir3l2.0

Flr11

Jnon,AS
Middle

Employee Job Title~_()=-,R_t:_d-tY
__·ci
__f-l_l\=-t'h..;;.:t.:..::Wc.;;.,1$....,ih'~A!i.;..t=O;;...;N=-------------

Instruction, to the HEALTH CARE ~OVIDER: Your patient has requested leave under the FMLA. Answer, fully
and completely, an applicable parts. several questions seek a response as to the frequency or duration of a
condition, treatment. etc. Your answer should be your best estimate based upon your mecical knowledge,
experience, and examination of the patil9nl Be as specific as you can; tem,s such as "Hfetime, • "unknown,• or
"indetenninate· may not be sufficient to detemilne FMLA coverage. Limit your responses to the condition for which
the employee is seeking leave. Please be sure to sign the fo.m, on the last page.
The Genetic lnfonnation Nondiscriminaiion Act of 2008 (GINA) prohibits employers and other entities covered by
GINA Tille II from requesting or requiring genetic information of an individual or famlly member of the individual,
except as speclflcalfY allowed by this law. To comply wHh this /aw, we are asking that you not provide any genetic
information when responding to this request for medical information. ·Genetic Information,# as defined by GINA,
includes an individual's famlly medical History, the results of an individual's or family member's genetic tests, the
fact that an indMdual or an Individual's family member sought or received genetic services, and genetic information
of a fetus carried by an Individual or an /fldividual's family membar or an embryo lawfully held by an individual or
family member receiving assistfve reprd(Juctive services.

Date(s) you treated the patient for condition:

~c. V?, 1Pt1--- :t
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.
Will the patient need to have treatmtnt visits at least twice per year due to the condition? 0No
Was medication, other than over-~~unter medication, prescribed?

[JJr{o"

Oves

Was the pa~nt referred to other he-1th care provider(s) for evaluation or treatment (e.g., physical therapist)?
0No
~Yes If so, state the nat,we d such treatments and expected duration d treatment:

~~ ,

H-1'.s M .d). ;1?JY

2. Is the medical condition pregnancy?! ~No

Oves

cJv.ctc- (-e vµ . -t- ~

If so, expected delivery date:....,.._ _ _ _ __

3. Is the employee unable to perform ~Y of his/her job functions due to the condition? ~ o

Oves

If so. identify the job functions the e~ployee is unable to perform:
4. Describe other relevant mecfrcal fac\S, if any, related to the condition for which the employee seeks leave (such
mecical facts may lndude symptomi, diagnosis, or any regimen of continuing treatment such as the use of
specialized equipment):

·-·. ......

--.~. ~ =---.~-'-i . - ---· -··· .. -

- . --.--..

-*>vkl•'i:)~
~~~·~"'%.~,lt;;;ii!~Hl
:'Jl'.~[~:5":~J
ltaa..,ef'.Ardbom:··0s.-rutA.ve!NE1:ce~<t«Nii·com'1itiif;~fiea~1
_,!! -~~,, ·-------·~--- ., . . . .
~
P.. --~Y.L. . ~ - . P...
. . B,..~.:,,
..• !&,",t.r,:ii.·~.J>...:.f\1%:.l~.Oill--~-

Iii'.

~- ••

.. .••

5. Will the employee be Incapacitated for a single continuous.Plrlod of time due to his/her medical condition,
including any time for treatment an~ recovery? 0No
l,LJYes
:;_ hn . / ~
If so. estimate the beginning and endln dates for the Incapacity: .,_.

6. WIii the employee need to attend low-up treatment appointm
because of the employee's medlcal:conditlon?
No
es

r:J:.. 2fJ,o

fr.lo. 1 :2. o(.l ( Of'P~)

or work part-time or~ reduced schedul~

'l"Y

~ :2.. V\( S •
Estimate treatment schedule, if any, including the dates of any scheduled appointments and the time
f / ~OK.ii
required for each appointment, Including any recovery period:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
If so, are the treatments or the reduced number of hours of work medically necessary? 0No

'2fves

-----+----'-.u....;...._-2:..,~./--J...!.-=.~~.......i,.a.u-U=-........_._.=.:.....u.~"----.:...:~ /

Estimate the part-time or reduced wo
_ _ _ hour(s) per day;

ft\.b .

schedule the employee needs, if any:
days per week from _ _ _ _ __

7. Will the co~:, cause episodic flare-ups periodically preventing the employee from performing his/her job
functions? ~ N ~ s
·
__
Is it medically necessary for th~ employee to be absent from ~ N o __OYes
If so, please explain:

...

·~

.jJu'S ~- h - - ~ ,
ru,.

Based upon the patient's medical history and your knowledge of the medical condition, estimate the ''
A ..
~ / 1 ~~
frequency d flare-ups and the duration of related incapacity that the patient may have over the next 6 17"" ~
.,.,....
months (e.g. 1 episode every 3months lasting 1-2 days):
.
d,o

n6~

Frequency:
Duration:

ti~es per
hours or

week(s)

month(s)

c...l){.IY-1' ~

day(s) per episode

7fll

l,we-t
Date

cg~.4.,J.D/3
Page2 of2
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Cassie Danell
Rich Wright
Wednesday, January 02, 2013 4:36 PM
Cassie Danell
RE: FMLA Documents

From:
Sent:

To:
Subject:

Thanks Cassie; You may be getting certifications from two different providers ... Just giving you a heads up. I was able to
fax one today and need to mail hardcopy to the second provider.
Let me know if you have any questions.
Thanks,
Rich
From: cassie Danell

Sent: Wednesday, January 02, 2013 1:45 PM
To: Rich Wright
Subject: FMLA Documents

Hi Rich,
Attached is your Notice of Eligibility and Rights and Responsibilities in response to your request for Family Medical Leave
(FMLA).
Ada County requires that an employee's leave due to the employee's own serious health condition be supported by a
certification issued by the health care provider of the employee. Failure to provide complete and sufficient certification
may result in the denial of the FMLA leave. The certification paperwork is attached.
Ada County requires the use of paid leave (sick leave, compensatory [comp] time, and vacation leave, in that order)
before unpaid leave is taken under the FMLA. Employees may elect to keep a balance of sixteen (16) hours of accrued
sick leave for future use or to exhaust all sick leave. If an employee wishes to retain sick leave, notice must be provided
to the supervisor of this request.
For a full description of the Ada County FMLA policy please see the Ada County Handbook and Procedural Guidelines at
http:l/adacountyportal/departments/admin/hr/HANDBOOK/Employee-Manager%20Handbook%20.pdf
If you have any questions regarding the paperwork attached or the FMLA, please let me know.
Thanks,
Cassie

Cassie Danell, PHR
Human Resources Specialist
Ada County Department of Administration
200 W. Front St., Boise, ID 83702
(208) 287-7107 phone
(208) 287-6999 fax
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Notice of Eligibility and
Rights & Responsibilities
Farylily and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)

To: Rich Wright
From: Cassie Danell, Human Resources Specialist
Date: 1/2/2013
On 1/2/2013, you informed us that you need leave beginning on 1/17/2013 for the reason(s) checked below:
0The birth of a child, or the placement of a child with you for adoption or foster care.
~Your own serious health condition.'
Dvou are needed to care for your parent due to his/her serious health condition.
DA qualifying exigency arising out of the fact that your spouse is on active duty or called to active duty status
in support of a contingency operation as a member of the National Guard or Reserves.
Dvou are needed to care for your spouse who is a covered servicemember with a serious injury or illness
sustained while on active duty.

This Notice is to inform you that you: .
~Are eligible for FMLA leave (See Part B below for Rights & Responsibilities)
OAre not eligible for FMLA leave because (only one reason need be checked, although you may not be eligible
for other reasons):
Dvou have not met the 12-month length of service requirement for the FMLA. As of the first date of
requested leave, you will have worked approximately 1 months towards this requirement.
Dvou have not met the 1,250 hours-worked requirement of the FMLA.

F~~~rom~;~HR~1ww~r&11i@i.~,iiiJR,r1~~~1ZeAv!~~i]-~~~~1
'
As explained in Part A, you meet the eligibility requirements for taking FMLA leave. However, in order to determine
whether your absence qualifies as FMLA leave, the following information must be returned to us by 1/18/2013. If
sufficient information is not provided a timely manner, your leave may be denied.

in

~Sufficient certification to support yOtJr request for FMLA leave. A Certification of Health Care Provider form
requesting the necessary information is enclosed.
Osufficient documentation to establi~h the required relationship between you and your family member.
Oother information needed:
0No additional Information requested.
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Ada County
Job Description

DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION
Department: Ada Count Department of Administration
Reports To: · Board of County Commissioners
Class Code: 76
EEO Category: A
Supervisory Responsibility: Yes

Pay Band: 002
FLSA Status: Exempt-Exec
Scope: Countywide
At-Will

GENERAL STATEMENT OF DUTIES: Responsible for overseeing an internal service organization
providing integrated business solutions; oversees enterprise risk management, human resources, employee
benefits, training and development, purchasing and business process service programs; develops, conducts
and evaluates public information and public contact programs for the Commissioners' Office and other
county offices and departments as necessary; oversees office management functions for the Commissioners'
Office; serves as technical advisor to the Board of County Commissioners (BOCC) on public information,
human resources and risk-related matters; and, performs related duties as required.
PRIMARY JOB RESPONSIBILITIES:
• Acts as the Public Information Director and plans and implements programs designed to meet the
County's communication objectives as well as manages and coordinates public relations and
media relations activities on behalf of the Ada County Commissioners and individual departments
as assigned;
• Acts as Human Resources Director and oversees a comprehensive human resources program for
the County that includes employee relations, recruitment and retention, compensation and
classification, personnel budget and human resource information systems;
• Acts as Employee Benefits Director and oversees the County's comprehensive employee benefits
programs including medical, dental, vision, life and disability insurance, flexible spending account
plans, retirement, deferred compensation 457(b) plans, unemployment insurance, sick leave,
vacation leave, military leave, court/jury duty leave, and holidays; .
• Participates as an ex-officio, non-voting member of the Ada County Self-Funded Health Care
Trust;
• Oversees an enterprise risk management program that includes risk identification and
management, loss prevention, accident investigation and analysis, insurance procurement and
management, tort claims and lawsuit investigations, defense and negotiations and other activities
to protect the County's corporate value;
• Provides advice and guidance to the BOCC regarding countywide leadership and professional
development as well as strategic planning, performance evaluation, business analysis, project
management, budget process, and business continuity;
• Directly involved in the insurance renewal process for Employee Benefits and Risk Management;
• Analyzes and researches insurance plans for quality, scope of coverage, and type of insurance,
exclusions, legal implications, and performs cost-benefit analyses;
• Works with legal staff in the coordination, investigation, defense, and negotiation of settlements of
tort claims and lawsuits against the County;
• Manages the county's Self-Insurance Reserve Fund and mitigates associated financial risks;
• Oversees staff involved in the planning, development and implementation of countywide and
department level leadership, professional development and computer training programs;
• Oversees staff involved in countywide bid solicitation, bid law compliance, development of
purchasing policies and procedures and provides advice and guidance regarding complex
solicitations;

EXHIBIT I
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Oversees professional staff involved in working with individual departments and offices regarding
strategic planning, business analysis and project management;
Oversees the office management functions for the Commissioners' Office; and
Develops and presents proposed budgets, and monitors expenditures and budget balances for the
Department of Administration.

JOB SPECIFICATIONS:
• Bachelor's degree in Communications, Human Resources, Risk Management or a related field;
• Master's degree in Business Management, Public Administration or a related field preferred;
• A minimum of 10 years of management experience;
• Knowledge of federal and state laws, regulations and standards for the management, storage and
disclosure of confidential and public information and current principles, techniques, methods, and
objective of public information management;
• Knowledge of the role of local governments; the goals and objectives of new media organizations;
and the strategies used in advertising, marketing and promotional activities;
• Knowledge of the principles and practices of human resource management and administration;
• Knowledge of the principles and practices of administrative management;
• Knowledge of the concept and application of traditional and enterprise risk management;
• Knowledge of employee benefits program management and administration;
• Knowledge of purchasing practices in a public sector environment;
• Knowledge of effective employee supervision and motivation;
• Skill in strategic planning and the development of long-term organizational strategies;
• Ability to use public relations strategies and communication tools;
• Ability to analyze statistical and financial data;
• Ability to communicate effectively verbally and in writing and exercise tact and discretion;
• Ability to mediate disputes, deescalate issues and affect change;
• Ability to maintain confidentiality of sensitive employee issues and records;
• Ability to effectively lead and manage others;
• Ability to work effectively with elected officials and department directors.
WORK ENVIRONMENT AND PHYSICAL DEMANDS:
• Work is performed primarily in an office environment and the employee in this class is subject to
inside environmental conditions;
• Requires sitting at a desk for long periods of time, up to 8 hours and ability to lift up to 20 lbs.;
• Requires sufficient personal mobility and physical reflexes, to permit the employee to function in
a general office environment and accomplish tasks.
DISCLAIMER:
To perform this job successfully, an individual must be able to perform the primary job responsibilities
satisfactorily with or without reasonable accommodation. The above statements are intended to describe
the general nature and level of work being assigned to this job. They are not intended to be construed as
an exhaustive list of all responsibilities, duties and skills required of individuals in the job. This job
description is not an employment agreement and/or an expressed or implied employment contract.
Management has the exclusive right to alter this job description at any time without notice.
Adopted: 6/09 B. Calley
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Ada County Job Description
Chief of Staff
FLSA Status:
EEO Category:
Reports To:

Exempt - Admin

Class Code:
Pay Band:

B
BOCC

14
04

GENERAL SUMMARY
The Chief of Staff provides professional assistance and recommendations on County issues to the Board of County
Commissioners (BOCC). The Chief of Staff leads County efforts to develop and maintain communications and
cooperation with other government agencies; oversees open and transparent government initiatives; serves as an advisor
and makes recommendations covering a broad range of County matters. ·
DISTINGUISHING FEATURES OF THE CLASS
This position is given a high degree of latitude to exercise independent discretion and judgment. At this level, analysis is
complex due to variations within the organization, operations, and systems processes. In addition, the actions and
decisions made by this position will impact the decisions made by the BOCC, elected officials, and department heads.
ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS
• Advises on a variety of County issues and assists in the development of county policies, procedures, and practices;
• Coordinates initiatives to create open and transparent government operations;
• Develops and maintains relationships with government agencies, County staff, media, and other private entities;
• Coordinates communications, public relations and media relations activities on behalf of the BOCC;
• Chairs and participates on committees as directed;
• Briefs the BOCC on matters of concern and secures information required for proper action;
• Works directly with department directors on day-to-day issues, special projects and urgent matters to assist in
solution development, and monitors implementation of programs;
• Provides advice and assistance to the BOCC on county service delivery and coordinates cross departmental
project management;
• Reviews proposed policies in order to advise the BOCC regarding such proposals;
• Functions as liaison for the BOCC regarding countywide budget matters;
• Assures implementation of programs developed and initiated by the BOCC, involving employees and citizens as
needed to measure effectiveness of such programs;
• On behalf of the BOCC, represents the County's interests to other public and private entities and represents the
County at other appropriate meetings;
• Performs related functions as required.
JOB REQUIREMENTS
• Bachelor's degree in Public Administration, Political Science, Business Administration or related field, or an
equivalent combination of education and experience;
• A minimum of six (6) years direct work experience in government or with government agencies;
• Knowledge of the role of local governments, the goals and objectives of media organizations, and the strategies
used in advertising, marketing and promotional activities;
• Knowledge of the laws, ordinances, and regulations relating to County government;
• Extensive knowledge of effective principles of management, employee supervision, planning, and budgeting;
• Skill in strategic planning and the development of long-term organizational strategies;
ADA 646
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Skill in the use of public relations strategies and communication tools;

•
•

Skill in making public presentations and persuading others;
Ability to establish and maintain effective working relationships with co-workers, department directors
and elected officials as well as external organizations;

•
•
•
•
•
•

Ability to analyze statistical and financial data;
Ability to communicate effectively verbally and in writing and exercise tact and discretion;
Ability to mediate disputes, deescalate issues and affect change;
Ability to maintain confidentiality of sensitive employee issues and records;
Ability to effectively lead and manage others;
Ability to work effectively with elected officials and department directors.

WORK ENVIRONMENT AND PHYSICAL DEMANDS
• Work is performed primarily in an office environment and the employee in this class is subject to inside
environmental conditions;
• May be required to lift up to 20 lbs.;
• Requires sufficient personal mobility and physical reflexes, which permit the employee to function in a general
office environment to accomplish tasks.
DISCLAIMER:
To perform this job successfully, an individual must be able to perform the essential functions satisfactorily with or
without reasonable accommodation. The above statements are intended to describe the general nature and level of work
being assigned to this job. They are not intended to be construed as an exhaustive list of all responsibilities, duties and
skills required of individuals in the job. This job description is not an employment agreement and/or an expressed or
implied employment contract. Management has the exclusive right to alter this job description at any time without notice.
Adopted:
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Employee/Manager Handbook

Chapter 2: Guide for Employees and Managers

CHAPTER 2: GUIDE FOR EMPLOYEES AND MANAGERS
SECTION 2.1 EMPLOYMENT LEGAL COMPLIANCE
It is Ada County's policy to comply with all applicable federal, state, and local laws. This
includes but is not limited to: the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA), the Equal Pay
Act (EPA), the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),
the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA), the Idaho Garnishment Law, the Idaho Wage Payment Law,
the Idaho Public Records Law, the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Uniformed
Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), and the Idaho Workers'
Compensation Law.

2.1.1 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY/ TITLE VII OF CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT
Ada County is an equal opportunity employer. It is the policy of Ada County to prohibit
discrimination and to afford equal employment opportunities to employees and applicants,
without regard to race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, disability, citizenship (with
valid work authorization), or veteran status (other than veterans' preference). The policy of
equal employment opportunity and anti-discrimination applies to all aspects of the
relationship between Ada County and its employees, including but not limited to:
• Recruitment and employment
• Promotions and transfers
• Training and working conditions
• Wages and salary administration
• Employee benefits and application of policies
• Discipline and termination
The policies and principles of equal employment opportunity also apply to the treatment of
independent contractors, individuals working on Ada County premises who are employed
by temporary agencies and any other persons doing business for or with Ada County.

HARASSMENT
Ada County is committed to providing a work environment where its employees and those
served by the County are treated respectfully and are free from harassment. Employees are
responsible for respecting the rights of coworkers and others to be free from harassment.

GENERAL HARASSMENT
General harassment is conduct that is insulting, degrading and shows hostility toward an
individual such that it interferes with the individual's work environment and performance.
General harassment is conduct that is so severe or occurs with such sufficient frequency to
create a hostile or offensive work environment. General harassment does not include
7
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Employee/Manager Handbook

Chapter 2: Guide for Employees and Managers

management actions including duty assignments, disciplinary actions, and performance
appraisals.
Prohibited general harassment includes the following types of behavior:
• Verbal or written communication that contains degrading comments or jokes.
• Intimidating or threatening conduct directed at an employee.

DISCRIMINATION BASED HARASSMENT
Harassment based on an employee's sex, age, color, race, national origin, religion, or
disability is a form of discrimination and is a violation of this policy. Sexual harassment is
a form of discrimination and violates this policy.
Sexual harassment is defined as unwelcome sexual advances, request for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when:
• Submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly as a term or
condition of an individual's employment.
• Submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for
employment decisions affecting such individuals.
• Such conduct has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment.

RETALIATION
All employees are responsible for assisting supervisors and managers in creating and
sustaining a harassment-free environment by respecting the rights of others to be free from
harassment and acts of retaliation. Retaliation against someone who reports harassment or
discrimination, or who participates in an investigation, is strictly prohibited. Retaliatory
acts may include but are not limited to: unsubstantiated negative appraisals, inappropriate
changes in job assignments or duties, exclusion from meetings, or negative treatment by
coworkers. Retaliation does not include disciplinary actions taken against an employee for
filing a fabricated claim of harassment, nor does it include disciplinary actions taken against
an employee for performance issues not related to the harassment complaint or
investigation.
Employees should report acts of retaliation to a supervisor, manager, department head,
elected official, or the Ada County Human Resource Manager. Reports of retaliation will
be promptly investigated. Appropriate follow-up measures may be taken as necessary.
Disciplinary action, up to and including termination, may be taken against anyone who
violates this retaliation policy.

VIOLATIONS
Violations of this policy, regardless of whether or not an actual law has been violated, will
not be tolerated. Ada County will investigate every issue that is brought to its attention in
this area and will take appropriate disciplinary action, up to and including termination of
employment.

8
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Kirtlan G. Naylor
[ISB No. 3569]
Bruce J. Castleton
[ISB No. 6915]
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
Attorneys at Law
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 610
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516
Email: kirt@naylorhales.com; bjc@naylorhales.com

NO.
FIL~~
A.M.----

CHR1S-10PHER o. RICH, Clerk
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendant Ada County

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,

Li

Case No. CV-OC-13-02730

0

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.

ADA COUNTY, political subdivision of the
State ofldaho; ADA COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS

-D
-2

Ci)

l>

r-

Defendants.
Defendant Ada County, Ada County Board of County Commissioners 1, by and
through its attorneys ofrecord, Naylor & Hales, P.C., hereby file their Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56. For the reasons stated herein, Defendant's
Motion should be granted and Plaintiffs claims dismissed with prejudice.

Ada County Board of County Commissioners is not a proper party as it is not a governmental
entity that can be sued. To the extent that any claims could be alleged against the Commission, this
Motion for Summary Judgment applies to those claims as well. However, Defendant does not waive
the right to move to dismiss this "party" at a later date.
1
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OCT \ 0 20\4
By KATRINA THIESSEN

-

I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

Defendant Ada County (hereinafter the "County") is a political subdivision of the State of
Idaho, which is governed by a three member Board of County Commissioners (hereinafter
"Commissioners"). (SOP, ,r 1.) Plaintiff Rich Wright was hired by the County in 2006 as the Public
Information Officer and on or around June 17, 2009 Wright became the Director of Administrative
Service, which was reclassified as Director of Administration in August 2009. (SOF ,r 2.) Wright
held that position until his termination on January 15, 2013. (Id.)
On February 12, 2013, Wright filed his initial Complaint against Ada County. On July 2,
2013, Wright filed an Amended Complaint alleging that Wright was terminated in violation of the
Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act (the "Whistleblower Act" or the "Act") and in violation
of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). (Amended Complaint, Counts 1-11.) The Amended
Complaint also alleges claims for "Negligent and/or Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress."

(Id., Count Ill.) All four of these claims are now before this Court for summary judgment.
First, Wright attempts to state a cause of action under the Whistleblower Act because he
alleges that his termination was in retaliation for his role as Director of Administration in the
"initiation" of investigations related two different employees, Dee Oldham and Jim Farrens.
(Amended Complaint,

,r,r 9, 17, 32.; SOF ,r 11.)

There were two investigations relating to Dee

Oldham. The first investigation was based on allegations of general harassment. (Amended
Complaint ,r,r 8-9; SOF

,r,r 12-13.)

The second investigation was regarding Ms. Oldham's job

In conjunction with this Memorandum, Defendant Ada County has submitted a Statement
of Undisputed Material Facts (hereinafter "SOP") describing the details of the factual background
of this case and noting facts in the record that Defendant has relied· on in support its motion,
specifically citing to the record and documentary evidence, in accordance with Local Rule 8.1.a.
2
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performance. (SOF ,r 15.) Neither of these investigations were related to potential violations of
laws, rules or regulations. (Id.)
Second, similar to the Oldham investigations, the initiation of the investigation into issues
resulting from a letter that Jim Farrens wrote did not relate to potential violations of laws, rules or
regulations. Rather, they were handled as a conflict resolution. (SOF ,r 19 .) Even if the issues were
construed as a hostile work environment complaint as alleged in the Amended Complaint, this only
implicated the County's policy prohibiting general harassment. (Amended Complaint ,r,r 17, 32;
SOF ,r,r 11, 19.)
Regarding the FMLA claim, Wright's employment with Ada County was terminated on
January 15, 2013. (SOF ,r 9.) On January 18, 2013, the Commissioners became aware for the first
time that Wright had submitted an application for leave under the FMLA prior to his termination.
(SOF ,r,r 23-28.) However, the required certification for his application was not received by the
County until January 15, 2013, the same day that Wright's employment was terminated. (SOF ,r 22.)
Nevertheless, the Commissioners extended Wright's salary and benefits to coincide with what would
have been the end of his FMLA had he remained employed with the County. (SOF

,r,r 10, 28.)

Wright's position remained eliminated. (SOF ,r 28.)
The third and fourth causes of action in Wright's Amended Complaint alleged by Wright
are for the negligent infliction of emotional distress and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Wright bases these claims on the County's conduct related to the Whistleblower Act claim and the
FMLA claim. (Amended Complaint ,r,r 44-46.)
All four of Wright's claims are now before this Court for summary judgment.
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II.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
"Summary judgement is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho State

Tax Comm'n, 142 Idaho 790, 793 (2006). See also I.R.C.P. 56(c).
"When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, disputed facts are construed in favor of
the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are drawn in
favor of the non-moving party." Id. If reasonable people could reach different conclusions or
inferences from the evidence, the motion must be denied. Van v. Portneuf Medical Center, 147
Idaho 552, 556 (2009).
However, the non-moving party must submit more than just conclusory assertions that an
issue of material facts exists to withstand summary judgment. Id. A mere scintilla of evidence or
only slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for the
purposes of summary judgment. Id. Instead, I.R.C.P. 56(e) provides that the non-moving party must
respond to the motion for summary judgment by "set[ting] forth by affidavit specific facts showing
there is a genuine issue for trial." Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, 138 Idaho 391, 394395 (2008).

III.
ARGUMENT

A.

Plaintiff's Whistleblower Claim Fails as a Matter of Law.
The Whistleblower Act, Idaho Code §§ 6-2101-6-2109, provides "a legal cause of action for

public employees who experience adverse action from their employer as a result of reporting waste
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and violations of a law, rule or regulation." LC.§ 6-2101. In order to protect an employee from such
action, LC.§ 6-2104(2) provides: "An employer may not take adverse action against an employee
because an employee participates or gives information in an investigation, hearing, court proceeding,
legislative or other inquiry, or other form of administrative review." In order to have a valid cause
of action under the Act, "the employee shall establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
employee has suffered an adverse action because the employee, or person acting on his behalf
engaged or intended to engage in an activity protected under section 6-2104, Idaho Code." LC. §
6-2105(4).
In 2008, the Idaho Supreme Court analyzed the Act and set forth the standards a plaintiff
employee must establish in order to survive a defendant employer's motion for summary judgment.

Curlee, 224 P.3d 458 (Idaho 2008). The Court stated that in order to withstand a motion for
summary judgment under the Act, a plaintiff employee must establish a prima facie case for
retaliatory discharge. Id. To do so, a plaintiff employee must demonstrate the following: "(1) she
was an 'employee' that engaged or intended to engage in protected activity; (2) her 'employer' took
adverse action against her; and (3) the existence of causal connection between the protected activity
and the employer's adverse action." Id. at 464 (citing LC. §§ 6-2104, 6-2105(4)).
The Act was created to provide "a legal cause of action for public employees who experience
adverse action from their employer as a result of reporting waste and violations of a law, rule, or
regulation." LC.§ 6-2101 (emphasis added). Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has found that
"[i]mplicit in the Whistleblower Act is the requirement that the employer engage in some sort of
predicate act -which could include ordering an employee to do something illegal, or engaging in
illicit activities itself -that triggers the applicability of the Act in the first place." Black v. Idaho
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State Police, 155 Idaho 570, 314 P.3d 625,629 (2013). Thus, when the entity has not committed
a predicate act contemplated by the Act, the employee has no cause of action under the Act. Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court stated that "simply asking [an employee] to do his job" does not
trigger the Act. Id. In Black, the Executive Director of POST was terminated by the Idaho State
Police (ISP) because he refused to provide to the Director of the ISP with requested proposed letters,
refused to transfer an employee to the ISP offices, and refused to provide a written response to a
report. Id. at 627. The Executive Director contended that he engaged in two protected activities:
(1) that he refused to comply with ISP's requests because they were in violation of the laws or rules

governing the different roles of the two entities and (2) that he communicated his beliefs that the
directives of the Director ofISP were in violation of the administrative rules. Id. at 629. The Court
rejected Black's claims because it found that Black's belief was not objectively reasonable that ISP
had committed a suspected violation of a statute or rule. Id. at 630. In doing so, it especially noted
that "the Whistleblower Act is not intended to protect those who engage in bureaucratic turf
squabbles." Id.

Accordingly, because there was no underlying violation of a statute or rule (or

reasonable belief of a violation) by the governmental entity, the Act was not triggered; the Act did
not create a legal cause of action for Black's discharge. Id. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court
affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on Black's Whistleblower claim in favor
of the ISP. Id.
Thus, the Act cannot be used as a tool to resolve or take action as a result of political,
internal, or organizational issues. The Act only protects activities directed at reporting or blowing
the whistle on the predicate act of wrongdoing related to waste or the violation of a law, rule, or
regulation. See I.C. § 6-2101. When the act predicating the alleged protected activity is not related
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to any wrongdoing implicating waste or the violation of a law, rule, or regulation, then there is no
cause of action under the Act. Thus, the protected activities articulated in Idaho Code § 6-2104 must
relate to a predicate act such that participating or giving information in an investigation must involve
or implicate the reporting waste or violations of a law, rule, or regulation as protected by Idaho Code

§ 6-2101.
For instance, an employee's communications regarding possible loopholes in an entity's
contract with a third party were not protected activities because they only implicated ''potential"
future waste and not actual waste. Van, 147 Idaho at 559. The Court stated "[t]his distinction is
important because the relevant statute, Idaho Code section 6-2104(1)(a) speaks in terms of
'existence' of any waste of public funds." Id. The Court declined to extend the narrow scope of the
statute to include communications regarding potential waste because such an interpretation would
subject a governmental entity to a whistleblower claim based on allegations of waste for any
government contract. Id. Ultimately, potential waste was not a predicate act as targeted by the
statute, and so there was no claim under the Act. However, in the same case the Court determined
that other of the employee's communications and complaints implicated the government entity's
violation of fe4eral regulations and therefore those communications could support a claim under the
Act. Id. Thus, the Court was careful to limit the causes of action under the Act to those expressly
within the statute's intent-those directly resulting from the existence of waste and violations of
laws, rules, or regulations.
Similarly, the Idaho Supreme Court has rejected taking an expansive view ofwhat constitutes
a violation of a law, rule or statute. Mallonee v. State, 139 Idaho 615,620 (2004). In Mallonee, the
Court upheld a district court's grant of summary judgment and dismissal of a claim under the Act
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because a plaintiff/former employee only reported violation of an internal policy. Id. The Court
determined that the Act only allowed for actions resulting from violations of laws or violations of
rules and regulations that had been properly promulgated by an administrative body giving them the
force and effect of law. Id. Therefore, the Court held that violation of policy does not equate with
a violation of a statute, rule or regulation, and so, the plaintiff could not claim protection under the
Act. Id. at 620-621.
Thus, an employee cannot assert cause of action under the Act unless the government entity
has committed a predicate act involving the existence of waste or implicating a violation of a law,
rule, or regulation; this is the required predicate act. Anything short of this does not allow for a
cause of action under the Act. In sum, the employee must be blowing the whistle on illegal or illicit
conduct and a violation of a policy does not suffice to invoke the Whistleblower Act.
In this case, Plaintiff Wright alleges the protection of the Act under two different potential
protected activities. The first is his initiation of the investigation into complaints of general
harassment against Dee Oldham, a former County employee. (Amended Complaint~~ 9, 32.) The
second was Wright's initiation of the investigation into Jim Farrens's complaint that unpleasant
working conditions were becoming a hostile work environment. (Amended Complaint~~ 17, 32.)
However, the activities underlying Wright's ministerial involvement in these investigations do not
result from reporting of waste or the violation oflaws, rules, or regulations. Simply put, Wright did
not blow the whistle on any illegal wrongdoing by or within the County and he has no cause of
action under the Whistleblower Act.
Wright first alleges that his termination was in retaliation for the investigation into Dee
Oldham's conduct when she was an employee at the County. (SOF ~ 11.) During the course of her
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employment, Ms. Oldham's conduct as Manager of the Commissioners' Office was investigated in
2009 and 2010. (SOF 'i['i[ 12, 15.) These investigations were treated as hostile work environment
complaints. (Id). Hostile work environment complaints fall under the County's policy prohibiting
general harassment. (SOF 'if 13.)
As a result of the 2009 investigation, Ms. Oldham signed a letter outlining performance
expectations for her future conduct as a manager. (SOF

'if

14.) There were no finding that Ms.

Oldham violated any law, rule or regulation. (Id.)

In 2010, a second investigation was initiated regarding Ms. Oldham's conduct based on
complaints made by employees who were dissatisfied with the way in which Ms. Oldham was
treating them. (SOF 'if 15.) During the initial intake process of the 2010 investigation, Human
Resources was able to determine that the complaint did not rise to a level of a hostile work
environment. (SOF 'if 16.) The Commissioners were advised of this information. (Id.)
The Commissioners requested an investigation into whether Ms. Oldham's conduct was
contrary to the expectations set forth in the letter. (SOF 'if 17.) Based on this request, Wright gave
direction to the Human Resources Office to initiate an investigation; an investigator was assigned.
(Id.) The investigation concluded that were some sustained findings regarding some of Ms.

Oldham's conduct that was not compliant with the expectation set out in the previous letter. (SOF

'if 17.)

There was no finding that Ms. Oldham violated a law, rule or regulation. Id.
Ultimately, the investigations into Ms. Oldham's conduct only involved allegations of a

violation of an internal policy and a failure to meet performance expectations; neither of the
investigations into Ms. Oldham were the result of a violation of a law, rule or regulation. Thus,
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neither Oldham investigation triggers the Whistleblower Act and Wright's activities in those
investigations are not protected by the Act.
As an alternative to the Dee Oldham investigation, Wright also asserts a protected activity
related to the 2012 investigation into the hostile work environment complaints received from Jim
Farrens, a County engineer. (Amended Complaint~~ 17, 32.) However, the initiation of the
investigation was treated as a conflict resolution. (SOF

~

19.) Even if the initiation of the

investigation was based on a hostile work environment complaint, a hostile work environment falls
under the County's General Harassment policy. (SOF ~ 13.)
Ultimately, neither of the investigations under which Wright is claiming protection as a
whistleblower were the result of reporting of waste or a violation oflaws, rules, or regulations. The
investigations into Dee Oldham only related to violation of a County policy and an inability to meet
performance expectations. Similarly, the investigation into Jim Farrens's was initially handled as
a conflict resolution and even if considered a hostile work environment complaint, it is was only
related to a potential violation of a County policy. Neither investigation resulted from a violation
of a law, rule, or regulation; they did not involve any illegal or illicit conduct by the County. Just
as Mallonee's report of violation of policy was insufficient to trigger the protections of the
Whistleblower Act, the investigations in this case involving violations of the County's policy are
insufficient to trigger the Act.
In short, Wright bases his claim under the Idaho Whistleblower Act on his initiation of the
Oldham investigations or the Farrens investigation; however, these investigations were not related
to waste or the violation of a law, rule, or regulation. Therefore, Wright cannot show that the County
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committed a predicate act necessary to trigger the Whistleblower Act. Accordingly, Wright cannot
maintain a claim under the Whistleblower Act and they must be dismissed.

B.

Neither a Claim for Interference Nor a Claim for Retaliation Under the Family Medical
Leave Act Can Withstand Summary Judgment.
Wright's Amended Complaint also alleges that his termination was in violation ofthe Family

and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) because he had submitted an application for leave under the FMLA
before his position was eliminated and his employment ended. (See Amended Complaint,~~ 24, 40.)
Wright claims that Ada County's conduct violated 29 U .S.C. § 2615 (Amended Complaint~ 40) but
offers no clarity as to whether he claims interference with his rights under the FMLA under 29
U.S. C. § 2615(a)( 1) or whether he claims retaliation for exercising his rights under the FMLA under
29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2). Regardless, Wright is unable to support any claim under the FMLA because
each theory ultimately requires that an employer is at least influenced in some way by the employee's
request of FMLA leave, and here it is undisputed that at the time of Wright's termination, the
Commissioners had no knowledge of Wright's illness or that he had filed any application for FMLA
leave. Therefore, Wright cannot create a genuine issue of material fact to show that his termination
was in any way influenced by his application for FMLA leave.

1.

There is No Evidence That Ada County "Interfered" With Any Benefit or Right
Under the FMLA.

The FMLA provides eligible employees with limited rights and benefits. It also makes it
unlawful for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of those limited rights. 29
U.S.C. § 2615(a)(l). However, the FMLA does not entitle an employee to rights, benefits, or
employment positions that the employee would not have been entitled to absent the employee's
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FMLA leave. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(3)(B). In other words, the FMLA does not protect an employee
from employment actions unrelated to the FMLA. See Bachelder v. America West Airlines, 259 F .3d
1112, 1126 (9th Cir. 2001). Ultimately, when termination of employment would have occurred
regardless of the request for FMLA leave, the employee may still be permissibly terminated even
when termination prevents him from exercising his right to FMLA leave. Bones v. Honeywell
Intern., Inc., 366 F.3d 869, 877 (10th Cir. 2004). Thus, no matter how an interference claim is

framed, it cannot withstand summary judgment when the termination of the employee was in no way
related to the FMLA. Id. at 877-878.

a.

Wright Cannot Meet His Burden to Present Evidence that the County Took his
FMLA Application into Account in its Termination Decision.

Where an employee alleges that his FMLA leave is considered in the decision to terminate
him, the Ninth Circuit applies the standard in 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c). 3 This regulation prohibits an
employer from considering an employee's notice ofFMLA leave as a negative factor in its decision
to terminate an employee. Bachelder v. America West Airlines, 259 F.3d 1112, 1122-1123, 1125
(9th Cir. 2001)(applying 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c)). At summary judgment, the plaintiff bears the
burden to present sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that the employer took the
plaintiff's notice ofFMLA leave into account in its decision to terminate an employee. Xin Liu v.
Amway Corp., 347 F.3d 1125, 1135-1136 (9th Cir. 2003). Although an interference claim does not

require the employee to show that the notice of FMLA was the singular "but for" cause of the

This regulation has also been analyzed as a retaliation claim. Hite v. Bermeer Mfg. Co., 446
F.3d 858, 865 (8th Cir. 2006).
3
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termination, as does an FMLA retaliation claim, the employee still must show that the employee's
notice ofFMLA leave was a factor or influence in the employer's decision. Id.
Commonly, an employer is found to have impermissibly taken an employee's FMLA leave
into account in when the employee's absences from work are a factor in the termination decision.
See Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1126. In other situations, an employee can meets its burden by showing

that FMLA leave influenced a negative performance evaluation that was the sole or main factor in
terminating the employee's employment. Xin Liu, 347 F.3d at 1137.
However, neither of these are the situation in this case. There is no evidence to show that
Wright's previous counseling appointments for which he was requesting FMLA leave were taken
into account either by the Commissioners or in any kind of performance review. (See SOF ~ 29.)
Additionally, there is an absence of evidence to show that Wright's FMLA application was a
consideration in the decision to eliminate the Director of Administration position and terminate
Wright. (See SOF ~ 8.) In fact, the Commissioners were not aware of his FMLA application until
days after they made their decision to terminate Wright. (SOF

~~

30-36.) In sum, there is no

evidence that Wright's FMLA application or previous counseling appointments influenced the
Commissioners' decision in any way. Therefore, Wright cannot support a claim that the County
interfered with his rights under the FMLA because the County did not consider his request for FMLA
as a negative factor in its decision to terminate him.

b.

Wright's Termination Was Unrelated to his Application for FMLA leave.

Additionally, when a plaintiff alleges that an employer failed to reinstate the employee or that ·
an employer denied the employee another FMLA benefit, then the employee must establish each
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element of a prima facie case of interference. Sanders v. City ofNewport, 657 F.3d 772, 778 (9th
Cir. 2011).

Specifically, the employee bears the burden to come forward with evidence to

demonstrate that: (1) he was an eligible employee under the FMLA, (2) his employer was covered
by the FMLA, (3) he was entitled to leave under the FMLA, (4) he provided sufficient notice of his
intent to take leave, and (5) his employer denied him FMLA benefits to which he was entitled. Id.
Even if an employee can establish a prima facie case, dismissal of the claim at summary judgment
is still proper when the employer shows that it had an unrelated reason to not reinstate the employee.

Id. at 779-780.
i.

Wright Cannot Establish that He was Denied Any FMLA Benefits to
Which He Was Entitled.

Although Ada County is not disputing that it was an employer covered by the FMLA and that
during his period of employment Wri~ht was an eligible employee entitled to leave under the FMLA,
Wright cannot establish that he was denied any of the benefits to which he was entitled when was
an employee. The only entitlements under the FMLA are to period(s) of requested leave and, upon
returning from the approved leave, reinstatement to his position of employment or equivalent
position. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612(a), 2614(a). See also Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1122. However, the
FMLA limits an employee's entitlements to those that the employee would have had if the employee
had not requested FMLA leave. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.216. Thus, the FMLA does not create an
absolute right to a period of leave or to reinstatement to a position of employment. Yashenko v.

Harrah's NC Casino Co., LLC., 446 F.3d 541,549 (4th Cir. 2006). See also O'Connor v. PCA
Family Health Plan, Inc. 200 F.3d 1349, 1354 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding that an employer may deny
the right to reinstatement).
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This remains true even when the employee's termination takes place during a period of
FMLA leave. 0 'Connor, 200 F.3d at 1354-1355. Thus, when an employee's position is eliminated
and ends the employment relationship, the employee's entitlement to FMLA benefits also ends.

fllhardt, 118 F.3d at 1158. Moreover, the entitlement to FMLA benefits is not extended simply
because the employer retains the employee temporarily after the position is eliminated. Id.
(employee not entitled to reinstatement when her position was eliminated in June and employer
allowed her to continue working until her scheduled maternity leave started in October). Thus as
a matter of law, when an individual is no longer an employee, that individual is no longer entitled
to the benefits under the FMLA.
Further, the FMLA only entitles an employee to reinstatement to his same or an equivalent
position. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(l). The Department of Labor regulations describe an "equivalent
position" as one, which is "virtually identical to the employee's former position in terms of pay,
benefits and working conditions, including privileges, perquisites and status."

29 C.F.R. §

825.215(a). The regulation ~her states that an equivalent position "must involve the same or
substantially similar duties and responsibilities, which must entail substantially equivalent skill,
effort, responsibility and authority." Id. Thus, there is no entitlement to reinstatement when the
employee's previous job does not exist and there is no equivalent position available.
Here, Wright's employment with Ada County ended on January 15, 2013. (SOF ,i 9.) As
stated in Wright's termination, this was the result of the elimination of his position as part of an
intended reorganization of his department.

(SOF ,i,i 3,9.)

Prior to the termination of his

employment, on January 2, 2013, Wright requested a period ofFMLA leave. (SOF ,i 20.) Before
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his request could be considered, Wright was required to get certification from his health providers
to support his request for FMLA leave. (Id.) His period ofFMLA leave was retroactively requested
from December 20, 2012 through February 28, 2013. (SOF 121.) The requested leave was an
unscheduled, intermittent leave of approximately two (2) hours per month for counseling sessions.
Wright's certification regarding his counseling was not received by the Human Resources Specialist
until January 15, 2013. (Id.) Hence, Wright's FMLA leave was not processed and designated until
January 18, 2013, which was after his January 15 termination. (SOF 1122, 28.) The designated
leave would have been for December 2012 through February 2013. (SOF 1121, 28.)
Despite any timing issues with processing and Wright's employment status or the fact his
position had been eliminated, the County extended Wright's pay and benefits through February 2013.
(SOF 1110, 28.) This coincided with what would have been the end of the requested FMLA leave,
had Wright still been employed by the County. (SOF 128.) Thus, Wright received the equivalent
of the leave benefits that he requested. Also, the fact that the County extended Wright's pay and
benefits through the end of February did not change Wright's employment status or entitle him to
reinstatement.

Wright's position was eliminated on January 15, 2013 and consequently his

employment was terminated on that date.

(SOF

1 9.)

After that time he had no right to

reinstatement.
Even if, for the sake of argument, Wright had been on FMLA leave when his position was
eliminated, there was no equivalent position available at the County. Although on January 14, 2013,
the Commissioners created and filled the position of Chief of Staff, the Chief of Staff position was
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not equivalent to the eliminated position of Director of Administration because the positions were
not virtually identical. (SOF ,r,r 29-31.)
The Director of Administration's primary job responsibilities included overseeing the human
resources program for the County, overseeing the employee benefits program, overseeing the risk
management program, researching and analyzing insurance plans, managing the County's SelfInsurance Reserve Fund, supervising staff in a number of areas, and office management functions
for the Commissioner's Office.

(SOF

,r

29.)

At the time of elimination, the Director of

Administration was paid $93,663. (Id.) In contrast, the Chief of Staff position was created to be a
liaison with other government entities, liaison to the legislature to keep the Commissioners abreast
of current legislation potentially impacting the County, and to carry out other special projects. (SOF

,r 30.)

The Chief of Staff position was salaried at $85,000. (Id.)
In comparing the two positions, a significant portion of the Director of Administration job

responsibilities included the supervision of employees. (SO F ,r 29.) The Chief of Staff position does
not supervise employees. (SOF ,r 30.) The Director of Administration was responsible for carrying
out the evaluation of insurance plans for the County and overseeing County continuous programs
such as human resources and risk management. (SOF

,r 29.)

The Chief of Staff position only is

involved in special projects rather than continuous ones. (SOF ,r 30.) And, the salaries between the
positions also differed. (SOF ,r,r 29, 30.) In short, the pay, job functions and responsibilities of the
Chief of Staff and the Director of Administration were not virtually identical; they were not
equivalent positions. Thus, the provisions of the FMLA did not entitle Wright to the Chief of Staff
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position. Accordingly, no trier of fact could reasonably conclude that Wright was deprived of any
right to reinstatement.
Ultimately, Wright cannot establish a prima facie case of interference because he cannot
create a reasonable inference that he was entitled to any benefits under the FMLA after he was
terminated or that he was denied any benefits to which he was entitled when he was employed.
Accordingly, Wright's interference claim cannot survive summary judgment.

ii.

Wright's Termination Was Unrelated to his Application for FMLA
Leave.

Even if Wright could establish a prima facie case of interference, a grant of summary
judgment is proper when the employer shows that it had an unrelated reason for not reinstating the
employee. Sanders, 657 F.3d at 779-780. As reinforced by the Department of Labor's regulations,
"an employee has no greater right to reinstatement or to other benefits and conditions of employment
than if the employee had been continuously employed during the FMLA leave period." 29 C.F.R.

§ 825.216. This expressly recognizes that an employer may permissibly deny reinstatement when
the employee would not otherwise have been employed at the end of the FMLA leave period. Id.
Thus, there is no violation when an employee's right to reinstatement has already been extinguished
for reasons unrelated to his FMLA leave. Shirley v. Precision Castparts Corp., 726 F.3d 675,682683 (5th Cir. 2013).
The regulation explains that an employee may be permissibly laid-off during a period of
FMLA leave when the employee's position is eliminated. 29 C.F.R. § 825.216. See also, Ilhardt

v. Sara Lee Corp., 118 F.3d 1151 (7th Cir. 1997). Similarly, there is no interference with an
employee's rights under the FMLA when a employee's position is eliminated as part of a
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reorganization. Yashenko v. Harrah's NC Casino Co., LLC, 446 F.3d 541, 550 (4th Cir. 2006).
Thus, an employee's claim cannot survive when there is no genuine issue of material fact that the
employer's reorganization or elimination of a position is unrelated to the terminated employee's
FMLAleave.
In this case, the Commissioners expressly stated that elimination of Wright's position as the
Director of Administration was as part of an intended reorganization of the Department of
Administration. (SOF ~~ 7, 8.) After the November 6, 2012 general election, Commissioner Dave
Case and Commissioner-elect Jim Tibbs started discussing making some changes in the structure
of the County administration. (SOF ~ 7 .) As part of these discussions, Commissioner Case and Mr.
Tibbs discussed reorganizing the Department of Administration. (SOF ~~ 7, 8.) Both Case and
Tibbs felt that the managers of the divisions within the Department of Administration should report
to and receive direction directly from the Commissioners and interface directly with other divisions.
(SOF ~~ 7-9.) In their assessment and judgment, such reorganization of the department made the
Director position unnecessary. (SOF ~ 9.) Accordingly, the Commissioners decided to eliminate
the Director of Administration position. (SOF ~ 8-9.) As a consequence of the elimination of his
position as Director of Administration, they decided to terminate Wright's employment. (SOF ~ 9.)
During this time, the Commissioners and Mr. Tibbs were unaware of Wright's request for
FMLA leave. (SOF ~~ 23-27.) In fact, the Commissioners had no knowledge of Wright's serious
medical condition or request for FMLA leave until after Wright's position was eliminated and his
employment terminated.

(SOF

~~

23-28.)

Hence, the undisputed facts show that the

Commissioners' reason for reorganization of the Department of Administration, eliminating
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Wright's position, and terminating his employment were unrelated to Wright's request for FMLA.
Ultimately, there are no facts to support a contention that the reason was somehow related to
Wright's application for FMLA leave. Thus, summary judgment on Wright's interference claim is
appropriate.
In conclusion, Wright's claim for interference with his rights under the FMLA pursuant to
29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(l) cannot withstand summary judgment because (1) Wright cannot create
genuine issue of material fact that his FMLA was considered as a negative factor in the decision to
terminate his employment; (2) Wright cannot establish a prima facie case of interference because he
cannot establish that he was entitled to or denied any benefits under the FMLA; and (3) the County
has established that the elimination of his position was unrelated to Wright's request for FMLA
leave. Therefore, summary judgment should be granted and Wright's FMLA interference claim
should be dismissed.

2.

Plaintiff Cannot Create a Reasonable Inference That Ada County Retaliated
Against Wright For Exercising a Right Under the FMLA.

Apart from interference, the FMLA also makes it unlawful for an employee to retaliate
against an employee for availing himself of a protected right under the FMLA. Sanders v. City of

Newport, 657 F. 3d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 2011). See also 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(l). For an FMLA
retaliation claim where the plaintiff has no direct evidence of retaliation, many federal circuits apply
the traditional McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework, which applies to other statutory
retaliation claims as well. See Hite v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 446 F.3d 858 (8th Cir. 2006); Hodgens v.

General Dynamics Corp., 144F.3d 151, 160 (1st Cir. 1998);Stricklandv. Water Works &Sewer Cd.
Of Birmingham, 239 F.3d 1199, 1207 (11th Cir. 2001). Idaho courts also apply the McDonnell
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Douglas framework to retaliation claims. Frogley v. Meridian Jt. School Dist. No. 2, l 55 Idaho 55 8,
314 P.3d 613,619 (2013). See also Hathewayv. Board ofRegents of University ofIdaho, 310 P.3d
315,323 (Idaho 2013).
The McDonnell Douglas framework uses three separate steps to analyze the viability of a
retaliation claim. Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 160. See also Frogley, 314 P.3d at 619. First, the plaintiff
must put forward sufficient evidence to establish his prima facie case. Id. When the plaintiff cannot
establish the prima facie case, the analysis is complete and the claim should be dismissed. Brungart

v. Bellsouth Telecommunications Inc., 231 F.3d 791,800 (11th Cir. 2000). If the plaintiff is able to
support a prima facie case, then the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 160. See also

Frogley, 314 P.3d at 619. Once the employer has met this burden, then the third step requires the
plaintiff to demonstrate a genuine issue of material facts as to whether the reason advanced by the
employer was a pretext for retaliating against him for having taken protected FMLA leave. Id. It
is only after satisfying that third step that the plaintiffs claim can survive summary judgment. Id.
As the framework is applied to other statutes in Idaho, the burden of production shifts at each stage
of the framework, but the burden of persuasion always remains with the plaintiff. Hatheway, 310
P.3d at 323.

a.

Wright Cannot Establish a Prima Facie Case of Retaliation Because There is No
Causal Connection Between Wright's Request for FMLA and his Termination.

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Wright must show that "(1) he availed himself
of a protected right under the FMLA; (2) he was adversely affected by an employment decision;
[and] (3) there is a causal connection between the employee's protected activity and the employer's
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adverse employment action. Hodgens, 144 F .3d at 161. At this time Ada County will not take issue
with the first two elements of Plaintiff's prima facie case. 4 However, Wright cannot establish the
third element of his prima facie case, which requires him to produce sufficient evidence from which
a reasonable inference could be drawn that the elimination of his position and termination were
causally connected to his attempt to avail himself of any protected rights under the FMLA.
To demonstrate a causal connection, a plaintiff needs to show that his conduct in accessing
the protected rights ofthe FMLA and the adverse employment decision were not "wholly unrelated."

Brungart v. Bellsouth Telecommunications Inc., 231 F.3d 791,799 (11th Cir. 2000); Colburn v.
Parker Hannifin/Nichols Portland Div., 429 F.3d 325,338 n. 10 (1st Cir. 2005). As the Eleventh
Circuit explained, "[i]n order to show the two things were not entirely unrelated, the plaintiff must
generally show that the decision maker was aware of the protected conduct at the time of the adverse
employment action." Id. This cannot be accomplished when there is undisputed evidence that the
decision maker did not have knowledge that the employee had accessed rights under the FMLA. Id.
In other words, a plaintiff is unable to establish the causal connection element of in his prima facie
case of retaliation unless he can produce evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact
regarding the decision makers awareness of the plaintiffs access of the FMLA.

Here, the

undisputed testimony from the Commissioners is that they had no knowledge of Wright's medical
condition or application for FMLA leave at the time they decided to terminated his employment.
(SOF

,r,r 23-25.)

In his deposition, Wright testified that he did not know whether the Human

However, Ada County is not conceding that Wright actually availed himself of a protected
right under the FMLA.
4
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Resources Division Manager had told the Commissioners about the pending FMLA application.
(SOF

,r 26.)

The Human Resources Division Manager testified that she had not informed the

Commissioners of Wright's request or application. (SOF ,r 27.) There is nothing to contradict the
Commissioners' asserted lack of knowledge. Thus, no reasonable jury could find a causal link
between Wright's application for FMLA leave and his termination. Consequently, Wright cannot
establish his prima facie case for retaliation, and summary judgment must be granted.

b.

Even If Wright Could Support a Causal Connection, Ada County Had A
Legitimate Reason for His Termination.

Even when an employee can support a prima facie case of retaliation under the FMLA, the
employer is given the opportunity to present its non-retaliatory reason for terminating the employee.

Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 160. In this case, Wright held the position of Director of the Department of
Administration at the County at the time of his termination. (SOF

,r 2.)

In November 2012,

Commissioner Dave Case was elected to serve as a County Commissioner. (SOF ,r 6.) In that same
election, Jim Tibbs was elected to serve as another County Commissioner. (Id.)

In preparing for his new position as Commissioner, Mr. Tibbs began attending meetings at
Ada County and meeting with individuals who worked at the County. (SOF ,r 7.) In particular, Mr.
Tibbs and Commissioner Case began meeting to discuss issues and their ideas for the County. (Id.)
Some of their discussions included ideas for reorganizing certain areas of the County. (Id.) In
particular, they discussed reorganizations of the landfill, the Department of Administration, and
purchasing office. (Id.) Regarding the Department of Administration, they discussed having the
Commission's support staff be managed by the Commissioners rather than as part of the Department
of Administration. Another change that Case and Tibbs discussed was having the division managers
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report directly to the Commissioners and engage directly with other divisions. (SOF ~ 8.) Before
the reorganization, the managers reported to the Director, the Director spoke to the Commissioners,
and then the Director relayed the Commissioners' information or other divisions' information back
to the managers. (Id.) Ultimately, Case and Tibbs felt that with such reorganization the Director
position within the Department of Administration was unnecessary. (Id.) So after they were sworn
in, Commissioners Case and Tibbs decided to eliminate the Director of Administration position.
(SOF ~ 9.) Consequently, Wright's employment with the County was terminated. (SOF ~~ 3,9.)
Thus, Wright's termination was the result of the elimination of his position as part of an
intended reorganization of the Department of Administration. Hence, the County had a legitimate
reason for terminating Wright's employment; his termination was not in retaliation for his
application for FMLA leave.

c.

Wright Cannot Meet His Burden To Demonstrate That the County's
Elimination of Wright's Position Was Pretext to Terminate Wright Because of
His Application for FMLA Leave.

The County's articulation of its legitimate reason for terminating Wright shifts the burden
to Wright to produce sufficient evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact that the
County's reason was only pretext for terminating Wright because of his application for FMLA leave.

Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 160. See also Hatheway, 310 P.3d at 324.

In order to establish pretext and move past summary judgment, an employee must produce
either direct evidence or circumstantial evidence of a retaliatory motive by the employer. See

Frogley, 314 P.3d at 622. "Such evidence must be substantial and specific." Id. Further, the Idaho
Supreme Court has noted, "[f]ederal courts have found that indirect evidence is not substantial and

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MSJ- 24.

000184

specific where no evidence beyond what is produced to satisfy the plaintiffs prima facie case is
produced." Id. And that, "[c]ourts only require an employer honestly believed its reason for its
actions, even if its reason is foolish or trivial or even baseless." Id. (quoting Villiarimo v. Aloha

Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1063 (9th Cir.2002)). In short to rebut an employer's articulated
legitimate reason for discharging the employee, the employee must establish that the employer had
a retaliatory motive and a nexus between that motive and the employer's termination of the
employee. Hatheway, 310 P.3d 327. Evidence such as a positive past performance is not sufficient
to meet this burden. Id. Additionally, although timing between the employee's protected activity and
his termination may be used to suggest retaliation, it is not conclusive and may be outweighed by
other evidence. Hodgens,144 F.3d at 170.
In this case, there is no evidence the Commissioners' reason for terminating Wright was
actually because of Wright's application for FMLA leave rather than the elimination of his position
as part of a reorganization of his department. See (SOF

~~

7-8.) Although Wright's termination

occurred approximately two weeks after he applied for FMLA leave, there is no other evidence to
create a nexus between the application or his previous counseling appointments and the
Commissioners' determination to terminate his position and employment. (SOF ~~ 23-27.) The
undisputed evidence is that the Commissioners had no knowledge of Wright's application or need
for FMLA leave until days after his termination. (Id.) Thus, Wright cannot meet his burden to
establish that the Commissioners were actually motivated by Wright's attempt to avail himself of
the FMLA when they made the decision to eliminate his position and terminate his employment.
Therefore, the evidence is insufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that the Commissioners'
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reorganization of the Department of Administration was pretext for terminating Wright because of
his FMLA application. As such, Wright cannot meet his burden on the last step of the McDonnell

Douglas framework and Wright's claim must be dismissed.
In all, Wright cannot establish the requisite causal link to support a prima facie case for
retaliation because Wright termination was wholly unconnected to his application for FMLA leave,
and even if he could establish a prima facie case, the County's reorganization and elimination of
Wright's position is a legitimate reason for his termination, which Wright is unable to rebut as
pretextual. Consequently, Wright's claim for retaliation in violation of the FMLA cannot withstand
summary judgment.

C.

Wright's Claim for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Fails as a Matter of Law.
In wrongful discharge cases, claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress are only

allowed if the facts of the case themselves support such a claim. Thomas v. Medical Center

Physicians, PA, 138 Idaho 200, 211 (2002). See also Frogley, 314 P.3d at 624-625 (negligent
infliction of emotional distress claim was analyzed separately from retaliatory discharge claim).
Negligent infliction of emotional distress "is a negligence action, requiring a showing of (1) a legally
recognized duty, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct
and the breach, and (4) actual loss or damage." Bollinger v. Fall River Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 152
Idaho 632, 642 (2012).
In order to survive dismissal, the plaintiff must pinpoint a legal duty that was breached by
his termination. Id. at 642-643. See also Nation v. State Dept. 0/Correction, 144 Idaho 177, 191
(2006). "An employer does not breach a legal duty to an at-will employee simply by terminating her
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without cause." Bollinger, 152 Idaho at 642. This is true even when the employee is terminated in
violation of the employer's policies. Id. !n dismissing an employee's negligent infliction of
emotional distress claim against his employer, the United States District Court for the District of
Idaho reasoned:
[O]ther courts considering this issue have generally held that a claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress cannot lie in the employment context. See, e.g.
Herman v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners, 60 F.3d 1375, 1386 (9th Cir.
1995) (holding that Nevada law precludes emotional distress claims in the
employment context); Dodge v. U.S., 162 F.Supp.2d 873 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (holding
that Ohio law does not recognize a separate tort for negligent infliction of emotional
distress in the employment context); Snyder v. Medical Service Corp., 145 Wash.2d
233,244, 35 P.3d 1158, 1164 (2001) ("absent a statutory or public policy mandate,
employers do not owe employees a duty to use reasonable care to avoid the
inadvertent infliction of emotional distress when responding to workplace disputes.").
See also, Berryv. WorldWide Language Resources, Inc., 716 F.Supp.2d 34, 52 (D.
Me. 2002) (applying Maine law and declining to recognize a "special relationship"
in the employment context sufficient to support a claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress). See also, Perodeau v. City ofHartford, 259 Conn. 729, 792 A.2d
752 (2002) (disallowing emotional distress claims against individual employees who
were involved in plaintiffs termination). Cf, Miller v. Fairchild Industries, Inc. 797
F.2d 727, 738 (9th Cir. 1986) (allowing an NIED claim to proceed under California
law where the conduct giving rise to that claim was separate from that underlying the
main claim of retaliatory discharge).

Feltmann v. Petco Animal Supplies, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-414-EJL-MHW (D. Idaho, Mar. 20, 2012).
Therefore, the plaintiff must identify a duty outside the employment relationship or point to specific
tortious conduct to support a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id.; See also,

Frogley, 314 P.3d at 624-625.
Although in some cases a common law duty may be supplanted by a statutory duty of care
in order !O establish a negligence claim, "the following elements must be met: (1) the statute or
regulation must clearly define the required standard of conduct; (2) the statute or regulation must
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have been intended to prevent the type of hann the defendant's act or omission caused; (3) the
plaintiff must be a member of the class of persons the statute or regulation was designed to protect;
and (4) the violation must have been the proximate cause of the injury. Nation,144 Idaho at 190
(citing Ahles v. Tabor, 136 Idaho 393, 395,(2001)). However, in this case neither of the statutes at
issue can be used to create a duty under the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress because
neither the Family Medical Leave Act nor the Whistleblower Act were intended to prevent emotional
distress.
First, emotional damages are not recoverable under the Family Medical Leave Act. Rodgers

v. City ofDes Moines, 435 F .3d 904, 908-909 (8th Cir. 2006). In Rodgers, the Eighth Circuit joined
the Fourth, Fifth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits in determining that "because the FMLA specifically
lists the types of damages for which an employer may be liable and the list includes only the actual
monetary losses of the employee, the FMLA does not permit recovery for emotional distress
damages." Id. at 909. The court further noted that "[t]he FMLA only permits recovery for 'wages,
salary, employment benefits, or other compensation denied or lost,' and when such benefits are not
denied or lost, an eligible employee may recover 'any actual monetary losses sustained ... as a direct
result of the violation, such as the cost of providing care."' Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. §
261 7(a)(1 )(A)(i)(I), (II)). The statutes provide for a range of compensatory damages, but they do not
expressly provide for emotional distress damages. Id. Therefore "emotional distress damages are
not available under the FMLA." Id.
Similar to the FMLA, the Whistleblower Act expressly lists the specific types of remedies
that a court may order when an employer is liable under the Act. Emotional distress damages are
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not within these remedies. Initially, the Act defines "damages" as "damages for injury or loss caused
by each violation of this chapter, and includes court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees." LC. §
6-2105(1). It goes on to provide that "[a]n employee who alleges a violation of this chapter may
bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief or actual damages, or both... " LC.§ 6-2105(2).
Although this initial provision is general, it must be read in conjunction with the other and more
specific statutes in the Act that limit the remedies that a court may provide to an employee. See

Wheeler v. Idaho Dept. ofHealth and Welfare, 147 Idaho 257,264 (2009).
The Act expressly enumerates the available remedies when a violation of the Act is found.
Specifically, the Act states that "[a] court, in rendering a judgment brought under this chapter, may
order any or all of the following:
(1) An injunction to restrain continued violation of the provisions of this act;
(2) The reinstatement of the employee to the same position held before the adverse
action, or to an equivalent position;
(3) The reinstatement of full fringe benefits and seniority rights;
(4) The compensation for lost wages, benefits and other remuneration;
(5) The payment by the employer ofreasonable costs and attorneys' fees;
(6) An assessment of a civil fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500), which
shall be submitted to the state treasurer for deposit in the general fund.

LC.§ 6-2106 (emphasis added). Thus, the Act only allows the court to provide an employee these
express and specific remedies; the Act does not provide for any other type of relief.
There is nothing to indicate that the legislature intended to compensate public employees for
any or all types of harm stemming from their employment, or that the express remedies it fashioned
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for this specific and narrow type of cause of action contemplated the award of any noneconomic
damages. It follows that because the Act provides specific remedies for other harm suffered, such
as compensation for lost wages, but does not provide a remedy for emotional distress, the Idaho
Whistleblower Act was not intended to prevent emotional distress. Therefore, the Act cannot be
used to create a duty to support a claim for infliction of emotional distress.
In sum, Wright cannot pinpoint a legally recognized duty that the County, as the employer,
owed to Wright, as the employee. Accordingly, Wright's termination did not breach any such duty.
Ultimately, Wright is unable to establish the elements of a claim for the negligent infliction of
emotional distress and summary judgment should be granted.

D.

Wright Cannot Maintain a Claim of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Because Ada County's Conduct was Not Extreme or Outrageous.
"Under Idaho law, a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress has four elements:

'(l) the conduct must be intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct must be extreme and outrageous;
(3) there must be a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress; and,
(4) the emotional distress must be severe."' Nation v. State Dept. of Correction, 144 Idaho 177
(2007) (citing Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Products, 139 Idaho 172, 179 (2003)). "Courts have
required very extreme conduct before awarding damages for the intentional infliction of emotional
distress." Id (citing Edmondson, 139 Idaho at 180). Further, regardless of the severity of any
emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff, summary judgment is appropriate when the plaintiff
cannot demonstrate that the defendant's conduct is extreme and outrageous. Id.
The determination of whether a defendant's conduct is extreme and outrageous is a matter
oflaw. Id. "To support an IIED claim, conduct must be more than merely 'unjustifiable,' but rather
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must rise to the level of 'atrocious' behavior 'beyond all possible bounds of decency."' Bollinger
v. Fall River Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 152 Idaho 632, 643 (2012). Therefore, liability "only results
when a party's actions are so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it." Davis
v. Gage, 106 Idaho 735, 741(1984).
Examples of conduct that have been deemed to be sufficiently extreme and outrageous by
Idaho courts include: prolonged sexual, mental, and physical abuse inflicted upon a woman by her
cohabitating boyfriend, Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598, 605-607 (1993) (recklessly shooting and
killing someone's pet donkey); Gilv. Brown, 107 Idaho 1137, 1138-39 (Ct. App. 1995)(areal estate
developer swindling a family out of property that was the subject of their lifelong dream to build a
Christian retreat); Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763, 773-74 (1995) (and an insurance company
speciously denying a grieving widower's cancer insurance claim while simultaneously impugning
his character and drawing him into a prolonged dispute). Walston v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 129
Idaho 211, 219-20 (1996).
In Jeremiah v. Yanke Mach. Shop, Inc., a Romanian immigrant was subjected to harassment
and discrimination during his employment. Jeremiah v. Yanke Mach. Shop, Inc., 131 Idaho 242,
244-45 (1998). Other employees physically threatened the plaintiff, locked him in a phone cabinet,
scratched his truck, deflated his tires, called him names, placed a green card with an obscenity on
his tool box, and would not assist him with rush jobs. Id. at 245. The plaintiff wrote a letter to the
president of the company advising him of the harassment the plaintiff was enduring. Id. Instead of
taking steps to end the harassment, the company president and plaintiffs supervisors tried to convince
him to quit and when he refused, they fired him. Id.
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The plaintiff sued his employer and several employees for intentional infliction of emotional
distress and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Jeremiah, 131 Idaho at 246.
However, the district court granted the defendant's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. The district court found that in "looking at the evidence most favorably to [plaintiffJ and
giving him the benefit of every reasonable inference to be gleaned from the evidence, there is no
evidence that the conduct was so 'severe and outrageous' as to support a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress." Id. at 248-49. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district
court's decision. Id. at 249.
Here, Wright alleges that defendant's conduct amounted to one Commissioner "refusing" to
meet with him, the Commissioner meeting directly with managers supervised by him, and
eliminating his position despite that Wright did not have performance issues. (Amended Complaint
~~

13-14, 22.) Further, there is no dispute that the County initially gave Wright two weeks of

severance and then later extended that to approximately six weeks. (SOF ~ 10.) Even assuming that
Wright's other allegations were true and that the termination of Wright's position was related to his
job duties to initiate investigations into complaints of harassment or was related to his application
for intermittent FMLA leave, that conduct does not rise to the level of the "very extreme" standard
or conduct beyond all possible bounds of decency. Indeed, it is less severe than much of the conduct
alleged in the cases cited above that did not meet the standard. Therefore, Wright cannot sustain a
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
Considering all the facts and total circumstances surrounding Wright's employment at Ada
County, Wright has failed to establish that a reasonable jury could infer (1) that under the
Whistleblower Act, he participated or gave information in an investigation resulting from a violation
of laws, rules, or regulations or that (2) Ada County interfered with his rights under the FMLA or
retaliated against him for filing an application under the FMLA. Also, Wright cannot establish that
the County owed or breached any legal duty to him, which are required elements of a negligent
infliction of emotional distress claim. Finally, as a matter oflaw, the County's termination of Wright
was not so extreme and outrageous that it supports a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Therefore, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment must be granted and Wright's
Amended Complaint must be dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this 10th day of October, 2014.
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.

By_--+~---...:~~~4.:~::::...._-----Kirtl
Atto

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MSJ- 33.

000193

''

r

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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1.

I am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter and have personal knowledge of the

facts contained herein.
2.

As a result of the 2009 investigation into Dee Oldham's conduct creating a hostile

work environment, a letter of reprimand was issued to Dee Oldham for violation of Ada County
policy.
3.

The letter of reprimand issued to Dee Oldham provided specific performance

requirement designed to prevent future violations of Ada County policy.
4.

When a second investigation was conducted regarding Dee Oldham in 2011, it was to

ensure she was not further violating Ada County policy.
5.

It is my understanding that it is a violation of Ada County policy to use email to

communicate performance issues with employee.
6.

It is my understanding that it is a violation of Ada County policy to discuss employee

performance issues with other employees.
7.

As a result of the 2011 investigation, Dee Oldham was given the choice to resign or

be terminated.
8.

I have reviewed the Ada County Chief ofStaff positionjob description. I performed

all of the job duties and responsibilities outlined in the Chief of Staff job description. The duties
described in the Chief of Staff job description were only a portion of responsibilities I had as the
Director of Administration.
DATED this E_ day of October, 2014.
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CASE NO. CV OC 1302730

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM
IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

COMES NOW, Plaintiff Richard Wright, by and through his counsel ofrecord, the law
firm of ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC, and hereby submits this Memorandum in Opposition
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to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Richard Wright (hereinafter "Plaintiff') was employed by Ada County as the
Director of the Department of Administration for the County's Board of County Commissioners.
Plaintiff was wrongfully terminated from his employment on January 15, 2013, and brought suit
in this Court on February 12, 2013. Plaintiffs Complaint alleges violations of the Idaho
Protection of Public Employees Act, Idaho Code§ 6-2101, et. seq., and the Family Medical
Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et. seq., and contains a claim for negligent and/or intentional
infliction of emotional distress.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment is proper only
"if the pleadings, deposition, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c); see also Northwest Bee-Corp. v. Home LivingServ., 136 Idaho 835,
838, 41 P.3d 263, 166 (2002). The burden is upon the moving party to prove the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact. Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865,868,452 P.2d
362, 365 (1969) (emphasis added). All controverted facts are liberally construed in favor of the
nonmoving party. See Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37 (1987).
Summary judgment is proper if the evidence before the court would warrant a directed
verdict if the case were to go to trial. Jephson v. Ambuel, 93 Idaho 790, 793, 473 P.2d 932, 935
(1970). However, the party responding to summary judgment is not required to present evidence on
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every element of his or her case at that time of summary judgment, bu! rather must establish a
genuine issue of material fact regarding the element or elements challenged by the moving party's
motion. See Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, 126 Idaho 527,530, 887 P.2d 1034, 1037 (1994).
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

Plaintiff brought this action claiming he was wrongfully discharged under

the Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act. Specifically that he was retaliated against for his
participation in certain investigation which took place during his employment at Ada County.
See Complaint.

2.

One individual who had been investigated was a personal friend of Commissioners

Case and Tibbs, they participated in social events together, and that individual had worked on
their respective campaigns. See Dave Case Deposition, 51:20-52:12, 54:22-55:1, 57:11-58:12,
63:19-25, 78:15-79:8 and Jim Tibbs Deposition 14:7-16:25.
3.

Two separate investigation found the employee had violated County policy. That

individual's employment with the County ended as a result of the investigations. See Wright
Affidavit,
4.

,r,r 2-7; Williams Affidavit, Exhibits "1" and "2."
During the time Plaintiff and Commissioner Case were both employed at the

County, another investigation was conducted on behalf of an employee regarding a hostile work
environment. Plaintiff participated in that investigation. Commissioner Case was angry when he
learned that the investigation had been conducted, felt he was the target of the investigation, and
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was aware that Plaintiff had initiated that investigation. See Dave Case Deposition, 119:22125:18. ·
5.

During their tenure together at the County, Case avoided contact with Plaintiff and

only went to Plaintiffs office to address him directly on two occasions. One of those occasions
was to demand to know who had initiated the investigation into the individual whose
employment had been terminated. See Wright Deposition 38:19-39:12.
6.

Before Commissioner Tibbs was sworn in, he would meet frequently with

Commissioner Case to discuss County business and plans they wanted to implement once
Commissioner Tibbs was seated. See Dave Case Deposition 130:5-10, 151:22-152:6, 152:23153:4, 162:8-164:9, 165:12-167:13, 169:4-24, 172:1-4, 177:13-178:3, 179:23-25 and Jim Tibbs
Deposition 49:9-51: 19.
7.

Before Commissioner Tibbs was sworn in, he and Commissioner Case offered a

job entitled Chief of Staff to a mutual friend, this friend had also worked on both of their
campaigns. See Dave Case Deposition 167:14-17, 169:25-171:5, 174:17-175:18, 190:12-19 and
Jim Tibbs Deposition 12:19- 13:23, 69-70, 75, 96:5-18.
8.

During this same period of time they decided to terminate Plaintiffs employment.

Deposition of Jim Tibbs 54-56, 65.
9.

Neither Commissioner followed the County procedures to appropriately determine

the creation of a new job, or the elimination of a position within the County. See Deposition of
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Dave Case 201:9-213:20; Deposition of Jim Tibbs 37, 43:21-47:6, 69-70, 77, 79, 81:5-21, 95.;
Deposition ofBethany Calley 29:1-31:1, 32:24-33:8, 75:46-76:1; Williams Affidavit, Ex. 5.
10.

These actions were decided without the input of knowledge of Commissioner

Yzaguirre or the Human Resources Manager. See Dave Case Deposition 190: 12-19, Deposition
of Jim Tibbs 37, 43:21-47:6, 69-70, 77, 79, 81:5-21, 95.; Deposition of Bethany Calley 29:131:1, 32:24-33:8, 75:46-76:1.
11.

The Chief of Staff job description is made up of responsibilities which were all

done by Plaintiff prior to his termination, although Plaintiff did have additional responsibilities
not on the Chief of Staff job description. See Wright Affidavit, ,r 8.
12.

The only reorganization made to the Department of Administration was to

eliminate the position of director. See Deposition of Jim Tibbs 82: 19-83 :2, 103.
13.

The Ada County personnel policies are promulgated under Ada County Code

Chapter 7. See Ex. "5" to the Affidavit of Kim Williams.
14.

Plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress as a result of the stress of being

wrongfully terminated from his employment. See Ex. "8" Wright Deposition.

IV. ARGUMENT
A.

Genuine issues of material fact exist as to the motivation for the termination of
Plaintiff's employment and his Claim must proceed to trial.

i.

Plaintiff engaged in a protected activity under the Ida/to Protection of
Public Employees Act

The Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act ("IPPEA" or "Whistleblower Act")
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provides:
An employer may not take adverse action against an employee because an
employee participates or gives information in an investigation, hearing, court
proceeding, legislative or other inquiry, or other form of administrative review.
Idaho Code § 6-2104(2).
Plaintiff brought this action alleging he was terminated for his role in the investigations of
policy violations by certain employees at Ada County. It is undisputed that Plaintiff not only
initiated the investigations, but also participated by providing information to the investigator in
each instance.
Defendants spends a great deal of time discussing the decision in Black v. Idaho State
Police, 155 Idaho 570,314 P.3d 625 (2013), which is an analysis ofWhistleblower claims under
LC.§§ 6-2104(1)(communications clause) and (3)(refusal clause), as opposed to LC.§ 6-2104(2)
which is the basis for the present matter. Both the "communications clause" and the "refusal
clause" of the Whistleblower Act contain a reasonable belief requirement. The "communications
clause" provides protection for communicating suspected violations of law, rule or regulation.
LC. § 6-2104(1).
The Black decision spends a great deal of time discussing the reasonableness of the
plaintiffs beliefs in context of LC. §§ 6-2104(1) and LC.§§ 6-2104(3). In its holding, the Black
court stated, "In sum, any belief Black may have had that Col. Russell or ISP had committed a
violation or suspected violation of statue or rule at issue here was not objectively reasonable."
This holding clearly does not create a requirement that a violation has to occur before protection
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can be invoked, but rather that the employee's belief or suspicion that a violation has occurred
must be reasonable before protection under the act can be invoked.
LC. §§ 6-2104(2), on the other hand, contains no such "reasonable belief' requirement
and does not discuss violations of law, rule or regulation at all. Rather, once an employee
participates or gives information in the course of an investigation they are protected under the
IPPEA. In fact, if one had to be 100% certain that a violation had occurred before participating
in an investigation, there would be no reason to conduct the investigation at all. A requirement
that a violation has to occur would before protection exists would undermine the very purpose of
the Whistleblower Act; employees would not be able to come forward with concerns or
suspicions of violations oflaw, rule or regulation without putting their jobs in jeopardy.
The decision in Van v. Portneuf, 147 Idaho 552,212 P.3d, 982 (2009) also discusses the
standard under LC.§ 6-2104(1). It is additionally distinguishable from the present matter in the
portion discussed in Defendants' brief, by the fact it discussed the potential for future waste. In
the present matter the investigations were conducted to determine whether violations of County
policy which had already occurred. Malonee v. State, 139 Idaho 615, 619, 84 P.3d 551, 555
(2004) is also based up LC.§ 6-2104(1) and LC.§ 6-2104(3) and again discusses violations of
law, rule, or regulation, which are not enumerated under LC. § 6-2104(2). Additionally, the Ada
County policies are promulgated under Ada County Code Chapter 7, pursuant to ordinance and
are rules and regulations adopted under the law. See Ex. "5" to the Affidavit of Kim Williams.
ii.

The investigations were conducted to determine whether County policy
had been violated, and in both Oldham investigations it was determined
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County policy had infact been violated.
Despite Defendants' claim that the investigations of Dee Oldham did not reveal any
violation of policy, that is a completely false claim. In the 2009 investigation of Dee Oldham,
the investigator found that she had violated the Ada County General Harassment policy. See Ex.
"1" to the affidavit of Kim Williams (2009 Investigation Report), page 14, bates ADA 118; see

also Ex. "2" to the affidavit of Kim Williams (2011 Investigation Report) page 2, bates ADA
121. This comports with the testimony of Bethany Calley in her deposition, as submitted by
Defendants in support of their motion. See Ex. "A" to the affidavit of Kirt Naylor, which reads
as follows:

16
17

A.

I do recall that the general nature of the

complaint was claiming a hostile work environment.

18

Q.

Was an investigation initiated in 2009?

19

A.

Yes.

7
8
9

Q.

And what was the outcome of that

investigation?
A.

It was founded.

Calley Deposition 47:16-19, 48:7-9.
As a result of Ms. 0 ldham' s violation of the Ada County General Harassment policy, she
was given a letter of reprimand which included several items intended to assist her in not
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violating County policy in the future. See Rich Wright Affidavit,

,r,r 2, 3

In 2011 the County

again received complaints of harassment from subordinates of Ms. Oldham and a second
investigation was undertaken. As a result of the 2011 investigation it was again determined that
Ms. Oldham had violated Ada County policies. See Ex. "2" to the affidavit of Kim Williams,
pages 4, 36, bates ADA 123, ADA 136. Additional concerns were discovered during the course
of the investigation, including that Ms. Oldham used her position to derive benefits such as box
seats to concerts, special service in clearing stretches of road ways upon which she traveled, and
obtaining information about private individuals which she would not otherwise have access to.
Ex. "2" to the affidavit of Kim Williams, page 77, bates ADA 237. The result of the 2011
investigation was that Ms. Oldham was given the choice to resign or be fired. See Rich Wright
Affidavit,

,r 7.

The investigation initiated on behalf of Jim Farrens was to determine if Mr. Farrens
himself had been the victim of workplace harassment or a hostile work environment. While the
finding was that no policy had been violated, the basis for initiating the investigation was
suspicion of a violation. It is undisputed that Dave Case was upset when he learned that this
investigation had been conducted, and that he felt himself to be the target of that investigation.
See Dave Case Deposition, 119:22-125:18.
Plaintiff initiated, participated, and provided information in all three investigations, and is
therefore protected under the IPPEA for those actions. Any retaliation for his involvement in
those activities is expressly forbidden by statute and his case should proceed to the jury. "As a
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general rule, causation is an issue of fact for the jury and only rarely can the issue be determined
on a motion for summary judgment. Van v. Portneuf, 147 Idaho 552,559,212 P.3d, 982, 989
(2009). See also Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391,224 P.3d 458 (2008).

B.

Plaintiff's Family Medical Leave Act Claim is for interference and not a claim/or
retaliation.

FMLA law clearly provides that an employer can be liable for interfering with an employee's
approved leave. "It shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the
exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under this title [29 U.S.C.S. § 261 et seq.]."
29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(l), see also Sanders v. City a/Newport, 657 F.3d 772 (9th Cir 2011).
"In interference claims, the employer's intent is irrelevant to a determination ofliability. Id.
at 657 F .3d 778. '"Employer motive plays no role in a claim for substantive denial of benefits."' Id.
(quoting Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 298 F.3d 955,960 (10th Cir. 2002). Under an
interference claim the Plaintiff only need show he was entitled to the leave and the Defendants'
conduct interfered with that entitlement. Id. at 657 F .3d 781 "The employer's good faith or lack of
knowledge that its conduct violated the Act is, as a general matter, pertinent only to the question of
damages under the FMLA, not to liability. Bachelder v. Am. W Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1130
(9th Cir. 2001).
Defendants cite Liu V Amway, 347 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2003) for the proposition that in an
interference claim the plaintiff must show that FMLA was a factor in the decision to terminate.
However, this is a misstatement of the decision. In a subsection entitled "Use ofFMLA Leave as a
Factor in Liu's Termination, the Liu court states, "Where an employee alleges that his or her
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FMLA leave is impermissibly considered in the decision to terminate him or her ...." Id., 347 F Jd
at 1135-1136 (emphasis added). The Liu court goes on to require the employee to then show by a
preponderance of evidence that the leave was a negative factor in the decision. Id.
In the present matter Plaintiff has not alleged that his FMLA leave was a factor in the
decision to terminate his employment.

The Liu court in discussing the employer's

mischaracterization of the plaintifrs leave states, "The statute and the accompanying regulations
protect an employee from any employer actions that discourage or interfere with the right to take
FMLA leave." Id., 347 F.3d at 1134 (emphasis in the original). "An employer's good faith or lack of
knowledge that its conduct violates FMLA does not protect it from liability." Id., 347 F.3d at 1135.
Plaintiff agrees with Defendants' statement of the five elements of an interference claim,
namely: (1) he was eligible for the FMLA' s protections, (2) his employer was covered by the FMLA,
(3) he was entitled to leave under the FMLA, (4) he provided sufficient notice of his intent to take
leave, and (5) his employer denied him FMLA benefits to which he was entitled. Sanders v. City of
Newport, 657 F.3d 772, 778 (9th Cir 2011). These five elements, "only require an employee to
prove that she was entitled to FMLA benefits and that "h[ er] employer denied h[er] FMLA benefits
to which [s]he was entitled."' Id, 657 F.3d at 781 (Quoting Burnett, 472 F.ed at 477)(Reversing
based upon the trial court's jury instruction requiring plaintiff to prove the employer did not have
reasonable cause to terminate her was prejudicial addition of an element of the interference claim).

i.

The Defendants' "legitimate reason" is a factual issue for the jury to
determine.

In the event that the employer claims a legitimate reason for denying the employee his
benefits under FMLA, the burden is upon the employer to establish a legitimate reason exists.
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 11

000208

Sanders v. City a/Newport, 657 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir 201 l)(rejecting the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting analysis in FMLA interference claims). It is undisputed that Plaintiff was entitled to
FMLA leave. Defendants' wrongful termination of Plaintiff under the Idaho Protection of Public
Employee's Act interfered with Plaintiffs right to qualified leave, thereby violating the Family
Medical Leave Act.
Additionally, Defendants try to minimize the quantity of Plaintiffs qualifying, and approved
FMLA leave based upon dates provided for in the medical certification existing at the time of his
wrongful termination. However, Plaintiff is entitled to a total of 12 weeks ofleave per year as long
as the need for such leave continues. Plaintiffs need for additional leave, after the expiration of the
original FMLA certification, would have been processed through re-certification. In fact, Ada
County policies require re-certification every 30 days for intermittent leave, which is precisely the
leave for which Plaintiff was certified. See Ex. "5" to the affidavit of Kim Williams (Ada County
Employee/Manager Handbook & Procedural Guidelines), page 84, paragraph: Updates, bates
ADA 1406.
While the position of Chief of Staff may not be "virtually identical" to the position held by
Plaintiff, he had performed all of the functions listed in the new Chief of Staffjob description during
the course of his employment with the County. See Rich Wright Affidavit,

,r 8.

Whether that

position is "equivalent" in terms of being an appropriate position for reinstatement is a factual
determination properly within the decision of the jury.
Both the issue of liability and damages in Plaintiffs FMLA interference claim are factual
disputes which are to be determined by the jury. Therefore Plaintiff respectfully requests that
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Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the FMLA claim be denied.
C.

Genuine Issues ofFact Exist Regarding Plaintiff's Claims for Negligent and/or
Intentional infliction of emotional distress.

i.

Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendants' termination of Plaintiffs employment in violation of the IPPEA constitutes a
breach of a legally recognized duty.

It is well-established in Idaho that statutes and

administrative regulations may define the applicable standard of care owed in a negligence case
and that violating such statutes and/or regulations constitutes negligence per se. Damages can be
established through Plaintiffs health care records, medications required, and his testimony of
how the breach of legal duty on the part of Defendants has impacted his life.
While Plaintiff can establish breach of a duty through the violation of the IPPEA, his
damages are not limited to the damages proscribed under that Act. The damages for his
negligent and/or emotional distress claim arise from a separate claim and cause of action.
Additionally, in Brown v. City of Caldwell, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143552, the court held that
nothing in the Idaho Whistleblower Act "restricts plaintiffs from seeking non-economic or other
special damages." Id. at 3. This holding was made after the defendant in that case made the very
same argument made in the present matter. That being the enumerated items in I.C. § 6-2106
somehow prevent the recovery of any other damages.
This violates two cardinal rules of statutory construction. First, "[t]he
Court must construe a statute as a whole, and consider all sections of applicable
statutes together to determine the intent of the legislature." Davaz v. Priest River
Glass Co., 125 Idaho 333, 870 P.2d 1292, 1295 (Idaho 1994) (internal citation
omitted). Second, Courts must "give a statute an interpretation that will not
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•

render it a nullity." State v. Nelson, 119 Idaho 444, 807 P.2d 1282, 1285 (Idaho
Ct. App. 1991). By allowing plaintiffs to seek recovery for non-economic and
special damages, the Court views Section 6-2105 and Section 6-2106 together, in
context, and ultimately gives effect to both- not just Section 6-2106.
Id.
In any event, the IPPEA cannot limit damages for claim under a separate legal theory, that
being Negligent and/or Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

ii.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Under Idaho law, an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists where
there is extreme and outrageous conduct coupled with severe emotional distress. See, e.g.,
Alderson v. Bonner, 142 Idaho 733, 132 P.3d 1261, 1267-68 (Ct. App. 2006). As is set forth in
the Statement of Facts and the arguments above, the evidence in this case is more than sufficient
to demonstrate that the Defendants acted outrageously in their treatment of Plaintiff.
Plaintiff has suffered extreme emotional distress based upon the action of the Defendants
in terminating his employment in violation of IPPEA. Defendants claim the conduct they
engaged in does not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous. However, when elected officials
make it their first order of business to repay personal favors to their friends by taking away the
employment of private citizen, a reasonable jury could very well find that behavior atrocious and
beyond the bounds of decency. That is a question squarely within the province of the jury to
decide.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court deny Defendants' motion
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 14

000211

for summary judgment on all claims.
DATED this

2.4

day of October, 2014.
ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC

By:
Kimberly L. Williams
Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 2.t( day of October, 2014 I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing to be forwarded with all the required charges prepaid, by the method(s) indicated below to
the following persons:
Kirtlan G. Naylor
Bruce J. Castleton
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610
Boise, ID 83702

Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail
Facsimile 383-9516
Overnight Mail
Electronic Mail
kirt@naylorhales.com
bic@naylorhales.com

!CW

Kimberly L. Williams

\\OFFICESERVER\Rossman Law\Documents\Work\W\Wright, Rich\Pleadings\MSJMemoOpp.doc
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Kirtlan G. Naylor
[ISB No. 3569]
OCT
Bruce J. Castleton
[ISB No. 6915]
Joan E. Callahan
[ISB No. 9241]
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
Attorneys at Law
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 610
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516
Email: kirt@naylorhales.com; bjc@naylorhales.com; jec@naylorhales.com
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Attorneys for Defendant Ada County
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,
Case No. CV-OC-13-02730
Plaintiff,
vs.
ADA COUNTY, political subdivision of the
State ofldaho; ADA COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN
REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.
Defendant Ada County, Ada County Board of County Commissioners 1, by ~d through its
attorneys ofrecord, Naylor & Hales, P.C., hereby files its Memorandum in Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition

Ada County Board of County Commissioners is not a proper party as it is not a governmental
entity that can be sued. To the extent that any claims could be alleged against the Commission, this Reply
applies to those claims as well. However, Defendant does not waive the right to move to dismiss this
"party" at a later date.
1
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to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons set forth below and in Defendant's
Memorandum in Support of this Motion, the motion must be granted and this proceeding dismissed.
ARGUMENT
A.

The Whistleblower Act Only Authorizes Causes of Action Stemming From Reporting
Waste or Violations of Laws, Rules or Regulations.

1.

Idaho Code§ 6-2104(2) Must Be Construed in Accordance with the Legislative
Intent of the Whistleblower Act.

Plaintiff essentially suggests that subsection (2) of Section § 6-21042 ofthe Idaho Whistleblower
Act should be given a far more expansive interpretation than was expressly intended by the Legislature.
However, this suggestion is contrary to the principles of statutory interpretation and must be rejected.

2

LC.§ 6-2104(1),(2), and (3) read in full:

(1) (a) An employer may not take adverse action against an employee because the employee, or a person
authorized to act on behalf ofthe employee, communicates in good faith the existence of any waste of
public funds, property or manpower, or a violation or suspected violation of a law, rule or regulation
adopted under the law of this state, a political subdivision of this state or the United States. Such
communication shall be made at a time and in a manner which gives the employer reasonable opportunity
to correct the waste or violation.
J

(b) For purposes of subsection (1 )(a) ofthis section, an employee communicates in good faith if there is

a reasonable basis in fact for the communication. Good faith is lacking where the employee knew or
reasonably ought to have known that the report is malicious, false or frivolous.
(2) An employer may not take adverse action against an employee because an employee participates or
gives information in an investigation, hearing, court proceeding, legislative or other inquiry, or other form
of administrative review."
(3) An employer may not take adverse action against an employee because the employee has objected
to or refused to carry out a directive that the employee reasonably believes violates a law or a rule or
regulation adopted under the authority ofthe laws ofthis state, political subdivision ofthis state or the
United States.
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As the Idaho Supreme Court has held:
In construing legislative acts it is not the business of the court to deal in any subtle
refinements ofthe legislation, but our duty is to ascertain, ifpossible, from a reading ofthe
whole act, and amendments thereto, the purpose and intent ofthe legislature and give force
and effect thereto. Statutes must also be construed as a whole without separating one
provision from another. The primary function of the court in con.struing a statute is to
determine legislative intent and give effect thereto.

George W. Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 539-540 (1990) (citations omitted).
Hence, the Idaho Whistleblower Act (the "Act"), which is contained in Chapter 21, Title 6 ofthe
Idaho Code, must be read and construed as a whole. Section 6-2101 entitled "Legislative Intent" declares
the purpose and legislative intent ofthe Act. The legislative intent ofthe Act is to create "a legal cause of
action for public employees who experience adverse action from their employer as a result ofreporting
waste and violations of a law, rule orregulation." I.C. § 6-2101 (emphasis added). Consequently,
employment actions that do not result from reporting waste or violations of a law, rule or regulation fall
outside the legislative intent and scope of the Act; the Act does not create a cause of action for those
actions. Ultimately, all sections ofthe Act must be construed within the Act's stated intent and its resultant
limitations.
Section 6-2104 describes the particular conduct that is protected by the Act. As part ofthe Act,
this section must be interpreted in accord with the legislative intent. This section is entitled "Reporting of
Governmental Waste or Violation of Law - - Employer Action" and this title is further evidence ofthe
Legislature's intent to limit its protections to conduct relating to potential waste or violations ofa law, rule
or regulation. Thus, to be protected by the Act, an employee's conduct must relate to waste or a violation
of law, rule or regulation.
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Plaintiffargues that subsection (2) ofSection 6-2104 should not be limited to investigations relating
to waste or a violation oflaw, rule or regulation.3 Rather, Plaintiffargues that simply participating or giving
information in any investigation triggers the protections of the Act without regard to the object of the
investigation. (Plfs Opp., p. 7.) This interpretation ignores the legislative intent and would isolate this
subsection and give it a different interpretation than the rest ofthe Act; this is the precise kind ofimproper,
piecemeal statutory interpretation that the Idaho Supreme Court has rejected. Messenger, 118 at 539540.
Further, blanket protection for participating in any investigation into any subject creates untenable
results. For instance under Plaintiffs interpretation, ifthe Commissioners wished to have an investigation
done into whether an employee was parking in another employee's designated space, any employee who
gave information in the parking space investigation would have a claim under the Act for any adverse action
they later suffered.
Another instructive example can be drawn from the facts of Mallonee v. State, 139 Idaho 615
(2004). In Mallonee, a former employee of the Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC), Mallonee,
alleged that he had been fired by his supervisor because he had not followed his supervisor's order to fire
two employees who were under departmental investigation for violating protocol and policies; during the
investigation the employees admitted the conduct. Id. at 618. Mallonee believed that firing the two
employees while the investigation was ongoing was a violation ofIDOC policy. Id at 620. Mallonee told
his supervisor that he believed firing the employees during the pending investigation was prohibited, but his

Plaintiff s argument here concedes that his actions at issue in this claim did not relate to waste or
a violation o~ law, rule or regulation.
3
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supervisor still ordered him to fire the employees. Id. Mallonee also relayed his concerns to the next level
ofthe chain ofcommand. Id. Mallonee still did not fire the employees even after further instruction from
his supervisor and Mallonee was terminated at least in part for failing to fire the employees. Id. At the time
ofMallonee' s termination, the final inves~igative report into the two employees still had not been seen by
the supervisor. Id.
In sum, Mallonee' s termination was based in part on Mallonee' s beliefthat firing the employees
while an investigation was pending was prohibited by IDOC policy, reporting that beliefto his supervisor
and the next level in the chain ofcommand, and then refusing to fire the employees in violation ofthe policy.
Mallonee filed a wrongful termination claim claiming protection under subsections (1) and (3) ofSection
6-2104 ofthe Act, which protects an employee who communicates a violation or suspected violation of
a law, rule or regulation or who objects or refuses to carry out a directive that the employee reasonably
believes violates a law, rule or regulation.
The Idaho Supreme Court determined that Mallonee did not have a cause of action under the Act
because his report and refusal were merely based on the violation of a policy and a policy is not a statute,
rule or regulation. Id. Therefore, even ifMallonee had been fired because he reported a violation ofthe
policy or because he refused to carry out a directive that violated a policy, Mallonee still did not have a
claim under the Act because the Act does not protect an employee from adverse action relating to violation
of a policy. Id. at 620-621.
However, under Plaintiffs proposed construction of subsection (2), prohibiting adverse action
because an employee participates or gives information in any investigation, if IDOC had acted on
Mallonee's report and investigated the policy violation and Mallonee provided information in that
REPLY MEMORANDUM- 5.
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investigation, then Mallonee could have claimed protection under the Act. In other words under Plaintiffs
interpretation, an employee's claimed retaliation based on his report and refusal to act in violation ofpolicy
is outside the scope ofthe Act, but the same claimed retaliation would be within the scope of Act ifthe
employee had participated in the investigation ofthe same violation ofpolicy. This interpretation is just
simply incongruous and unreasonable. This result simply could not be the Legislature's intent.
Ultimately, all subsections ofSection 6-2104 must be construed in harmony and in accord with the
legislative intent. Thus, as stated by the Idaho Supreme Court, the summary judgment standard "does not
authorize the district court to extend the reach ofI. C. § 6-2104 to include 'policies' that are not expressly
mentioned in the language ofthe statute." Id. at 620. Hence, participation in an investigation only creates
a cause of action under the Act when the investigation relates waste or a violation of a law, rule or
regulation.
The investigations at issue in this case do not relate to the reporting ofwaste or the violation of a
law, rule or regulation; they only relate to the violation ofpolicies. Therefore, Wright's connection to these
investigations does not fall under the protections of the Act, and his claim cannot survive summary
judgment.
2.

Policies Contained in the Handbook Do Not Have the Force and Effect of Law.

Wright also contends that the policies at issue are rules and regulations adopted under the law and
promulgated under Ada County Code Chapter 7. (Plf's Opp .,p. 5 ~ 13, p. 7.) However, the fact that the
County ordinance recognizes that an Employee/Manager Handbook would be drafted does not make the
guidelines in the Handbook themselves the equivalent of a law, rule or regulation.
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The core of the Idaho Supreme Court's reasoning in Mallonee was that the Department of
Correction (IDOC) policies did not have the force or effect oflaw because they were not promulgated
under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). 13 9 Idaho at 620. The prescribed procedures in the
APA and underlying legislative authority is what makes a rule or regulation synonymous with a statute. Id.
Further, the Mallonee Court likened the IDOC policies to a policies and procedures manual, such
as in the case of Service Employees Int'! Union Local 6 v. Idaho Dep't ofHealth and Welfare, 106
Idaho 756 (1984). In that case the Court held those policies also did not constitute a rule and therefore did
not have the force and effect oflaw. Id. In Service Employees, the Court explained that the Administrative
Procedures Act definition ofa rule excludes statements "concerning only the internal management of any
agency and not affecting private rights or procedures available to the public." 106 Idaho at 756-757
(quoting LC.§ 67-5201). Because the manual was not a rule it could only provide "guidelines for the
internal management ofthe Department not affecting private rights or procedures available to the public."

Id at 757. The Court continued that "[t]he Department's agency handbook must be construed as merely
an internal guideline capable ofbeing changed by an agency head when necessary, not having the force and
effect of law." Id.
Also, the Idaho Supreme Court has distinguished a resolution from a law, noting that a resolution
is not a law. Wasden ex rel. State v. Idaho State Bd of Land Com'rs, 150 Idaho 547, 556 (2010)
(citing Balderston v. Brady, 17 Idaho 567(1910)). In Balderston, the Court also noted that a resolution
"is not enacted in the manner provided for the enactment of a law ... and it is not contended that it is a
law." 17 Idaho at 577. Thus, the manner in which a resolution or policies are are created and adopted
by a governmental entity are a distinguishing factor when determining the force and effect they have.
REPLY MEMORANDUM- 7.

000219

Similarly, a local government's ordinance and a resolution are not legally equivalent. It is a basic
principle that "[c] aunty boards can proceed in the exercise of their powers only by means of orders,
ordinances, or resolutions. Any action which does not rise to the dignity of an ordinance is a resolution,
· and a county resolution does not have the binding effect of an ordinance." 20 C.J.S. Counties§ 145
(2014). Hence, ordinances are legally binding and have the force and effect oflaw, but resolutions do not
have the force and effect of law.
In this case, on December 27, 2006 Ada County passed an ordinance that repealed its previous
ordinances and eliminated its classified employment system. Afjid ofChristopher D. Rich, Exh. A, ADA
1197. Theordinancealsoenactedanat-willsystemofpersonneladministration. Id atADA 1197-1198.
The repeal ofthe classified system and enactment ofthe at-will system was originally to be effective March
1, 2007. Id. On February 20, 2007, Ada County amended the ordinance to change the effective date of
the at-will system to June 1, 2007. Id. at ADA 1199-1200. The ordinance also anticipated that
"handbooks" providing the human resource policies and procedures would be adopted by resolution on
June 1, 2007. Id
The ordinance states that:
In the interim period prior to the effective date of the new personnel system, the Ada
County Department ofAdministrative Services shall prepare a draft handbook for review
by the Board ofAda County Commissioners. This handbook will be an overall guide to
the County personnel system. The handbook shall be adopted by resolution ofthe Board
of County Commissioners. It may be amended from time to time by the Board of County
Commissioners for such reasons as they may determine.
Id. at ADA 1199-1200. Additionally, the ordinance discussed "further procedural guidelines" to be

created by an internal department of Ada County. Id. at ADA 1200. The ordinance states:
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Prior to the effective date of this Ordinance further procedural guidelines shall be
promulgated by the Ada County Department ofAdministrative Services and circulated to
each elected official for comment. The Human Resources Procedural Guidelines
Handbook shall provide a guide for supervisors, department heads and elected officials in
the implementation ofthe Ada County Employment Handbook. On or after June 1, 2007,
such Human Resources Procedural Guidelines Handbook, amended, as the Board of
County Commissioners shall deem appropriate, shall be adopted by resolution. The
Human Resources Procedural Guidelines Handbook may be amended from time to time
by resolution of the Board of Ada County Commissioners.
Id. at 1200.
On May 30, 2007, the Commissioners adopted Resolution No. 1468 approving the Ada County
Employee/Manager Handbook and Procedure Guidelines and authorizing the Employee/Manager
Handbook and Procedure Guidelines to be amended from time to time. Id.,~ 5, Exh. B. Hence, the
Employee/Manager Handbook and Procedural Guidelines were not enacted by ordinance and have only
been amended by motion of the Commissioners. Id., ~ 6.
Ultimately, Ada County's handbooks that contain the personnel policies and guidelines were
adopted by resolution and not by ordinance. They may be changed at any time without amending any
ordinance; they are simply amended by a motion. They do not impact the private rights or procedures
available to the public; they are only guidelines for the internal management ofAda County. Therefore, the
policies in this case are similar to the policies in Mallonee and the policy manual in Services Employees,
which did not have the force and effect oflaw. pius, the Employee/Manager Handbook and Procedural
Guidelines do not have any ofthe qualities of an ordinance or law, and do not have the force and effect of
law. Consequently, a violation of an Ada County policy is not a violation of a law, rule or regulation.
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In summary, the Whistleblower Act must be construed as a whole in accordance with the legislative
intent ofthe Act. The legislative intent ofthe Act is to create a cause of action resulting from the reporting
of waste or violations of a law, rule or regulation. Hence, to fall within the protections of the Act, an
investigation must relate to violation of a law, rule or regulation. Under the Act, a law, rule or regulation
does not include a policy lacking the force and effect oflaw. Ada County's personnel policies do not have
the force and effect oflaw and do not qualify as a law, rule or regulation under the Act. Therefore, an
investigation into a suspected violation ofan Ada County policy is not protected conduct and does not give
rise to a cause of action under the Act.
Even viewing the facts most favorable to Wright, there is no dispute that the investigations that are
the basis ofhis Whistleblower claim only relate to the violation ofAda County policy. (Plfs Opp., pp. 3
~ 3, 8-9.)

Therefore any involvement that Wright may have had in the investigations is not protected by

the Act, and Wright has no cause of action of under the Act. Accordingly, summary judgment and
dismissal of his Whistleblower claim is appropriate.
B.

An Employer Is Not Liable for an FMLA Interference Claim When It Had A Reason
Unrelated to FMLA for Terminating An Employee.
1.

Under the FMLA a Legitimate Reason for Termination is a Reason Unrelated to
theFMLA.

Although Plaintiffis not required to prove that Ada County intended to interfere with his rights uµder
the FMLA, an interference claim does not impose strict liability against an employer who terminates an
employeewhohasexercisedrightsundertheFMLA. Edgarv. JACProducts, Inc.,443 F. 3d501, 508
(6th Cir. 2006); Throneberry v. McGehee Desha County Hosp., 403 F.3d at 977-78 (8th Cir.2005)
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(citing Smithv. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, Jnc.,298F.3d955, 961 (lOthCir.2002)). As explained
by the Eighth Circuit,
We initially note eveiy discharge ofan employee while she is taking FMLA leave interferes
with an employee's FMLA rights. However, the mere fact of discharge during FMLA
leave by no means demands an employer be held strictly liable for violating the FMLA' s
prohibition of interfering with an employee's FMLA rights. ,

Throneberry, 403 F.3d at 980. Hence, "an employer who interferes with an employee's FMLA rights
will not be liable ifthe employer can prove it would have made the same decision had the employee not
exercised the employee's FMLA rights." Throneberry, 403 F.3d at 977. Thus, invocation ofthe FMLA
does not protect an employee from any adverse employment action that may impact him; it only protects
him from adverse employment actions resulting from the employee's exercise ofthe rights created under
theFMLA.
Plaintiffasserts the unsupported position that his federal FMLA claim should survive because he
is claiming protection under the state-created Idaho Whistleblower Act. (Plf's Opposition, p. 12.)
Plaintiffoffers absolutely no authority that a violation of an unrelated state statute establishes a violation of
the FMLA. To the contraiy, "a reason for dismissal insufficiently related to FMLA leave will not support
recoveiy under an interference theoiy." Throneberry, 403 F.3d at 977 (quoting Smith, 298 FJd at 961 ).
Plaintiffs alleged Whistleblower Act claim is wholly unrelated to his FMLA claim.
As demonstrated in its Memorandum on the Motion, Ada County's reasons for eliminating the
Director ofAdministration position and discharging Wright were wholly unrelated to Wright's application
for FMLA leave. Plaintiff offers no evidence to raise a question offact to the contraiy. Accordingly, there
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is no question of genuine material fact that Wright's discharge was unrelated to his FMLA leave and
Wright's FMLA claim cannot withstand summary judgment.
2.

A Reasonable Jury Could Not Find That Wright Was Denied Any FMLA
Benefits.

To survive summary judgment on an interference claim, a plaintiffmust provide evidence that he
was entitled to benefits under the FMLA and that his employer denied him those benefits. Sanders v. City
ofNewport, 657 F.3d 772, 778 (9th Cir.2011 ). The FMLA only creates two entitlements for employees:

requested periods ofleave and reinstatement to his position or an equivalent position when returning from
leave. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612(a), 2614(a).
Plaintiff correctly states that the FMLA generally entitles an employee to a total oftwelve (12)
weeks ofleave per year while a serious medical need continues. (Plfs Opp., p.12). However, Plaintiff
makes the uncertain assumption that ifh~ would have remained an employee, he would have been recertified for additional leave after his previously requested period ofleave expired at the end ofFebruary
2013. Any potential for Wright's future re-certification is too tenuous to show that Wright was actually
denied any leave to which he was entitled, which is a required element to establish a prima facie case.
Re-certification ofFMLA leave is not automatic. Although re-certification may be requested by
an employer, re-certification must be done in connection with an employee's request or absence. See 29
C.F.R. § 825.308. Accordingly, an employee on intermittent FMLA leave is not assumed to have a
continuing serious health condition. In fact, an employer may actually violate the FMLA by automatically
re-certifying FMLA leave when the employee has not requested additional leave or had an absence
connected to his serious health condition. Therefore, to establish a right to additional FMLA leave, Wright
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would have had to request additional intermittent FMLA leave or had additional absences connected to
his serious health condition after February 2013, and even ifhe did that his medical provider would still
have had to provide medical certification to verify that the terms ofthe additional leave were medically
necessary.: Given all ofthe conditions precedent to Wright receiving additional FMLA leave past his initial
certified request, Wright cannot establish that he was denied any additional FMLA leave.
Regarding reinstatement, Wright admits that the ChiefofStaffposition is not virtually identical to
the Director ofAdministration position. (Plf's Opp., p. 12; Wright Affid., ~ 8.) Wright furtheradmits that
the ChiefofStaffposition did not include all ofthe duties that the Director ofAdministration had. (Wright
Affid., ~ 8.) The FMLA does not create an absolute right to reinstatement or employment. Yashenko v.
Harrah's NC Casino Co., LLC., 446 F.3d 541,549 (4th Cir. 2006). The FMLA limits the right to

reinstatement to the same or an equivalent position. 29 U.S. C. § 2614(a)( 1). The U.S. Department of
Labor's very definition of an equivalent position is "one that is virtually identical to the employee's former
position." 29 C.F.R. § 825.215(a); Crawford v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., No. 12-3698 (6th Cir.
)

2013). Jobs are not virtually identical when they do not include the same duties or the same pay. See Id.
Here, there is no factual dispute that the jobs did not have the same duties or have the same pay. Therefore
there is no factual dispute that the jobs were not virtually identical. Accordingly, there is no question as to
any material fact that by definition the jobs were not equivalent. Thus, Wright was not denied any rightto
reinstatement.
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In sum, the undisputed facts demonstrate that Wright was not denied any benefits to which he was
entitled under the FMLA. Consequently, Wright cannot establish a prima facie case for interference under
the FMLA and his claim cannot survive summary judgment.
C.

Whistleblower Act Cannot Be Used to Establish a Duty of Care for the Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress.

Plaintiff essentially argues that he can bootstrap his negligent infliction ofemotional distress claim ·
to his Whistleblower Act claim in order to recover damages that are unrecoverable under the
Whistleblower Act. Plaintiff's theory for his negligent infliction of emotional distress claim is solely
dependent on the Whistleblower Act to establish the required element that Ada County owed a duty of
care. However, a statutory duty of care does not exist when the statute was not intended to prevent the
type of harm the defendant's act or omission purportedly caused. Nation v. State Dept. ofCorrection,
144 Idaho 177, 190 (2007).
"It is a universally recognized rule of construction that, where a constitution or statute specifies

certain things, the designation of such things excludes all others." Idaho Press Club, Inc. v. State

Legislature ofthe State, 142 Idaho 640,642 (2006) quoting Local 1494 ofint'l Ass'n ofFirefighters
v. City ofCoeur d'Alene, 99 Idaho 630, 639,(1978). Applying this rule of statutory construction to the
statutes at issue, the Whistleblower Act enumerates the specific remedies for a violation ofthe Act. I. C.
§ 6-2106. Non-economic damages or damages for emotional distress are not one of the enumerated

remedies; therefore, they are excluded as a remedy for a breach ofthe Whistleblower Act. Plaintiffcannot
attemptto achieve a remedy that has already been excluded by re-characterizing the same breach ofthe
same statute under a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. Additionally, an employer does not
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breach any legal duty by terminating an at-will employee without cause. Bollinger v. Fall River Rural

Elec. Co-op., Inc., 152 Idaho 632, 642(2012). Thus, the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim
cannot survive summary judgment.

D.

Under an Intentional Infliction of Emotion Distress Claim the Determination of Whether
Conduct Is Extreme or Outrageous Is A Matter of Law.

Plaintiff incorrectly contends that the outrageousness of a Defendant's conduct is a question for
the jury to decide. (Plf's Opp., p. 14.) The Idaho Supreme Court has explicitly stated that"[w]hether
a defendant's conduct is so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery is a matter oflaw." Nation, 144
Idaho at 192. Further,"[c]o~s have required very extreme conduct before awarding damages for the
intentional infliction of emotional distress." Edmonson v. Shearer Lumber Products, 13 9 Idaho 172, 180
(2003). The extreme and outrageous conduct must be so severe that no reasonable person could expect
to endure it. Davis v. Gage, 106 Idaho 735, 741 (1984).
Idaho case law demonstrates the difficulty ofestablishing an IIED claim in the employment setting.
l
See Bollinger, 152 Idaho 63 2 (2012) (plaintiff failed to demonstrate that her employer's conduct was
I

extreme or outrageous even though the employee's position was eliminated and she was terminated after
i
'

reporting safety compliance issues); Nation, 144 Idaho 177 (employer's conduct was not extreme or
outrageous even though it resulted in correctional officers' personal information being released and
distributed to the inmate population); Edmonson, 139 Idaho 172 (no intentional i~iction of emotional
i

distress where an employee with excellent work record was terminated for attending'public meetings and
potentially taking a position that did not support the company's position on a project); Jeremiah v. Yanke

Machine Shop, Inc., 131 Idaho 242 (1998) (no evidence that conduct was severe and outrageous even
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though employee was severely harassed by his co-workers and when management failed to persuade him
to quit, they fired him). The simple fact that an at-will employee is discharged without cause cannot does
not constitute extreme and outrageous behavior. Bollinger, 152 Idaho at 643. This remains true even
when the termination is in violation of the employer's policies. See id
In all, the conduct in this case does not rise to the level of outrageousness and extremity that is
required to sustain a claim for Intentional Infliction ofEmotional Distress under Idaho law. Thus, Wright's
claim is appropriate for a grant of summary judgment.

IV.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons state above and in the Defendant's Memorandum in Support ofthis Motion, the
Motion must be granted and Plaintiffs claims dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this 31st day of October, 2014.
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
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Christopher D. Rich, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I am the County Clerk of Ada County, State of Idaho, and the Ex-Officio

Clerk to the Board of Ada County Commissioners (the "Board"). I give this affidavit based upon
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I

my personal knowledge and experience. I am over the age of eighteen (18) and competent to testify
to the matters herein.
2.

As the clerk of the board my duties include keeping the records of the Board

and I have control and access over the records of the Board.
3.

The records of the Board include minute records, which record all orders and

decisions made by the Board, and the daily proceedings had at all regular and special meetings;
ordinance records, containing all ordinances, stating the date enacted; and resolution records,
containing all resolutions, stating the date adopted.
4.

On December 27, 2006, the Board enacted Ordinance 649 implementing an

at-will system of personnel administration. Ordinance 649 made the effective date implementing
the at-will system March 1, 2007. On February 20, 2007, the Board enacted Ordinance 654 to amend
Ordinance 649 to change the effective date implementing the at-will system to June 1, 2007.
Ordinance 654 was identical to Ordinance 649 except for the effective dates. Ordinance 654 has not
been amended since February 20, 2007. Attached hereto as Exhibit A are true and correct copies
of Ordinance 649 and 654.
5.

On May 30, 2007, the Board adopted Resolution No. 1468 approving the Ada

County Employee/Manager Handbook and Procedure Guidelines and authorizing the
Employee/Manager Handbook and Procedure Guidelines to be amended from time to time. Attached
hereto as Exhibit Bis a true and correct copy of Resolution No. 1468.
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·6.

The Employee/Manager Handbook and Procedural Guidelines were not

adopted by ordinance and have only been amended by motion of the Board.

Christopher D. Rich

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this

&

day of October, 2014.

Residing in Boise, Idaho
My Commission Expires: ~

("f-( 'J(){ f-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 31st day of October, 2014, I caused to be served,
by the method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon:
Eric S. Rossman
Erica S. Phillips
Kimberly L. Williams
Rossman Law Group, PLLC
73 7 N. 7th Street
Boise, ID 83702

_L'

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
- / Fax Transmission: 342-2170
_t/ Email: erossman@rossmanlaw.com
ephillips@rossmanlaw.com
kwillliams@rossmanlaw.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff
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ORDINANCE NO. 649
AN ORDlNANCE REPEALING TITLE 1, CHAPTERS 7 AND 11 ADA COUNTY CODE, AND
ADOPTING A NEW CHAPTER 7 PROVIDING FOR AN AT-WILL SYSTEM OF
EMPLOYMENT IN ADA COUNTY; PROVIDING FOR THE CREATION OF A POLICY
HANDBOOK ADOPTED BY RESOLUTION OF TiiE BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS; PROVIDING FOR A PROCEDURAL HANDBOOK ADOPTED BY
RESOLUTION OF THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; PROVIDING FOR THE
ADOPTION OF OTHER POLICIES BY ELECTED OFFICIALS NOT IN CONFLICT WITH
COUNTY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES; AND PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE DATE;
BE IT ORDAINED BY THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF ADA COUNTY,
IDAHO, THAT EFFECTIVE MARCH 1, 2007, ADA COUNTY CODE, TITLE 1, CHAPTERS 7
AND 11, BE REPEALED AND A NEW TITLE 1 CHAPTER 7 BE ENACTED EFFECTIVE
MARCH 1, 2007, AS FOLLOWS:
CHAPTER?
AT WILL PERSONNEL SYSTEM
1-7-1: PURPOSE AND SCOPE: Idaho is an at-will state for employment purposes. It is
the intention of the Board of County Commissioners of Ada County to bring its employment
policies in line with an at-will system of personnel administration. At-will employees serve at the
will and pleasure of their supervising elected officials. Their employment may be terminated at any
time, with or without cause. Ada County at-will employees retain all the employment protections
guaranteed by state and federal law. It is .both good business practice 1µ1d sound public policy for
Ada County to have personnel administration under an at-will system that is clear and manageable
for employees, supervisors and elected officials. The Board of County Conmrissioners finds that an
at-will personnel system will. aid in the retention of skilled employees and serve the public interest.
1-7-2: EFFECTIVE DATES: Effective March 1, 2007, Title 1, Chapters 7 and II of the
Ada County Code are hereby repealed. Effective March I, 2007, a new Chapter? is hereby enacted
implementing an at-will system of personnel administration. On the same date, handbooks
providing the human resource policies and procedures of Ada County will be adopted by resolution
of the Board of Ada County Commissioners.
1-7-3: CREATION OF ADA COUNTY EMPLOYEFJMANAGER HANDBOOK: In the
interim period prior to the effective date of the new personnel system, the Ada County Department
of Administrative Services shall prepare a draft handbook for review by the Board of Ada County
Commissioners. This handbook will be an overall guide to the County personnel system. The
handbook shall be adopted by resolution of the Board of County Commissioners. It may be
amended from time to time by the Board of County Commissioners for such reasons as they may
determine. Between the adoption date or' this ordinance and the effective date of March 1, 2007,
employees are encouraged to review a draft of this handbook and meet with representatives of the
Human Resources Division concerning the handbook and/or implementation of this ordinance. The
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Ada County Department of Administrative Services shall provide a copy of the handbook to each
employee of Ada County by such means as they detennine to be most effective.
1-7-4: CREATION OF HUMAN RESOURCES PROCEDURAL HANDBOOK: Prior to
the effective date of this Ordinance further procedural guidelines shall be promulgated by the Ada
County Department of Administrative Services and circulated to each elected official for comment.'
The Hwnan Resources Procedural Guidelines Handbook shall provide a guide for supervisors,
department heads and elected officials in the implementation of the Ada County Employment
Handbook. On or after March 1, 2007, such Human Resources Procedural Guidelines Handbook,
amended, as the Board of County Commissioners shall deem appropriate, shall be adopted by
resolution. The Hwnan Resources Procedural Guidelines Handbook may be amended from time to
time by resolution of the Board of Ada County Corrunissioners.
1-7-5: ADDITIONAL POLICIES AND PROCEDURES. In addition to using the Ada
County Employee/Manager Handbook and Human Resources Procedural Guidelines Handbook,
elected officials may adopt such further policies and procedures to meet the unique needs of the
offices they administer as are not in conflict with the policies and procedures described in the Ada
County Employee/Manager Handbook and Human Resources Procedural Guidelines Handbook
and/or state and federal laws.
ADOPTED this 27th day of December, 2006.
Board of Ada County Commissioners

By:

By:

·~~
Rick·
Yzagu7rre;

~
;J~m •./huui/--ll!.kV
udyM.1'eavey-Derr, Corfunissioner

By:.
Fred Tilman, Commissioner
ATTEST:
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ORDINANCE NO. 654
AN ·ORDINANCE AMENDING ORDINANC,::E. NO. 649 TO PROVIDE FOR A NEW
EFFECTIVE DATE OF JUNE 1, 2007, FOR. SAD;> ORDINANCE. ORDINANCE NO. -649
REPEALED TITLE 1, CHAPTERS 7,AND 11 ADA COUNTY. CODE, AND ADOPTED A
NEW CHAPTER 7; PROVIDED FOR AN AT-WILL SYSTEM OF EMPLOYMENT IN ADA
COUNTY; PROVIDED FOR THE CREATION OF A POLICY HANDBOOK ADOPTED BY
RESOLUTION OF THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; PROVIDED FOR A
PROCEDURAL HANDBOOK ADOPTED BY RESOLUTION OF THE BOARD OF COUNTY
C0lv1MISSI0NERS; PROVIDED FOR THE ADOPTION OF OTHER POLICIES BY ELECTED
OFFICIALS NOT IN CONFLICT WITH COUNTY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES; AND
PROVIDED AN EFFECTIVE DATE OF MARCH l, 2007, WHICH IS HEREBY AMENDED
TO JUNE l, 2007;
BE IT ORDAINED BY THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF ADA COUNTY,
IDAHO, THAT EFFECTIVE JUNE 1, 2007, ADA COUNTY CODE, TITLE 1, CHAPTERS 7
AND 11, BE REPEALED AND A NEW TITLE } CHAPTER 7 BE ENACTED EFFECTIVE
JUNE 1, 2007, AS FOLLOWS:
CHAPTER 7
AT WILL PERSONNEL SYSTEM
1-7-l: PURPOSE AND SCOPE: Idaho is an at-will state for employment purposes. It is
the intention of the Board of County Commissici~ers I of Ada County to bring its employment
policies in line with an at-will system of personnel administration. At-will employees serve at the
will and pleasure of their supervising elected .officials. Their employment may be terminated at any
time, with or without cause. Ada County at-will :~mployees retain all the employment protections
guaranteed by state and federal law. It is both good business practice and sound public policy for
Ada County to have personnel administration under an at-will system that is clear and manageable
for employees, supervisors and elected officials. The Board of County Commissioners finds that an
at-will personnel system will aid in the retention of skilled employees and serve the public interest.
1-7-2: EFFECTIVE DATES: Effective Mareh June l, 2007, Title 1, Chapters 7 and 11 of
the Ada County Code are hereby repealed. Effective Mareh-June 1, 2007, a new Chapter 7 is
hereby enacted implementing an at-will system of persoIU1el administration. On the same date,
handbooks providing the human resourcci policies a.pd procedures of Ada County will be adopted
by resolution of the Board of Ada County Commis&iciners:
1-7-3: CREATION OF ADA COUNTY EMPLOYEF/MANAGER HANDBOOK: In the
interim period prior to the effective date of the new personnel system, the Ada County Department
of Administrative Services shall prepare a draft .handbook f.or review by the Board of Ada County
Commissioners. This handbook will be an overall guide to the County personnel system. The
handbook shall be adopted by resolution of the. Board of County Commissioners. It may be
amended from time to time by the Board of Couricy,_C0mmissioners for such reasons as they may
. ·· ...
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detennine. Between the adoption date of this ordinance and the effective date of Mareh June 1,
2007, employees are encouraged to review a draft of this handbook and meet with representatives
of the Human Resources Division concerning tp~. handbook and/or implementation of this
ordinance. The Ada County Department of Acimipistrative Services shall provide a copy of the
hanQbook to each employee of Ada Coll!!ty by su~.~- 111eans as they determine to be most effective.
1-7-4: CREATION OF HUMAN RESO\.IRCES. PROCEDURAL HANDBOOK: Prior to
the effective date of this Ordinance further procedural guidelines shall be promulgated by the Ada
County Department of Administrative Services and circulated to each elected official for comment.
The .f!uman Resources Procedural Guidelines }:Iand}?ook shall provide a guide for supervisors,
department heads and elected officials in ~~ imp~ementation of the Ada County Employment
Handbook. On or after M!lf6h: ~ l , 2007, · ~li~J;!; ,~uman Resources Procedural Guidelines
Handbook, amended, as the Board of County Coirunissioners shall deem appropriate, shall be
adopted by resolution. The Human Resoun;es Pr9cedural Guidelines Handbook may be amended
from time to time by resolution of the Board of A~ County Commissioners.
1-7-5: ADDITIONAL POLICIES AND PROCEDURES. In addition to using the Ada
County Employee/Manager Handbook and Human Resources Procedural Guidelines H!!,Ddbook,
elected officials may adopt such further policies and procedures to meet the unique needs of the
offices they administer as are not in conflict with the policies and procedures described in the Ada
County Employee/Manager Handbook and Human Resources Procedural Guidelines Handbook
and/or state and federal laws.

AD(?PTED this 20th dayofFebruary, 2b07.i
. .,

.

..,

Bo.ard of Ada County Commissioners

By:

'&O~

Fred Tilman1 Chainnan
By:

Paµl:R, Woods, Commissioner

By:

AT.TEST:

avid Navarro, Ada County Clerk

~&~/07

.

r
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~

RESOLUTION NO. 1468

AT A MEETING OF THE BOARD OF ADA COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, STATE
OF IDAHO, ON THE 30th DAY OF MAY, 2007, THE FOLLOWING RESOLUTION
ADOPTING THE ADA COUNTY EMPLOYEE/MANAGER HANDBOOK & PROCEDURE
GUIDELINES EFFECTNE JUNE 1, 2007, WAS ADOPTED, TO WIT:

WHEREAS, on December 27, 2006, the Board of Ada County Commissioners
adopted Ordinance No. 649 which provided that effective March I, 2007, Title 1
Chapters 7 and 11, Ada County Code would be repealed and a new Chapter 7 enacted
providing for an at-will system of personnel administration and that human resources
policy and procedure handbooks to administer the at-will would be enacted by resolution
also effective March 1, 2007; and
WHEREAS, on February 20, 2007, the Board of Ada County Commissioners
adopted Ordinance No. 654 that provided the effective dates of both the at-will ordinance
and human resources policy and procedure handbooks would be June 1, 2007; and
WHEREAS, said handbooks are by resolution to be known
EMPLOYEE/MANAGER HANDBOOK & PROCEDURE GUIDELINES; and

as

WHEREAS, said handbooks may be amended from time to time as required; and
WHEREAS, in order to have a full and careful review of the at-will policies and
procedures, the Board hereby creates a committee to be comprised of the Director of
Administrative Services, a representative of Human Resources and the Prosecuting
Attorney; and
WHEREAS, said committee shall meet on a quarterly basis for the first year to
review the operation of the HANDBOOK & GUIDELINES and advise the Board of
County Commissioners.
BE IT THEREFORE RESOLVED, the Board of Ada County Commissioners
hereby adopts the EMPLOYEE/MANAGER HANDBOOK & PROCEDURE
GUIDELINES to implement the at-will system of personnel administration effective June

1, 2007.
I

ADA COUNTY EMPLOYEE/MANAGER HANDBOOK & PROCEDURE GUIDELINES.
RESOLUTION NO. 1468 - PAGE 1
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,.

APPROVED AND ADOPTED this 30th day of May, 2007.
Board of Ada County Commissioners

By:

~~

Fred Tilman, Chairman

ABSENT
By:
Paul R. Woods, Commissioner

By:
ATTEST:

'

ADA COUNTY ElvIPLOYEE/MANAGER HANDBOOK & PROCEDURE GUIDELlNES.
RESOLUTION NO. 1468 -PAGE 2
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FILED
"..__-'-! .,,
A.M . _ _ _ _
P.M,___

~?I~

\\~~

Kirtlan G. Naylor
[ISB No. 3569]
Bruce J. Castleton
[ISB No. 6915]
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
Attorneys at Law
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 610
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516
Email: kirt@naylorhales.com; bjc@naylorhales.com

NOV 10 2014
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By PATRICK McLAUGHLIN
O!'o11,-y

Attorneys for Defendant Ada County

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,
Case No. CV-OC-13-02730
Plaintiff,
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO
INQUIRY CONCERNING
DEFENDANTS'STATUS

vs.
ADA COUNTY, a political subdivision of the
State ofldaho; ADA COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS,

cc

0

c:]

Defendants.

Defendant Ada County, Ada County Board of County Commissioners 1, by and
through its attorneys of record, Naylor & Hales, P.C., hereby files its Response to Inquiry
Concerning Defendants' Status.

Ada County Board of County Commissioners is not a proper party as it is not a governmental
entity that can be sued. To the extent that any claims could be alleged against the Commission, this
Response applies to those claims as well. However, Defendant does not waive the right to move to
dismiss this "party" at a later date.
1

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO INQUIRY CONCERNING DEFENDANTS' STATUS-1.

000239

Jim Tibbs and David Case were dismissed with prejudice by stipulation and order as
Defendants on June 9, 2014. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is the Stipulation to Dismiss Parties, filed
June 4, 2014. Attached hereto as Exhibit Bis the Order to Dismiss Parties, filed June 9, 2014.
DATED this 10th day of November, 2014.
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.

By_--+-+-'-"'5~~=----------Kirtl

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 10th day ofNovember, 2014, I caused to be served,
by the method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon:
Eric S. Rossman
Erica S. Phillips
Kimberly L. Williams
Rossman Law Group, PLLC
737 N. 7th Street
Boise, ID 83 702

~U.S.Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax Transmission: 342-2170
Email: erossman@rossmanlaw.com
ephillips@rossmanlaw.com
kwillliams@rossmanlaw.com

7

Attorneys for Plaintiff

8745_54 Response to Inquiry ofDefs' Status.wpd
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!
FILED
A.M-----P,.M-----

JUN O4 ?.014
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By STACEY LAFFERTY
OEPIJTY

Kirtlan G. Naylor
[JSB No. 3569]
Bruce J. Castleton
[JSB _No. 6915]
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
Attorneys at Law
·
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 610
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516
Email: kirt@naylorhales.com; bic@naylorhalcs.com
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,
Case No. CV-OC-13-02730

Lb

Plaintiff,
STIPULATION TO DISMISS PARTIES

vs.
ADA COUNTY, a political subdivision of the
State ofldaho; ADA COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS; DAVID CASE, an
individual, as Commissioner and agent of Ada
County; and JIM TIBBS, an individual, as
Commissioner and agent of Ada County,
Defendants.

The parties stipulate and agree that individual Defendants David Case and Jim Tibbs
can and should be dismissed from this case with prejudice. The basis for this stipulation is that
Defendants Case and Tibbs were at all times relevant to the allegations in the Plaintiffs complaint
acting within the course and scope of their positions as Ada County Commissioners.

STIPULATION TO DISMISS PARTIES- I.

EXHIBIT
A
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..

RESPECTFULLYSUBMITIEDthis Lj._j,v\dayof

~u. \\...-e

'

,2014.

ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC

BylL~.
Kimberly Williams
Attorneys for Plaintiff

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this
.

!:I!!:- day

of

J@e.i

,2014.

NAYLOR & HALES, P. .

8745_36 Stipubdon to Dilmin Partios.\\-pd
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.
JUN I :? 2D14

NO·---------A.M _ _ _ _FI_LE~,.M. ,;) : 5:°7
JUN 0:9 W14
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By MARTI-IA LYKE
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT I
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,
Case No. CV-OC-13-02730
Plaintiff,

ORDER TO DISMISS PARTIES
vs.
ADA COUNTY, a political subdivision of the
State ofldaho; ADA COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS; DAVID CASE, an
individual, as Commissioner and agent of Ada
County; and JIM TIBBS, an individual, as
Commissioner and agent of Ada County,
Defendants.

This matter having come before the Court on stipulation between these, parties
filed in this matter; and the Court having found good cause;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the individual Defendants David Case and
Jim Tibbs are dismissed from this case with prejudice.

v-

DATED this

..

7 day of June, 2014.

~
J(:~
GE0RGD.
CAREY
Senior District Judge

~~

ORDER TO DISMISS PARTIES-1.
I
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
0
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the/
day of June, 2014, I caused to be :served
by U.S Mail a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon:
·

/I

Eric S. Rossman
Erica S. Phillips
Kimberly L. Williams
Rossman Law Group, PLLC
737 N. 7th Street
Boise, ID 83702

Kirtlan G. Naylor
Bruce J. Castleton
Nayar & Hales, P.C.
1
950 W. Bannock St., Ste. 610 .
Boise, ID 83702
Attorneys for Defendants

Attorneys for Plaintiff

.M~·~~·
~~~·-__/·_.

By: _ _
Deputy Clerk

v~7':"--!i,,.

ORDER TO DISMISS PARTIES- 2.
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i: I?

FILE~.M. _ _ __

NOV 1 3 2014
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By MARTHA LYKE
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,
Plaintiff,

v.

)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-OC-13-02730

)

)
ADA COUNTY, A POLITICAL
)
SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO,)
ADACOUNTYBOARDOFCOUNTY
)
COMMISSIONERS, DAVID CASE, AN
)
INDIVIDUAL, AS COMMISSIONER AND )
AGENT OF ADA COUNTY, AND JIM
)
TIBBS, AN INDMDUAL, AS
)
COMMISSIONER AND AGENT OF ADA
)
COUNTY,
)
)
Defendants.
)

INQUIRY CONCERNING
DEFENDANTS' STATUS

Please help me on a confusing point.
The original complaint named as defendants Ada County, the Ada County
Board of County Commissioners, David Case, and Jim Tibbs. It made one or more
claims against each of the four defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - 1
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By stipulation of the parties, the court granted a motion to amend the
complaint. The memorandum supporting the motion to amend said that the
plaintiff intended to make additional claims for relief. It did not, however, say that
he intended to delete Mr. Tibbs and Mr. Case as parties.
The caption of the amended complaint, filed July 2, 2014, named Ada County
and the Ada County Board of County Commissioners as defendants but did not
name Mr. Case or Mr. Tibbs.
The opening paragraph of the amended complaint read as follows:
COMES NOW, Richard Wright, the above named Plaintiff and for
cause of action against the Defendant, Ada County Board of County
Commissioners, hereby COMPLAINS AND ALLEGES as follows:

The opening paragraph did not say that the plaintiff was making claims
against any of the three other original defendants. Likewise, the body of the
amended complaint did not specifically assert that it was making a claim or claims
against Ada County, Mr. Tibbs, or Mr. Case, although it did note parenthetically
that Count I was asserted against "All Defendants" and that Count II was asserted
against "Defendant Ada County and Defendant Ada County Board of County
Commissioners." The allegations in the body of the amended complaint usually
referred to defendant in the singular but occasionally referred to defendants in the
plural.
Since the filing of the amended complaint, the caption of documents filed by
both sides ordinarily referred to Ada County and the Ada County Board of County
Commissioners, but not Mr. Tibbs or Mr. Case, as defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - 2
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•

I suspect that the plaintiff intended to name both Ada County and the Ada
County Board of County Commissioners as defendants and to delete Mr. Tibbs and
Mr. Case as defendants, but I do not want to assume anything. Please clarify who is
or are the defendant or the defendants.
In the interest of resolving this issue quickly, I am emailing this
memorandum to counsel. I also will send copies by regular mail.

Dated November?-, 2013

::f.K

c~Bistric

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - 3
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Eric S. Rossman, ISB #4573
erossman@rossmanlaw.com
Erica S. Phillips, ISB #6009
ephillips@rossmanlaw.com
Kimberly L. Williams, ISB #8893
kwilliams@rossmanlaw.com
ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC
737 N. ?'h Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 331-2030
Facsimile: (208) 342-2170

<

._..,
. ;

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,

)

CASE NO. CV OC 1302730

)
Plaintiff,
-vsADA COUNTY, a political subdivision of the
State ofldaho, ADA COUNTY BOARD OF
. COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,
Defendants.
_______________

-·

...,.. ·,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

COMES NOW, Plaintiff Richard Wright, by and through his counsel of record, the law
firm of ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC, and hereby submits this Supplemental Memorandum
in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Filed concurrently with this
Memorandum, and incorporated by this reference, is the Affidavit of Kimberly L. Williams in
PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1
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Support of Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum ("Williams Affidavit").
At the hearing on Defendant's motion for summary judgment which took place on November
7, 2014, this Court permitted the parties to supplement the record on the above referenced motion
regarding one issue of fact that Defense counsel challenged for the first time during his rebuttal on
oral argument. The issue of fact in dispute was in regards to an interaction between Plaintiff and
Commissioner Case during their mutual time together at Ada County.
As Plaintiff pointed out in his original briefing, Commissioner Case avoided contact with
Plaintiff and only went to Plaintiffs office on two occasions during the time they worked together at
the County. On one of those occasions Commissioner Case demanded to know who had initiated an
investigation of Dee Oldham. Plaintiff alleged the same in his complaint, and has never varied from
that statement. See Williams Affidavit Ex. 1, which contains every excerpt from the deposition of
Rich Wright in which he addresses this issue, and Exhibit 21 to the deposition of Rich Wright which
is an email he wrote shortly after the interaction occurred in late 2012. In his deposition and in
Exhibit 21 to his deposition, Plaintiff maintains that Commissioner Case asked about Dee Oldham.
Also contained in Exhibit 1 to the Williams Affidavit is every statement Plaintiff made about the Jim
Farrens investigation and at no point does he recall Commissioner Case demanding to know who had
initiated that investigation.
The contention that Dave Case had been upset about, and demanded to know who had
initiated, the Farrens investigation comes exclusively from Commissioner Case himself. See
Williams Affidavit Exhibit "2."

PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENT AL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2
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<t . ..

Based upon this and other genuine issues of material fact, Plaintiff respectfully renews his
request that the Court DENY Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
DATED this

19~ day ofNovember, 2014.
ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC

lL Le.3-·

By:

Kimberly L. Williams
Attorneys for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

q-e

I hereby certify that on the \
day of November, 2014 I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing to be forwarded with all the required charges prepaid, by the method(s) indicated
below to the following persons:
Kirtlan G. Naylor
Bruce J. Castleton
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610
Boise, ID 83702

Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail
Facsimile 383-9516
Overnight Mail
Electronic Mail
kirt@naylorhales.com
bjc@naylorhales.com

({ -

,/

LQ__si·

Kimberly L. Williams

I\OFFICESERVER\Rossman Law\Documents\Work\W\Wright, Rich\Pleadings\MSJ OPP Supp Memo.doc

PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3
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NO----;;i~-,-,4~~AM_ ___,~

NOV 19 2014
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH Clerk
By STEPHANIE VIDAK

Eric S. Rossman, ISB #4573
erossman@rossmanlaw.com
Erica S. Phillips, ISB #6009
ephillips@rossmanlaw.com
Kimberly L. Williams, ISB #8893
kwilliams@rossmanlaw.com
ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC
737 N. 7th Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 331-2030
Facsimile: (208) 342-2170

DEPUTY

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH WDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,
Plaintiff,
-vsADA COUNTY, a political subdivision of the
State ofldaho, ADA COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, DAVID
CASE, an individual, as Commissioner and
agent of Ada County, and JIM TIBBS, an
individual, as Commissioner and agent of Ada
County,
Defendants.
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV OC 1302730

AFFIDAVIT OF KIMBERLY L.
WILLIAMS IN SUPPORT TO
PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM

)
) ss.
)

KIMBERLY L. WILLIAMS, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
AFFIDAVIT OF KIMBERLY L. WILLIAMS IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM - 1
000251

1.

I am one of the attorneys of record for the Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter and

have personal knowledge of the facts contained herein.
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "1 ", is a true and correct copy of portions of the

Deposition of Richard Thomas Wright, taken on February 11, 2014.
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "2", is a true and correct copy of portions of the

Deposition of Dave Case, taken on February 13, 2014.
DATED this

\q~ day ofNovember, 2014.

lL Lb---·

Kimberly L. Williams

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this \'\~day of November, 2014.

No~
Residing at
'(;~ 1 ~ o
Commission expires:
"'2- / \-i... { .z.o '2::0

AFFIDAVIT OF KIMBERLY L. WILLIAMS IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the l'l~day of November, 2014 I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing to be forwarded with all the required charges prepaid, by the method(s) indicated
below to the following persons:
Kirtlan G. Naylor
Bruce J. Castleton
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610
Boise, ID 83702

Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail
Facsimile 383-9516
Overnight Mail
Electronic Mail
kirt@naylorhales.com
bjc@naylorhales.com

/

lL~.
Kimberly L. Williams

\\OFFICESERVER\Rossman Law\Documents\Work\W\Wright, RichlPieadings\MSJ Opp Supp AffKLW.doc

AFFIDAVIT OF KIMBERLY L. WILLIAMS IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM - 3
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Deposition of
Richard Thomas Wright
Case: Wright v. Ada County, et al.
Case No: CV-OC-13-02730
Date: February 11, 2014

Reporter: Andrea J. Wecker, CSR#716, RMR, CRR, CBC

Associated Reporting and Video Inc.
Phone: 208.343.4004
Fax: 208.343.4002
Email: production@associatedreportinginc.com
Internet: www.associatedreportinginc.com
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Richard Thomas Wright

February 11, 2014 Wrignt v. Ada County, et al.
Page 40
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A. Correct.
Q. So she didn't really have a high regard
for Dave Case, did she?
MR. ROSSMAN: Object; speculation,
foundation.
THE WITNESS: I -- I think it was very clear
that Commissioner Ullman did not have a high regard
for Commissioner Case.
Q. (BY MR. NAYLOR) And she stated that as
well to you, did she not?
A. She probably did.
Q. Other than what you've just testified
to, is there any other information that supports
your belief that Dee Oldham orchestrated your
termination from Ada County through Dave Case and
Jim Tibbs?
MR. ROSSMAN: Object; overbroad, vague and
ambiguous.
THE WITNESS: I know that Dave Case was
interested in the Dee Oldham investigation. Sue
Axtman told me that one day he came to her office
and sat down and asked what she thought about Dee's
departure and what happened with the whole
departure of Dee.
I also know that Dave Case came to my

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Oldham investigation, did he?
A. I provided it to Commissioner Case the
first two days he was in office.
Q. Did Dave Case ever request a copy of the
Dee Oldham investigation from you?
A. No. I provided it to him.
Q. Okay. Did he ever, to your knowledge,
request affirmatively the Dee Oldham report from
anyone?
MR. ROSSMAN: Object to the form;
foundation, speculation.
THE WITNESS: I don't know.
Q. (BY MR. NAYLOR) Okay. And isn't it true
that Sharon Ullman instructed you to give Dave Case
a copy of the Dee Oldham report?
A. Both Commissioner Yzaguirre and
Commissioner Ullman said that they wanted
Commissioner Case to have a copy of the
investigation, which is why I delivered it to him.
Q. And that was in June 2012, correct?
A. It could have been. I don't recall the
date.
Q. Let me hand you Exhibit 17. Go ahead
and look at all of it just so that you get -- can
put it into context.
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office one day and closed the door -- one of only
probably two times that he had ever visited my
office -- closed the door and asked me who ordered
the investigation against Dee Oldham and Pam
Woodies.
I explained to him that Pam Woodies was
never investigated, that she was a witness. He
abruptly interrupted me and said, "Okay. Who
ordered the investigation against Dee?" I told him
that after conferring with the board, I did, and he
got up and said, "Thank you very much," and left my
office.
Q. (BY MR. NAYLOR) And when did that take
place?
A. I believe it was sometime in December of
2012.
Q. And who did you tell about that
conversation?
A. I told Bethany Calley, Kim Osborn, Kelly
Paananen, Sue Axtman, and Donna Dana.
Q. Anybody else?
A. At the time, I told my partner, Tim.
Q. Tim Wilson?
A. Correct.
Q. And Dave Case never asked for the Dee
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This is Ada 718 to 722.
Are those e-mails between you and
Ada County staff and officials?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And so you see there that on
June 1st, on the second page there, Sharon Ullman
asked you to provide a -- well, she sent it to Rick
Yzaguirre, you, and Bethany Calley-A. Uh-huh.
Q. -- requesting that you provide certain
information for him to be brought up to speed on
personnel issues, including "and why our friend
from our office is no longer with the County."
Who did you understand that that was in
reference to?
A. I understood that to be Dee Oldham.
Q. Okay. So then you respond, "We are
preparing to deliver those investigative binders to
Commissioner Case. I suspect they can be delivered
to him shortly."
A. Correct.
Q. And that was on June 1st, 2012?
A. Yes, it appears to be.
Q. In fact, you were -- you then wanted a
follow-up from Rick Yzaguirre to make sure it was
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office, I scheduled a meeting with him and my
department managers to provide an overview of the
department, answer any questions that he might have
in terms of how the Department of Administration
was organized, structured, how it functions.
We also gave him a briefing in terms of
big issues that we were currently dealing with,
projects that were on the table that we were
working through, as well as we sought additional
direction, guidance, insight, and input from him in
terms of whether there was anything that he wanted
to see done differently.
Q. And when did you do all of those things?
A. That was shortly after he joined the
County, I believe, in May.
Q. Did he rebuff those overtures?
A. No.
Q. Was he appropriate to those -- in those
meetings?
A. He was.
Q. Did he engage in those meetings?
A. Not a lot, no.
Q. But did he ask questions?
A. Not very many.
Q. Did you ask him any questions?
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MR. ROSSMAN: Object to the form.
THE WITNESS: I don't think it would be fair
to say that because Commissioner Paul Woods, when
he joined the commission, I never felt awkwardness
at all with Commissioner Woods. He was very
engaging, very interested in what I did and what my
people were doing.
Q. (BY MR. NAYLOR) And when did
Commissioner Woods come onto the commission?
A. He replaced Commissioner Peavey-Derr on
the commission. I don't recall the years.
Q. But that was early on when you were the
information officer?
A. It was during the transition time, I
believe. I was the public information officer,
transitioning to the Department of Admin, I
believe.
Q. I'll have you take a look at Exhibit 21.
Take a look at Exhibit 21.
Do you recognize that?
A. Yes.
Q. And isn't that an e-mail that you sent
to Commissioner Ullman and Commissioner Yzaguirre?
A. Correct.
Q. And that was on December 13th, 2012?

Page 59
1
A. Yes.
2
Q. And did he respond?
3
A. To my recollection, yes.
4
Q. · Okay. In the first three or four months
5 that Sharon Ullman was a commissioner in 2009, was
6 there also a period of time of adjusting to her
7 familiarity?
8
MR. ROSSMAN: Object to the form.
9
THE WITNESS: Yes.
10
Q. (BY MR. NAYLOR) I mean, it was difficult
11 for you to talk to her for the first few months,
12 wasn't it?
13
A. It was not difficult for me to talk to
14 her. It was -15
For me, it was somewhat stressful.
16
Q. And what about Fred Tillman?
17
Did he come on as a new commissioner
18 while you were here at Ada County?
19
A. He did not.
20
Q. Okay. So isn't it fair to say that at
21 the -- in the beginning with a new commissioner
22 like Sharon Ullman, it takes a while for you to
23 become familiar with what she needs and wants and
24 to be able to have a conversation, communication
25 with her?
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A. Yes.
Q. And isn't that the day after you had
your tape recorded meeting with
Commissioner Yzaguirre?
A. Perhaps. I don't remember the exact
date.
Q. What was your purpose in writing this
e-mail at that time on December 13th?
A. I previously had had conversations with
Commissioners Yzaguirre and Ullman about my fears
of retaliation as they also told me about their
fears of retaliation against me.
And following Dave Case's visiting my
office asking about the Dee Oldham investigation, I
wanted to formally notify both Ullman and Yzaguirre
about that exchange as well as formally document my
fears of retaliation.
Q. Okay. Well, in this e-mail, in the
third paragraph you say, "Dave came into my office
last month."
A. Uh-huh.
Q. So was that in November?
A. I -- I don't recall the day.
Q. Well, at the time you wrote this, you
said, "Last month." It was written in December.
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Did you intend for it to mean November?
A. I don't recall what I intended at that
time. I do know that I had talked to Commissioners
Yzaguirre and Ullman about Dave Case visiting my
office and asking about the Dee Oldham
investigation.
Q. Okay.
A. I'd spoke with them personally about it,
and this document was intended to formally put them
on notice of that interaction.
Q. As you sit here today, you don't recall
what month that -- that Dave Case came into your
office?
A. It could have been November. It could
have been December. I -- I can't remember.
Q. Could it have been October?
A. I don't believe so.
Q. Could it have been July?
A. It was after the election.
Q. Okay. And did you write down what
happened at that meeting when Dave Case came into
your office, when it happened?
A. I can't remember whether I did or not.
I know I spoke to people about it.
Q. Well, if you wrote it down, wouldn't you
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that you wrote this e-mail on December 13th to
formalize and memorialize your conversations with
Rick and Sharon, correct?
MR. ROSSMAN: Object; asked and answered,
argumentative.
THE WITNESS: That is correct.
Q. (BY MR. NAYLOR) Okay.
A. Keep in mind, this e-mail was also
crafted on the day that I found out that
Commissioner Case would not meet with me until
January 22nd.
Q. Okay. And you noted that in this
e-mail, didn't you?
A. I did because -Q. And that was something you wanted to
document?
A. Because for me, I felt that that clearly
showed his intention that he had no interest in
meeting with me or keeping me on.
Q. Okay. So this meeting, when Dave Case
came into your office, was not significant enough
for you to make a written documentation of it, was
it?
MR. ROSSMAN: Object; argumentative and
asked and answered twice.
Page 65

Page 63

1 have a record of it?
2
A. If I wrote it down, I'm sure I would.
3
Q. Okay. Do you recall writing it down?
4
A. I don't remember.
5
Q. Do you have a copy of something that you
6
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wrote down about that meeting?
A. I don't recall.
Q. If you did have something that you wrote
down contemporaneous with that meeting, wouldn't it
be important for you to have provided it as
documentation like this December 13th e-mail?
A. If I would have remembered it, yes.
Q. Okay. So to the best of your
recollection, you did not write down the meeting
with Dave Case when he came into your office,
correct?
MR. ROSSMAN: Object; misstates testimony.
Go ahead.
THE WITNESS: I can't remember whether I did
or not. I do know that I told several people after
the exchange, and perhaps I thought that talking
about it with several people, it -- it would serve
the purpose of making sure that people were aware
of what he had said to me.
Q. (BY MR. NAYLOR) But you just testified
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THE WITNESS: It was significant, which is
why I spoke to several people about it.
Q. (BY MR. NAYLOR) Now, in this e-mail,
attached to it is a chain of e-mails beginning
December 5th where you were asking
Commissioner Case to sit down and meet with him,
correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And then you followed it up again on
December 11th.
A. The 11th, correct.
Q. And then he responded to you on
December 12th, correct?
A. And I previously had asked him about
meeting with me at the end of another meeting that
I had attended with him.
So I did speak with him in person about
it as well between the 5th and the 11th.
Q. Okay. So prior to December 5th, had you
ever requested a meeting with Commissioner Case in
the same way that you did with this e-mail?
A. Yes, when -- when he took office.
Q. And he did meet with you and your
directors or managers at that time, didn't he?
A. He did.
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other directors one-on-one, correct?
A. That's not correct. I can't say that -when it was. I knew that he was meeting with other
County directors.
Q. Did you know that in October?
A. I don't know. I can't remember.
Q. Okay. And the only way you knew that
was from what Sue Axtman told you, correct?
A. Correct. And I believe that I had -- I
had access to the -- the board's calendars so I
could see who they were meeting with when and
where. And I -- I believe that I even noticed a
couple of those meetings on the commissioners'
calendar.
Q. And when did you notice those meetings?
A. Again, I -- I don't recall. It would
have been right after the election, I would
imagine, because that's when everybody was trying
to get their time with the commissioner.
Q. Okay. So from May until December, you
knew that he was meeting with other directors, but
he chose to wait until December 5th to formally
request a meeting with him?
MR. ROSSMAN: Object; argumentative,
misstates testimony.
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retaliation.
Q. Was there anything-- any reason keeping
you from contacting him prior to December 5th with
an e-mail like this?
MR. ROSSMAN: Object; asked and answered.
Go ahead.
THE WITNESS: There was no reason to.
Q. (BY MR. NAYLOR) But there wasn't
anything preventing you from e-mailing him as well,
correct?
MR. ROSSMAN: Object; asked and answered -THE WITNESS: No.
MR. ROSSMAN: -- three times.
Q. (BY MR. NAYLOR) Do you remember the Jim
Farrens investigation?
A. I do.
Q. And did you ever have a conversation
with Commissioner Case about that?
A. Only in the confines of an executive
session meeting.
Q. Okay. Did he ever come to you in your
office and ask you who authorized the Jim Farrens
investigation?
A. He did not.
Q. You're sure of that?
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Q. (BY MR. NAYLOR) Is that correct?
MR. ROSSMAN: Argumentative, misstates
testimony.
THE WITNESS: I had interacted with
Commissioner Case in other meetings during that
time period that you just mentioned.
Q. (BY MR. NAYLOR) But -A. This was my first formal request.
Q. Okay. And there was no reason keeping
you -- there was nothing keeping you from making
this e-mail request prior to December 5th, was
there?
A. The reason why it was made on
December 5th was Commissioner Case had approached
Bethany Calley wanting to know the County's at-will
policy.
There were other things happening at the
time that also -Shortly after Commissioner Case came to
office, I felt everything was okay, but the longer
that he was in office, the more distance he made
himself from me. And his conversations with my
division managers led me to believe that there was
something afoot, that his plan no longer would
include me, and I feared it was because of
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A. I am positive.
Q. Was Dave Case involved in the
instigation of the Jim Farrens investigation?
A. No.
Q. That was with Commissioner Yzaguirre,
correct?
A. The investigation regarding the Jim
Farrens situation came about as a result of some
public comments that were made to the media. The
board called a meeting with myself, Bethany Calley,
the human resources manager, and wanted to know
what had happened and how to proceed.
Jim Farrens had submitted a letter to
the County, as I recall, making some claims that
were employment-related as well. And that is
how-In that meeting, the executive session,
is where everybody sat around a table and
strategized as to how the Jim Farrens investigation
would be conducted and how we would respond.
I took no official action on the Jim
Farrens situation outside of that executive session
meeting.
Q. Well, isn't it true that you met with
Jim Farrens and Commissioner Yzaguirre about Jim
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Farrens' concerns?
A. No, not to my recollection at all.
Q. You met with Jim Tibbs and tape recorded
a conversation with him, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And that was in -- I believe
January 11th, 2013?
A. Probably so.
Q. Okay. Did he know that he was being
tape recorded?
A. No.
Q. And why not? Why didn't you tell him?
A. Again, as I stated before, I was in
protection mode. I had previously reached out to
Commissioner Tibbs to ask him to lunch so I could
begin to establish a relationship with him. It was
originally put on the calendar, and then it was
cancelled.
Q. Which meeting was cancelled?
A. My lunch with him.
Q. Which was scheduled for when?
A. I don't recall the day.
I do recall that Commissioner Tibbs had
asked Terri to reach out to department directors to
schedule meetings with them as he approached to
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about that was ultimately cancelled?
And, here, let me show you Exhibit 7, if
that helps you.
A. I believe that the meeting that's
discussed in Exhibit 9 that you presented to me is
the meeting with myself and my leadership team to
review the Department of Administration's structure
and projects.
This is separate from the lunch meeting
that I had originally scheduled with Commissioner
Tibbs, as I recall.
Q. Okay. Doesn't Exhibit 9 talk about a
meeting that was scheduled by Terri Broome for
January 21st?
A. 22nd.
Q. Yeah. Jam,1ary 22nd, 2013.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. That's the meeting that you're saying
was scheduled to be able to present everything to
Jim Tibbs with your staff?
A. No.
Q. Okay. I misunderstood. Sorry.
A. This is the meeting -It's my recollection that this is the
meeting that Jim was willing to meet with me
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take a seat on the board, and I don't -- I can't
recall whether or not the meeting that got
scheduled with the Department of Administration was
on the same day as I was scheduled to have lunch
with him or if it was in close proximity to that
date.
I -- I know that I just got a meeting
cancellation that indicated that Jim Tibbs would be
meeting with the Department of Admin staff and
myself on a particular day.
Q. Did he actually meet with you and the
staff on a particular day?
A. He did.
Q. Was-A. But that meeting was, again, the exact
same meeting that my team provided to
Commissioner Case when he came on the commission.
It was not the meeting that I had hoped to have
with Commissioner Tibbs where I could have spoken
to him more intimately about his desires and wishes
for how the department would run.
Q. Let me hand you Exhibit 9, if you'd look
at that ·chain of e-mails.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. ls that the meeting that you're talking
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individually on the 22nd, and then -- and then it
got rescheduled.
There's a January 14th date here as
well.
This meeting on the 22nd is the meeting
for the Department of Administration leadership
team. It was not the meeting that I had tried to
schedule with him for lunch.
Q. Okay. Even though, as you said -- and I
think you were reading this -- it was a meeting
for -According to Terri Broome's e-mail to
you, "Jim has conveyed that he wishes to meet with
you individually after he takes office in January."
A. Uh-huh.
Q. That's -It's your understanding that that was
not the meeting that you wanted to meet with him
individually?
A. Correct.
Q.. Okay. And-A. I -- I wanted to meet with him much
sooner than that.
Q. And did this meeting, even though it was
cancelled for January 22nd, take place where he met
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with you and your staff?
A. I didn't have a job on January 22nd.
Q. I know. What I'm saying is: Did the
meeting of you meeting with him and your staff, the
same meeting that you gave to -A. Uh-huh.
Q. -- Commissioner Case when he came on,
did that meeting actually occur?
A. I believe it occurred on January 11th.
Q. Okay. Do you know when you asked to
meet with Jim Tibbs and go to lunch with him?
A. It would have been right around the same
time that I started asking to have a meeting with
Commissioner Case.
Q. Which would have been when?
A. Early December.
Q. It was -A. After the election.
Q. And what was Jim Tibbs' response?
A. Again, as I recall, we actually had
something scheduled, and then it got cancelled.
Q. Do you know why it got cancelled?
A. I don't recall why. I just remember -I believe it was Terri that called to
say Jim was going to have to cancel the meeting.
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A. I don't recall.
Q. Do you recall who delivered the Farrens
investigation to the board?
A. It would have been Bart Hamilton, the
internal investigator.
Q. Were you present when it was delivered
to the board?
A. I believe I was.
Q. Was Commissioner Case at that board
meeting when the report was delivered?
A. I believe he was. I can't recall.
Q. And when you were talking about
roundtabling with the commission about the Jim
Farrens complaint, was Dave Case present at that
meeting?
A. Yes.
Q. Was it an executive meeting?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you remember when that happened?
A. I don't.
Q. Did you ever participate on Sharon
Ullman's campaign?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever contribute money to her
campaign?
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Q. After it was -- after you got notice
that it was cancelled, did you go back to Jim Tibbs
to reschedule?
A. I don't recall whether I did or not. I
think at that point, I became scared and nervous
again.
Q. Were you scared and nervous when you
asked him to go to lunch?
A. Yes.
Q. But you still just -- but you didn't
have any problem with going to lunch with him?
A. I extended the invitation to him hoping
that -Jim and I had worked previously together
at the Boise Police Department. In fact, I took
his position at the Boise Police Department. We
were friendly, and I always considered him a
friend.
However, the cancelling of his lunch
with me, Commissioner Case not wanting to meet with
me for me was evidence that the two had plans to
eliminate my position as a result ofretaliation.
Q. But as you sit here today, you don't
recall exactly when that lunch was scheduled for
with vou and Jim Tibbs, correct?
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A. I believe her first -- I believe the
first time she ran for reelection, I might have
given her $25, as I did all the commissioners. I
contributed to Commissioner Yzaguirre and
Commissioner Tillman's, as do other County
employees.
Q. Well, do you know that for a fact?
A. I've witnessed checks being delivered by
County employees to commissioners.
(Deposition Exhibit No. 24 was marked.)
MR. NAYLOR: I'm sorry. I don't have
another copy of that.
MR. ROSSMAN: Let's look at it first.
Q. (BY MR. NAYLOR) Do you recognize this
document?
A. I believe I've seen it before, yes.
Q. All right. Let me call your attention
to Exhibit 4 of this document, toward the back.
It's a January 15th letter.
MR. ROSSMAN: What's the exhibit number on
this document?
THE REPORTER: 24.
Q. (BY MR. NAYLOR) Are you there?
A. Yes.
o. Do you recognize that letter?
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understanding that HR, for those medical HIPP A
reasons, do not disclose an FMLA request until it's
been certified by the medical providers and granted
FMLA leave?
A. Which is -MR. ROSSMAN: Object to the form.
Go ahead.
THE WITNESS: Which is why HR should be
involved in every termination so they can -- along
with the prosecuting attorney's office so that they
can provide proper guidance and counsel.
MR. NAYLOR: Would you read my last question
and let him answer it?
MR. ROSSMAN: I think he has answered it.
Read his answer as well, please.
(Record read by reporter.)
Q. (BY MR. NAYLOR) Okay. So isn't it your
understanding that HR, for those medical HIPAA
reasons, do not disclose the FMLA request until
it's been certified and granted?
MR. ROSSMAN: Object; asked and answered.
Go ahead.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
MR. NAYLOR: Should we take a lunch break
here? It's a little early, but it's probably a
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A. No. The only -- the only time I recall
the Farrens report even being discussed, the
investigation or its conclusions, was in executive
session.
Q. Right. And this would have been an
executive session.
A. Uh-huh. And I remember
Commissioner Case being concerned about the nature
of Jim Farrens' letter and the prosecuting
attorney's office recommendation that it contained
human resources information and, therefore, should
have been determined to be an HR personnel
document.
And I remember the discussions also
surrounding around how or why Commissioner Case
let -- gave that letter to the Boise Guardian.
Q. Do you remember a meeting with the
commissioners where Commissioner Case asked, "Who
ordered this investigation," on the Farrens matter?
A. No. It was -- it was known. When we
roundtabled in the very beginning, it was discussed
freely among all the commissioners that an
investigation was to be launched. No one -I did not make that decision. It was a
directive from the board, or at least two of the
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good stopping spot.
Off the record.
(Lunch break taken from 11 :46 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.)
MR. NAYLOR: May the record reflect that
Eric is not here. I'll just make sure if Bruce
needs to ask any questions, that I leave the room.
MS. WILLIAMS: Okay. Sounds good.
Q. (BY MR. NAYLOR) Do you remember when the
Farrens report was delivered to the commissioners?
A. I don't. I believe it was before the
election.
Q. But do you remember it being provided to
the commissioners?
A. I don't remember the date.
Q. No, not the date, but you remember the
event?
A. I don't really recall. I don't remember
the conclusion.
Q. Okay. Do you remember a time when
Commissioner Case was upset about the investigation
when it was delivered?
A. No.
Q. You don't remember any time when
Commissioner Case was upset about the Farrens
report?
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board members.
Q. Was Commissioner Case involved in
directing that that investigation of the Farrens
complaint be investigated?
A. I believe it was just
Commissioner Yzaguirre and Commissioner Ullman.
Q. So you're not aware of any time where
Commissioner Case expressed any concern that the
report seemed to be targeting him?
A. Seemed to be targeting him as in
Dave Case or -Q. Yes.
A. -- Jim Farrens?
I remember in the meeting it was
discussed how the media got a copy of Jim Farrens'
letter that was declared a personnel document.
Q. Okay. But wasn't the fact of the matter
that Jim Farrens filed a grievance that he felt
that he was being harassed because the letter had
gone out to the public?
A. That came after the letter was given to
the public -Q. Correct.
A. -- by Commissioner Case.
Q. And it was the grievance, Jim Farrens'
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grievance, that was then investigated, was it not?
A. Correct. It would have been a situation
where anytime any employee claims harassment, the
investigation is launched.
Q. Okay. So there -And I just want to make sure we're
understanding each other here.
So then Jim Farrens files a grievance.
It is then submitted for an investigation, and you
were involved in that -A. Correct.
Q. -- correct?
A. The whole board was, right.
Q. But you and Chairman Yzaguirre met with
Jim Farrens about his grievance in September?
MS. WILLIAMS: I'm going to object as asked
and answered.
Go ahead.
THE WITNESS: I don't recall that meeting.
Q. (BY MR. NAYLOR) Okay. And then who did
the actual investigation?
A. It likely would have been Bart Hamilton.
I don't specifically recall who did it as well.
Q. Okay.
A. But Bart Hamilton did all of those types
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1
Q. -- not the disclosure of the letter
2 and-3
A. Right.
4
Q. -- any conversation dealing with that.
5
Do you understand what I'm talking
6 about?
7
A. Yes.
8
Not to my knowledge, not that I can
9 recall.
10
Q. Okay. So once that report of that
11 investigation was returned to the commissioners,
12 you really weren't involved in that process?
13
MS. WILLIAMS: Asked and answered.
14
THE WITNESS: Correct.
15
Q. (BY MR. NAYLOR) Okay. Did anyone ever
16 report to you that Commissioner Case had been upset
17 about that investigation?
18
A. Not to my recollection.
19
Q. Okay.
20
(Deposition Exhibit No. 25 was marked.)
21
Q. (BY MR. NAYLOR) I'm handing you
22 Exhibit 25.
23
Have you seen that before?
24
A. I don't know that I have. I don't know
25 who produced this.
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of investigations.
Q. So you really weren't a principal or
involved in that investigation, correct?
A. No.
Q. It was through HR?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. Then once that report of the
investigation was returned to the County
commissioners, were you present when the
commissioners discussed the investigation?
A. I don't recall that I was.
Given the timing of when that would have
happened, I don't know that I was still employed
with the County at the time that Bart Hamilton
concluded the investigation.
Q. Oh, it was -- it was September 20th, the
date of the report, so it was while you were still
employed. But I just -- so that's -I'm just trying to find out if you
recall that part of it?
A. Then clearly I don't.
Q. Okay. So really, you didn't have any
involvement with the Farrens report. And I'm
talking about the investigation of his grievance -A. Uh-huh.
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MR. NAYLOR: Have you seen it, Kim?
MS. WILLIAMS: Yes.
MR. NAYLOR: Okay. Just getting a little
concerned here.
Q. (BY MR. NAYLOR) If you'll take a minute
to look at this, and -- if you haven't seen it
before. I know some of this information you may
not be privy to, but I just wanted to ask you about
some of this stuff and see if the timing on the
timeline seems appropriate.
Around January 2nd is when you sent an
e-mail requesting FMLA documentation?
A. After I had a conversation with Bethany
Calley, who suggested that, given my situation, I
submit my FMLA paperwork.
Q. So that was yes?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And then -Again, I'm not sure what you're aware
of, but until it gets down to January 18th,
designation notice and e-mail from commissioners
sent to Rich Wright.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. And you received that, correct?
A. Yes. That was the letter vou had me
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From:
Subject:
Date:
To:
it·

Rich Wright <richwright@adaweb.ne1>
FW: Meeting Request
December 13, 201212:52:31 PM MST
Rick Yzaguirre <ryzaguirre@adaweb.ne1>, Sharon Ullman
<sharonu@adaweb.ne1>
1 Attachment, 16.6 KB

Rick & Sharon,
As you know, f have made three separate attempts over the past two weeks to arrange to have 30 minutes of Dave's
time to discuss what the future might hold for the Department of Administration. My requests appear below. As you
will see, l identified that I was interested in learning whether the team is meeting his needs, whether I am meeting his
needs, can we be doing something more to assist him, etc. Realizing he and Jim are meeting daily behind closed
doors one can only assume plans are being hatched tha1 could, one day very soon. impact my position or the
department as a whole. While I hope I am wrong, Dave's recent actions only lend to the notion that changes are
afoot. He has recently questioned staff about our at-will policy and he has also requested a copy of the Department of
Administration organizational chart. Dave frequently goes directly to the division leaders to ask his questions - it would
appear to avoid interacting with me as the director. I am happy he is willing to establish a working relationship with the
leadership team even though rt appears he is not interested in establishing one with me.
Dave's reply to my request for a meeting indicates he isn't willing to schedule such a meeting until the week of January
21, 2013 "after the new administration" is in place. You will see that he does mention my upcoming planned vacation
over the holidays and 3 days of personal ·time for an upcoming eye surgery; however, in looking at his calendar, I do
find it hard to believe he couldn't find 30 minutes to meet sometime in the next two weeks before I leave for vacation.
Again, this plays into the theory that he is avoiding me and doesn't want to have ·U,e conversation.
I can only assume that it is in retaliation for any involvement I had with Dynamis and Dee Oldham's
departure from the County. Dave came to my office last month, one of only two times that lie has ever been to my
office since joining the county six months ago, closed the door and said, "I want to know who ordered the
investigations conducted on Dee Oldham and Pam Woodies." I informed him that Pam Woodies was never investigated
-- she was a witness who participated in investigations regarding claims of harassment. Dave then said, "OK, I want to
know who ordered the investigation of Dee." I told him that as outlined in the investigative file that I had previously
provided to him that two of her employees reported situations where they felt Dee had harassed them and was
creating a hostile work environment. Dave interrupted and said, "WHO ordered ihe investigation!" I said that by policy,
I was obligated to begin an investigation and I did so only after i first discussed the situation with the Board. He got
up, said "thank you" and left my office.

Why????

It's no secret that Dee and Dave are close. From posts on his campaign Facebool( page, to invitations to join him in
his private box at the fair, to the personal invitation she is scheduled to receive to his swearing-in ceremony, it is clear
that there is a relationship between Dave, Jim Tibbs and Dee. I believe that Dee has clouded their judgments of me,
my skills and abilities, and the successes that I have facilitated for the County.
Kelly Paananen just told me that Dave pulled her into his office this morning and questioned her as to why she is never
in Legal staff meetings and questioned why I am there. He also said that Bethany Calley needs to attend Legal Staff
for HR issues. He told Kelly that "come January a lot of things were going to change around here."

WRIGHT 000466
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Realizing the new year might bring my ·termination, I, unfortunately, have no choice but 1:o begin to consider all of my
options moving forward. This is ABSOLUTELY not what I want. As I have expressed to you both on several occasions,
my goal is to retire from Ada County. If this is not possible, I need to keep all options open. Until l can determine the
best course of action, I hope you might be willing to provide me with letters of recommendation that I could use should
I need them. I hope that I don't but your testament of my success over my nearly a-years with the County (nearly 4 as
Director of Administration) I feel, would be beneficial in my career search.

Thank you.
Rich
Rich Wright
Director
Ada County Department of Administration
200 W. Front St., Boise, ID 83702

(208) 287-7123 office

(208) 287-7159 fax

From: Rich Wright

Sent: Wednesday, December 12, 2012 11:03 AM
To: David Case

Subject: RE: Meeting Request
OK Commissioner,
Thank you for the reply. I'll work with Terri to get something on the calendar for that week.
l appreciate it.
Rich
From: David Case

Sent: Wednesday, December 12, 2012 10:45 AM
To: Rich Wright

Subject: RE: Meeting Request
Rich,
In seeing how the demand is for my time throughout the month of December and your schedule of vacation and
personal time I don't see how to accommodate your request at this time. Perhaps this discussion would be better
seived once we have the new administration in place and your return back to work the week of January 21, 201s.
Thanks,
Dave Case
From: Rich Wright

Sent: Tuesday, December 11, 2012 3:22 PM
To: David Case

WRIGHT 000467

000264

Subject: FW: Meeting Request
Commissioner:
Sorry to pester you about this again - last Friday you said you'd get back with me regarding my request to meet with
you to discuss the Department of Administration, specifically are we meeting your needs - am I meeting your needs as
director, etc.? Additionally, I am interested to hear what you'd like to see done moving forward with the department.
Obtaining this insight now will allow me some lead time to work with the team leadeiS so that we can carry out your
vision.
I can make myself available whenever you are available.
Thank you for your time.
·
Rich
From: Rich Wright

Sent: Wednesday, December 05, 2012 8:48 AM
To: David case (dcase@adaweb.net)
Subject: Meeting Request
Good morning Commissioner Case,
I am wondering if you might have 20 to 30 minutes to share with me in the near future? Given that we are at your 6
month mark in office, I would like to get a feel for how you feel the Department of Administration is doing, my
leadership of the department, how the team if functioning and what's working for you and what isn't. Previous Boards
have never engaged Department Heads with any type of performance appraisal and it is important to me to know how
you think I am doing and what I can be doing better to meet your needs.
With your go-ahead, may I work with Terri to find some time on your calendar next week for a brief meeting?
Thanks for your time and consideration.
Rich

Rich Wright
Director
Ada County Department of Administration
200 W. Front St., Boise, ID 83702
(208) 287-7123 office
(2oa) 287-7159 fax
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How do you remember that date?
A. I had -Again, getting to know the computer
system, I had put it under a task rather than a
calendar. And as 1 was trying to figure -I knew I had -- I had written it down
somewhere, but I couldn't recall where I had
written it. And as I was going through the tasks,
I discovered it as a task, and it had a return date
on it with a line through it indicating that it had
been completed.
Q. That was on your calendar?
A. Yes.
Q. On June 11th, 2012?
A. July 11th.
Q. July 11th, 2012?
A. Yes.
Q. Who did you give the file to?
A. When I found it, I turned it over to -I think it was -THE WITNESS: Who's your partner again?
MR. NAYLOR: Bruce.
THE WITNESS: Bruce on this last Monday.
Q. (BY MR. ROSSMAN) Who did you give it to
when you returned it on July 11th?
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1
A. No.
2
Q. Do you recall ever asking him who
3 initiated any investigation before you became a
4 commissioner?
5
A. Not before I became a commissioner.
6
Q. Okay. Do you recall asking him who
7 initiated any investigation at any time?
8
A. Yes.
9
Q. When?
10
A. It was in either late September or early
11 October of 2012.
12
Q. You had -13
Where were you when you asked that
14 question?
15
A. Two places. One was upstairs in the
16 boardroom.
17
Q. Who was present?
18
A. Ted Argyle, Sharon Ullman, Rick
19 Yzaguirre, Rich, our investigator. I can't
20 remember his name right now.
21
Those are the main folks I recall.
22
Q. Why was there a meeting in the boardroom
23 at that point in time?
24
A. Because an investigation was delivered
25 to the boardroom regarding Jim Farrens.
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A. I took it down to Rich's office and gave
them to him, I believe. That's kind of fuzzy. It
was either that or Sue took it -- or I gave it to
Sue, and she took it down.
Q. Do you recall going in Rich's office
and -- and giving him the investigation files?
A. I don't know if it was Rich or Sue.
I -- I don't -Q. It might have been Rich?
A. It could have been.
Q. Do you recall saying anything to this
person that you returned the files to?
A. Just said, "Here's the investigation
files."
Q. Do you remember asking any questions?
A. No.
Q. Do you remember asking any questions
about who initiated the investigation?
A. No.
Q. Have you seen reference by Rich Wright
in this case that he recalls you coming in his
office and asking him who initiated the
investigation of Dee Oldham?
A. I heard his testimony.
o. Do vou recall doing that?
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1
Q. You believe this was in September, early
2 October of2012?
3
A. That's correct.
4
Q. Was -- was this an executive session
5 meeting?
6
A. I believe it was because it was dealing
7 with a personnel issue.
8
Q. Was Sue Axtman present?
9
A. Somebody was clerking, probably Sue.
10
Q. And when you say "clerking," she was
11 taking her handwritten notes?
12
A. Yes.
13
Q. What was said about Jim Farrens'
14 investigation?
15
MR. NAYLOR: Now, in -16
You're not interested in the details of
17 Farrens' allegations?
18
MR. ROSSMAN: Let me -- let me rephrase the
19 question.
20
Q. (BY MR. ROSSMAN) Did you ask who
21 initiated the investigation of Jim Farrens?
22
A. Yes.
23
Q. Why?
24
A. Because as I opened the book -25
As -- as the reports were delivered, I
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overheard Rick Yzaguirre state, "Oh, I've been
waiting for this," and I didn't know what it was.
And I asked the question, you know, "What is this?"
And the comment was this was the Farrens
investigation.
So I opened it up and started reading
the first couple pages of it and saw in there that
I was being accused of causing personnel -- or
causing, quote/unquote, harassment regarding Jim
Farrens and -- and the problems he was having.
Q. What do you recall the problems Jim
Farrens had?
A. Well, he had submitted a letter to the
board regarding his -- what he felt was his
inability to properly evaluate the Dynamis project
and that -- felt that an outside engineer needed to
be consulted.
And when he submitted that letter to his
director, it was brought up to the attention of
the -- the board because that was a hot topic at -at the time.
Q. Did you consider that letter to be a -Well, strike that.
Who did he send the letter to?
A. His director.
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don't think The Guardian was there, but they picked
it up. They always -Q. Why did you provide that letter to
The Statesman?
A. Number 1, first off, I didn't believe -And the timeline, you need to understand
the timeline. This investigation that you're
referring to came after I had submitted the letter
to the media.
So having that in mind, before I
submitted the letter to the media, I went to Jim
Farrens and asked him about it. And I asked him
what his thoughts were and his -- his intention.
And I asked him -- when he told me, I asked him if
he -- if he would allow me to release that to the
media, and he gave me permission to do so.
Q. So your testimony is Jim Farrens gave
you permission to release that to the media?
A. That's correct.
Q. Did you read the investigation report?
A. Well, the investigation report came
later.
Q. And did it indicate in the investigation
report that Jim Farrens agreed that he'd allowed
you to release that letter?
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Q. And did you understand that letter to be
a personnel issue?
A. I did not.
Q. Did he indicate in the letter that he
was concerned about his ability to perform his job?
A. As it related to certifying the Dynamis
blueprints.
Q. Had the letter been routed to HR by his
director?
A. I don't know.
Q. Had an investigation been performed at
the time of this meeting?
A. At the time of the meeting we're -Q. Yes.
A. Yes. That was the investigation report
that was handed to us.
Q. And was the investigation a personnel
investigation?
A. Yeah, I believe so.
Q. Did you provide the letter to the -- to
the publication The Guardian?
A. I believe I -Let's see. The Statesman -There was a group videotaping it. It
was the group that he had mentioned before. And I
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A. I believe it was stated in there that he
had talked to me, he'd spoken to me, and gave me
permission to do so.
Q. Did you speak to anyone else before
releasing that letter about releasing the letter?
A. No, just Jim.
Q. And the purpose of the -When you saw the investigation, the
investigation related to the release of that letter
to the public, correct?
A. No. It dealt with a claim that -- of -of -- personnel claim of harassment.
Q. Okay. What was Mr. Farrens claiming?
How was he claiming he was being harassed?
A. He was claiming he was being harassed
because after the letter was released, he advised
me that Rick Yzaguirre and Rich Wright had
scheduled an appointment to talk with him about the
issues, and he felt that he was being singled out,
and he was in fear of his job.
Q. Because Rich Wright and Rick -- Rick
Yzaguirre asked him questions about it?
A. No, because they had scheduled a meeting
to talk with him about it.
Q. Had they said anything to him that led
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to him -A. They just -Q. -- feeling he was being harassed?
A. No. They just said he -- or his comment
was they scheduled a meeting to discuss his
concerns.
Q. Did you understand that the County had a
policy against the public dissemination of per -personnel matters?
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form.
Go ahead.
THE WITNESS: I obtained permission from
Mr. Farrens to do so.
Q. (BY MR. ROSSMAN) Did you understand that
the County had a policy against the public
dissemination of personnel matters?
MR. NAYLOR: Same objection.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
Q. (BY MR. ROSSMAN) You knew that when you
released this, correct?
A. After obtaining permission from
Mr. Farrens.
Q. Okay. So when you saw this
investigation report, you asked the question who
initiated the investigation of Mr. Farrens,
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and yet in walks a completed investigation that I
had no knowledge was even ordered.
Q. So do you feel personnel matters such as
that should have come to your attention?
A. If it had been ordered by another
commissioner.
Q. Did you feel that the hiring or firing
of an employee, a director-level employee, was
something that should be shared with other
commissioners?
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
Q. (BY MR. ROSSMAN) So were you upset by
the fact that this investigation had been
performed?
A. I was upset because I was being labeled
as -- within this investigation as the cause for
Mr. Farrens' harassment when that was not the case.
Q. Were you upset with Rick Yzaguirre for
initiating the investigation?
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form.
MR. ROSSMAN: Strike that.
Q. (BY MR. ROSSMAN) Were you upset with
Rick Yzaguirre for scheduling a meeting with
Mr. Farrens to talk about the release of the
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correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Why did you ask that question?
A. Because typically, in order for an
investigation to come, you have to get
commissioners involved in -- in something of this
level, especially dealing with the Dynamis
situation.
So I wanted to know which -- which
commissioners had ordered the investigation.
Q. Did a particular commissioner have the
authority to request an investigation?
A. Yeah.
Q. Did HR have the authority to initiate an
investigation?
A. They do.
Q. Did Rich Wright have the authority to
initiate an investigation?
A. Yes. Since he's the director and the
supervisor over HR, I would venture to say that's a
yes.
Q. Okay. So why are you concerned about
who initiated the investigation?
A. Because I felt like I'd been blindsided.
I'm a commissioner. I was a sitting commissioner,
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letter?
A. No, I wasn't upset about that.
Q. Were you upset about Rich Wright talk -scheduling a meeting to talk to him about the
release of the letter?
A. No.
Q. Were you upset about Rich Wright working
with Rick Yzaguirre to communicate with Mr. Farrens
about the letter without talking to you?
A. No.
Q. So what did Mr. -Who did you ask who initiated -- who did
you direct that question to as to who initiated the
investigation?
MR. NAYLOR: At that meeting?
MR. ROSSMAN: At the meeting.
THE WITNESS: I asked the group.
Q. (BY MR. ROSSMAN) And who responded?
A. Nobody.
Q. Did anyone tell you who initiated the
investigation?
A. No.
Q. Did you find out who initiated the
investigation?
A. 1--1 did not.
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Q. Never -- never found out who initiated
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1
2

it?
A. I -- I further went to -- down to Rich's
office to ask him.
Q. Okay. So after the meeting, you went
down to Rich's office because you didn't get an
answer, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And was this the same day as the
meeting?
A. Yes.
Q. Was anyone else present at Rich's
office?
A. No.
Q. What was discussed?
A. I asked him who ordered the Farrens
investigation.
Q. What did he say?
A. He started explaining how investigations
go, and I -- I told him I didn't want to hear it.
I just wanted to know who ordered it.
· Q. What'd he say?
A. He said the -- the investigation -- he
·ordered -I can't think of the investigator's name
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you about it, too, correct?
A. He's an employee that works for the
County commissioners.
Q. He worked for you at the time. He
should have told you about that.
You felt that way, correct?
A. Again, my -- my anger wasn't directed
specifically at an individual. It was at the
content of what was in the investigation report.
Q. Your anger was directed at the fact that
an investigation was initiated and you were not
informed of it, correct?
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form; misstates
his testimony.
Q. (BY MR. ROSSMAN) Go ahead.
A. Repeat it, please.
MR. ROSSMAN: Let's have her read it.
(Record read by reporter.)
THE WITNESS: Yes.
Q. (BY MR. ROSSMAN) And you -- to some
extent, you were the subject of that investigation
or a subject of that investigation.
Would you agree?
A. I would agree.
Q. Did you understand at the time that
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right now. Driving me nuts. Bart Hamilton. That
Bart Hamilton worked for him. He had a request to
get an investigation done, so he ordered it through
policy, through chain of command or whatever.
Q. Okay. Did you say -Was anything else discussed?
A. No. And when he said that, I said,
"Thanks," and I stormed out. And I was pretty
upset.
Q. Why were you upset?
A. Because, again, I -- I was a sitting
commissioner. I felt I -- I had the right to
understand what business was going on with the
County, and -- and stuff was being withheld from
me.
Q. You were upset because this
investigation was held without you being informed
of it, correct?
A. Yeah.
Q. You felt Yzaguirre, Rick Yzaguirre,
should have told you about it, correct?
A. I felt either Rick Yzaguirre or Sharon
Ullman should have given me the courtesy to tell me
what was going on.
Q. You felt Rich Wright should have told

1
2
3
4
5
6

7

8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21

22
23
24
25

there was any policy, any written policy or
procedure that required communication of an
investigation to every commissioner?
A. No.
Q. So you didn't believe that anybody
violated policy. You were just mad because you
weren't told about it, correct?
A. Yeah, and I wanted to know who -- who
ordered it.
Q. And you were mad because you were being
investigated, correct?
MR. NAYLOR: Object to the form.
THE WITNESS: I didn't know I was being
investigated until l started reading the report.
Q. (BY MR. ROSSMAN) And when you saw the
report, you were upset because you were -- you were
sub -- one of the subjects of the investigation?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you.
MR. ROSSMAN: It's about noon. Do you want
to take a break?
MR. NAYLOR: Yeah, let's take a break.
MR. ROSSMAN: All right.
VIDEOGRAPHER: Off the record. The time is
11 :55 a.m.
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Bruce J. Castleton
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By PATRICK McLAUGHLIN
or.o:.·1TV

Attorneys for Defendant Ada County

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,

...J

Case No. CV-OC-13-02730

d..

2

--

Plaintiff,
vs.

ADA COUNTY, a political subdivision of the
State ofldaho; ADA COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS,

DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL
BRIEF REGARDING INTENTIONAL
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS

-cc

(!)

a

Defendants.

Defendant Ada County, Ada County Board of County Commissioners 1, by and
through its attorneys ofrecord, Naylor & Hales, P.C., hereby files its Supplemental Brief Regarding
the Conduct Underlying Plaintiffs Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress claim.

Ada County Board of County Commissioners is not a proper party as it is not a governmental
entity that can be sued. To the extent that any claims could be alleged agairist the Commission, this
Supplemental Brief applies to those claims as well. However, Defendant does not waive the right
to move to dismiss this "party" at a later date.
1
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0

I. BACKGROUND
On November ,7, 2014, at the Hearing on Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment, this Court asked the parties to submit supplemental briefing to addre~s the alleged
underlying conduct of Wright's claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

II. ARGUMENT
To support a claim for the tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, a
plaintiff must show that the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous. "Courts have
required very extreme conduct before awarding damages for the intentional infliction of emotional
distress." Nation v. State Dept. ofCorrection, 144 Idaho 177 (2007); citing Edmondson v. Shearer

Lumber Products, 139 Idaho 172, 179 (2003). To support an IIED claim, conduct must be more than
merely 'unjustifiable,' but rather must rise to the level of 'atrocious' behavior 'beyond all possible
bounds of decency."' Bollinger v. Fall River Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 152 Idaho 632, 643 (2012).
Wright alleges that his termination was the result of the Commissioners' "repaying
a personal favor" to a former employee whose employment with Ada County had been terminated
as the result of an investigation. (Plfs Opp., p. 2, ~~ 2, 3, 5; p. 14; Affid. ofK Williams in Support

of Plaintiff's Opposition to Def's Motion for Summary Judgment, Exh. 7, Wright Depo.,
38:19-39:20; 138:2-141:25.) To establish this conduct Wright primarily relies on his recollection
that Commissioner Case asked him who had initiated an investigation. (Plfs Opp., p. 4, ~ 5; Am.
Comp.,

~

16.) Wright ~ontends that Commissioner Case asked the question in regard to the

investigations into a previously terminated employee, Dee Oldham. (Id.; Williams Affid. in Opp.,
Exh 7, Wight Depo., 38:25-39: 16.) Wright was unable to pinpoint the date of this conversation but
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indicated that it he believed it was either in November or December 2012. (Supp. Affid. of K

Naylor, Exh. B, Wright Depo., 62: 11-19.)
Commissioner Case was appointed to the Board of County Commissioners for Ada
County in May 2012. (Affid. ofK Naylor inSupportofDef's Motion/or Summary Judgment, Exh.
B, Case Depo., 89: 11-16.) On June 1, 2012, Commissioner Sharon Ullman requested that a number
of personnel investigation files, and specifically the Dee Oldham investigation files, be delivered to
Dave Case for his review.

(Naylor Supp. Affid., Exh. A; Exh. B, Wright Depo., 41-42.)

Commissioner Case testified that he recalled receiving those files and that two files regarding Dee
Oldham were included. (Id. at Exh. C, Case Dep., 105:22-106:21.) Commissioner Case further
testified that he read a couple of pages of one of the Oldham investigations and then closed the file
and set it aside. (Case Depo., 106:22-107:1.) Commissioner Case state.d that he "didn't really care
about it" because it was something that happened long before his arrival and did not involve him or
his work and that he did not know why he had been asked to look at the files. (Case Depo., 107: 1-6.)
He further testified that he had not developed any opinions regarding whether Ms. Oldham's loss
of employment was justified or not. (Case Depo., 109: 1-22.) Commissioner Case indicated that
he returned the files around July 11, 2012. (Case Depo., 109:19-24.)
Therefore, given the fact that Commissioner Case had been given the investigative
files in June 2012 and returned them in July 2012, there is no reason that he would have needed to
have a conversation with Mr. Wright about the investigations approximately 4-5 months later, which
is when Mr. Wright indicated that Commissioner Case asked him who ordered the Dee Oldham
investigation.
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Commissioner Case does admit to asking Mr. Wright who ordered the investigation
into the complaints made by Jim Farrens, who was a current employee at that time. (Case Depo.,
112:6-16, 118:23-120:6.) This conversation took place in late September or early October 2012.

(Id.) The conversation was first initiated in an executive session of the Board when the completed
investigation was delivered to the Board. (Case Depo., 112:13-16, 22-25). This was the first time

.
that Commissioner Case learned of the investigation into complaints made by Jim Farrens. (Case
Depo., 113: 20-114:5.)
Commissioner Case asked who initiated the investigation because typically for an
investigation dealing with a high level county project the Commissioners would have to be involved.

(Id., Case Depo., 118:23-119:8.) Commissioner Case did not receive an answer in the meeting and
so after the meeting, he went down to Mr. Wright's office to ask him. (Case Depo., 122:1-17.)
Commissioner Case asked Mr. Wright who ordered the investigation, and Mr. Wright indicated that
he had received a request to get an investigation done and through the chain of command he had
assigned an investigator. (Case Depo., 122:19-123:4.) Commissioner Case further admits that he
was upset because that investigation was conducted without his knowledge as a Commissioner, and
he felt that this information had been withheld from him by other Commissioners. (Case Depo.,
123:10-24.)
Ultimately, the legal issue at hand is whether Ada County's conduct was so extreme
and outrageous that it rose to the level of intentional infliction of emotional distress. In this case,
the conduct at issue is Dave Case's conversation with Mr. Wright regarding who initiated the Farrens
investigation. Simply stated, this conversation does not amount to going beyond all possible bounds
of decency, just because Commissioner Case wanted to know who had initiated the investigation.
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.
This is particularly evident when compared to the examples of what constitutes
extreme and outrageous conduct and what does not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct under
Idaho case law, as described in Defendant's Memorandum and Reply Memorandum. In short, the
conversation at issue is not so extreme or outrageous that it was intended to inflict severe emotional
distress. Accordingly, as demonstrated in Defendant's Memorandum, Reply, and Supplemental
Brief, Wright's claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotion Distress is appropriate for a grant of
summary judgment.
DATED this 19th day of November, 2014.
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 19th day ofNovember, 2014, I caused to be served,
by the method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon:
Eric S. Rossman
Erica S. Phillips
Kimberly L. Williams
Rossman Law Group, PLLC
737 N. 7th Street
Boise, ID 83702

y

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax Transmission: 342-2170
Email: erossman@rossmanlaw.com
ephillips@rossmanlaw.com
kwillliams@rossmanlaw.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff
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NOV 19 2014
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By PATRICK McLAUGHLIN
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Defendant Ada County

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,
Case No. CV-OC-13-02730
Plaintiff,
vs.

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF
KIRTLAN G. NAYLOR IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL
BRIEF ON INTENTIONAL INFLICTION CC
OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
O

f2

ADA COUNTY, political subdivision of the
State ofldaho; ADA COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS,

n

Defendants.
STATEOFIDAHO )
) ss.
County of Ada
)

Kirtlan G. Naylor, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I am the attorney of record in the above-captioned case for the Defendant. I

give this affidavit based upon my personal knowledge and experience.

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF KIRTLAN G. NAYLOR IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ON IIED - 1.
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2.

Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of redacted email

correspondence between Rich Wright, Commissioner Sharon Ullman, and other Ada County staff
and officials, numbered ADA 718-720.
3.

Attached as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy ofportions oftestimony from

the Deposition of Rich Wright.
4.

Attached as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of portions of testimony and

exhibits from the Deposition of Dave Case.

Residing in Boise, Idaho
My Commission Expires: 8/4/17
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 19th day of November, 2014, I caused to be served,
by the method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon:
Eric S. Rossman
Erica S. Phillips
Kimberly L. Williams
Rossman Law Group, PLLC
737 N. 7th Street
Boise, ID 83702

~
~

U.S.Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax Transmission: 342-2170
Email: erossman@rossmanlaw.com
ephillips@rossmanlaw.com
kwillliams@rossmanlaw.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

8745_55 AffKGN Defs Supp Brief re IIED_FINAL.wpd

·

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF KIRTLAN G. NAYLOR IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ON IIED - 3.

000278

Bethany Calley
Rich Wright
Friday, June 01, 2012 11:49 AM
Bethany Calley
Personnel Binders

From:

Sent:
To:
Subject:

I heard from Rick, - he said to provide all the investigation binders Sharon mentioned.

Rich Wright
Director

•

Ada County Department of Administration
200 W. Front St., Boise, ID 83702
(208) 287-7123 office
{208) 287-7159 fax

1

ADA 718

EXHIBIT
A
000279

Bethany Calley

To:
Cc:

Rich Wright
Friday, June 01, 2012 11:49 AM
Sharon Ullman; Rick Yzaguirre; Bethany Calley
David Case

Subject:

RE:

From:
Sent:

We are preparing to deliver those Investigative binders to Commissioner Case. I suspect they can be delivered to him
shortly.
Thanks,
Rich
----Original Message----From: Sharon Ullman
Sent: Friday, June 01, 2012 11:40 AM
To: Rick Yzaguirre; Rich Wright; Bethany Calley
Cc: David Case
Subject: FW:
Importance: High
Dave needs to be brought up to speed on some personnel issues including the situation with Carolyn and Bob and why
Parks is now a separate department; the situation with John, Pam and Shelly and why DS is now a separate department;
and why our friend from our office is no longer with the county. Perhaps he could be provided with all of the personnel
investigations from these situations so he can begin to familiarize himself with them.
Thanks,
Sharon:-)
From: Carolyn Nitz
Sent: Friday, June 01, 2012 9:40 AM
To: Rich Wright; Bethany Calley; Sharon Ullman; Rick Yzaguirre; David Case
Subject:
Since I have not been given the chance for a formal accounting of what transpired with-I am emailing it.

1

ADA 719

EXHIBIT
A
000280

Thanks,
Carolyn Nitz
Administrative Specialist & Event Coordinator
Ada County Parks and Waterways
4049 S. Eckert Rd.
Boise, Idaho 83716
208.577.4577 p
208.577.4579 f
Website: www.adaweb.net/parks<http://www.adaweb.net/parks>
PRIVILEGED/ CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION may be contained in this message and is thus protected from disclosure
under applicable law. The information in this e-mail correspondence is intended for the personal and confidential use of
the individual or entity to which It Is addressed and is covered by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2521. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any disclosure, duplication,
distribution, or the taking of any action in reliance of this correspondence is strictly prohibited. If you received this
correspondence in error, please immediately notify the sender by reply e-mail or phone and destroy any and all copies
of the correspondence. Thank You.
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ADA 720
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Deposition of
Richard Thomas Wright
Case: Wright v. Ada County, et al.
Case No: CV-OC-13-02730
Date: February 11, 2014

Reporter: Andrea J. Wecker, CSR#716, RMR, CRR, CBC

Associated Reporting and Video Inc.
Phone: 208.343.4004 ,
Fax: 208.343.4002
Email: production@associatedreportinginc.com
Internet: www .associated reporting inc.com
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B
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Richard Thomas Wright

1

A.

I provided i t to Commissioner Case the

first two days he was in office.

4
5

Wright v. Ada County, et al.

Oldham investigation, did he?

2
3

February 11, 2014

Q.

Did Dave Case ever request a copy of the

Dee Oldham investigation from you?

6

A.

No.

7

Q.

Okay.

I provided it to him.
Did he ever, to your knowledge,

8

request affirmatively the Dee Oldham report from

9

anyone?

10

MR. ROSSMAN:

11

foundation, speculation.

12

THE WITNESS:

13

Q.

Object to the form;

I don't know.

(BY MR. NAYLOR) Okay.

And isn't i t true

14

that Sharon Ullman instructed you to give Dave Case

15

a copy of the Dee Oldham report?

16

A.

Both Commissioner Yzaguirre and

17

Commissioner Ullman said that they wanted

18

Commissioner Case to have a copy of the

19

investigation, which is why I delivered i t to him.

20

Q.

And that was in June 2012, correct?

21

A.

It could have been.

Q.

Let me hand you Exhibit 17.

22
23

I don't recall the

date.
Go ahead

24

and look at all of i t just so that you get -- can

25

put i t into context.

[40]
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Richard Thomas Wright

February 11, 2014

Wright v. Ada County, et al.

1

This is Ada 718 to 722.

2

Are those e-mails between you and

3

Ada County staff and officials?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

Okay.

And so you see there that on

6

June 1st, on the second page there, Sharon Ullman

7

asked you to provide a -- well, she sent it to Rick

8

Yzaguirre, you, and Bethany Calley --

9

A.

Uh-huh.

10

Q.

-- requesting that you provide certain

11

information for him to be brought up to speed on

12

personnel issues, including "and why our friend

13

from our office is no longer with the County."

14

Who did you understand that that was in

15

reference to?

16

A.

I understood that to be Dee Oldham.

17

Q.

Okay.

So then you respond, "We are

18

preparing to deliver those investigative binders to

19

Commissioner Case.

20

to him shortly."

I suspect they can be delivered

21

A.

Correct.

22

Q.

And that was on June 1st, 2012?

23

A.

Yes, i t appears to be.

24

Q.

In fact, you were -- you then wanted a

25

follow-up from Rick Yzaguirre to make sure i t was

[41]
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Richard Thomas Wright

February 11, 2014

Wright v. Ada County, et al.

1

okay. · And the first page says, "I heard from Rick.

2

He said to provide all the investigation binders

3

for"

4

A.

Correct.

5

Q.

Correct?

6

A.

As with any action I took in my

7

position, I needed at least a second vote to carry

8

out any one commissioner's wish.

9

Q.

So you did provide Commissioner Case

10

with the Oldham investigation in June of 2012,

11

correct?

12

A.

Correct.

They felt i t important because

13

Commissioner Bisterfeldt was so upset about Dee

14

Oldham's departure.

15
16

Q.

Well, but i t wasn't just Dee Oldham's

report that you provided, is it, correct?

17

A.

There was another personnel issue that

18

was brewing within the Parks and Waterways

19

Department that --

20

Q.

We don't have to go into the details.

21

A.

Uh-huh.

22

Q.

But you provided that information to

23
24
25

him?
MR. ROSSMAN:

Counsel, let's have an

agreement between you and the witness.

He's doing

[42]
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Richard Thomas Wright

1

February 11, 2014

Wright v. Ada County, et al.

Did you intend for i t to mean November?

2

A.

I don't recall what I intended at that

3

time.

4

Yzaguirre and Ullman about Dave Case visiting my

5

office and asking about the Dee Oldham

6

investigation.

7

Q.

Okay.

8

A.

I'd spoke with them personally about it,

9

10
11

I do know that I had talked to Commissioners

and this document was intended to formally put them
on notice of that interaction.

Q.

As you sit. here ~oday, you don't recall

12

what month that -- that Dave Case came into your

13

office?

14
15

A.

It could have been November.

have been December.

It could

I -- I can't remember.

16

Q.

Could i t have been October?

17

A.

I don't believe so.

18

Q.

Could i t have been July?

19

A.

It was after the election.

20

Q.

Okay.

And did you write down what

21

happened at that meeting when Dave Case came into

22

your office, when i t happened?

23
24
25

A.

I can't remember whether I did or not.

I know I spoke to people about it.

Q.

Well, if you wrote i t down, wouldn't you

[62]
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Deposition of
Dave Case
Case: Wright v. Ada County, et al.
Case No: CV-OC-13-02730
Date: February 13, 2014

Reporter:· Andrea J. Wecker, CSR#716, RMR, CRR, CBC

Associated Reporting and Video Inc.
Phone: 208.343.4004
Fax: 208.343.4002
Email: production@associatedreportinginc.com
Internet: www .associatedreportinginc.com
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Dave Case

February 13, 2014

Wright v. Ada County, et al.

1

is now a separate document"

2

why our friend from our office is no longer with

3

the County.

4

or, "department; and

"Perhaps he could be provided with all

5

of the personnel inve~tigations from these

6

situations so he can begin to familiarize himself

7

with them."

8
9

Do you -- do you recall getting an
e-mail indicating something in that nature?

10

A.

I don't.

11

Q.

Do you recall anybody requesting that

12

you be provided with investigation files relating

13

to certain former employees?

14

A.

No.

15

Q.

When you took office, do you recall ever

16

seeing an investigation file relating to Pam

17

Woodies?

18

A.

19
20
21
22

23

I -Yes.

Q.

How did you come across that

investigation file?
A.

There were three files brought up and

put on my desk.

24

Q.

When?

25

A.

It was in early June.

[105]
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Dave Case

1

2

February 13, 2014

Q.

Wright v. Ada County, et al.

At or sometime around the date of this

e-mail, correct?

3

A.

Correct.

4

Q.

Who put those on your desk?

5

A.

I don't know if it was Rich or if i t was

Q.

Did anyone explain to you why those were

6
7

8
9

Sue.

put on your desk?
A.

I asked the question of, "What is this?"

10

And the answer was given to me of, "These are

11

investigation files that the other commissioners

12

felt you should be aware of."

13
14

Q.

Did they indicate why the other

commissioners felt you should be aware of them?

15

A.

To bring me up to speed on them.

16

Q.

Pam Woodies' investigation file was one

17

of them, correct?

18

A.

I believe so.

19

Q.

Who were the other two?

20

A.

I believe the other two were two

21

separate investigation files regarding Dee Oldham.

22

Q.

Did you read those investigation files?

23

A.

I opened it, one file.

I believe i t

24

was -- I want to say i t was Dee's, the first one.

25

And I read about two or three pages and I closed i t

[106]
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Dave Case

1

February 13, 2014

Wright v. Ada County, et al.

and set it aside, didn't really care about it.

2

Q.

Why?

3

A.

It was something that happened long

4

before my arrival there.

5

me or my business.

6

being asked to look at them.

7

8
9

Q.

It had nothing to do with

I didn't understand why I was

Did you ask anybody why you were being

asked to look at them?

A.

10

Again, I don't know who -I cannot recall specifically who

11

delivered them, but the comment was, "Why -- why do

12

I need to look at these?"

13

was that, "The other commissioners felt you needed

14

to be apprized of this" --

And, again, the comment

15

Q.

16

A.

"or up to speed."

17

Q.

Sharon Ullman or Rick Yzaguirre why

18
19

Did you ask Sharon

they wanted you to read those files?
A.

I did not.

There was not a lot of

20

communication between Sharon Ullman and I, nor

21

nor Rick and I during this six-month time period.

22

Q.

23

correct?

24

A.

25

You're working in the same building,

Yeah.

We conducted business, and there

was no -- there was no chitchat between the two of

[107]
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Dave Case

February 13, 2014

Wright v. Ada County, et al.

1

thought was this happened long before my time.

2

not concerned about it.

Q.

3

4

I'm

Did you develop
Did you have an opinion at that point in

5

time that her -- the loss of her employment was

6

justified?

7

A.

No.

8

Q.

Did you feel i t was unjustified?

9

A.

I didn't develop an opinion.

10

Q.

Had Vern Bister -- Bisterfeldt told you

11

that he felt the loss of her employment was

12

unjustified?

13

A.

Not that I recall.

14

Q.

Hadn't Sue -- or Dee Oldham told you she

15

felt the loss of her employment was unjustified?

16

A.

No.

17

Q.

Never told you that?

18

A.

No.

19

Q.

So you looked at the first couple pages,

20

closed it, and a little while later, you returned

21

it?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

When did you return them?

24

A.

I believe i t was July 11th.

25

Q.

Why --
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1

A.

No.

2

Q.

Do you recall ever asking him who

3

initiated any investigation before you became a

4

commissioner?

5

A.

Not before I became a commissioner.

6

Q.

Okay.

7

Do you recall asking him who

initiated any investigation at any time?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

When?

10

A.

It was in either late September or early

11

12

October of 2012.

Q.

13
14

15
16

You had
Where were you when you asked that
\

question?
A.

Two places.

One was upstairs in the

boardroom.

17

Q.

Who was present?

18

A.

Ted Argyle, Sharon Ullman, Rick

19

Yzaguirre, Rich, our investigator.

20

remember his name right now.

21
22
23
24
25

I can't

Those are the main folks I recall.

Q.

Why was there a meeting in the boardroom

at that point in time?
A.

Because an investigation was delivered

to the boardroom regarding Jim Farrens.
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You believe this was in September, early

October of 2012?

3

A.

That's correct.

4

Q.

Was -- was this an executive session

5

meeting?

6

A.

7

I believe i t was because i t was dealing

with a personnel issue.

8

Q.

Was Sue Axtman present?

9

A.

Somebody was clerking, probably Sue.

10

Q.

And when you say "clerking," she was

11

taking her handwritten notes?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

What was said about Jim Farrens'

14

investigation?

15

MR. NAYLOR:

16
17
18
19
20
21

Now, in --

You're not interested in the details of
Farrens' allegations?
MR. ROSSMAN:

Let me -- let me rephrase the

question.

Q.

(BY MR. ROSSMAN) Did you ask who

initiated the investigation of Jim Farrens?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

Why?

24

A.

Because as I opened the book --

25

As -- as the reports were delivered,

I
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to him --

2

A.

They just --

3

Q.

-- feeling he was being harassed?

4

A.

No.

They just said he -- or his comment

5

was they scheduled a meeting to discuss his

6

concerns.

7

Q.

Did you understand that the County had a

8

policy against the public dissemination of per --

9

personnel matters?

10

MR. NAYLOR:

11

12
13
14

Object to the form.

Go ahead.
THE WITNESS:

I obtained permission from

Mr. Farrens to do so.

Q.

(BY MR. ROSSMAN) Did you understand that

15

the County had a policy against the public

16

dissemination of personnel matters?

17

MR. NAYLOR:

18

THE WITNESS:

19

Q.

20
21
22
23

Same objection.
Yes.

(BY MR. ROSSMAN) You knew that when you

released this, correct?
A.

After obtaining permission from

Mr. Farrens.

Q.

Okay.

So when you saw this

24

investigation report, you asked the question who

25

initiated the investigation of Mr. Farrens,
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1

correct?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

Why did you ask that question?

4

A.

Because typically, in order for an

5

investigation to come, you have to get

6

commissioners involved in -- in something of this

7

level, especially dealing with the Dynamis

8

situation.

9

10

So I wanted to know which -- which
commissioners had ordered the investigation.

11

12

Q.

Did a particular commissioner have the

authority to request an investigation?

13

A.

Yeah.

14

Q.

Did HR have the authority to initiate an

15

investigation?

16

A.

They do.

17

Q.

Did Rich Wright have the authority to

18

initiate an investigation?

19

A.

Yes.

Since he's the director and the

20

supervisor over HR, I would venture to say that's a

21

yes.

22

23
24
25

Q.

Okay.

So why are you concerned about

who initiated the investigation?
A.

Because I felt like I'd been blindsided.

I'm a commissioner.

I was a sitting commissioner,
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1

and yet in walks a completed investigation that I

2

had no knowledge was even ordered.

3

4
5
6
7

Q.

So do you feel personnel matters such as

that should have come to your attention?
A.

If it had been ordered by another

commissioner.
Q.

Did you feel that the hiring or firing

8

of an employee, a director-level employee, was

9

something that should be shared with other

10

commissioners?

11

MR. NAYLOR:

12

THE WITNESS:

13

Q.

Object to the form.
Yes.

(BY MR. ROSSMAN) So were you upset by

14

the fact that this investigation had been

15

performed?

16

A.

I was upset because I was being labeled

17

as -- within this investigation as the cause for

18

Mr. Farrens' harassment when that was not the case.

19

20

Q.

Were you upset with Rick Yzaguirre for

initiating the investigation?

21

MR. NAYLOR:

22

MR. ROSSMAN:

23

Q.

Object to the form.
Strike that.

(BY MR. ROSSMAN) Were you upset with

24

Rick Yzaguirre for scheduling a meeting with

25

Mr. Farrens to talk about the release of the
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Q.

Never -- never found out who initiated

A.

I -- I further went to -- down to Rich's

it?

office to ask him.

Q.

Okay.

So after the meeting, you went

6

down to Rich's office because you didn't get an

7

answer, correct?

8

A.

Correct.

9

Q.

And was this the same day as the

10

meeting?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

Was anyone else present at Rich's

13

office?

14

A.

No.

15

Q.

What was discussed?

16

A.

I asked him who ordered the Farrens

17

investigation.

18

Q.

What did he say?

19

A.

He started explaining how investigations

20

go, and I -- I told him I didn't want to hear it.

21

I just wanted to know who ordered it.

22

Q.

What'd he say?

23

A.

He said the -- the investigation -- he

24
25

ordered
I can't think of the investigator's name
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1

right now.

2

Bart Hamilton worked for him.

3

get an investigation done, so he ordered it through

4

policy, through chain of command or whatever.

5

Q.

6

Driving me nuts.

Okay.

Bart Hamilton.

That

He had a request to

Did you say --

Was anything else discussed?

A.

7

No.

8

"Thanks," and I

9

upset.

And when he said that, I said,
stormed out.

10

Q.

Why were you upset?

11

A.

Because, again, I

And I was pretty

I was a sitting

12

commissioner.

13

understand what business was going on with the

14

County, and -- and stuff was being withheld from

15

me.

16

Q.

I

felt I -- I had the right to

You were upset because this

17

investigation was held without you being informed

18

of it, correct?

19

A.

Yeah.

20

Q.

You felt Yzaguirre, Rick Yzaguirre,

21
22

should have told you about it, correct?
A.

I felt either Rick Yzaguirre or Sharon

23

Ullman should have given me the courtesy to tell me

24

what was going on.

25

Q.

You felt Rich Wright should have toldI
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlJNTY OF ADA
)

RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,

)

CASE NO. CV-OC-13-02730

)

Plaintiff,

)
)

v.

)
)

ADA COUNTY, A POLITICAL
)
SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO,)
AND ADA COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY )
COMMISSIONERS,
)

MEMORANDUM
CONCERNING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)
)

Defendants.

)

This is an employment dispute, in which Plaintiff Richard Thomas Wright, a
discharged employee of Ada County, brought a direct action against Defendants
Ada County, its Board of County Commissioners, and Commissioners David Case
and Jim Tibbs for monetary damages. He has not sought reinstatement. By
stipulation the claims against Mr. Case and Mr. Tibbs have been dismissed.
In Count I of the unverified amended complaint Mr. Wright's attorney
alleged that her client was terminated in violation of the Idaho Protection of Public
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Employees Act. I.C. Sections 6-2101- 2109 ("Whistleblower Act"). In Count II she
alleged that he was terminated in violation of the Federal Family Medical Leave
Act. 29 U.S.C. Sections 2601- 2654 ("FMLA"). In Count III she alleged on behalf of
Mr. Wright !llternative claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. In addition, although not pled as a
separate count she has asserted in the prayer for relief that Mr. Wright is entitled
to damages in excess of $25,000.00 for retaliatory discharge "in violation of the
Idaho Public Policy."
Defendants Ada County and Ada County Board of Commissioners moved for
summary judgment on all claims. The Board of County Commissioners also asserted
that it is not an entity capable of suing or being sued, but the issue is not now
before the court.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS
The burden of proving the non-existence of material facts lies at all times
with the moving party. Even if nothing is presented in opposition by the nonmoving part, summary judgment must not be granted if the moving party fails to
eliminate all genuine issues of material fact. McCoy v. Williams, 120 Idaho 765,
771, 820 P.2d 360 (1991).
Summary judgment "... shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter oflaw." IRCP Rule 56(c). The trial court must liberally
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construe the facts in the existing record in favor of the non-moving party and should
draw all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the non-moving party.

Anderson v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 658, 660, 651 P.2d 923 (1982). In this process the
court must look to the totality of the motions, affidavits, depositions, pleadings, and
attached exhibits, not merely to portions of the record in isolation. Central Idaho

Agency v. Turner, 92 Idaho 306,442 P.2d 442 (1968). Circumstantial evidence can
create a genuine issue of material fact. Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92
Idaho 865, 452 P.2d 361 (1969). All doubts must be resolved against the moving
party. Ashby v. Hubbard, 100 Idaho 67, 593 P.2d 402 (1979). The motion must be
denied "if the evidence is such that conflicting inferences can be drawn therefrom
and if reasonable [people] might draw different conclusions." Id.
Controverted facts are viewed in favor of the party resisting the motion for
summary judgment. When a jury has been requested, the non-moving party also is
entitled to the benefit of every reasonable inference that can be drawn from the
evidentiary facts. Anderson v. Ethington. Thus the burden of a party, when faced
with a motion for summary judgment, is not to persuade the judge that an issue will
be decided in its favor at trial. Rather, it "simply must present sufficient materials
to show that there is a triable issue." 6 MOORE, TAGGART & WICKER, MOORE'S

FEDERAL PRACTICE ,r 56.11(3), at p. 56-243 (2d ed. 1988).
A triable issue exists whenever reasonable minds could disagree as to the
material facts or the inferences to be drawn from those facts. Petricevich v. Salmon

River Canal Co.; Snake River Equipment Co. v. Christensen, 107 Idaho 541, 691
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P.2d 787 (Ct. App. 1984). Therefore, although a party carries the ultimate burden at
trial of proving facts to a standard of probability, the court in a summary judgment
proceeding does not weigh the evidence for probability. The court determines only
whether the evidence frames an issue upon which reasonable minds could disagree.
Beyond this threshold of reasonableness, weighing the evidence is a task reserved to
the trier of fact, who will have a first-hand opportunity to consider conflicting
evidence and observe the cross-examination of witnesses. Earl v. Cryovac, A

Division of W.R. Grace, 115 Idaho 1087, 1094, 772 P.2d 725 (Ct. App. 1989).
Nevertheless, in a case in which the non-moving party has the burden of
proof at trial, summary judgment is appropriate if that party fails to make a
showing of the existence of an element essential to its case, provided that an
adequate time for discovery has passed. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317
(1986); Sparks v. St. Luke's Regional Medical Center, 115 Idaho 505, 768 P.2d 768
(1988). A mere scintilla of evidence or only a slight doubt is insufficient to withstand
summary judgment. Corbridge v. Clark Equipment Co., 112 Idaho 85, 730 P.2d 85
(1986). "[T]he party opposing the motion must present more than a conclusory
assertion that an issue of fact exists." Coughlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133
Idaho 388, 401, 987 P.2d 300 (1999). The non-moving party cannot rest its case
upon mere speculation. Finolt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 897, 155 P.3d 695 (2007).
Furthermore an unsworn allegation in a pleading does not create a disputed issue of
fact in the face of affidavits or other materials provided for in the summary
judgment rule. IRCP Rule 56(e); Tafoya v. Fleming, 94 Idaho 3,479 P.2d 483 (1971).
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Summary judgment should be granted whenever, on the basis of the evidence before
the court, a directed verdict would be warranted or whenever reasonable minds
could not differ as to the facts. Snake River Equipment Co. v. Christensen.
"Notwithstanding the utility of a summary judgment, a motion for summary
judgment should be granted with caution." McCoy v. Williams, 120 Idaho at 770.

DISCUSSION
Mr. Wright was hired in 2006 by Ada County. In August 2009 he became
Director of Administrative Services, later designated as Director of the Department
of Administration. He held that position until he was discharged from employment
with the county on January 15, 2013. His employment was "at will", that is, he
could be terminated from his employment at any time for any reason or for no
reason, so long as the termination did not violate public policy or a statutory right.
See, e.g., Roberts v. Board of Trustees, Pocatello, School District No. 25, 134 Idaho
890, 893, 11 P.3d 1108 (2000).
The decision to terminate Mr. Wright was made by two of the three county
commissioners, Mr. Case and Mr. Tibbs. The third commissioner, Mr. Yzaguirre,
apparently did not agree to the termination. The reason given for Mr. Wright's
termination was a reorganization of county administration. Whether this in fact
was the actual reason or whether there was another reason or whether there was no
reason at all is immaterial in the context of the discharge of an at-will employee
such as Mr. Wright, provided that the termination did not violate public policy and

SUMMARY JUDGMENT MEMORANDUM

5

000303

the termination did not violate a statutory right.

****
Public Policy Claim for Relief.
Mr. Wright asserted that his employment was terminated in violation of the
State Whistle blower Act and in violation of the Federal Family Medical Leave Act.
He did not make a specific claim for discharge in violation of public policy, but he
nevertheless requested damages for discharge in violation of state public policy.
Because of the possibility that he intended to claim a violation of public policy based
on the Whistleblower Act or the FMLA, the issue will be discussed briefly.
A violation of the Whistle blower Act by discharge of an employee previously
has been held not to be a violation of Idaho's public policy in the context of an atwill employment relationship. Van v. Portneuf Medical Center, 147 Idaho 552, 561,
212 P.3d 982 (2009). Likewise, based on decisions from other jurisdictions it is
probable that a violation of the statutory scheme contained in the FMLA is not a
violation of Idaho's public policy. See, e.g., Wiles v. Medina Auto Parts, 773 N.E.2d
526 (Ohio 2002); Crevier v. Town of Spencer, 600 F. Supp. 2d 242 (D. Mass. 2008);

Lucht v. Encompass Corp., 491. F. Supp. 2d 856 (S.D. Iowa 2007); Perez v.
Hospitality Ventures-Denver, 298 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (D. Colo. 2004).
Consequently even if there were a violation of the Whistle Blower Act or the
FMLA, Mr. Wright would not be entitled to separate damages for discharge in
violation of state public policy.

****
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Claim for Violation of the State Whistleblower Act.
The intent of the Whistle blower Act is to "protect the integrity of government
by providing a legal cause of action for public employees who experience adverse
action from their employer as a result of reporting waste and violations of a law,
rule or regulation." LC. Section 6-2101. The term "adverse action" includes the
discharge of a public employee. LC. Section 6-2103(1). A public employer, such as
Ada County:
may not take adverse action against an employee because the employee, or a
person authorized to act on behalf of the employee, communicates in good
faith the existence of any waste of public funds, property or manpower, or a
violation or suspected violation of a law, rule or regulation adopted under the
laws of t]:i.is state, a political subdivision of this state or the United States.
LC. Section 6-2104(1)(a).
An employee who has been the victim of a violation of the Whistleblower Act
may bring an action for injunctive relief, actual damages, and reinstatement. LC.
Sections 6-2105 and 6-2106. In this case Mr. Wright has sought damages but not
injunctive relief or reinstatement.
The burden is on the employee to establish that he or she "has suffered an
adverse action because the employee, or a person acting on his behalf engaged or
intended to engage in an activity protected under section 6-2104, Idaho Code." LC.
Section 6-2105(4).
Implicit in Section 6-2104(1)(a). of the Whistle blower Act is the requirement
that the discharged employee had engaged in some sort of "predicate" act to protect
the integrity of government and that there was a causal connection between the
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predicate act and the adverse action taken by the defendants. Black v. Idaho State

Police, 155 Idaho 570, 57 4, 314 P.3d 625 (2013). In this case, Mr. Wright has
argued that his predicate act involved communicating or reporting "a violation or
suspected violation of a law, rule or regulation adopted under the law of ... a
political subdivision of this state ... " LC. Section 6-2104(1)(a). The communicating
or reporting involved investigations conducted under Mr. Wright's authority, but
without his factual input, of claims of "harassment" made by county employees.
One predicate-act claim involved allegations by several employees that a
county supervisory employee, Dee Oldham, consistently was discourteous and
verbally abusive in criticizing the work product of her subordinates. As a result of a
series of investigations conducted under Mr. Wright's ultimate direction, Ms.
Oldham was asked to resign. She later worked on the election campaign of one or
both of the county commissioners who concurred in Mr. Wright's termination.
The other predicate-act claim involved investigation under Mr. Wright's
direction of a claim by a county engineer, Jim Farrens, that he was treated so coldly
and abrasively by his supervisors as to amount to a hostile work environment. The
investigation also involved a claim that the conduct of a county commissioner in
making public a letter from the engineer contributed to a hostile work environment.
Neither investigation involved an alleged violation of a state, county, or
federal law, rule or regulation. At most each investigation involved only actual or
alleged violations of county employment policies - policies that did not reach the
level of statutes, rules, or regulations. Consequently there is no evidence of a
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"predicate" act sufficient to sustain a claim for violation of Section 6-2104(1)(a) of
the Whistleblower Act. Black v. Idaho State Police; See, Mallonee v. State, 119 Idaho
615, 84 P.3d 551 (2003).
Mr. Wright also has contended that he has a valid claim under LC. Section 62104((2) of the Whistleblower Act, which prohibits an employer from taking
adverse action against an employee because he or she "participates or gives
information in an investigation, hearing, court proceeding, legislative or other
inquiry, or other form of administrative review."
The evidence before the court demonstrates that Mr. Wright did not
participate in or give information in any meaningful manner with respect to any of
the investigations. The actual investigations were conducted by third persons other
than Mr. Wright. The reports of the investigations were prepared by third persons
other than Mr. Wright. Mr. Wright himself gave no evidence and was not
interviewed by any of the investigators.
As the Idaho Supreme Court said in Corbridge, "It is well settled that a mere
scintilla of evidence or only a slight doubt as to the facts is insufficient to withstand
summary judgment." Corbridge v. Clark Equipment Co., 112 Idaho at 87. Summary
judgment will be granted dismissing the Whistleblower Act claim.

****
Claim for Violation of the FMLA.
It is undisputed that the decision to discharge Mr. Wright was made by the
two involved county commissioners prior to January 15, 2013, and that he actually
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was discharged by the two county commissioners on January 15, 2013. At that time
they had no knowledge that he had an illness or that he had requested a benefit
under the FMLA. When the commissioners were advised of the request, the
effective date of termination was extended so that he could have the benefit of his
FMLA request. While it is correct that an employee has a claim for damages for
improper employer action taken to interfere with or retaliate for an FLMA request,
29 U.S.C. Section 2615, there is no evidence that the decision to discharge Mr.
Wright interfered with or retaliated for his request. Quite the contrary, the decision
to discharge Mr. Wright was made before the commissioners knew of his request.
Once they knew of the request they accommodated it by extending the date of his
termination. In other words, there is no evidence of any interference with or causal
connection between Mr. Wright's request for an FMLA benefit and the decision to
discharge him. The decision to terminate and the request for FMLA leave may have
been close in time, but the undisputed evidence shows that they were unrelated.
Summary judgment will be granted dismissing the FMLA claim.

****
Claim for Intentional or Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress.
The Idaho Supreme Court has discussed both intentional infliction of
emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress in the context of
employment disputes. See, Bollinger v. Fall River Rural Electrical Cooperative, 152
Idaho 632, 642-643, 272 P.3d 1263 (2012). To paraphrase Bollinger:
Intentional infliction of emotional distress requires evidence that:
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1. The defendant's conduct was intentional or reckless; and

2. The conduct was extreme and outrageous, beyond all possible bounds of
decency; and
3. There was a causal relationship between the defendant's conduct and the
plaintiffs emotional distress; and
4. The emotional distress was severe.
Although Mr. Wright's termination was intentional, there is no evidence to
suggest that the behavior was extreme or outrageous and beyond all possible
bounds of decency. Summary judgment will be entered dismissing the intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim
Negligent infliction of emotional distress requires evidence that:
1. There was a legally recognized duty; and

2. The defendant breached that duty; and
3. There was a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the
breach; and
4. As a result the plaintiff suffered an emotional injury and actual loss or
damage; and
5. The plaintiff must have a physical manifestation of the emotional injury.
In this case there is no evidence of a breach of a duty owed by the defendants to
their at-will employee, Mr. Wright. As noted at the beginning of the discussion, an
employer may terminate an at-will employee for any reason or for no reason so long
as the termination does not violate public policy or a statutory right.
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Since there was no breach of a duty, summary judgment will be entered
dismissing the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim.

****
For the reasons stated the court will grant summary judgment dismissing all of
Mr. Wright's claims against the defendants with prejudice.

V

Dated this

S

day of January, 2015

George D. Carey, Senior Distr~t Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
)

RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,

CASE NO. CV-OC-13-02730

)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)

v.

)
)

ADA COUNTY, A POLITICAL
)
SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO,)
AND ADA COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY )
COMMISSIONERS,
)

ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)
)

Defendants.

)

Based on the court's memorandum opinion of today's date, it hereby is
ordered that summary judgment is granted in favor of Defendants Ada County and
Ada county Board of County Commissioners dismissing the claims of Plaintiff
Richard Thomas Wright with prejudice, the plaintiff to recover nothing thereby.
1--.,

Dated this

O

day of January, 2015

George D. Carey, Senior District'Judge
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on this

~ day of January, 2015, I mailed (served) a true and

correct copy of the within instrument to:

ERIC ROSSMAN
ERICA PHILLIPS
KIMBERLY WILLIAMS
ROSSMAN LAW GROUP
737 N 7TH STREET
BOISE ID 83702

(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
(X) Electronic Mail
( ) Facsimile

KIRTLAN NAYLOR
BRUCE CASTLETON
NAYLOR & HAYLES
950 W BANNOCK STREET STE 610
BOISE ID 83702

(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
(X) Electronic Mail
( ) Facsimile

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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V1tlf5A

••

a

NO·---=----

FILED ___._....._.'~5
A.M. _ __.P,M.
___
_,_

JAN O5 2015
CHRISTOPHER ;), f11CH, Clerk
By LUCILLE DANSEREAU
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
)

RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,

)

CASE NO. CV-OC-13-02730

)

Plaintiff,

)
)

v.

)
)

ADA COUNTY, A POLITICAL
)
SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO,)
AND ADA COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY )
COMMISSIONERS,
)

JUDGMENT

)
)

Defendants.

)

JUDGMENT HEREBY IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
All claims for relief of Plaintiff Richard Thomas Wright alleged in his
amended complaint against Defendants Ada County and Ada County Board of ·

~

County Commissioners are dismissed with prejudice, t~e plaintiff to recover nothing
thereby. Claims against former Defendants David Case and Jim Tibbs previously
were dismissed with prejudice by stipulation. The court will consider costs in favor
of the prevailing parties upon timely submission of co"st bills.

Dated this

5"

~

day of January, 2015

George D. Carey, Senior Dist ·ct Judge
JUDGMENT
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on this

~

'f''-day of January, 2015, I mailed (served) a true and

correct copy of the within instrument to:

ERIC ROSSMAN
ERICA PHILLIPS
KIMBERLY WILLIAMS
ROSSMAN LAW GROUP
737 N 7TH STREET
BOISE ID 83702

(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
(X) Electronic Mail
( ) Facsimile

KIRTLAN NAYLOR
BRUCE CASTLETON
NAYLOR & HAYLES
950 W BANNOCK STREET STE 610
BOISE ID 83702

(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
(X) Electronic Mail
( ) Facsimile

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court

JUDGMENT
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/v/t~

1

:,;;J

NO-----~--m--"'-f";'--

Kirtlan G. Naylor
[ISB No. 3569]
A.M., _ _ _ _F_1L1~.~
Bruce J. Castleton
[ISB No. 6915]
Joan E. Callahan
[ISB No. 9241]
JAN 16 2015
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
Attorneys at Law
ByTENILLE RAD
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 610
DEPUTY
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516
Email: kirt@naylorhales.com; bic@naylorhales.com; jec@naylorhales.com
Attorneys for Defendant Ada County

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,
Case No. CV-OC-13-02730

....J

c;:t

Plaintiff,
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM OF
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES

vs.

-e-r
2

C!)

0

ADA COUNTY, political subdivision of the
State ofldaho; ADA COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS

CJ

Defendants.
Defendant Ada County, Ada County Board of County Commissioners 1, by and through its
attorneys ofrecord, Naylor & Hales, P. C., hereby submits this Memorandum of Costs and Attorney's
Fees pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 6-2107 and 12-117 and Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(d)
and 54(e), on the basis that Ada County is the prevailing party in this matter. This memorandum is
supported by the affidavit ofKirtlan G. Naylor filed contemporaneously herewith.

Ada County Board of County Commissioners is not a proper party as it is not a governmental
entity that can be sued. To the extent that any claims were alleged against the Commission, this
Memorandum applies to those claims as well.
1
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I. ATTORNEY'S FEES
A.

Attorney's Fees for Defendant are Statutorily Prescribed Pursuant to Idaho Code
Sections 6-2107 and 12-117.
Pursuant to Rule 54(e)(1 ), "[i]n any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney fees,

which at the discretion of the court may include paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or parties as
defined in Rule 54(d)(l)(B), when provided for by any statute .... " I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l). In this case,
Plaintiff alleged violation of the Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act (Whistleblower Act),
violation of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), and Negligent and/or Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress (Emotional Distress claims). The Whistleblower Act and Emotional Distress
claims have a clear statutory basis for granting attorney's fees to Defendant. Therefore, Defendant
is only requesting an award of fees that were incurred relating to the Whistleblower Act claim and
Emotional Distress claims and has apportioned fees to those claims as appropriate.

1.

Violation of the Whistleblower Act

The Whistleblower Act specifically provides that "attorneys' fees and court costs be awarded
to an employer if the court determines that an action brought by an employee under this chapter is
without basis in law or in fact." LC. § 6-2107. In the current case, Plaintiffs Whistleblower Act
claim was dismissed on summary judgment because the acts alleged did not fall under the
enumerated protections of the Whistleblower Act. (Summary Judgment Memorandum, pp. 8-9.)
Thus, Plaintiffs Whistleblower Act claim lacked a basis in law or in fact and attorney's fees are
appropriate under Idaho Code Section 6-2107.
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2.,

Emotional Distress Claims

Idaho Code Section 12-117 applies "in any proceeding involving as adverse parties a state
agency or a political subdivision and a person." Further the statute provides that "the court hearing
the proceeding . . . shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney fees, witness fees, and other
reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact
or law." Id. (emphasis added). Bonner County v. Cunningham, 2014 Opinion No. 33, p. 3 (Ct.
Appeals, April 24, 2014). Under Idaho Code Section 12-117, an award of attorney's fees is
mandated when a party acted without a reasonable factual or legal basis. Id.
In this case, the Court found that regarding Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, there
was "no evidence to suggest that the behavior was extreme or outrageous and beyond all possible
bounds of decency," which was a required element of Plaintiffs prima facie case. (Summary
Judgment Memorandum, pp. 10-11.) Thus, the Court dismissed the claim on summary judgment.

(Id.) Similarly, the Court dismissed Plaintifrs claim for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
because there was no evidence of breach of a duty owed by Defendant to Plaintiff, who was an at
will employee. (Id. at 11-12.) As was particularly noted by the Court and clearly established in case
law, an at will employee may be dismissed for any reason or no reason at all when the termination
does not violate public policy or statutory right. (Id.) Hence, Plaintiffs Emotional Distress claims
lacked a reasonable basis in law and in fact, as there was no evidence to support prima facie elements
of Plaintiffs Emotional Distress claims. Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to an award of
attorney's fees relating to those claims under Idaho Code Section 12-117.
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B.

Defendant is the Prevailing Party in this Action and the Fees Requested are
Reasonable.
Whether a party is the "prevailing party" is left to the sound discretion of the court, with

consideration to "the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the
respective parties." I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l). Here, Defendant obtained dismissal of Plaintiffs entire
Amended Complaint through a motion for summary judgment, and thus achieved the relief sought
through defense of Plaintiffs allegations.
Once it is determined that a statute or rule authorizes an award of fees, and that the requesting
party is the prevailing party, the issue becomes the reasonableness of the amount of the attorney's
fees award. E.g., Sun Valley Potato Growers v. Texas Refinery, 139 Idaho 761,769 (2004). For that
purpose, Rule 54(e)(3) sets forth a number of factors the court should consider, including:
(A)
(B)
(C)
(D)
(E)
(F)
(G)
(H)
(I)
(J)
(K)
(L)

The time and labor required.
The novelty and difficulty of the questions.
The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the experience and ability
of the attorney in the particular field of law.
The prevailing charges for like work.
Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case.
The amount involved and the results obtained.
The undesirability of the case.
The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
Awards in similar cases.
The reasonable cost of automated legal research (Computer Assisted Legal
Research), if the court finds it was reasonably necessary in preparing a party's case.
Any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the particular case.

I.R.C.P .54(e)(3). No one factor is to be given more weight than any other. Elec. Wholesale Supply
Co. v. Nielson, 136 Idaho 814, 827 (2001). The court is required to consider the existence and

applicability of each factor, Nalen v. Jenkins, 113 Idaho 79,81 (Ct. App. 1987), but the rule does not
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require the court to state how it determined the amount of the award. As the Idaho Supreme Court
has stated:
When awarding attorney's fees, a district court must consider the applicable factors
set forth in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) and may consider any other factor that the court deems
appropriate. Rule 54(e)(3) does not require the district court to make specific
findings in the record, only to consider the stated factors in determining the amount
of the fees. When considering the factors, courts need not demonstrate how they
employed any of those factors in reaching an award amount. In addition, the court
need not specifically address all of the factors contained in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) in
writing, so long as the record clearly indicates that the court considered them all.
The record shows that in this case the district court considered all of the factors
listed in Rule 54(e)(3).

Parsons v. Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 143 Idaho 743, 747,152 P.3d 614,618 (2007) (emphasis
added, internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
In the current action, Idaho Code Sections 6-2107 and 12-11 7 provide the basis for this Court
to award attorney's fees to the prevailing party with respect to claims under the Whistleblower Act
and for emotional distress, such as Plaintiff alleged. Defendant is undoubtedly the prevailing party
in this case, as it was granted full summary judgment and the entirety of Plaintiffs Amended
Complaint was dismissed. Therefore, attorney's fees are appropriate for Defendant in this case.
The issue thus becomes the amount of fees to award. Defendant has incurred attorney's fees
in connection with filing a motion to dismiss, filing an Answer, conducting and responding to
extensive discovery, briefing and attending oral argument for discovery motions, conducting legal
research, briefing and attending oral argument for its motion for summary judgment, briefing and
participating in mediation, beginning trial preparation, and preparing the present materials regarding
costs and fees. In doing so, Plaintiff claims attorney's fees in the total sum of $123,054.50 (Affidavit
ofK.irtlan G. Naylor, ,r 2). Attorneys billed their time at $155.00 per hour. See Affidavit ofK.irtlan
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G. Naylor, ~ ~ 4-6. The total time claimed in connection with this litigation is as follows: Kirtlan
G. Naylor ("KGN") total of 242.2 hours (See Naylor Affidavit, ~7, Exh. A); Bruce J. Castleton
("BJC") total of221.8 hours (See Naylor Affidavit, ~7, Exh. B); Joan E. Callahan ("JEC") total of
329.9 hours (See Naylor Affidavit, ~7, Exh. C).
While the total amount claimed is reasonable and actually incurred, since the FMLA statutes
do not allow for a prevailing Defendant to be awarded attorney fees, this total should be reduced by
one-third to include fees associated with the Whistleblower Act claim and Emotional Distress
claims. When total fees of $123,054.50 are divided into three equal portions: Whistleblower Act,
FMLA, and Emotional Distress Claims, and then one-third representing the FMLA claim is
deducted, the remaining amount is $82,036.33. (Affidavit of Kirtlan G. Naylor,

~

2.) Therefore,

Defendant claims only this amount for the reasons set forth in this memo above.

C.

Alternative Fees Award for Time Spent After Plaintiff Should Have Reasonably
Dismissed the Lawsuit.
In the alternative to awarding two-thirds of the fees claimed throughout the course of this

action, Defendant would offer that it would be reasonable to award fees incurred after the briefing

-

for Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on October 10, 2014. The Whistleblower
Act contains a specific provision that allows a Plaintiff to avoid liability for the Defendant's
attorney's fees "if, after exercising reasonable and diligent efforts after filing a suit, the employee
files a voluntary dismissal concerning the employer, within a reasonable time after determining that
the employer would not be liable for damages." LC. § 6-2107 (emphasis added). Thus, the
Whistleblower Act emphasizes that a Defendant should be awarded attorney's fees for having to
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defend against a Plaintiffs futile Whistleblower Act claim when the Plaintiffreasonably should have
known the claim's futility.
While Defendant asserts the clear absence of a claim in law and fact should have been known
to Plaintiff at the outset of this matter, the fact that no predicate act required for the Whistleblower
Act claim and no duty owed by the Defendant should have been clearly known to Plaintiff on
October 10, 2014 when Defendant filed motion for summary judgment. As demonstrated in
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs Whistleblower Act claim lacked a basis in
law because the alleged acts did not fall within the scope of the Whistleblower Act. Further the lack
of the prima facie element of a duty for the Emotional Distress claims was made apparent at that
time. After considering Defendant's Memorandum, Plaintiffreasonably should have determined that
Defendant would not be liable for damages.
However, Plaintiff did not file a voluntary dismissal at that time. Rather, Plaintiff continued
to pursue those claims forcing Defendant to defend the claims through summary judgment briefing
and the mandatory court-ordered mediation process. Additionally, Defendant had to incur time and
fees in beginning to prepare for trial and for this briefing on costs and fees. Thus despite the futility
of the claims, Defendant had to incur additional attorney's fees in its continued defense against
Plaintiffs claims after Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment.
After filing its Motion for Summary Judgment on October 10, 2014, Defendant has incurred
attorney's fees in connection with reply briefing, supplemental briefing, and attending oral argument
on the motion, briefing and participating in mediation, trial preparation such as, preparing its list of
lay witnesses and preparing its trial strategy, and preparing the present materials regarding costs and
fees ..In doing so, Defendant has incurred attorney's fees in the total sum of $31,170.50. Affidavit
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ofKirtlan G. Naylor,~ 8. The total time claimed in connection with this litigation after Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment breaks down as follows: Kirtlan G. Naylor ("KGN") total of
46.5hours since October 10, 2014 (See Naylor Affidavit~ 8, Exh. A); Bruce J. Castleton ("BJC")
total of 41.5 hours since October 10, 2014 (See Naylor Affidavit~ 8, Exh. B); Joan E. Callahan
("JEC") total ofl 13.l hours since October 10, 2014 (See Naylor Affidavit~ 8, Exh. C). Reducing
this total claimed amount since October 10, 2014 by one-third to reflect the FMLA claim deduction
addressed above would result in a fees award to Defendant of $20,780.33 as an alternative to the
amount set forth above (Naylor Affidavit ~ 8).
In all, taking into account the factors set forth in Rule 54(e)(3 ), the amount of fees requested
in the amount of $82,036.33 for the course of this litigation is reasonable (excluding the FMLA
claim), as set forth in more detail in the Affidavit of Kirtlan G. Naylor, incorporated herein by
reference. In the alternative and taking into account the factors set forth in Rule 54(e)(3), the amount
of fees requested for post-summary judgment $20,780.33 (also excluding the FMLA claim) is
reasonable as well.
II. COSTS
As Defendant is the prevailing party in this matter, Defendant requests the Court order costs
against Plaintiff in the total amount of $5,539.212, including costs as a matter of right totaling
$4,154.96 and discretionary costs of $1,384.25. The costs are itemized below and supported by the
Affidavit ofK.irtlan G. Naylor and Exhibit D attached thereto.
A.

Costs as a Matter of Right Under Rule 54(d)(l)(C):

TOTAL

$4,154.96

These costs should not be reduced or portioned in any way because all these costs were
necessarily incurred in defense of any or all of the Plaintiffs claims.
2
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1.

Court filing fees:
Court filing fee for Ada County: $66.00
11.
Court filing fee for Utah /Foreign Subpoena: $35.00

$101.00

2.

Fees for service:
1.
T. Wilson: $50.00
11.
S. Ullman: $135.00 (Utah)
iii.
S. Ullman: $102.20 (Idaho May 2014)
lV.
S. Ullman: $61.80 (Idaho August 2014)

$349.00

3.

Witness fees and travel ex:genses for testimony at a de:gosition:
1.
Tim Wilson: $21.80

$21.80

4.

Re12orting and transcribing of de12ositions:
1.
February 10, 2014 - $207.50
Donna Dana
11.
February 11, 2014 - $882.50
Tim Wilson
Rich Wright
iii.
September 5, 2014 - $205.85
Rich Wright (Second deposition)

$1,295.85

5.

One co:gy of transcri12ts and exhibits for de12ositions:
S. Axtman: $158.40
1.
11.
T. Broome: $211.20
iii.
B. Calley & B. Lopeman: $328.81
lV.
D. Case: $578.60
V.
L. Maneely: $231.00
vi.
D. Oldham: $247.40
vii.
K. Paananen: $33.00
viii.
J. Tibbs: $270.60
lX.
R. Yzaguirre: $261.80
X.
Deposition Exhibits: $66.50

$2,387.31

1.

B.

Discretionary Costs Under Rule 54(d)(l)(D):

TOTAL: $1,384.25

The Court is allowed to award additional items of cost when those costs were necessary and
exceptional, were reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the
adverse party. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l )(D). Defendant is requesting only the following discretionary costs:
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1.
2.
3.

Mediation fees: $1,062.50
Rough Draft of Deposition D. Case: $197.25
Rough Draft of Deposition R. Wright: $124.50

Mediation took place after briefing and oral argument on Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment, which resulted in Plaintiffs claims being entirely dismissed. Also, mediation was required
by the Court to be conducted. Hence the cost of mediation was necessary and exceptional, reasonably
incurred, and in the interest of justice should be awarded as part of the Defendant's costs.
Rich Wright and Dave Case were the two primary subjects of the alleged conduct underlying
this case; thus, their testimony was critical evidence in evaluating and advancing this case.
Accordingly, the costs for rough drafts of their depositions were necessary and exceptional,
reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be awarded as part of the Defendant's costs.

III. CONCLUSION
Defendant respectfully requests the Court grant its attorney's fees claimed for the two-thirds
of the claims recoverable by Defendant in the amount of $82,036.33. Or, in the alternative, for the
legal work done after filing Defendant's motion for summary judgment when Plaintiffs futility in
advance those two claims was evident in the amount of$20, 780.33 as set forth above. Defendant also
respectfully requests the Court grant its costs as a matter of right in the amount of $4,154.96 and
discretionary costs of $1,384.25 for a total amount of costs $5,539.21
DATED this 16th day of January, 2015.
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 161h day of January, 2015, I caused to be served,
by the method(s) indicated, a true' and correct copy of the foregoing upon:
Eric S. Rossman
Erica S. Phillips
Kimberly L. Williams
Rossman Law Group, PLLC
737 N. 7thStreet
Boise, ID 83702

·x

__x_

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax Transmission: 342-2170
Email: erossman@rossmanlaw.com
ephillips@rossmanlaw.com
kwillliams@rossmanlaw.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff
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Kirtlan G. Naylor
[ISB No. 3569]
Bruce J. Castleton
[ISB No. 6915]
JAN 16 20\5
Joan E. Callahan
[ISB No. 9241]
CHRISTOPHER D. RICt-l, Clerk
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
By TENILLE RAD
Attorneys at Law
·
DEPUTY
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 610
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516
Email: kirt@naylorhales.com; bjc@naylorhales.com; jec@naylorhales.com
Attorneys for Defendant Ada County

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,

_.

Case No. CV-OC-13-02730
Plaintiff,
vs.

ADA COUNTY, political subdivision of the
State ofldaho; ADA COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS

AFFIDAVIT OF KIRTLAN G. NAYLOR
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES

County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

KIRTLAN G. NAYLOR, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says as follows:
1.

C.!)

a:

0

a

Defendants.
STATE OF IDAHO

c:t
2

I am one of the attorneys of record for Defendant in the above- entitled action, and

as such I have personal knowledge of the attorney's fees and costs described in the accompanying
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney's Fees and attest to the accuracy as reported therein.
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2.

Counsels' claimed fees are in the total amount of $123,054.50, but the only fees

Defendant claims the Court award represent fees associated with the Whistleblower Act claim and
Emotional Distress claims. When total fees of $123,054.50 are divided into three equal portions:
Whistleblower Act, FMLA, and Emotional Distress Claims, and then one-third representing the
FMLA claim is deducted, the remaining amount is $82,036.33. These attorney's fees amounts are
supported by true and accurate copies of the fees itemizations attached hereto as Exhibits A, B, and
C.

3.

The attorney's fees set forth therein were reasonably and necessarily incurred in fully

litigating this case on the Whistleblower Act claim and the Intentional and/or Negligent Infliction
of Emotional Distress claims, including filing a motion to dismiss, filing an Answer, conducting and
responding to extensive discovery, briefing and attending oral argument for discovery motions,
conducting legal research, briefing and attending oral argument for its motion. for summary
judgment, briefing and participating in mediation, beginning trial preparation, and preparing the
present materials regarding costs and fees.
4.

I billed an hourly rate of$155.00 in this matter. I have practiced law since 1986, and

have prior experience in these types of matters. I am familiar with the prevailing charges for like
work, and my hourly rate for the work performed is significantly lower than what other similarly
situated attorneys would likely charge. Thus, I believe the hourly rate charged here is reasonable.
A true and correct copy of the fees itemization for me are attached hereto as Exhibit A.
5.

Attorney Bruce J. Castleton billed an hourly rate of $155.00 in this matter. He has

practiced law since 2004, and has prior experience in these types of matters. Attorney B. Castleton' s
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hourly rate for the work performed is significantly lower than what other similarly situated attorneys
would likely charge. Thus, I believe the hourly rate charged here is reasonable. A true and correct
copy of the fees itemization for Attorney B. Castleton are attached hereto as Exhibit B.
6.

Attorney Joan E. Callahan billed an hourly rate of $155.00 in this matter. She has
.
.
practiced law since 2013, and has prior experience in these types of matters. Attorney J. Callahan's
hourly rate for the work performed is significantly lower than what other similarly situated attorneys
would likely charge. Thus, I believe the hourly rate charged here is reasonable. A true and correct
copy of the fees itemization for Attorney J. Callahan are attached hereto as Exhibit C.
7.

The time and labor claimed for this case is fairly and accurately reflected in, and is

proportionate to, the total 793.9 hours incurred in the amount $123,054.50. The total time claimed
in connection with this litigation is as follows: Kirtlan G. Naylor ("KGN") billed a total of 242.2
hours (See Exh. A); Bruce J. Castleton ("BJC") billed a total of 221.8 hours (See Exh. B); Joan E.
Callahan ("JEC") billed a total of 329.9 hours (See Exh. C).
8.

I

The time and labor claimed for this case after Defendant filed its Motion for Summary

Judgment on October 10, 2014 is fair and accurately reflectd in the attached exhibits, and is
proportionate to the 201.1 hours incurred. After filing its Motiojfor Summary Judgment on October
'

\

10, 2014, Defendant has incurred attorney fees in connection with reply briefing, supplemental
briefing, and attending oral argument on the motion, briefing and attending mediation and trial
preparation such as, preparing its list of lay witnesses and preparing its trial strategy, and preparing
the present materials regarding costs and fees. In doing so, Defendant has incurred attorney's fees
in the total sum of $31,170.50. The total time claimed in connection with this litigation after
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Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment breaks down as follows: Kirtlan G. Naylor ("KGN")
total of 46.Shours since October 10, 2014 (See Exh. A); Bruce J. Castleton ("BJC") total of 41.5
hours since October 10, 2014 (See Exh. B); Joan E. Callahan ("JEC") total of 113.l hours since
October 10, 2014 (See Exh. C). Reducing this total claimed amount since October 10, 2014 byonethird to reflect the FMLA claim deduction addressed above would result in a fees award to
Defendant of $20,780.33.
9.

The hours reflected in the Memorandum of Costs and Attorney's Fees pertaining to

work performed in fully defending this matter on just the Whistleblower Act claim and the Negligent
and/or Intentional Inflictions of Emotional Distress claims, include filing a motion to dismiss, filing
an Answer, responding to extensive discovery, briefing and attending oral argument for discovery
motions, conducting legal research, briefing and attending oral argument for its motion for summary
judgment, briefing and participating in mediation, beginning trial preparation, and preparing the
present materials regarding costs and fees. The hours reflected in the Memorandum of Costs and
Attorney's Fees pertaining to work performed in defending this matter on the Whistleblower Act
claim and the Negligent and/or Intentional Inflictions of Emotional Distress claims after filing for
summary judgment, include reply briefing, supplemental briefing, and attending oral argument on
the motion, briefing and participating in mediation, trial preparation such as, preparing its list of lay
witnesses and preparing its trial strategy, and preparing the present materials regarding costs and
fees.
10.

I, along with the above-mentioned attorneys have previous experience dealing in

employment and Whistleblower Act matters, and therefore have the requisite knowledge and legal
experience to properly prosecute this matter.
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11.

As indicated above, the hourly rates charged are more than reasonable given that

many local attorneys with similar experience charge significantly more per hour for similar work.
Defendant thus benefitted from having the undersigned represent it in this matter.
12.

The fees in this case were hourly, which were paid through monthly billings.

13.

It is my opinion that the total amount of attorney's fees and costs reflected

Defendant's Memorandum of Fees is reasonable and were necessarily incurred in defending
Defendant's interests in this action.
14.

Counsels' costs are in the total amount of $5,539.21, including costs as a matter of

right totaling $4,154.96 and discretionary costs of $1,384.25. A true and correct copy of the costs
itemization is attached hereto as Exhibit D.
15.
That to the best of my knowledge and belief the following items of costs have been
necessarily incurred.
16.

The items of costs are set forth as costs of right under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C).

17.
That pursuant to Rule 54(d)(l)(C), I.R.C.P., Defendant Ada County incurred the
following $4,154.96 costs as a matter ofright:

a.

Court filing fees:
1.
Court filing fee for Ada County: $66.00
11.
Court filing fee for Utah /Foreign Subpoena: $35.00

$101.00

b.

,Fees for service:
1.
T. Wilson: $50.00
11.
S. Ullman: $135.00 (Utah)
S. Ullman: $102.20 (Idaho May 2014)
111.
IV.
S. Ullman: $61.80 (Idaho August 2014)

$349.00

C.

Witness fees and travel expenses for testimony at a deposition:
1.
Tim Wilson: $21.80

$21.80

d.

Reporting and transcribing of depositions:
1.
February 10, 2014 - $207.50

$1,295.85
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11.

m.

e.

Donna Dana
February 11, 2014 - $882.50
Tim Wilson
Rich Wright
September 5, 2014 - $205.85
Rich Wright (Second deposition)

One cony of transcrints and exhibits for denositions:
S. Axtman: $158.40
11.
T. Broome: $211.20
B. Calley & B. Lopeman: $328.81
111.
IV.
D. Case: $578.60
v.
L. Maneely: $231.00
VI.
D. Oldham: $247.40
VII.
K. Paananen: $33.00
Vlll.
J. Tibbs: $270.60
IX.
R. Yzaguirre: $261.80
X.
Deposition Exhibits: $66.50

$2,387.31

1.

18.

That pursuant to Rule 54(d)(l)(D), I.R.C.P., Defendant Ada County incurred the

following $1,384.25 discretionary costs:
a.
b.
c.

Mediation fees: $1,062.50
Rough Draft of Deposition D. Case: $197.25
Rough Draft of Deposition R. Wright: $124.50

Residing at Ada County, ldah°/J./
Commission Expires:

811
••
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 161h day of January, 2015, I caused to be served, by the
method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon:
Eric S. Rossman
Erica S. Phillips
Kimberly L. Williams
Rossman Law Group, PLLC
737 N. 7thStreet
Boise, ID 83702
Attorneys for Plaintiff

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
_:1.. Fax Transmission: 342-2170
_x_ Email: erossman@rossmanlaw.com
ephillips@rossmanlaw.com
kwillliams@rossmanlaw.com

8745_59 Defs AffRe Memo of Costs Fees FINAL.wpd
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Wright v. Ada County
Ada County Case No. 13-02730
Slip Value Description
Analyze complaint; prepare for and attend

Date

ATIY

Time

Rate

2/15/2013

KGN

2.40

$155.00

$372.00

Director.

2/18/2013 'KGN
2/20/2013 KGN

0.90

$155.00
$155.00

$139.50
$62.00

Analyze legal theories and issues re: defenses.
Analyze factual documents.

factual meeting w/clients; interview HR

0.40

Prepare for and interview county elected
officials and employees and investigate
documents re: complaint allegations and facts.

2/25/2013

KGN

10.20 $155.00

2/27/2013

KGN

1.20

$155.00

$186.00

3/1/2013

KGN

0.40

$155.00

$62.00

T/call w/Atty Argyle and analyze case strategy.
Analyze county documents re: follow up

3/25/2013

KGN

0.70

$155.00

$108.50

interviews.

4/1/2013

KGN

0.80

$155.00

$124.00

Review documents and prepare for interviews.

$1,581.00

Review draft motion; t/call w/Atty Argyle;
review county documents.

Prepare for and interview witnesses; mtg
w/Atty Argyle, D. Case; research case law re:

WBA.
Research legal defenses and revise motion to
dismiss pleading and research memo re:
strategy.
Analyze case strategy.
T/call w/Atty McCarthy.
Review fact inverviews and documents.
T/call w/Atty Argyle and draft pleading;
research legal issues and defenses.
Review and revise discovery requests and

4/2/2013

KGN

4.60

$155.00

$713.00

4/8/2013

0.20

$155.00

$31.00

0.30

$46.50

0.60

$155.00
$155.00

4/30/2013

KGN
KGN
KGN
KGN

0.70

$155.00

$108.50

5/28/2013

KGN

0.80

$155.00

$124.00

6/6/2013

KGN

1.30

$155.00

$201.50

review documents.
Analyze and draft discovery responses;

6/19/2013

KGN

2.80

$155.00

$434.00

research documents and facts re: same.
Analyze discovery issues and documents for

6/21/2013

KGN

1.70

$155.00

$263.50

response.

6/22/2013

KGN

2.20

4/10/2013
4/12/2013

$93.00

Research documents and revise discovery

$155.00

$341.00

responses.
T/calls w/witnesses and Atty McCarthy; review
documents; revise discovery responses.

KGN

1.90

$155.00

$294.50

6/25/2013 . KGN
7/19/2013 KGN

0.70

$155.00

1.70

$155.00

$108.50
$263.50

and revise discovery responses.
Review research and pleadings.

KGN

3.60

$155.00

$558.00

Prepare for and attend court hearing; review
pleadings and legal research; mtg w/clients.

6/24/2013

Communicate w/clients and review documents

7/22/2013
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$155.00
$155.00

$201.50
$93.00

Legal research.
Analyze court decision and draft email.

$108.50

Analyze case strategy and legal issues.
Analyze discovery and motion to compel issues

0.40

$155.00
$155.00

$108.50
$62.00

and documents.
Analyze trial setting issues and discovery.
Analyze discovery, deposition and trial issues

KGN

0.50

$155.00

$77.50

KGN

1.60

$155.00

$248.00

and case analysis and email clients.
T/call w/Atty McCarthy; analyze discovery and
trial issues; review witness statements.
T/interviews w/Comm Tibbs, Case and
Yzaguirre; t/call w/Atty Williams re: trial and
depositions; review discovery issues and
documents.

7/23/2013
7/25/2013

KGN
KGN

1.30
0.60

7/30/2013

KGN

0.70

8/27/2013

KGN

0.70

9/9/2013

KGN

9/18/2013
9/19/2013

$155.00

9/20/2013

KGN

2.70

$155.00

$418.50

9/26/2013

KGN

1.90

$155.00

$294.50

10/2/2013

KGN
KGN

1.10
0.30

$155.00
$155.00

$170.50
$46.50

10/17/2013 KGN

1.20

$155.00

$186.00

10/28/2013 KGN

0.80

$155.00

$124.00

10/29/2013 KGN

1.60

$155.00

$248.00

10/31/2013 KGN

1.90

$155.00

$294.50

11/4/2013
11/5/2013

KGN
KGN

2.30
0.70

$155.00
$155.00

$356.50
$108.50

11/7/2013

KGN

2.80

$155.00

$434.00

11/11/2013 KGN
11/13/2013 KGN
11/13/2013 KGN

0.80
0.40
0.80

$155.00
$155.00
$155.00

$124.00
$62.00
$124.00

11/14/2013 KGN

0.50

$155.00

$77.50

KGN
KGN
KGN
KGN

1.80
1.10
0.50
0.30

$155.00
$155.00
$155.00
$155.00

$279.00
$170.50
$77.50
$46.50

10/7/2013

11/15/2013
11/19/2013
11/27/2013
12/5/2013

Prepare for and mtg w/Comm. Case; review
discovery documents.
Emails w/Atty Williams re: trial and documents
related to reorganization; case strategy re:
discovery.
Review discovery issues and trial pleadings.
T/call w/Comm. Case and review strategy;
draft demand for supplementation re: Chris
Rich letter.
T/call w/D. Case; draft demand to Plaintiff and
draft supplemental discovery.
Analyze emails and legal issues re: discovery
dispute and draft emails.
T/calls w/Comm. Case; review discovery
documents; analyze case strategy re:
employee matters.
T/interviews w/B. Calley and Atty McCarthy;
review documents and case law.
T/call w/Atty Argyle.
Prepare for and mtg w/BOCC and Atty Argyle;
follow up investigation; outline motion to
compel and documents.
Revise motion to compel and research
documents and case law.
Analyze fact issues; interview C. Rich.
Analyze fact issues; in~erview P. McGrane.
T/call w/Atty Argyle and research facts for
discovery.
Prepare for and t/interview w/ witness; draft
interview report.
T/call w/Atty Argyle.
Analyze legal research.
T/call w/Atty Argyle and D. Case.
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T/call w/Atty Argyle; email to Atty Williams;
review and analyze response brief.

KGN

0.90

$155.00

$139.50

12/11/2013 KGN

4.80

$155.00

$744.00

12/16/2013 KGN

2.80

$155.00

$434.00

12/16/2013 KGN
12/17/2013 KGN

1.70
0.40

$155.00
$155.00

$263.50
$62.00

w/Comm. Case and w/BOCC.
Analyze court decision.
Review Tibbs and some of Yzygarrie taped
conversations.

12/9/2013

12/23/2013 KGN
12/27/2013 KGN

1.60
0.60

$155.00
$155.00

$248.00
$93.00

1/7/2014

KGN

1.40

1/8/2014
1/10/2014

KGN
KGN

0.80
0.40

$155.00
$155.00
$155.00

$217.00
$124.00

1/14/2014

KGN

2.80

$155.00

$434.00

1/23/2014

KGN

1.70

$155.00

$263.50

1/24/2014

KGN

1.10

$155.00

$170.50

$62.00

1/25/2014

KGN

1.40

$155.00

$217.00

1/27/2014

KGN

9.60

$155.00

$1,488.00

1/28/2014

KGN

2.30

$155.00

$356.50

1/29/2014
1/30/2014
1/31/2014

KGN
KGN
KGN

3.40
0.80
0.40

$155.00
$155.00
$155.00

$527.00
$124.00
$62.00

2/3/2014

KGN

1.30

$155.00

$201.50

2/6/2014

2/8/2014

2/10/2014

KGN

KGN

KGN

2.80

2.30

$155.00

$155.00

13.30 $155.00

Legal research and draft discovery reply brief.
Review pleadings and prepare for and attend
court hearing.
T/call w/Atty McArthy; interview witness; mtg

Review pleadings and draft report to clients.
Review documents; t/interview witness and
draft emails re: depositions.
Review discovery issues and documents.
Review discovery and deposition issues.
Review documents and prepare for and
meeting w/BOCC; t/call w/Atty Williams.
Review documents for deposition prep; draft
notices; review investigation notes.
Analyze witness statements and prepare for
depositions.
Analyze witness statements, documents and
prepare for deposition meetings.
Prepare for and mtg w/witnesses for
depositions.
T/interview w/B. Calley; analyze factual issues
and documents; produce documents and
emails; research facts re: investigations.
T/interviews witnesses; investigate facts and
details; draft emails w/counsel re: depositions;
analyze correspondence.
Deposition prep.
Deposition planning and prep.
T/call w/B. Calley; prepare documents for
deposition.
T/interview w/Comm. Case; analyze

$434.00

documents; draft supplemental discovery;
draft RFA's responses and emails; prepare for
depositions.

$356.50

Revise RFAs; t/call w/Comm. Case; analyze
discovery dispute; prepare for depositions;
review witness statements.

$2,061.50

Prepare for and attend depositions; mtgs
w/clients; prepare exhibits and deposition of
Plaintiff and T. Wilson.
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Prepare for and attend depositions; mtg
2/11/2014

KGN

11.80 $155.00

$1,829.00

w/clients and witnesses re: depositions.

2/12/2014

KGN

10.30 $155.00

$1,596.50

Prepare for and attend depositions.

2/13/2014

KGN

9.70

$155.00

$1,503.50

2/14/2014

KGN

4.40

$155.00

$682.00

Prepare for and attend deposition of D. Case;
mtg w/clients; prepare for Axtman depositon.
Prepare for and attend S. Axtman deposition;
mtg w/clients; strategize motion to compel
response.

2/19/2014

KGN

a.so

$155.00

$77.50

Analyze strategy and issues re: motion to
compel.
Draft correspondence and review documents

3/24/2014

4/1/2014

KGN

KGN

0.70

2.20

$155.00

$155.00

$108.50

re: depositions, S. Ullman and discovery
responses.

$341.00

Mtg w/and prepare for depositions of B.
Lopeman and B. Calley; t/interview w/ witness;
analyze case strategy re: discovery.

4/2/2014

KGN

6.30

$155.00

$976.50

4/7/2014
4/15/2014
4/29/2014
5/12/2014
5/15/2014

KGN
KGN
KGN
KGN
KGN

1.60
0.40

$248.00
$62.00

0.4Q
0.80
0.40

$155.00
$155.00
$155.00
$155.00
$155.00

Prepare for and attend depositions of B.
Lopeman and B. Calley; mtg w/clients; review
subpoena motion and analyze strategy.
T/interviews w/Atty Argyle, D. Case and
witness re: facts and case strategy; analyze
discovery issues.
T/call w/ witnesses.

$62.00
$124.00
$62.00

T/call w/Atty Walker.
Prepare for and mtg w/BOCC.
Review Ullman issues and emails.

5/21/2014
5/22/2014
6/4/2014

KGN
KGN
KGN

0.60
0.40
0.30

$155.00
$155.00
$155.00

$93.00
$62.00
$46.50

6/16/2014

KGN

0.60

$155.00

$93.00

6/17/2014

KGN

0.80

$155.00

$124.00

T/call w/Atty Dickinson; draft email to clients.
Draft client report.
T/call w/Atty Williams and review dismissal.
Analyze defenses re: amended complaint and
legal issues.
T/calls w/Attys McArthy and Williams re:
motion to admend and strategy; review legal
standards.

6/24/2014 KGN

2.30

6/25/2014 KGN

0.90

KGN

1.80

7/9/2014

$155.00

$155.00

$155.00

$356.50

Review Wright deposition; legal analysis and
research; prepare for and attend mtg w/BOCC.
Draft email re: amended pleadings; review
revised amended pleadings and stipulation;

$139.50

follow up on Ullman deposition; t/call to
Ullman.

$279.00

Analyze factual issues and review documents
and revise answer to amended complaint.
EXHIBIT A

000337

Wright v. Ada County
Ada County Case No. 13-02730
Revise answer to complaint; analyze
7/10/2014

KGN

0.80

$155.00

$124.00

depositions issues.
Research Ullman information and
communicate w/Utah re: service; draft Idaho

KGN

0.80

$155.00

$124.00

7/17/2014

KGN

0.60

$155.00

$93.00

pleadings.
Follow up deposition issues.
T/call w/Atty Walker; review documents and

7/22/2014

0.60

8/14/2014

KGN
KGN

$93.00
$62.00

analyze case strategy.
Analyze deposition matters.

10/6/2014

KGN

0.70
1.60

$155.00
$155.00
$155.00
$155.00

$108.50
$248.00

Analyze damages reports and documents.
Review MSJ pleadings and revise.

7/14/2014

10/8/2014 KGN

0.40

T/calls w/Judge Stegner re: mediation; draft
emails to clients and Atty Williams; revise MSJ
KGN

2.40

$155.00

$372.00

10/10/2014 KGN

2.60

$155.00

$403.00

10/16/2014 KGN
10/28/2014 KGN

1.80
0.40

$155.00
$155.00

$279.00
$62.00

10/30/2014 KGN

1.80

$155.00

$279.00

KGN
KGN

1.10
1.10

$155.00
$155.00

$170.50
$170.50

11/6/2014 KGN
11/7/2014 KGN
11/10/2014 KGN

2.70
4.60
1.80

$155.00
$155.00
$155.00

$418.50
$713.00
$279.00

KGN
KGN
KGN
KGN

2.60
0.70
1.70
9.30

$155.00
$155.00
$155.00
$155.00

$403.00
$108.50
$263.50
$1,441.50

11/25/2014 KGN
11/26/2014 KGN
12/2/2014 KGN

1.10

$155.00

$170.50

0.60
0.40

$155.00
$155.00

$93.00
$62.00

12/4/2014 KGN

0.60

$155.00

$93.00

1/5/2015

KGN

1.70

$155.00

$263.50

1/6/2015

KGN

3.30

$155.00

$511.50

10/9/2014

11/3/2014
11/5/2014

11/18/2014
11/20/2014
11/21/2014
11/24/2014

pleadings.
Review case law, documents and revise and
final MSJ pleadings; t/calls and emails w/Atty
Williams re: hearing and mediation.
Analyze expert reports and information; t/call
w/Atty Argyle; t/call w/Judge Schilling.
T/interview w/Atty B. Miller.
Review document records, exhibits and
response brief and revise MSJ pleadings.
Prepare for and mtg w/clients and review MSJ
issues.
Review MSJ pleadings and case law.
Research case law and prepare for MSJ
hearing.
Prepare for and attend MSJ hearing.
Prepare for and mtg w/BOCC.
Revise mediation statement and draft and
analyze supplemental briefing re: MSJ.
T/call w/Atty Argyle.
Prepare for and review document.
Prepare for and attend mediation.
Analyze case strategy and research facts re:
trial issues and jury instructions; t/call w/Atty
Argyle.
Analyze legal issues and strategy.
T/call w/Atty Squires.
Analyze witness list issues and salary history.
Analyze court decision, legal issues and
strategy; draft emails to clients.
Analyze case strategy; legal research; prepare
for and mtg w/clients; t/call w/Atty Williams
re: case resolution.
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Draft emails w/Atty Williams and clients;
1/9/2015

KGN

0.70

$155.00

$108.50

review legal issues.
Research case law and revise pleadings re:

1/12/2015

KGN

1.90

$155.00

$294.50

costs/fees.
Analyze records: revise pleadings re:

1/13/2015

KGN

6.60

$155.00

$1,023.00

costs/fees.
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Date
2/19/2013
2/25/2013

ATIY

Time

Rate

Slip Value

Description

BJC

1.20

$155.00

$186.00

Review Complaint; analyze case.

$139.50

Analyze case re: factual issues, allegations;
research pleading issues.

BJC

0.90

$155.00

Analyze case facts; draft motion to dismiss,
memo in support; research jurisdiction,
dismissal issues; research Ravenscroft case,
judicial review.

2/26/2013

BJC

2.90

$155.00

$449.50

3/1/2013

BJC

0.40

$155.00

$62.00

3/5/2013

BJC

a.so

$155.00

$77.50

in support.

3/11/2013

BJC

0.40

$155.00

$62.00

Analyze case re: motion to dismiss hearing.

4/3/2013

BJC

0.60

$155.00

$93.00

Analyze file re: legal issues.

Analyze case re: motion to dismiss, filing.
Revise and finalize motion to dismiss, memo

Analyze Plaintiff's opposition memo re:
motion to dismiss; analyze legal issues re:
4/8/2013

BJC

2.90

$155.00

$449.50

opposition memo; research judicial review
issues; draft reply memo.
Analyze case re: legal issues; analyze case
re: motion to dismiss oral argument issues.
Analyze case and legal defenses.

BJC
BJC

1.10
0.60

$155.00
$155.00

$170.50
$93.00

4/11/2013

BJC

$77.50

BJC
BJC

a.so
a.so

$155.00

5/15/2013
5/20/2013

0.40

$155.00
$155.00

$77.50
$62.00

Analyze case re: case issues.
Analyze file re: legal issues and discovery.
Review file re: judge assignment issues.

5/22/2013

BJC

0.40

$155.00

$62.00

Analyze case re: judge assignment issues.

4/9/2013
4/10/2013

Review file re: discovery requests,
responses; begin drafting first set of
5/24/2013

BJC

0.70

$155.00

$108.50

discovery requests to Plaintiff.

5/28/2013

BJC

1.30

$155.00

$201.50

Finish drafting discovery requests; analyze
file re: discovery issues.

5/29/2013

BJC

a.so

$155.00

6/6/2013

BJC

0.80

$155.00

$77.50
$124.00

6/18/2013

BJC

a.so

$155.00

$77.50

6/19/2013

BJC

0.90

$155.00

$139.50

discovery issues.

6/24/2013

BJC

a.so

$155.00

$77.50

Analyze case re: documents, case issues.

$372.00

Draft discovery responses; analyze file re:
documents for discovery production.

Analyze file re: discovery.
Revise discovery requests.
Analzye case re: discovery requests and
responses.
Draft supplemental memo; analyze case re:

6/25/2013

BJC

2.40

$155.00

Analyze discovery responses, documents;
6/26/2013

BJC

0.80

$155.00

$124.00

analyze supplemental brief from plaintiff.
Analyze file re: document production; t/call

7/19/2013

7/22/2013

BJC

BJC

0.60

2.60

$155.00

$155.00

w/ H. Mccarthey.
Analyze case re: hearing issues; attend

$93.00

$403.00

hearing on motion to dismiss; meet w/ Atty
Mccarthey.
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Analyze decision on motion to dismiss.

7/25/2013

BJC

0.50

$155.00

$77.50

7/30/2013

BJC

0.80

$155.00

$124.00

Analyze case re: liability issue.
Analyze case re: scheduling order, case
issues.

8/1/2013

BJC

0.50

$155.00

$77.50

8/6/2013

BJC

0.80

$155.00

$124.00

Analyze discovery supplementation; analyze
case re: discovery issues.
Meet w/ D. Case and Atty Argyle re: case
issues; analyze case re: witness issues;

8/8/2013

BJC

2.80

$155.00

$434.00

review file re: witness issues.

8/9/2013

BJC

0.90

$155.00

$139.50

Analyze case re: discovery, MSJ issues.

8/16/2013

BJC

1.40

$155.00

Analyze case re: discovery, production
$217.00

issues.
Review file re: discovery responses, meet

8/27/2013

BJC

1.40

$155.00

$217.00

and confer letter.
Analyze file re: discovery supplement; t/call

8/28/2013

BJC

1.30

$155.00

$201.50

8/29/2013

BJC

0.50

$155.00

$77.50

issues.

$124.00

Analyze file re: supplemented responses,
documents.

8/30/2013

BJC

0.80

$155.00

w/ D. Case; t/call w/ J. Tibbs.
Analyze case re: discovey supplementation

Begin drafting supplemented discovery
responses; analyze file re: discovery
9/2/2013

BJC

1.10

$155.00

$170.50

responses.
Review documents from Ada County; finish
drafting supplemental discovery responses;
draft letter to Atty Williams re: discovery;

4.40

$155.00

analyze case re: discovery issues.

9/3/2013
9/4/2013

BJC
BJC

0.50

$155.00

$77.50

Analyze case re: scheduling issues.

9/9/2013

BJC

0.50

$155.00

$77.50

Review case re: trial dates, depositions.

9/13/2013

BJC

0.50

$155.00

$77.50

Review case re: depositions and scheduling.

9/17/2013

BJC

1.30

$155.00

$201.50

$682.00

Draft second supplemented discovery
responses; analyze case documents.
Analyze case re: discovery issues; review file
re: deposition and discovery documents;

BJC
9/19/2013 BJC
9/18/2013

1.20
0.60

$155.00
$155.00

$186.00
$93.00

analyze case re: scheduling and trial issues.
Analyze case re: depositions, scheduling.
Analyze case re: scheduling stipulation

9/23/2013

BJC

0.80

$155.00

$124.00

issues; revise and finalize second
supplemental discovery responses.
Draft responses to second set of discovery
from plaintiffs; analyze documents re:

9/25/2013
9/26/2013

BJC
BJC

0.80
1.20

$155.00
$155.00

$124.00
$186.00

discovery requests.
Meet w/ D. Case.
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BJC

0.50

$155.00

$77.50

Analyze case re: scheduling, discovery issue.

10/18/2013 BJC
10/19/2013 BJC

0.60

$155.00

$93.00

Review file re: documents, discovery
verification.

0.40

$155.00

$62.00

Review case re: discovery issues.

10/21/2013 BJC
10/28/2013 BJC

0.40

$155.00

$62.00

Review file re: discovery issues.

0.40

$155.00

$62.00

10/2/2013

Analyze case re: discovery issues.
Analyze new discovery request;

10/29/2013 BJC
10/30/2013 BJC

0.70

$155.00

$108.50

correspondence w/ Atty McCarthy.

0.80

$155.00

$124.00

Review file re: discovery items.

10/31/2013 BJC

0.80

$155.00

$124.00

Analyze case re: discovery issues.

11/4/2013

BJC

1.60

$155.00

$248.00

T/call w/ Atty McCarthy; analyze case re:
discovery items.

11/5/2013

BJC

1.60

$155.00

$248.00

discovery; analyze case matters.
Meet w/ county commissioners; analyze

11/7/2013

BJC

1.90

$155.00

$294.50

case re: discovery, case items.

11/11/2013 BJC

0.90

$155.00

$139.50

issues.
Draft response to third set of requests for

11/12/2013 BJC

0.50

$155.00

$77.50

production; analyze case re: documents.
Analyze case re: new discovery, motion to

12/11/2013 BJC
1/6/2014 BJC
1/8/2014 BJC
1/9/2014 BJC

0.70
0.50

$155.00
$155.00

$108.50
$77.50

compel.
Review case re: discovery issues.

0.70
0.80

$155.00
$155.00

$108.50
$124.00

Review file re: discovery items.
Review case re: discovery issues.

T/call w/ Atty Argyle; analyze case re:

Review motion to compel memo, discovery

compel issues; review memo on motion to

Review file re: deposition, discovery items.

1/10/2014

BJC

0.50

$155.00

$77.50

1/17/2014

0.80

$155.00

$124.00

1/20/2014

BJC
BJC

0.50

$155.00

$77.50

Analyze case re: discovery items.

1/21/2014

BJC

0.60

$155.00

$93.00

Draft responses to fourth set of requests for
production; analyze case re: discovery.

1/22/2014

BJC

0.40

$155.00

$62.00

Plaintiff.

Analyze discovery requests, issues.

Review meet and confer letter from
Analyze letter from Atty Williams re: meet
and confer; draft response letter; analyze
case re: evidence issues.

1/23/2014

BJC

1.40

$155.00

$217.00

1/24/2014

BJC

0.70

$155.00

$108.50

1/27/2014

BJC

8.40

$155.00

$1,302.00

1/30/2014

BJC

0.40

$155.00 .

$62.00

Draft witness subpoena; analyze case re:
fees.

2/4/2014

BJC

0.60

$155.00

$93.00

Analyze case re: deposition issues.

T/call w/ D. Case; analyze case re:
depositions, discovery responses.
Prepare for witness interviews; attend
witness interviews.
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Review case re: deposition, discovery items;
analyze documents; analyze case re: motion
2/6/2014

BJC

0.90

$155.00

$139.50

to compel.
Analyze case re: deposition issues; review

2/7/2014

BJC

2.10

$155.00

$325.50

file re: deposition documents.
Meet w/ D. Case re: discovery items;
analyze case re: documents, discovery
supplementation; analyze documents

BJC

2/10/2014

2.40

$155.00

$372.00

produced.
Attend Wright, Wilson depositions; analyze
case issues re: facts, depositions,

BJC

2/11/2014

6.10

$155.00

$945.50

documents.
Analyze case re: deposition, document

BJC

2/12/2014

0.80

$155.00

$124.00

issues.
Analyze case re: documents, motion to

BJC

2/14/2014

0.90

$155.00

$139.50

compel.
T/call w/ B. Lopeman re: affidavit; analyze
case re: motion to compel issues; draft

BJC

2/19/2014

1.30

$155.00

$201.50

Lopeman affidavit.
Review case re: Lopeman affidavit; draft

:

2/20/2014

Castleton affidavit for motion to compel
BJC

2.70

$155.00

$418.50

response; analyze file re: motion to compel
issues; review Case deposition transcript.
Draft BJC affidavit for motion to compel;
draft memo in opposition to motion to

2/21/2014

BJC

2.10

$155.00

$325.50

compel.
Analyze case re: discovery, motion to

2/24/2014

BJC

0.80

$155.00

$124.00

compel issues.

2/25/2014

BJC

0.70

$155.00

$108.50

Review file re: motion to compel issues.
Draft responses to Plaintiff's sixth set of
requests for production.
Correspondence w/ Atty Williams re:

2/26/2014

BJC

0.50

$155.00

$77.50

3/10/2014

BJC

0.80

$155.00

$124.00

3/11/2014

BJC

0.50

$155.00

$77.50

Analyze case re: depositions, discovery.

3/18/2014

BJC

0.60

$155.00

$93.00

Review case re: new discovery requests.

depositions; analyze case re: additional
depositions.

Review case re: new discovery requests;
analyze case re: out-of-state subpoena,
3/20/2014
3/21/2014

BJC
BJC

0.90
1.20

$155.00
$155.00

$139.50

deposition issues.

$186.00

Analyze case re: Ullman deposition; review
file re: documents produced.
Review case re: discovery requests; analyze
supplemented discovery from Plaintiff;

3/24/2014
3/31/2014

BJC
BJC

1.20
0.60

$155.00
$155.00

$186.00

analyze case re: depositions.

$93.00

Review case re: motion for email
subpoenas.
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4/1/2014

4/2/2014

BJC

BJC

0.50

1.40

$155.00

Review file re: discovery responses.

$77.50

$155.00

•

Analyze case re: motion for subpoena;

$217.00

motion.

correspondence w/ Atty Williams re:
Analyze case re: discovery requests; revise
and finalize correspondence to Atty
Williams re: subpoenas; review file re:

4/3/2014

BJC

0.80

$155.00

$124.00

document production.
Analyze case re: discovery issue; t/call w/

4/4/2014

BJC

1.90

$155.00

$294.50

Atty Argyle.

4/7/2014

BJC

0.70

$155.00

$108.50

Analyze case re: discovery items.
Review seventh set of requests for
production; t/call w/ D. Dana re: case

4/8/2014

BJC

0.80

$155.00

$124.00

issues.

4/11/2014

BJC

0.80

$155.00

$124.00

Review case re: subpoenas, stipulation.

4/14/2014

BJC

0.60

$155.00

Review file re: discovery issues; t/call w/ B
Calley.

$93.00

Review documents from Ada County; begin
drafting responses to 7th set of requests for
4/16/2014

BJC

1.40

$155.00

$217.00

production; review case re: documentation.
Begin drafting discovery responses; analyze

4/17/2014

BJC

1.40

$155.00

$217.00

documentation re: discovery.
Finish drafting responses to discovery
requests; analyze documentation re:

4/18/2014

BJC

1.90

$155.00

$294.50

4/28/2014

BJC

1.20

$155.00

$186.00

discovery; correspondence w/ Atty Williams
re: discovery.
Review case re: subpoenas, factual issues.
Analyze case re: requests for production,
documents; t/call w/ Atty Argyle.

5/5/2014

BJC

0.90

$155.00

$139.50

5/6/2014

BJC

0.70

$155.00

$108.50

responses to discovery.

5/8/2014

BJC

0.90

$155.00

$139.50

analyze case re: documents.

Analyze case re: documents; draft
Draft supplemental discovery responses;
Analyze case re: stipulation for dismissal;
correspondence w/ Atty Williams re:
5/9/2014

BJC

0.90

$155.00

$139.50

5/12/2014
5/16/2014

BJC

0.60
0.60

$155.00
$155.00

$93.00
$93.00

BJC

stipulation.
Analyze case re: stipulation, case issues.
Review case re: Ullman subpoena.
Analyze case re: motion to quash, nonopposition; attend hearing on motion to

5/21/2014

BJC

1.80

$155.00

$279.00

quast.

6/9/2014

BJC

0.50

$155.00

$77.50

Analyze case re: discovery supplement.
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Review motion to amend; analyze file re:
new claims, factual issues; analyze case re:
deposition issues; review case re:
6/20/2014

BJC

2.20

$155.00

$341.00

documents.
Analyze case re: Oldham deposition,

6/24/2014

BJC

0.70

$155.00

$108.50

documents.
Analyze case re: stipulation to amend
complaint, legal issues; review case re:

6/25/2014

BJC

1.10

$155.00

$170.50

Ullman deposition.

6/26/2014

BJC

0.70

$155.00

$108.50

amendment issues.

Review stipulation to amend complaint,
Review case re: amended complaint,
7/3/2014

BJC

0.80

$155.00

$124.00

pleadings.
Review file re: Oldham deposition; attend

BJC

4.20

$155.00

$651.00

Oldham deposition; analyze case re:
deposition issues.

7/9/2014 · BJC

0.90

$155.00

$139.50

Ullman deposition items.

7/8/2014

Review factual issues re: answer; review S.
Analyze case re: answer to amended
complaint; analyze case re: deposition;
BJC

1.10

$155.00

0.60

7/17/2014

BJC
BJC

a.so

$155.00
$155.00

$77.50

Analyze case status.

7/18/2014

BJC

0.60

$155.00

$93.00

T/call w/ Atty Argyle.
Analyze case re: D. Oldham deposition

7/21/2014

BJC

0.40

$155.00

$62.00

transcript.

7/22/2014

BJC

0.50

~;155.00

$77.50

Analyze deposition issues.

7/10/2014
7/11/2014

$170.50
$93.00

t/call w/ Atty Walker re: case issues.
Analyze case re: amended complaint.

Review new discovery; analyze case re:
7/24/2014

BJC

0.90

$155.00

$139.50

updating discovery.
Analyze case re: Ullman deposition, case
status.

7/25/2014

BJC

0.50

$155.00

$77.50

7/28/2014

BJC

1.60

$155.00

$248.00

Review file re: case issues; meet w/
commissioners.

8/6/2014
8/13/2014

BJC

0.70

$155.00

BJC

0.50

$155.00

$108.50
$77.50

items.
Review file re: expert disclosures.

Review case re: depositions and discovery

Review case re: Wright deposition; t/call w/
Atty Muir re: affidavit issue; analyze case re:

8/14/2014

BJC

1.30

$155.00

$201.50

expert issues.

8/15/2014

BJC

0.80

$155.00

$124.00

Review case re: Boise affidavit; analyze case
re: second Wright deposition.

8/18/2014 BJC
8/21/2014 BJC

1.80

review expert report.

1.60

$155.00
$155.00

$279.00

$248.00

Analyze Wright expert economist report.
Analyze re: City of Boise, affidavit; review

8/22/2014 BJC

0.90

Review case re: depositions, discovery;

$155.00

$139.50

file re: expert issues, monthly meeting
update.
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Review file re: prep for commissioner
8/25/2014

BJC

1.60

$155.00

$248.00

meeting; attend BOCC meeting.
Review file re: expert witnesses, summary

BJC
BJC

0.70

8/29/2014

0.80

$155.00
$155.00

$108.50
$124.00

9/3/2014

BJC

0.80

$155.00

$124.00

8/28/2014

judgment issues.
Analyze case re: Plaintiff experts.
Analyze case re: expert issues.
Review file re: Wright second deposition;
draft outline for deposition; review case re:
expert issues; prepare documentation for

9/4/2014

BJC

6.40

$155.00

$992.00

deposition.
Prepare for second Wright deposition;
attend second Wright deposition; analyze
case issues re: deposition; analyze case re:
summary judgment issues.
Analyze case re: status, expert issues.

9/5/2014

BJC

3.40

$155.00

$527.00

9/9/2014
9/16/2014

BJC
BJC

0.70
0.60

$155.00
$155.00

$108.50
$93.00

9/23/2014

BJC

1.50

$155.00

$232.50

Analyze case re: defenses, damages issues.
Review file re: summary judgment issues,

9/24/2014

BJC

1.10

$155.00

$170.50

strategy.

9/26/2014

BJC

0.70

$155.00

$108.50

Analyze mediation issues.

Analyze case re: MSJ outline, issues.

Analyze case re: summary judgment issues,
9/29/2014
9/30/2014

BJC
BJC

0.50
1.10

$155.00
$155.00

research.

$77.50
$170.50

Analyze summary judgment timeline, case
issues.
Review case re: mediation, summary

10/1/2014
10/2/2014

BJC
BJC

0.90
1.10

$155.00
$155.00

$139.50

judgment issues.

$170.50

Analyze case re: documents in file,
discovery.
Analyze case re: summary judgment;
analyze case re: mediation issues; begin

10/6/2014

BJC

1.50

$155.00

$232.50

reviewing summary judgment documents.
Review case re: mediation issues; attend
BOCC meeting; review briefing for summary
judgment; analyze case re: summary

10/7/2014

BJC

2.80

$155.00

$434.00

judgment issues.
Analyze case re: summary judgment
documents, case issues; review and revise

10/8/2014

BJC

2.10

$155.00

$325.50

summary judgment documents.
Review case re: summary judgment filings,

10/9/2014

BJC

0.80

$155.00

$124.00

issues.
Analyze case re: summary judgment

10/10/2014 BJC

1.30

$155.00

$201.50

briefing, filing issues.
Analyze case re: summary judgment issues,

10/13/2014 BJC

0.80

$155.00

$124.00

documentation.
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Analyze case re: expert issues, summary
10/15/2014 BJC

0.70

$155.00

$108.50

judgment.
Review case re: expert analysis, reports;
analyze case re: summary judgment

10/16/2014 BJC

1.80

$155.00

$279.00

briefing, issues.
Analyze case re: summary judgment hearing
issues; analyze case re: expert reports,
assessment.

10/17/2014 BJC

1.90

$155.00

$294.50

10/21/2014 BJC

0.50

$155.00

$77.50

10/22/2014 BJC

0.50

$155.00

$77.50

mediation dates, issues.

10/23/2014 BJC
10/28/2014 BJC

0.70

$155.00

$108.50

deadline; review meet and confer letter.

0.40

$155.00

$62.00

Analyze case re: mediation, scheduling
issues.
Communications w/Plaintiff's counsel re:
Draft stipulation to extend mediation
Analyze file re: mediation issues.
Review file re: summary judgment reply
10/29/2014 BJC

1.00

$155.00

$155.00

issues; analyze case re: evidence, claims.
Review summary judgment reply memo
issues; analyze case re: affidavit; analyze

10/30/2014 BJC

1.60

$155.00

$248.00

case re: legal issues, evidence; t/call w/
clients.
Analyze case depositions; review and revise
summary judgment reply memorandum;
analyze case re: summary judgment issues.

10/31/2014 BJC

2.10

$155.00

$325.50

11/5/2014

BJC

0.50

$155.00

$77.50

11/6/2014

BJC

0.70

$155.00

$108.50

Analyze case issues, discovery.
Prepare for and attend summary judgment

11/7/2014

BJC

3.80

$155.00

$589.00

judgment issues.

Analyze case re: discovery and summary
judgment items.

oral argument; analyze case re: summary

Meet w/ BOCC; review briefing inquiry from
J. Carey; analyze case re: response to J.
11/10/2014 BJC
11/12/2014 BJC

3.10

$155.00

$480.50

Carey; review case re: mediation statement.

1.10

$155.00

$170.50

Analyze file re: mediation items.

11/19/2014 BJC
11/20/2014 BJC

0.40

$155.00

$62.00

Review supplemental brief on summary
judgment.

1.10

$155.00

$170.50

11/24/2014 BJC
11/25/2014 BJC

7.70
1.10

$155.00

$1,193.50

BJC

0.50

$155.00
$155.00

$170.50
$77.50

Analyze case re: legal issues.

12/1/2014

Review and revise mediation statement.
Attend mediation; analyze case re:
mediation issues.
Analyze case re: mediation issues.

12/2/2014

BJC

0.70

$155.00

$108.50

Analyze case re: settlement, summary
judgment issues.

12/3/2014
12/5/2014

BJC
BJC

0.60
0.70

$155.00
$155.00

$93.00
$108.50

Analyze case re: evidence issues.
Analyze case re: witnesses and evidence.
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12/10/2014 BJC
12/11/2014 BJC

0.60

$155.00

$93.00

Review file re: lay witnesses.

0.50

$155.00

$77.50

Review file re: lay witness list.
Review and analyze MSJ decision; analyze

1/5/2015

BJC

1.80

$155.00

$279.00

case re: costs and fees, appeal issues.
Analyze case re: MSJ decision, fees and
costs memo; meet with Board of
Commissioners re: MSJ, future issues.

1/6/2015

BJC

2.20

$155.00

$341.00

1/7/2015

BJC

0.60

$155.00

$93.00

Review file re: settlement, case issues.
Review cost memo; analyze file re: cost

1/12/2015

BJC

0.80

$155.00 ,

$124.00

issues, briefing.

1/13/2015

BJC

$155.00

analyze case re: post-MSJ issues.

Review costs and attorney fees briefing;
1.00

$155.00
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Time

Rate

10/7/2013 JEC
10/8/2013 JEC

1.50

$155.00

Slip Value Description
$232.50 Research retaliation issue.

1.00

$155.00

$155.00

Research retaliation issue and draft memo.
Research disclosure identity of individuals with

11/9/2013 JEC

2.40

$155.00

$372.00

factual knowledge re: motion to compel.

11/10/2013 JEC

2.60

$155.00

$403.00

compel.

11/11/2013 JEC

1.10

$155.00

$170.50

11/11/2013 JEC
11/12/2013 JEC

4.80

$155.00

$744.00

Draft motion to compel.

a.so

$155.00

$77.50

Draft affidavit re: motion to compel.

3.30

$155.00
$155.00

$511.50
$124.00

Analyze Plf response re: motion to compel.

Date

ATIY

Research work product protection re: motion to
Revise memorandum in support of motion to

12/10/2013 JEC
12/11/2013 JEC

0.80

compel.

Revise reply re: motion to compel
Review and analyze motion re:subpoena non-

3/31/2014 JEC
4/1/2014 JEC

3.60

$155.00

$558.00

2.70

$155.00

$418.50

JEC
4/11/2014 JEC

1.50
0.30

$155.00
$155.00

$232.50

resident.
Draft objection re: subpoena non-resident.
Continue drafting objection, affidavit, and exhibits

4/2/2014

$46.50

re: subpoena non-resident.
Analyze discovery re: 7th & 8th RFP.
Analyze mitigation of damages re: Plf's new

6/17/2014 JEC

1.80

$155.00

$279.00

employment.
Analyze mitigation of damages re: Plf's new

6/18/2014 JEC

4.00

$155.00

$620.00

employment.

6/18/2014 JEC

a.so

$155.00

$77.50

Review and analyze Motion to Amend Complaint.
Continue researching re: Motion to Amend

6/19/2014 JEC
6/19/2014 JEC
6/25/2014 JEC

2.40
2.20

$155.00
$155.00

$372.00
$341.00

Complaint.

0.90

$155.00

$139.50

Research subpoena re: out of state deponent.

JEC

2.80

$155.00

$434.00

Draft memo re: out of state deponent.

7/7/2014

Research re: Motion to Amend Complaint.

Analyze discovery documents and depositions re:
7/8/2014

JEC

2.90

$155.00

$449.50

answer to amended complaint.
Continue analyzing depositions and discovery

7/9/2014

JEC

3.80

$155.00

$589.00

documents re: answer.
Review Idaho and Utah pleadings re: S. Ullman

7/9/2014

JEC

0.80

$155.00

$124.00

7/9/2014

JEC

2.00

$155.00

$310.00

depo.
Draft answer.
Review deposition and documents; revise answer

7/10/2014 JEC

2.00

$155.00

$310.00

to amended complaint.
Research address re: S. Ullman and J. Coones;

7/14/2014 JEC

0.70

$155.00

$108.50

draft notice and subpoena re: S. Ullman.
T/call w/ Tri-County re: service of subpoena for S.

7/17/2014 JEC
7/18/2014 JEC

0.10

$155.00

$15.50

0.70

$155.00

$108.50

Ullman.
Revise answer.
Review discovery responses re: supplementation

7/21/2014 JEC

0.80

$155.00

$124.00

of email.

EXHIBITC
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Wright v. Ada County
Ada County Case No. 13-02730
Draft supplemental discovery response re: email.

7/23/2014 JEC

0.20

$155.00

$31.00

7/25/2014 JEC
7/28/2014 JEC

2.50

$155.00

$387.50

0.80

$155.00

1.60

$155.00

3.10

$155.00

$124.00 Draft updated analysis re: damages.
$248.00 • Research damages.
$480.50 Review and analyze expert disclosures.

Review and analyze Plf's supplemented discovery

8/27/2014 JEC
8/27/2014 JEC

re: damages mitigation.

Analyze expert report re: voe rehab; analyze
supporting documents and evidence re: voe rehab

8/28/2014 JEC

8.50

$155.00

$1,317.50 report; analyze expert report re: economist.
Review supporting evidence and deposition re:
expert reports basis; draft analysis and memo re:

8/29/2014 JEC

8.10

$155.00

JEC

2.50

$155.00

$1,255.50 expert reports.
Research and analyze whistleblower claim re:
standards and causal connection; draft outline for

9/1/2014

$387.50

MSJ.
Research and analyze infliction of emotional

9/2/2014

JEC

2.90

$155.00

$449.50

distress standards; continue draft outline of
arguments re: MSJ.

9/4/2014

JEC

2.50

$155.00

$387.50

Review and draft factual summary.
Research standards for MSJ re: whistleblower;
research and analyze protected activity re:

9/4/2014

JEC

3.80

$155.00

$589.00

whistleblower; draft outline of claim re:
whistleblower.
Research and analyze FMLA interference claims
re: standards, termination, and protected rights;

$1,069.50 draft outline re: FMLA interference.
$170.50 T/interview with witness.
Continue analyzing FMLA interference claims re:

9/5/2014

JEC

6.90

9/8/2014

JEC

1.10

$155.00
$155.00

9/8/2014

JEC

3.20

$155.00

$496.00

re: reinstatement.
Research and analyze negligent and infliction of

9/9/2014

JEC

4.50

$155.00

$697.50

emotional distress claims.

9/9/2014

JEC

3.50

$155.00

$542.50

Research and analyze FMLA claim re: retaliation.

reinstatement; draft outline of interference claim

Review and preparation of documents re:

9/9/2014 JEC
9/10/2014 JEC
9/13/2014 JEC

0.80
0.10
2.20

$155.00
$155.00
$155.00

$124.00
$15.50
$341.00

damages.
T/call w/ witness.
Draft outline retaliation claim and IIED claim.
Research and analyze NIED re:duty; draft outline

9/14/2014 JEC

3.30

$155.00

$511.50

of arguments re: NIED.
Research and analyze emotional distress ,
standards re: employment claims and damages;
review and analyze document and evidence re:

9/15/2014 JEC

6.20

$155.00

$961.00

emotional damages; begin draft MSJ and
statement of facts.
EXHIBIT C
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.

(

Wright v. Ada County
Ada County Case No. 13-02730
Research non-economic damages re:
wh.istleblower; research and analyze causal
connection re: NIED; begin drafting MSJ and
9/16/2014 JEC

5.90

$155.00

$914.50

statement of facts.
Research equivalent position re: FMLA; draft

9/17/2014 JEC

8.90

$155.00

$1,379.50 statement of facts; draft MSJ.
Research and analyze causal connection re: FMLA
retaliation; draft MSJ; continue analyzing
depositions and evidence and drafting statement
$1,147.00 of facts.
Continue drafting MSJ; continuing drafting

9/18/2014 JEC

7.40

$155.00

9/19/2014 JEC
9/20/2014 JEC

3.30

$155.00
·$155.00

$511.50

statement of undisputed material facts.

2.50

$387.50

Continue drafting statement of facts and MSJ.

9/22/2014 JEC
9/23/2014 JEC

3.20

$155.00

$496.00

Draft MSJ and statement of facts.

9/25/2014 JEC
9/29/2014 JEC
9/30/2014 JEC

4.30

$155.00

$666.50

Continue drafting MSJ and statement of facts.

2.10

$155.00
$155.00

$325.50
$170.50

Continue drafting MSJ.

$294.50

Draft MSJ and statement of facts.
Continue drafting MSJ and statement of facts.
T/call w/ witness.

1.10
1.90

10/1/2014 JEC
10/2/2014 JEC

1.70

$155.00
$155.00

0.80

$155.00

$263.50
$124.00

10/4/2014 JEC
10/5/2014 JEC

6.30
6.20

$155.00
$155.00

$976.50
$961.00

Continue drafting MSJ and statement of facts.

Continue drafting MSJ and excerpts from record.
Continue drafting MSJ.
Finish drafting and revise MSJ; review record

10/6/2014 JEC

11.00

$155.00

$1,705.00 citations.

10/7/2014 JEC

8.90

$155.00

$1,379.50 Draft SOF and review record excerpts; revise MSJ.
Finish drafting statement of facts and affidavit;

10/8/2014 JEC
10/8/2014 JEC

7.30

$155.00

0.80

$155.00

10/9/2014 JEC
10/10/2014 JEC

7.60
2.80

$155.00

$1,131.50 prepare exhibits.
$124.00 Draft motion for overlength brief.
$1,178.00 Finish preparing exhibits; revise MSJ and SOF.

$155.00

$434.00

10/16/2014 JEC

0.80

$155.00

$124.00

correspondence w/ K. Williams re: expert
deadline.

10/23/2014 JEC

0.50

$155.00

$77.50

supplementation.

10/24/2014 JEC

0.10

$155.00

$15.50

T/call w/ H. McCarthy; t/call w/ J. Carroll re: Plf's
response brief.

10/26/2014 JEC
10/27/2014 JEC

7.20
9.10

$155.00
$155.00

$1,116.00 draft reply.

$1,240.00
$1,162.50
$899.00
$62.00

Finalize MSJ and related filings.
T/calls and correspondence w/ witness;

Review documents and files re: request for

Review and analyze Plf's response brief; research;

10/28/2014
10/29/2014
10/30/2014
10/31/2014

JEC

8.00

$155.00

JEC

7.50

JEC
JEC

5.80
0.40

$155.00
$155.00
$155.00

$1,410.50 Draft reply brief.
Research resolution re: force and effect; continue
drafting reply brief.
Finish drafting reply.
Revise reply brief; draft affidavit.
Finalize affidavit of C. Rich.
EXHIBIT C
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Wright v. Ada County
Ada County Case No. 13-02730
Analyze brief and case law.
Strategize re: supplemental briefing; review of
$496.00 depositions and evidence.
Review documents and depositions re:
$697.50 supplemental briefing.
$356.50 Draft mediation materials.
$294.50 Continue drafting mediation statement.
$697.50 Review record; draft mediation statement.
$1,782.50 Continue drafting mediation statement.
$682.00 Finish drafting supplement brief re: IIED.
$666.50 Finish drafting mediation statement.

11/7/2014 JEC

3.10

$155.00

11/10/2014 JEC

3.20

$155.00

11/11/2014
11/12/2014
11/15/2014
11/16/2014
11/17/2014
11/18/2014
11/18/2014

JEC
JEC
JEC
JEC
JEC
JEC
JEC

4.50
2.30
1.90
4.50
11.50
4.40
4.30

$155.00
$155.00
$155.00
$155.00
$155.00
$155.00
$155.00

11/19/2014
11/19/2014
11/20/2014
11/26/2014
12/1/2014
12/2/2014

JEC
JEC
JEC
JEC
JEC
JEC

1.30
1.30
3.30
0.80
5.90
3.50

$155.00
$155.00
$155.00
$155.00
$155.00
$155.00

$201.50
$201.50
$511.50
$124.00
$914.50
$542.50

12/2/2014
12/3/2014
12/3/2014
12/5/2014

JEC
JEC
JEC
JEC

0.40
1.30
0.70
0.30

$155.00
$155.00
$155.00
$155.00

$62.00
$201.50
$108.50
$46.50

1/6/2015 JEC
1/9/2015 JEC

3.90
3.70

$155.00
$155.00

$604.50
$573.50

1/12/2015 JEC
1/13/2015 JEC

3.60
4.00

$155.00
$155.00

$558.00
$620.00

$480.50

Draft affidavit and exhibits re: supplemental brief.
Review depositions.
Revise mediation statement.
Research salary issues.
Review and analyze legal defenses.
Draft legal memo re: trial issues.
Finish reviewing documents and testimony re: R.
Wright's counseling.
Factual research.
Draft lay witness disclosure.
Review facts; revise lay witness list.
Research and analyze applicable atty fee statutes;
draft memorandum of costs.
Draft attorney fees memo.
Continuing costs drafting attorney fees memos;
affidavit KGN re: fees and costs.
Finish drafting affidavit of costs and fees.

EXHIBIT C

000352

Federal ID# 82-0436903

7/16/2014

Phone # 208.343.4004

201400532

iiiila.

Bruce J. Castleton
Naylor & Hales, P.C.
950 W. Banoock Street, Suite 610
Boise, Idaho 83702

iiiila.

iiiila.
tFFi•

iiiila.
Your business is greatly
appreciated!

Case: Wright vs. Ada County, et al.
Case No: CV OC 1302730
Date Taken: 7/8/14
Location: Boise, ID
Deponent: Dee Oldham
Reporter: Susan L. Sims, CSR No. 739, RPR
Reporting services rendered in the above-entitled matter:
Transcript - Copy
Exhibits
State Sales Tax

.

233.20T
3.SOT

14.20

·.

.

.

PLEASE REFERENCE THIS INVOICE NUMBER ON YOUR CHECK
TERMS ARE NET- 30
· LATE CHARGES
WILL BE ASSESSED
.
-ON ALL PAST DUE ACCOUNTS

EXHIBIT D

$250.90

000353

Federal ID# 82-0436903

2/24/2014

Phone # 208.343.4004

201400205

iiil•
iiiil•

Kirtlan G. Naylor
Naylor & Hales, P.C.
950 W. Bannock, Suite 610
Boise, Idaho 83702

-·
-·
iiiil•

Your business is greatly
appreciated!

Case: Wright vs. Ada County, et al.
Case No: CV-OC-13-02730
Date Taken: 02/10/2014 and 02/11/2014
Location: Boise, Idaho
Deponents: Terri Broome, Rick Yzaquirre, Kelly Paananen
Deponents: Donna Dana, Richard Thomas Wright and Tim Wilson
Reporter: Andrea J. Wecker, CSR No. 716, RMR, CRR, CBC
Appearance- 02/10/2014
Transcript - Original - Dana - 42 pgs

50.00
157.50

Appearance 02/11/2014
. Transcript - Original - Wright -166 pgs
Rough Draft- Wright
Transcript - Original - Wilson - 36 pgs

125.00
622.50
124.50
135.00

I

Transcript- Copy- Broome- 96 pgs
Transcript- Copy- Yzaquirre -119 pgs
Transcript- Copy- Paananen -15 pgs

211.20
261.80
33.00

Exhibits - 207 pgs

51.75

PLEASE REFERENCE THIS INVOICE NUMBER ON YOUR CHECK
TERMS ARE NET 30 - LATE CHARGES WILL BE ASSESSED.

$1,772.25

; ON ALL PAST DUE..ACCOUNTS
.

EXHIBIT D
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Federal ID# 82-0436903

2/25/2014

Phone # 208.343.4004

201400209

iiiila.
iiiila.
iiiila.

Kirtlan G. Naylor
Naylor & Hales, P.C.
950 W. Bannock, Suite 610
Boise, Idaho 83702

-·
iiiila.

Your business is g1'eatly
appreciated!

Case: Wright vs. Ada County, et al.
Case No: CV~OC-13-02730
Date Taken: 02/12/2014, 02/13/2014 and 12/14/2014
Location: Boise, Idaho
Deponents: Larry Maneely, Jim Tibbs
Deponents: David Case and Sue Axtman
Reporter: Andrea J. Wecker, CSR No. 716, RMR, CRR, CBC
Transcript- Copy- Larry Maneely-105 pgs
Transcript - Copy - Jim Tibbs - 123 pgs

231.00
270.60

Transcript-Copy- David Case (Video) 263 pgs
Rough Draft - Case

578.60
197.25

Transcript - Copy - Sue Axtman - 72 pgs

158.40

Exhibits - All Deponents

11.25

PLEASE REFERENCE
nris INVOICE NUMBER ON ·yoUR CHECK
~:
TERMS ARE NET 30 - LATE CHARGES WILL BE ASSESSED
. ON ALL PAST DUE ACCOUNTS
~

EXHIBIT D

$1,447.10

000355

-·

5: Associated Reporting & Video, Inc.

-

Federal ID# 82-0436903

1618 W. Jefferson Street
Boise, ID 83702

208.343.4004

info@associatedreportingi-'1iwww.associatedr

tiifclttro'\

A

4/10/2014

201400319

~.J~f,'(Ji.

Kirtlan G. Naylor
Naylor & Hales, P.C.
950 W. Bannock, Suite 610
Boise, Idaho 83702

tJ

'-

, .. .,,,, ____,.,._

~

..

·,.,..~.

--~~

•.

"'

,

·.":;..

-··-

,'~sociat~d
eport1ng

_d&
eo

1

,

.

SCTJII>
SCTJ•
SCTJa.
SCTJ•
SCTJ-.

Your business is greatly
appreciated!

Case: Wright vs. Ada County, et al.
Case No: CV OC 1302730
Date Taken: 4/2/14
Location: Boise, ID
Deponents: Bret Lopeman & Bethany Calley
Reporter: Rebecca Bowker, CSR #133, RPR
Reporting services rendered in the above-entitled matter:

310.20T
18.61

Transcript - Copy
State Sales Tax

PLEA.SE REFERENCE THIS INVOICE NUMBER ON YOUR CHECK
· TERMS ARE NET 30 .- -.:,.ATE CHARGES WILL BE ASSESSED
.': ON
. ALL PAST DUE ACCOUNTS

EXHIBIT D

$328.81

000356

OCT @2

STATEMENT
Tucker & Associates
Post Office Box 1625
Boise, ID 83701
Phone:208-345-3704 Fax:208-345-3713

Account No.

Date

C3351

10/1/2014

Current

$205.85

90 Days
Kirtlan G. Naylor
Naylor & Hales
950 W Bannock, Ste 610
Boise, ID 83702

Invoice
Date

9/16/2014

Invoice
No.

121892

60 Days

30 Days

$0.00

120 Days & Over

$0.00

$0.00
Total Due

$0.00

$205.85

Page 1 of 1

Balance

Job Date

205.85

9/5/2014

Witness

case Name

Wright v. Ada County

Rich Wright

Tax ID: 820440907
Please detach bottom portion and return with payment.

Kirtlan G. Naylor
Naylor & Hales
950 W Bannock, Ste 610
Boise, ID 83702

Account No.
Date

0351

Total Due

$ 205.85

10/1/2014

Remit To: Tucker & Associates
Post Office Box 1625
Boise, ID 83701

EXHIBIT D
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•

•

6

t.

If

••

• May 29, 2014

TRI-COUNTY PROCESS SERVING L.L.C.
P.O. Box 1224
Boise, ID, 83701
(208) 344-4132 Business
(208) 338-1530 Fax
Federal Tax ID: 82-0348092

Attn: Kirtlan G. Naylor
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
950 W. BANNOCK ST., STE. 610
BOISE ID 83702
208-383-9511 Business
208-383-9516 Fax

-------<
Please Reference Job #137864 When Remitting.
NON-SERVICE
Richard Thomas Wright vs Ada County
Case Number: CV-OC-13-02730

Attn: Kirtlan G. Naylor
Documents: Deposition Subpoena

Due and Diligent Search for Sharon Ullman
by Richard L. Rambo,

Non-Service Fee $57.20
Attempt service at multiple addresses $45.00

Total: $102.20

DUE ON RECEIPT: $102.20
Thank You for Choosing
TRI-COUNTY PROCESS SERVING LLC!

· EXHIBIT D
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J. JOYCI: & ASSOCIATES LAW FIRM ·
Third Judlctal District Court, W Jordan

I

zz z

•

V

•

I

11906

7/10/20.14
Ada County adv Wright

35.00

/)!tfl9t ~·-fur{)·~-~

8uhpt'tJ~ ~bc35 +o
J. ,)tyl( 5 Afsou · --io
([jvt',.Y.JOYS-e -~.t'Y\ .Pe,r- -~. .

+ii if\.J- tu,_ ·-Hw-f Won-tcol
-~v- us.
·'·
·' ,, z1911~ Ch~.Gklng Acct . Ada·ColJ~tyadvWrfg!i,L- Out.L?f.~tat~·~-~bpoena·

39,0Q

3P.D DJ.BT. COURT - WEST JORDAN
C.\7 /lJ./J.o) 10: 21

CltH·li:: J..isaw

Re.ae.:i.pt Number-: 20lH8BOO'.l 1
1?.iyoi:: J JOYCE S: )l,SSCIC'

Re.c:e.ivecl:
Cheak 1906

$

25.00

Cd~e 140~09886 Notice. 0£ Dcp OoS
Judge: l.J,WP.ENCE, ru:.P.P,Y
Defend.mt: .i\DA COlTWPY t.'T .M,,
WRIGHT, RICW.RD TH0)1},5 VS ,l,D}.
COUNTY l'."I' AL

E'OREIGN DEP.OSITION $

2S .. OO

Note: Cocl~ De~aripticn: FOREIGN
DEPOSITION
H·.t't."Ht'
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:

I
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] . ] oyce & Associates

JJoyce & Associates Law Firm, PC
10813 South River Front Parkway
Suite 230
South Jordan, UT 84095

Law Firm I Professional Corporation
Trial Lilwyers * Excellence in Utgation * Innovative Solutions to Legal Disputes

Tax ID: 20-4877844

Invoice Date:

Kirtlan G. Naylor
950 West Bannock Street, Suite 610
Boise, ID 83702
Regarding:

Ada County adv Wright

Invoice No:

10153

7/31/2014

Claim No.

Services Rendered
Date

Staff

Description

Hours

Rate

7/10/2014

AKM

Telephone call with attorney and review paperwork for
purposes of foreign subpoena.

0.60

$90.00

$54.00

7/11/2014

AKM

Filed Application for Subpoena and other documents.

0.70

$90.00

$63.00

7/14/2014

AKM

Communicate with outside attorney and process server
regarding service of subpoena.

0.20

$90.00

$18.00

Total Fees

$135.00

Charges

Expenses
Quantity

Start Date

Description

7/10/2014

Witness Fee - SOT - Sharon Ullman

1.00

7/10/2014

Court Fees - Filing of Out of State Subpoena - Sharon Ullman - West
Jordan Court

1.00

Total Expenses

Total New Charges

Price

Charges

$35.00

$35.00

- - - -$18.50
- - -----'-$18.50

$53.50

$18~.50

$0.00

Previous Balance

EXHIBIT D

000360

.. '
J Joyce & Associates Law Firm, PC
7/14/2014

Payment

16026

$-35.00

Reimbursement of Filing Fees
Total Payments and Credits

$-35.00

Balance Due

$153.50

Staff Summary
Name
AmyK Martin

Hours
1.50

Rate
$90.00

EXHIBIT D

Fees
$135.00

000361

J\UG - '! 2014

August 61 2014

TRI-COUNTY PROCESS SERVING L.L.C.
P.O. Box 1224
Boise, ID, 83701
(208) 344-4132 Business
(208) 338-1530 Fax
Federal Tax ID: 82-0348092

Invoice #139193
. Attn: Kirtlan G. Naylor
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
950 W. BANNOCK ST., STE. 610
BOISE ID 83702
208-383-9511 Business
208-38·~-9516 Fax

-------<
Please Reference Job #139193 When Remitting.
NON-SERVICE
Richard Thomas Wright vs Ada County
Case Number: CV-OC-13-02730

Attn: Kirtlan G. Naylor
Documents: Deposition Subpoena, Notice of Taking Deposition
Due and Diligent Search for Sharon Ullman
by Richard L. Rambo,

Non-Seryice Fee $61.80
Total: $61.80

DUE ON RECEIPT: $61.80
Thank You for Choosing
TRI-COUNTY PROCESS SERVING LLC!

EXHIBIT D

000362

..

February 3, 2014

TRI-COUNTY PROCESS SERVING L.L.C.
P.O. Box 1224
Boise, ID, 83701
(208) 344-4132 Business
(208) 338-1530 Fax
Federal Tax ID: 82-0348092

Invoice #135115
Attn: Kirtlan G. Naylor
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
950 W. BANNOCK ST., STE. 610
BOISE ID 83702
208-383-9511 Business
208-383-9516 Fax

------<
Reference Job #135115 when remitting.

Richard Thomas Wright vs Ada County
Case Number: CV-OC-13-02730

Attn: Kirtlan G. Naylor
Documents: Deposition Subpoena Duces Tecum
Service Upon: Tim Wilson
Personal Service to Tim Wilson on January 30, 2014 at 7:10 PM,
at: 784 N. Troutner Way, Boise, ID 83712
by Antonio Roque
Mileage Fee $9.00
Service Fee $41.00

Total: $50.00

DUE ON RECEIPT: $50.00
Thank You for Choosing
TRI-COUNTY PROCESS SERVING LLC!

EXHIBIT D

000363

NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.

Vendor ID: WITI

·Check Date:

01/30/14

Invoice No.

Vendor Name: Tim Wilson
Date
D~e:::s::::c:!.crici:::P!!:tio:::n.!..-_________________

8745

01/30/14

witness fee&mileage

15549
Amount Paid
21.80
21.80

MSF400M

~Sllf-EGUIIRD

111,wu~.

:,t!;1,t.1

TO REORDER. CALL YOUR LOCAL SAFEGUMD DISTRIBUTOR AT 208-429,8282

HY7L7Z001DOOO

M0DSF02B215

c1:;~rtn1:i1.1
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~~c ~c/-d ~ EMPLOYER NO. 84-0382505
Holland & Hart LLP
ATIORNEYSATLAW
DENVER* BOULDER

PLEASE REMIT TO:

JACKSON HOLE

DENVER TECH CENTER
COLORADO SPRINGS
ASPEN * BILLINGS
BOISE* CHEYENNE

P. 0. BOX 17283
DENVER, CO 80217-0283
TELEPHONE (303) 295-8000
FACSIMILE (303) 295-8261

LAS VEGAS" SANTA FE
CARSON CITY • RENO
SALT LAKE CITY
WASHINGTON D.C.

December 26, 2014
Kimberly Williams
Rossman Law Group, PLLC
737 N. 7th St.
Boise, ID 83702

Invoice No.
H&HRef.No.
Client No.
Attorney:

1362192
2288122
59315
BNSquyres

Kirtlan G. Naylor
Naylor & Hales, P.C.
950 W. Bannock St., #610
Boise, ID 83 702
Regarding: Matter No. 0016 - Mediation - Wright v. Ada County BOC

Invoice Summary
Current fees

$2,125.00

Current charges this invoice

$2,125.00

Proportional Amounts Due
Rossman Law Group

$1,062.50

Naylor & Hales, P.C.

$1,062.50

Thank you for your prompt payment. Questions regarding this invoice should be directed to the
attorney responsible for your account, or Keena Just, Billing Specialist in our Boise office, at
(208) 383-3906.
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IRS EMPLOYER NO. 84-0382505

Holland & Hart LLP
ATIORNEYS AT LAW

Invoice No.
H&HRef.No.

59315 B. Newal Squyres Mediations

1362192
2288122

For professional services rendered through December 26, 2014

Itemized Fees
Description of Work
Final preparation for today's mediation; mediate case and
attempt to resolve the litigation;

Date

Tkpr

Hours

11/24/14

BNS

8.50

Total Current Fees:

$2,125.00

Timekeeper Summary
Timekeeper

Tkpr ID

BNSquyres

0518

Rate

Hours

Amount

250.00

8.50

2,125.00

8.50

$2,125.00

Outstanding Invoices as of 12/26/14
Invoice No.

Date

Amount Billed

Payments Balance Due

Total Outstanding Balance:

$0.00
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IRS EMPLOYER NO. 84-0382505

Holland & Hart LLP
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
PLEASE REMIT TO:
P. 0. BOX 17283
DENVER, CO 80217-0283
TELEPHONE (303) 295-8000
FACSIMILE (303) 295-8261

DENVER" BOULDER
DENVER TECH CENTER
COLORADO SPRINGS
ASPEN " BILLINGS
BOISE * CHEYENNE

JACKSON HOLE
LAS VEGAS" SANTA FE
CARSON CITY * RENO
SALT LAKE CITY
WASHINGTON D.C.

December 26, 2014
Kimberly Williams
Rossman Law Group, PLLC
737 N. 7th St.
Boise, ID. 83702

Invoice No.
H&R Ref.No.
Client No.
Attorney:

1362192
2288122
59315
BNSquyres

Regarding: Matter No. 0016 - Mediation- Wright v. Ada County BOC

Invoice Summarv
Current fees

$2,125.00

Current charges this invoice

$2,125.00

Due On Receipt
Please return this page with your remittance.
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By TENILLE RAD
DEPUTY

Eric S. Rossman, ISB #4573
erossman@rossmanlaw.com
Erica S. Phillips, ISB #6009
ephillips(a),rossmanlaw.com
Kimberly L. Williams, ISB #8893
kwilliams@rossmanlaw.com
ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC
737 N. ?1h Street
Boise, Idaho 83 702 .
Telephone: (208) 331-2030
Facsimile: (208) 342-2170

·,

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,
Plaintiff,
-vsADA COUNTY, a political subdivision of the
State ofldaho, ADA COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
.)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV OC 1302730

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

----------------)
COJ\.1ES NOW, Plaintiff Richard Wright, by and through his counsel ofrecord, the
law firm of ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC, and hereby moves this Court for an Order to

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 1
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reconsider its Decision and Order entered on January 5, 2015, and deny Defendants' motion for
_ summary judgment it its entirety.
This motion is made pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1l(a)(2)(B) and is
supported by the Affidavit of Kimberly Williams, Affidavit of Richard Wright and the
memorandum filed concurrently herewith and the pleadings and affidavits on file in this matter.
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED.
DATED this

lb-f!!

day of January, 2015.
ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC

By:

/L

.

~

Kimberly L. Williams
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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000369

...

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the [~~ day of January, 2015 I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing to be forwarded with all the required charges prepaid, by the method(s) indicated below to
the following persons:
Kirtlan G. Naylor
Bruce J. Castleton
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610
Boise, ID 83702

Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail
Facsimile 383-9516
Overnight Mail
Electronic Mail
kirt@naylorhales.com
bjc@naylorhales.com

/

Kimberly L. Williams

\IOFFICESERVER\Rossman Law\Documents\Work\W\Wright, Rich\Plcadings\Motion for Reconsideration.doc
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JAN 16 2015
Eric S. Rossman, ISB #4573
erossman@rossmanlaw.com
Erica S. Phillips, ISB #6009
ephillips@rossmanlaw.com
Kimberly L. Williams, ISB #8893
kwilliams@rossmanlaw.com
ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC
737 N. ih Street
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 331-2030
Facsimile: (208) 342-2170

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, C!erk
By TENILLE RAD
DEPUTY

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,
Plaintiff,
-vsADA COUNTY, a political subdivision of the
State ofldaho, ADA COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,
Defendants.

_______________
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV OC 1302730

AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD
WRIGHT IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

)
) ss.
)

RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD WRIGHT IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
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1.

I am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter and have personal knowledge of the

facts contained herein.
2.

As Director of the Department of Administration, I was the person who received the

initial complaints regarding the 2010-2011 investigation, from the complainants.
3.

After receiving the initial reports, I met with and interviewed the complainants.

4.

I determined that a formal investigation needed to be launched, and approached the

members of the Ada County Board of County Commissioners, who advised me to proceed as I felt
necessary.
5.

As Director of the Department of Administration, I had supervisory authority over the

Human Resources department. I informed Bethany Calley, department manager, that we would be
conducting a formal investigation. Ms. Calley and I determined it would be best to bring on an
outside investigator. ·
6.

I hired outside investigator, Bart Hamilton, to conduct the investigation, in part to

ensure the integrity of the investigation.
7.

Upon hiring Mr. Hamilton, I provided him with information and documentation

regarding the allegations, and regarding my own interactions with the employee to be investigated.
We discussed witnesses to be interviewed, and the manner in which the investigation should be
conducted. I also provided him with background information so that he would be aware of previous
investigations that had been conducted in regards to the same employee.
8.

I provided Mr. Hamilton with a summary of the coaching and counseling I had taken

with respect to the employee being investigated, for whom I had supervisory responsibility.

AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD WRIGHT IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION - 2
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9.

Throughout the course of the investigation Mr. Hamilton, Ms. Calley, and I would

have investigation progress meetings. During those meetings we would receive reports from Mr.
Hamilton regarding his findings, and discuss what further steps need to be taken. We would provide
•

responses to statements made by the individuals interviewed, and would direct Mr. Hamilton to
which documentation would assist him in addressing claims made during the interviews.
10.

At one point in the investigation Ms. Calley and I determined it was necessary to do a

review of the emails of some of the employees involved in the matter, we directed IT to pull up the
emails for review. We then provided the relevant emails to Mr. Hamilton.
11.

Due to the information I provided to Mr. Hamilton at the beginning and throughout

the course of the investigation, there was no need for Mr. Hamilton to interview me or Ms. Calley.
12.

During the course of the investigations Mr. Hamilton was free to, and did, contact me

ifhe needed additional information and/or guidance regarding the manner in which the investigation
was proceeding.
13.

As Director of the Department of Administration, I was contacted in 2012 by the

Director of Development Service regarding a letter she had received from one of the employees in
her department.
14.

I determined that a formal investigation needed to be launched, and approached Rick

Yzaguirre, then Chairman of the board, regarding a formal investigation. Commissioner Yzaguirre
advised that I should proceed as I felt necessary, as did Commissioner Ullman.

AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD WRIGHT IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION - 3
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15.

I informed Bethany Calley that we would need to launch a formal investigation. By

this time Mr. Hamilton was employed by the County as an investigator. Ms. Calley and I directed

Mr. Hamilton to initiate the investigation.
16.

Again, we provided information to Mr. Hamilton to facilitate his investigation; we

also continued to hold investigation progress meetings with Mr. Hamilton as the investigation
ensued. During those meetings we discussed Mr. Hamilton's findings, and what additional steps
needed to be taken.
17.

At all times during each of these investigations, I was actively involved in attempting

to resolve the issues that had been brought to my attention.
DATED this

/.s day of January, 2015. ~~~

_,..-.....::.......,,
__..,_0L4-'~4~,Z._v!J_,·chard Wright
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

7

/

/5'I} day of January, 2015.

No~
Residing at
8af4(.,,
Commission expires:

,

I.J.~

'i.-/ ri- t/'2-:o2o
1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the \ b~ day of January, 2015 I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing to be forwarded with all the required charges prepaid, by the method(s) indicated below to
the following persons:

Kirtlan G. Naylor
Bruce J. Castleton
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610
Boise, ID 83702

Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail
Facsimile 383-9516
Overnight Mail
Electronic Mail
kirt@naylorhales.com
bjc@naylorhales.com

IL~
Kimberly L. Williams

\\OFFICESERVER\Rossman Law\Documents\Work\W\Wright, Rich\Pleadings\Reconsidcr Alf Wright.doc

AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD WRIGHT IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION - 5

000375

....

qi-i.

NO-----=-=-..,...,..---

A.M. _ _ _ _F_1L,~.M.

JAN 16 2015

Eric S. Rossman, ISB #4573
erossman@rossmanlaw.com
Erica S. Phillips, ISB #6009
ephillips@rossmanlaw.com
Kimberly L. Williams, ISB #8893
kwilliams@rossmanlaw.com
ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC
737 N. ih Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 331-2030
Facsimile: (208) 342-2170

CHRISTOPHER 0. RICI-I, Clerk
By TENILLE RAD
DEPUTY

,
C

~

~
..=-,.,
~~

....,

•

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,
Plaintiff,
-vsADA COUNTY, a political subdivision of the
State ofldaho, ADA COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,
Defendants.

_______________

...;,/

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV OC 1302730

AFFIDAVIT OF KIMBERLY L.
WILLIAMS IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.
County ~f Ada
)
KIMBERLY L. WILLIAMS, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

AFFIDAVIT OF KIMBERLY L. WILLIAMS IN SUPPORT OF.PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION - 1
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.

1.

I am one of the attorneys of record for the Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter and

have personal knowledge of the facts contained herein.
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "1 ", Filed Under Seal is a true and correct copy of

complete Investigation Report from the 2011 Investigation bates number ADA 120-433.
DATED this ( ~~~ day of January, 2015.

/{_'~
Kimberly L. Williams
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ~day of January, 2015.

Notary~
0014.t. r 'I cl~~
Residing at
-,_/t2,,/,z.o~
Commission expires:
l

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

l6~

day of January, 2015 I caused a true and correct copy of the
I hereby certify that on the
foregoing to be forwarded with all the required charges prepaid, by the method(s) indicated below to
the following persons:
Kirtlan G. Naylor
Bruce J. Castleton
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610
Boise, ID 83702

Hand Delivery
U.S. Mail
Facsimile 383-9516
Overnight Mail
Electronic Mail
kirt@naylorhales.com
bjc@naylorhales.com

,I

L~·

Kimberly L. Williams
\\OFFICESERVER\Rossman Law\Documents\Work\W\Wright, Rich\Pleadings\Reconsider Aff'KLW doc
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, C!erk
By TENILLE RAD
D~PUTV

Eric S. Rossman, ISB #4573
erossman@rossmanlaw.com
Erica S. Phillips, ISB #6009
ephillips@rossmanlaw.com
Kimberly L. Williams, ISB #8893
kwilliams@rossmanlaw.com
ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC
73 7 N. ih Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 331-2030
Facsimile: (208) 342-2170
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Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,
Plaintiff,
-vsADA COUNTY, a political subdivision of the
State ofldaho, ADA COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV OC 1302730

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

----------------)
COMES NOW, Plaintiff Richard Wright, by and through his counsel ofrecord, the
law firm of ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC, and hereby submits this Memorandum in Support
of Motion for Reconsideration.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This case arises from the wrongful termination of Plaintiff, Richard Wright
("Wright"), by Defendants, Ada County and Ada County Board of County Commissioners
("County"). The County filed a motion for summary judgment against Wright on the grounds
that there were no genuine disputes of material fact regarding the reasons for Wright's
termination of employment and, therefore, the County was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Wright responded to the motion, and on January 5, 2015, the Court entered a Memorandum
Concerning Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Order granting the County's motion
for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, Wright respectfully requests that the
Court reconsider its Decision and Order and deny the County's motion for summary judgment.

II. ARGUMENT
A.

Legal Standards for Motions for Reconsideration.

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (a)(2)(B) expressly provides that a party may file
a motion for reconsideration at any time prior to the entry of final judgment, but no later than
fourteen (14) days after the entry of final judgment. As the Court's Memorandum Decision and
Order was entered on January 5, 2015 this motion is timely. The decision to grant or deny a
motion for reconsideration is subject to the discretion of the trial court. Johnson v. Lambros, 143
Idaho 468, 147 P.3d 100, 105 (Ct. App. 2006). When presenting a motion for reconsideration
pursuant to Id. R. Civ. P. 1 l(a)(2)(B) a party may, but is not required, to present new evidence.

Johnson, 147 P.3d at 104. Where new evidence is presented to the Court, such evidence should
be considered. See Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'/ Bank ofN Idaho, 118 Idaho 812,
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823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990). A trial court may reconsider its opinion for both errors of fact
or errors oflaw. See Johnson, 147 P.3d at 104.

B.

The Court should Reconsider its Decision Granting Summary Judgment
on Count One of Plaintiff's Complaint.

L

Plaintiff's Duty in Responding to a Summary Judgment Motion.

The party responding to summary judgment is not required to present evidence on
every element of his or her case at the time of summary judgment, but rather must establish a
genuine issue of material fact regarding the element or elements challenged by the moving
party's motion. See Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, 126 Idaho 527, 530, 887 P.2d 1034, 1037
(1994) (emphasis added). This holds true even where the responding party will ultimately be
required to prove each.element at trial. Id. Furthermore, while the Court can grant summary
'

judgment sua sponte where it finds that no genuine issue of material fact exists, it must provide
both notice and an opportunity to respond to the opposing party before summary judgment can
be granted. See Mason v. Tucker & Assocs., 125 Idaho 429, 431-32, 871 P.2d 846, 848-49 (Ct.
App. 1994) (holding that where a district court grants summary judgment sua sponte or on
grounds other than those raised by the moving party, the opposing party must be given adequate
advance notice and an opportunity to demonstrate why summary judgment should not be
entered).

2.

Defendants Never Raised an Issue Regarding the Sufficiency of
Plaintiff's Participation in the Investigations.

Within the Court's Memorandum Decision and Order, the Court held that
summary judgment was appropriate because the Plaintiff did not participate in or give

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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information in any meaningful manner with respect to any of the investigations.

See

Memorandum Decision and Order, pp. 8-9. Specifically, the Court stated that "the evidence
before the court demonstrates that Mr. Wright did not participate in or give information in any
meaningful manner with respect to any of the investigations." See id., p. 9. The Court noted that
Mr. Wright did not conduct the actual investigations or prepare the investigative reports and "Mr.
Wright himself gave no evidence and was not interviewed by any of the investigators." See id.
However, the sufficiency of Plaintiffs participation was not raised by Defendants in their
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Rather, a review of
Defendants' Memorandum in Support clearly demonstrates that the only basis upon which
Defendants sought summary judgment on Plaintiffs claim for violation of the Idaho Protection
of Public Employees act was Defendants' assertion that there could be no protection for
participation in an investigation unless the investigation was related to potential waste of public
resources or a violation oflaw, rule or regulation. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants'
MSJ, pp. 4-10. Nothing in the Memorandum raises any issue with regard to whether Plaintiff
"participated" in an investigation under Idaho Code§ 6-2104(2).
Because Defendants never raised the issue of Plaintiffs participation in the
relevant investigations, Plaintiff had no obligation to come forward with evidence demonstrating
Plaintiffs participation and/or the extent of that participation. Had Plaintiff been placed under
that burden, Plaintiff would have specifically pointed out the substantial participation within the
investigations. Furthermore, if the Court believed that there was no genuine issue of fact
regarding Plaintiffs participation, because the issue had not been raised, the Court was required

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
-4
000381

to provide notice to Plaintiff that the Court intended to grant summary judgment on that basis
and, additionally, provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to respond and be heard on that issue.

See Mason v. Tucker &Assocs., 125 Idaho 429, 431-32, 871 P.2d 846, 848-49 (Ct. App. 1994).
Therefore, because the sole basis for the Court's grant of summary judgment to Defendants on
Count One of Plaintiffs complaint was Plaintiffs alleged lack of participation in any
investigation, and such issue was never raised by Defendants, the Court's grant of summary
judgment was in error and Plaintiff respectfully requests ,that the Court grant the motion for
reconsideration and deny Defendants' motion on this basis alone.

3.

PlaintiffParticipated in the Relevant Investigations.

In addition to not being properly raised by the Defendants, there is substantial
evidence in the record to demonstrate that Plaintiff participated and provided information in the
investigations. As was set forth above, the Court specifically found that Mr. Wright did not
participate or give information in the relevant investigations because he did not conduct the
investigation, prepare the report, and did not give evidence or be interviewed by the
investigators. See Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 9. For the reasons set forth below,
Plaintiff respectfully asserts that this finding was in error and, therefore, the Court should
reconsider its Order granting summary judgment on Count One of the Complaint.
a.

"Participation" includes initiating, supervising, and being
involved in an investigation.

Plaintiff has maintained from the beginning that he was actively involved in the
investigations. Specifically, the Amended Complaint in this matter expressly alleged "As
Director of Administrative Services, Wright was obligated to, and did in fact, initiate, coordinate,
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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and facilitate an investigation into the complaints of harassment. In doing so, Wright provided
necessary information to the Human Resources Manager, and to the investigator he hired to
assist in the investigation." See Amended Complaint, ,r 9. As will be discussed in more detail
within this Memorandum, Mr. Wright did, in fact, give information in an investigation.
However, even if Mr. Wright was not interviewed by the investigator and even if he did not
provide information in the course of an interview, he nevertheless "participated" in the
investigation.
Idaho Code § 6-2104(2) prohibits an employer from taking adverse action against
an employee because he or she "participates or gives information in an investigation, hearing,
court proceeding, legislative or other inquiry, or other form of administrative review." Based on
the plain language of the statute, "participation" must mean something other than the giving of
information within or separate from an interview. The Court's Memorandum Decision and
Order seems to conclude that "participation" is otherwise limited to conducting the actual
investigation or preparing the investigative report. See Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 9.
However, nothing in the statute purports to limit participation in that manner. Although the
Idaho Supreme Court has never directly addressed the parameters of"participation" within the
Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act, the ordinary definition of the word supports a finding
the Plaintiff fits within the parameters of the Act. The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines
"participate" as to be involved with others in doing something; to take part in an activity or event
with others." See, e.g., Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391,400,224 P.3d
458,467 (2008) (using the dictionary definition to determine the plain and ordinary meaning of
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"investigation.").

Furthermore, in Curlee, the Court rejected a narrow definition of

"investigation" and concluded that the plain meaning of the word was broader and encompassed
more than just official inquiries, but also "actions involving close examination or observation."
See id.

The analysis used by the Court in Curlee is directly applicable to the question of
how this court should define "participates." In Curlee, the Court looked at the dictionary
definitions to find the "plain meaning" of the words and, further, refused to adopt only a narrow
definition of such terms. This process is consistent with the underlying purpose and intent of the
statute to provide protection for public employees. To so narrowly define "participates" as to
include only the person conducting the investigation would subvert the purposes of the statute.
For example, someone who sat in on interviews and took notes on the investigation, without
actually asking the question, would be eliminated from the protections offered by the
Whistleblower Act. Further, the person who initiated the investigation and who would be a
likely target for retaliation, under such a limited definition of "participation," would not be
entitled to such protections. Such a result is neither consistent with the plain meaning of
participation or the purposes and policies behind the Whistleblower Act itself.
Clearly then, conducting a preliminary investigation to determine whether there is
a basis for a more formal investigation, hiring the investigator, meeting with the investigator to
provide necessary information regarding .the investigation, communicating about potential
witnesses, and providing additional information or guidance as necessary is taking part in an
activity or event with others.
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b.

The record is undisputed that Plaintiff participated and gave
information in an investigation.

Furthermore, as is set forth in the Affidavit of Richard Wright filed concurrently
herewith, Mr. Wright was the person who initiated the investigation, hired the outside
investigator, and provided information to the investigator regarding the allegations, including
potential witnesses and documentation such as e-mails to the il}vestigator. See Wright Affidavit,

,r,r 2-12.

Mr. Wright further provided specific information to the investigator regarding prior

corrective action taken against one of the employees under investigation. See Wright Affidavit, ,r
8. Mr. Wright further participated in investigation progress meetings with the HR representative
and the investigator. See Wright Affidavit,

,r 9.

During those meetings Mr. Wright would

receive reports from the investigator and discuss what steps needed to be taken next. See id. Mr.
Wright would then provide responses to statements made to the investigator by employees who
had been interviewed and would direct the investigator to documentation which would assist his
investigation. See id. In fact, during the 2011 investigation, Mr. Wright, along with the HR
representative, determined that it was necessary to review e-mails from some of the employees
involved in the matter and they directed the County IT department to pull up those e-mails. See

id.

Those e-mails were then provided to the investigator by Mr. Wright and the HR

representative. See id.
The vast extent of Mr. Wright's participation in the investigation into the county
employees is further supported by the investigative reports themselves. Specifically, the January
19, 2011 Internal Investigation Status Report issued by the Internal Investigator hired by Plaintiff
to investigate the allegations made against one county employee, specifically states in the
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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summary of incident that after receiving reports from subordinates of the employee "Director
Wright and [another county employee] met with each of the [reporting] employees separately to
gather information regarding their concerns." See Affidavit of Kimberly L. Williams in
Opposition to Defendant's MSJ ("Williams SJ Affidavit"), Exhibit "2," p. ADA 121, filed on
October 24, 2014.

Thus, Plaintiff clearly participated in the investigation by personally

gathering the initial information from the reporting employees.
After the Internal Investigator began his investigation, the report clearly
demonstrates that Plaintiff was heavily involved in the investigation. Specifically, information
provided by Plaintiff to the Internal Investigator is referenced multiple times throughout the
Investigator's written summary of his interview with the accused employee. See generally,
Williams SJ Affidavit, Exhibit "2," pp. ADA 183-195. For example, in a portion of the
interview discussing the accused employee's meetings with Plaintiff, the Investigator states that
"I then discussed specific items provided by Rich as outlined in his notes to me." See id., p.
ADA 188. The interview summary further specifically references Plaintiffs "counseling notes"
and an email exchange which demonstrated a certain response by the accused employee was
incorrect. See id., p. ADA 189. The interview summary then states, "Rich's response to [the
accused employee's statement] during her interview with me is as follows" and includes a halfparagraph quotation from Plaintiff offered in direct response to a statement made by the accused
employee. See id., p. ADA 189.
Similarly, the investigative report specifically provides that "Rich Wright, Human
Resources Director, began directly supervising [accused employee] in August 2010. Director
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Wright prepared a summary of the counseling and coaching issues he has addressed with [her]
during that time, and will be included with this report." See id. at ADA 236. The report
continued "the summary listed general areas of concern along with specific examples in those
areas." See id. The report then stated, "[p]lease review Director Wright's entire summary to
understand the specific issues addressed. It is apparent from his summary that Director Wright
has been trying to change [the employee's] behavior .... " See id. at ADA 237. Therefore, it is
undisputed that Plaintiff did, in fact, give information to the Investigator regarding the
allegations against the accused employee. Further, the quote used by the Investigator could have
only come from some kind of interview between Plaintiff and the Investigator.
In regards to the September, 2012 investigation related to an employee's
complaint of harassment, the record demonstrates that Mr. Wright was responsible for initiating
that investigation based on complaints received and interviews conducted by him. See Wright
Affidavit, ,r,r 13-14. Mr. Wright then directed the investigator to initiate the investigation and,
again, participated in investigation progress meetings. See Wright Affidavit, ,r 16. During those
meetings, Mr. Wright again would discuss the investigator's findings and what additional steps
would be taken. See id. Based on this information, as well as the evidence cited above, there is
simply no dispute that Plaintiff participated and gave information in the course of investigation
and, in fact, was actively involved in the conduct of both investigations.· As such, Plaintiff fits
squarely within the parameters ofldaho Code § 6-2104(2) and Plaintiff respectfully requests that
the Court reconsider its decision and deny Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Count
One of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint.
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4.

The 2011 Investigation Resulted in a Finding of Waste of Public
Funds.

Plaintiff anticipates that Defendants may argue, as they did on summary judgment,
that even if Mr. Wright participated in an investigation, summary judgment is appropriate
because the investigations at issue did not involve waste of public funds or violations of a law,
rule or regulation.

As was fully set forth in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, no such requirement exists in the statute. However,
even if such requirement did exist, which it does not, the findings of the Internal Investigator in
the 2011 investigation clearly demonstrate that there was, in fact, a finding of waste.
Like "participation" there is no definition of "waste" set forth within the Idaho
Protection of Public Employees Act. However, in Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue,
148 Idaho 391,224 P.3d 458 (2008), the Idaho Supreme Court held that an employee who had
documented notes about her co-workers using office time on personal conversations had
documented waste. See id. at 399, 224 P.3d at 466. Specifically, the Court noted that the
underlying facts included that the employee "maintained a detailed, handwritten, minute-byminute log of activities engaged in by her co-workers which Curlee deemed to be wasteful." See
id. at 393, 224 P.3d at 460. The Court further noted that the conduct which prompted this

documentation was the "inordinate amount of time [the other employees] spent on personal
conversations during the workday." See id. As such, the Court has recognized that waste of
public funds can include using work time for non-work purposes. See id.
In this case, the conclusions of the Internal Investigator in the 2011 investigation,
includes specific findings that the accused employee had used county time and resources to
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION000388
- 11

engage in improper actions. As is set forth in the findings, the investigator concluded as follows:
•

The accused employee used "Ada County time and technology resources to engage in email communications that demonstrated disrespect and insubordination. See Williams SJ
Affidavit, Exhibit "2," p. ADA 196.

•

The accused employee used Ada County time and technology resources to allow her
subordinates to engage in e-mail communications that included disparaging remarks
about co-workers and others and also engaged in those conversations. See id.

•

The accused employee used Ada County resources to make derogatory comments about
current or past Ada County employees with other employees, including members of other
Ada County departments. See id.

•

Ada County Human Resources Division provided the investigator with a report detailing
turnover experienced in [the accused employee's] office for the past ten years. During
that time overall turnover was 74%. During 2002, the turnover was 200%. The two most
conservative estimates of the cost of that turnover demonstrate that it cost Ada County
between $178,000 and $196,000 since 2001. See id. at ADA 234-235.

•

The accused employee used her position 1(? derive benefits that other employees did not
enjoy, including box seats to a concert at the fairgrounds. The accused requested that the
Ada County Highway District provide special service in clearing a hazardous stretch of
roadway that the accused traveled. She contacted a sheriffs deputy to obtain details of
an incident in her neighborhood. She also collected property tax information pertaining
to her neighborhood and forwarded that information to her personal email address. See
id. at ADA 237.

As these findings clearly establish, the accused employee was found to have misused County
time and resources.

There is no functional difference between waste occurring because

employees engage in personal conversations during work as occurred in Curlee, and waste
occurring because an employee engages in improper conduct on County time and uses County
resources for improper purposes. As such, Rich Wright not only participated in an investigation
which constitutes protected activity under Idaho Code § 6-2104(2), but that investigation
ultimately found conduct constituting waste of public resources. As such, Plaintiff respectfully
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requests that the Court reconsider its order granting summary judgment on Count One of
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and deny said motion.
C.

The Court Should Reconsider the Grant of Summary Judgment on
Plaintiff's FMLA Claim

Plaintiff also respectfully requests that the Court reconsider its grant of summary
judgment to Defendant on Count Two of Plaintiff's complaint. Count Two of Plaintiff's
complaint alleged interference by Defendants with Plaintiff's FMLA rights. In the Court's
Memorandum Decision and Order, the Court held that because the commissioners were unaware
of Plaintiff's FMLA request at the time the decision was made to terminate his employment,
there was no evidence of interference with Plaintiff's request for an FMLA benefit. However, as
was fully set forth in the Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' MSJ, the courts have held
that, in an interference claim, the employer's intent is irrelevant and the employer's good faith or
lack of knowledge that the conduct violates the FMLA is irrelevant. See, e.g., Sanders v. City of
Newport, 657 F.3d 772, 778-81 (9th Cir. 2011); Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d
1112, 1130 (9th Cir. 2001). Rather, under an interference claim, the plaintiff only needs to show
that he was entitled to leave and the defendant's conduct interfered with that entitlement.
Sanders, 657 F .3d at 781. Therefore, it is irrelevant as to whether the commissioners knew that
Plaintiff had requested an FMLA benefit. All that matters is that, as is undisputed in this case, he
was entitled to such benefit and the Defendants' conduct interfered with that entitlement.
Therefore, Plaintiff was not required to prove that his taking ofFMLA leave played any part in
the decision tq terminate his employment. Rather, the Defendants must prove that it had a
legitimate, non-FMLA related reason for his termination. As was set forth in the Memorandum
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION000390
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in Opposition to Defendants' MSJ, as well as in this brief, there are numerous issues of fact
regarding whether Defendants had a legitimate reason for the termination of his employment. As
such, the Court should reconsider the decision granting summary judgment on this claim and
deny the motion.
The Court also seemed to hold that because the Defendants extended Mr. Wright's
termination date for thirty days, there was no interference with his benefit. However, this
mischaracterizes the benefit to which Mr. Wright was entitled. He had requested, and been
approved, for intermittent leave under the FMLA. He was entitled to a full twelve weeks of such
leave, as long as the need for such leave continues. There is no evidence in the record that Mr.
Wright's need for FMLA leave would have ceased after thirty days. Rather, he only would have
been required to submit a recertification for such leave after thirty days. As long as his health
condition necessitated continued intermittent leave, he was entitled to such leave. Therefore,
there is at least a factual dispute as to whether the County provided Plaintiff with all the benefits
he was entitled to under the FMLA and Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court reconsider
the grant of summary judgment and deny the motion.

D.

Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims.

The Court's Memorandum Decision and Order indicates that the Court believes
that Plaintiff failed to establish a breach of a duty that would support a Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress Claim because the Court granted summary judgment on the Whistleblower
claim. See Memorandum Decision and Order, pp. 11-12. However because Plaintiff has
established a genuine issue of fact regarding whether the Defendants violated the Whistleblower
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Act in the termination of Mr. Wright's employment, Plaintiffhas also established a genuine issue
of fact regarding the Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim. Therefore, Plaintiff
respectfully requests that the Court reconsider the grant of summary judgment on the Negligent
Infliction claim and deny said motion on that claim.

III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court
reconsider its Memorandum Decision and Order granting Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment and deny Defendants' motion.
DATED this

\ Ip~ day of January, 2015.
ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC
By:

d;;?__ ,. ., .
Eric S. Rossman
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the l b~day of January, 2015 I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing to be forwarded with all the required charges prepaid, by the method(s) indicated below to
the following persons:
Kirtlan G. Naylor
Bruce J. Castleton
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610
Boise, ID 83 702

Hand Delivery
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Facsimile 383-9516
Overnight Mail
Electronic Mail
kirt@naylorhales.com
bjc@naylorhales.com
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~Erfo S. Rossman
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,
Case No. CV-OC-13-02730
Plaintiff,

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

vs.

ADA COUNTY, political subdivision of the
State ofldaho; ADA COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS

-

( !)

a:
0

a

Defendants.
Defendant Ada County, Ada County Board of County Commissioners 1, by and through its
attorneys of record, Naylor & Hales, P.C., hereby submits this Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs Motion should
be denied.

Ada County Board of County Commissioners is not a proper party as it is not a governmental
entity that can be sued. To the extent that any claims were alleged and dismissed against the
Commission, this Opposition applies to those claims as well.
1

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 1.

000394

ARGUMENT

1.

Wright Has No Claim Under the Whistleblower Act.
A.

Wright's Activities Do Not Create a Cause of Action under the Whistleblower
Act.

In its Memorandum concerning Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Summary
Judgment Memorandum"), the Court made the necessary findings and reasoning to dismiss Plaintiffs
Whistleblower Claim in its entirety. Initially, the court stated that the express intent of the
Whistleblower Act is to "protect the integrity of government by providing a legal cause of action for
public employees who experience adverse action from their employer as a result of reporting waste
and violations of a law, rule or regulation." Summary Judgment Memorandum p. 7, quoting LC. §
6-2101.
To achieve that intent, the Whistleblower Act specifies the elements that an employee must
establish in his legal cause of action. LC. § 6-2105(4), Summary Judgment Memorandum, p. 7. The
Court noted that the employee is required to establish that he engaged in a protected activity covered
by the Whistleblower Act. Id. Therefore, other activities in which the employee engages are not
protected by the Whistleblower Act.
There is no dispute that all of Mr. Wright's claimed protected activities relate to the
investigations into Dee Oldham's conduct as a supervisor and a complaint made by Jim Farrens. As
the court correctly determined, "neither investigation involved an alleged violation of state, county,
or federal law, rule or regulation. At most each investigation involved only actual or alleged
violations of county employment policies - policies that did not reach the level of statutes, rules or
regulations." (Summary Judgment Memorandum, p. 8.)
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These findings were amply supported in the law and record as demonstrated in Defendant's
Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment (pp. 4-11) and in Defendant's
Memorandum in Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
("Reply Memorandum") (pp. 2-10). Thus at a fundamental level, none of Wright's claimed conduct
falls within the intent of the Whistleblower Act because, as the Court determined, none of the
investigations were the result of reporting waste or violations of a law, rule or regulation.
Consequently, the Whistleblower Act does not create a cause of action for Mr. Wright's claimed
conduct, and these findings and determination are alone sufficient to dismiss Mr. Wright's
Whistleblower Act claims in their entirety.
These findings apply with equal validity to the claim under Section 6-2104(2) as well as
Section 6-2104(1)(a). Just as Section 6-2104(1)(a) is construed within the intent of the
Whistleblower Act, Section 6-2104(2) must also be construed within the intent ofthe Whistleblower
Act. However, Mr. Wright continues to argue that the Whistleblower Act applies to any investigation
without regard to the subject of the investigation. Thus, Mr. Wright asks the court to construe
subsection 2 of Section 6-2104 (entitled "Reporting of Governmental Waste or Violation of Law")
to apply to investigations that do not involve the reporting of governmental waste of violation oflaw.
It is directly contrary to the express intent of the Whistleblower Act to create a cause of action for
adverse action resulting from anything other than the reporting of waste and violations of law, rule
or regulation.
As explained in Ada County's Reply Memorandum (pp.2-6), this interpretation produces
untenable and unreasonable results. As illustrated in the Reply Memorandum, under this
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interpretation, an investigation into the use of a parking space could become the basis for a
Whistleblower Claim. Similarly, under this erroneous interpretation, a reported violation of policy
would not create a cause of action under the Whistleblower Act, but ifthe employer investigated that
report, then the employer would be potentially subject to a cause of action under the Whistleblower
Act. This illogical application of the Act could motivate employers to not investigate policy
violations.
To avoid such incongruity, Section 6-2104(2) must be construed in harmony with the
Whistleblower Act. Accordingly, participation in an investigation only falls within the protections
of the Whistleblower Act when the investigation relates to the reporting of waste or violation of
laws, rules or regulations. Thus any involvement Mr. Wright had in the investigations at issue in this
case did not fall within the protections of the Whistleblower Act because, as the Court correctly
determined, the investigations at issue in this case only involved alleged violations of policies that
did not rise to the level of a law, rule, or regulation. Accordingly, the Court should uphold its
dismissal of Mr. Wright's Whistleblower Act claims.

B.

Any Incidental Finding of Newly Alleged Waste Does Not Salvage the
Whistleblower Act Claim.

The Court correctly disregarded Plaintiffs new allegations and new legal theories regarding
any implications of "waste" in the 2010/2011 investigation into Dee Oldham's conduct because
issues regarding the reporting and existence of waste were never at issue in this case.
1.

Mr. Wright Never Pied a Cause of Action Based on the Reporting of Waste.

First, Mr. Wright never raised or pied allegations involving waste until its Memorandum in
Opposition to the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Memorandum in Opposition to
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MSJ") and now in its Motion for Reconsideration. Mr. Wright only raised allegations regarding
harassment and a hostile work environment. Mr. Wright's allegations did not claim protected
activities regarding waste. Specifically, Mr. Wright's Amended Complaint claimed protected activity
relating to the "investigation into complaints of harassment" (if 9) and the "termination of Plaintiff's
employment because he initiated, coordinated, facilitated, and provided necessary information during
the investigation of an Ada County employee accussed of harassment, and/or investigation of claims
ofhostile work environment. (if 32, emphasis added). Thus, the reporting of waste was never at issue
in this case.
Mr. Wright now improperly attempts to interject a new basis for a Whistleblower Act claim,
by alleging waste. This new theory, which he never pied, raises different issues of fact and different
questions oflaw involving whether Mr. Wright's activities related in any way to reporting of waste
and what does and does not constitute "waste." Thus, the Court was correct in not considering the
specter of waste that Mr. Wright attempts to raise to save Count I of his Amended Complaint, and
it should disregard it now on the Motion for Reconsideration.
11.

Incidental Implications of Waste in an Investigation are Insufficient to Support a
Claim Under the Whistleblower Act.

As stated in Idaho Code Section 6-2101, the Whistleblower Act only creates a cause of action
from adverse action resulting from the reporting of waste. See also Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire

& Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 395 (2008), citing to LC. § 6-2101.
There is no dispute that the complaints that were the basis of the 2010/2011 investigation of
Ms. 0 ldham were allegations of harassment. There was no report of any claimed existence of waste.
Thus, the investigation did not result from the reporting of waste and the investigation was not
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initiated into the existence of waste. Mr. Wright even acknowledges that the investigation was not
into allegations of waste but only that it "ultimately found conduct" (Memorandum in Support of
Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration, hereafter "Memo in Support of Reconsideration," p. 12.) that
Mr. Wright alleges constitutes waste. Consequently, Mr. Wright cannot revive his Whistleblower
Act claim by now trying to re-frame the investigation as relating to waste rather than into the
violation of a county policy, as he alleged in his Amended Complaint. Any implication of potentially
wasteful activities that the investigator raised cannot sustain a cause of action for Mr. Wright under
the Whistleblower Act.
m.

The Findings and Concerns in the Investigative Report Do Not Constitute Waste
Within the Meaning of the Statute.

In support of his un-pled cause of action for participating in an investigation regarding waste,

.,.
Mr. Wright argues for a sweeping definition of "waste" based on the underlying facts of Curlee.
However, contrary to Mr. Wright's assertion the Ada County investigation did not determine that
any waste occurred. Plaintiff contends that the findings and special concerns raised in the 2011
Oldham Investigative Report were waste.
Initially, Mr. Wright supports his all-encompassing definition of waste by relying on Curlee

v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue; however, his reliance on Curlee is misplaced because the Court
never made any findings about whether the actions of Curlee 's co-workers actually constituted
waste. Mr. Wright argues that in Curlee the Idaho Supreme Court "recognized that waste of public
funds can include using work time for non-work purposes." (Memo in Support of Reconsideration
p. 11.) However, the Court never made this finding or determination.
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The Court carefully discussed the alleged wasteful activities as what Curlee "perceived as
waste" or "perceived the actions as wasteful," what Curlee "deemed to be wasteful" or "believed
to be wasteful," that she was documenting her "allegations of waste" and that Curlee was "displeased
with what she considered to be an inordinate amount oftime [the other employees] spent on personal
conversations during the workday. " 2 Curlee, 148 Idaho at 393, 400. Whether there was actual waste
was not an issue before the court, and the Court never made a finding that personal conversations
between two government employees during work hours is waste under the Whistleblower Act. The
questions before the court were whether Curlee either "communicated" her allegations or intended
to participate in an "investigation" by documenting her allegations Id. Importantly, the Court never
determined that an employee's conversations that are not about work constitute waste within the
meaning of the Whistleblower Act.
The Whistleblower Act does provide some guidance as to what constitutes waste. Idaho Code
Section 6-2104(1)(a),(4) discuss waste in terms of "the existence of any waste of public funds,
property or manpower." Mr. Wright asserts that the investigation "ultimately found conduct
constituting waste of public resources" and characterizes the alleged waste as "improper conduct on
County time" and the "uses of County resources for improper purposes." (Memo in Support of
Reconsideration, p.12.)

Mr. Wright also uses a portion of this same quote (Memo in Support of Reconsideration, p.
11) however, the fuller quote provides the context that shows the Court did not determine that she
documented wasted time, but that the reason she documented her coworkers use oftime was because
she was "displeased with what she considered to be an inordinate amount of time spent on personal
conversations·."
2
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Mr. Wright relies on certain items from the investigative report. However, regarding the
findings that Mr. Wright identifies, the evidence supporting those findings show that many of the
"improper" conversations involved work. Additionally, two items that Mr. Wright identifies were
not findings but were only "special concerns" that "came to [the investigator's] attention during this
investigation." (Affidavit of Kimberly Williams in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment, hereinafter, "Williams Affid. In Opposition to MSJ," Exh. 2, p. ADA 234.)
Mr. Wright relies on certain items from the investigative report to try to demonstrate a
finding of waste. However, the evidence supporting those findings show that many of the alleged
"improper" conversations with her coworkers involved her job. (Memo in Support of
Reconsideration, p. 12.)
As an example, "email exchange #1" was used to support the finding that Ms. Oldham used
Ada County time and technology resources to engage in disrespectful and insubordinate email
exchanges and the email contains a discussion about the frequency of office events. (Williams Affid.

In Opposition to MSJ, ADA 199). Similarly, "email exchange #10" supported the finding that she
used Ada County time and technology to allow sub-ordinates to make disparaging remarks about coworkers and this email is regarding another employee leaving a vault open with a light on despite
that she was not currently working in that area. (Id at ADA 203.) Finally, regarding the finding that
she used Ada County resources to make derogatory comments about current or past employees in
other departments, "email exchange #50" was prompted by an incident that Ms. Oldham was
working to resolve an error in payroll. (Id. at ADA 218.) Quite simply, these are not the same type
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of non-work related conversations as the personal conversations in Curlee that were alleged to
constitute waste.
Further, Mr. Wright also identifies two "special concerns" that were raised independently by
the investigator, including the turnover rate of employees during Ms. Oldham's tenure and that Ms.
Oldham may have derived benefits that other employees did not enjoy. (Memo in Support of
Reconsideration, p. 12.) An additional benefit for one employee does not equate with a waste of
resources. More importantly, these "concerns" were not substantiated findings and there is no
evidence that Mr. Wright engaged in activity to further investigate these concerns.
Ultimately the details of the underlying basis for Ms. Oldham's eventual discipline and
resignation from Ada County and whether Ms. Oldham's exhibited lack of respect and
insubordination in her emails are irrelevant to the question at issue, regarding whether Mr. Wright
engaged in conduct protected by the Whistleblower Act, simply because the investigator also found
that Ms. Oldham's conduct in her job was inappropriate.
Essentially, what Mr. Wright contends is that any employee's alleged performance issue
constitutes governmental waste and provides the foundation for a lawsuit under the Whistleblower
Act. This all-encompassing position is unsupportable. It would result in sweeping liability that the
Court rejected in Van when it declined to extend the definition of waste to include potential waste
because such a holding "might subject any government contract to allegations of potential future
waste of funds." 147 Idaho at 559. In this case, to hold that any performance issues of an employee
in her job constitutes a waste of funds, property, or manpower would subject any less than perfect
employee performance to allegations of waste and potential liability under the Whistleblower Act.
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While an employee's performance problems may not constitute the best use of government funds,
property or manpower, they do not necessarily constitute a waste of government funds, property or
manpower. The Whistleblower Act only protects activities resulting from the report of waste, not
from a sub-optimal use of resources.

C.

Mr. Wright Cannot Contradict His Prior Sworn Testimony to Create an Issue
of Fact About his Participation in the Farrens Investigation.

Although findings regarding the extent of Mr. Wright's participation in the investigations at
issue are not required to uphold the dismissal of his claims, there are two points of note regarding
the 2009 Oldham investigation and the investigation into the complaint made by Jim Farrens. ·
First, Mr. Wright does not appear to assert that he participated in the 2009 Oldham
investigation that was commenced prior to his becoming the Director of Administrative Services.
Rather, Mr. Wright focuses on the 2010 complaints that he contends he received regarding Dee
Oldham ~d it is only the 2010/2011 investigation that he now contends incidentally implicated
waste, as discussed above.
Second regarding the Farrens investigation, Mr. Wright now alleges that, as Director of
Department of Administration, he conducted some activities regarding the Farrens investigation,
such as providing information to the eventual investigator and holding meetings with the investigator
"as the investigation ensued." (Affid. of R. Wright in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration, ~~ 13-17.) He also states in his affidavit that he had determined that a formal
investigation needed to be launched(~ 14), and that he and Ms. Calley directed Mr. Hamilton to
begin an investigation (~ 15). He now alleges this activity to try to demonstrate that he participated
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in that investigation. (Memo in Support of Reconsideration, p. 10.) Ho~ever, in his deposition, Mr.
Wright testified that:
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

A. The investigation regarding the Jim
Farrens situation came about as a result of some
public comments that were made to the media. The
board called a meeting with myself, Bethany Calley,
the human resources manager, and wanted to know
what had happened and how to proceed.
Jim Farrens had submitted a letter to
the County, as I recall, making some claims that
were employment-related as well. And that is
how-In that meeting, the executive session,
is where everybody sat around a table and
strategized as to how the Jim Farrens investigation
would be conducted and how we would respond.
I took no official action on the Jim
Farrens situation outside of that executive session
meeting.

Affidavit. ofKirtlan G. Naylor in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, hereinafter, "Affid. of
K. Naylor in Support ofMSJ ," Exh. D, Deposition ofR. Wright, p. 73, emphasis added. Mr. Wright
cannot now attempt to create an issue of fact by an affidavit contradicting his prior deposition
testimony. See Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 266 (9th Cir. 1991). Thus, the
evidence that Mr. Wright now presents and relies on to demonstrate that he was actively participating
in the Farrens investigation contradicts his prior testimony about how the investigation was initiated
and his level of involvement in the investigation. 3

Plaintiff did, in fact, raise Wright's involvement in prior briefing and had ample opportunity
to address this issue, despite his protestations to the contrary in the Memo in Support of
Reconsideration. (See Memo in Opposition to MSJ, pp. 3, 4, 6 & 9).
3
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Mr. Wright testified in his prior deposition that he "took no official action on the Jim Farrens
situation" (lines 21-23) outside of the executive session meeting that was called by the Board of
Commissioners (lines 9-12) "where everybody sat around a table and strategized as to how the Jim
Farrens investigation would be conducted and how we would respond" (lines 17-20).

Now he

claims that he was intimately involved. Mr. Wright cannot attempt to defeat summary judgment with
a self-created issue of material fact regarding his participation through the use of an affidavit
contradicting his prior testimony. The Court need not consider the allegations in Wright's current
affidavit regarding his alleged participation in the Farrens investigation that contradict his prior
sworn testimony.

2.

The Court Properly Dismissed Wright's FMLA Claim Because Ada County Proved Its
Complete Defense to the Claim and There Is No Evidence that Wright was Deprived
of Any Benefit under the FMLA.
The Court's dismissal of Count II, which is Plaintiff's claim under the Family Medical Leave

Act (FMLA) claim, is supported both by the law and in the record. Mr. Wright offers no new
evidence to support his claim that he was denied benefits under the FMLA or that Ada County's
reason for terminating him was related to the FMLA. Therefore, the Court's reasoning based on the
legal and factual arguments argued at summary judgment support dismissal of the FMLA both
because Ada County demonstrated its complete defense to the claim and because Mr. Wright failed
to demonstrate that he was denied any benefits to which he was entitled under the FMLA; these
bases mandate the Court's denial of Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration.
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A.

Dismissal of the FMLA Claim was Supported in Law and Fact Because Ada
County's Defense to the Claim was Supported by Undisputed Evidence.

In its Swnmary Judgment Memorandum (p. 10), the Court's reasoning recognized that under
the FMLA, an employer has a complete defense to any claim for interference under the FMLA when
the employer demonstrates that the reason for ·the employee's termination was unrelated to the
FMLA. Sanders v. City of Newport, 657 F.3d 772, 779-780 (9th Cir. 2011); Throneberry v.

McGehee Desha County Hosp., 403 F.3d 973,977 (8th Cir. 2005). The FMLA does not impose strict
liability. Throneberry, 403 F.3d at 980. Plaintiff also recognizes this principle of law. (Memo in
Support of Reconsideration, p. 13, ("[r]ather, the Defendant[] must prove that it had a legitimate,
non-FMLA related reason for his termination.")) Thus, the Court properly granted summary
judgment on Wright's FMLA claim because Ada County demonstrated that its reasons for
terminating Wright were unrelated to the FMLA.
The Court properly found that the commissioners who discharged Mr. Wright. "had no
knowledge that he had an illness or that he had requested a benefit under the FMLA." (Swnmary
Judgment Memorandum, p. 10.) These findings were supported in the record and briefing. (Memo
in Support of Summary Judgment, p. 19; Defs Statement of Undisputed Facts,~~ 23-28, (citing to
deposition testimony and exhibits.) The significance of these key facts is that, as a matter of logic
and reasoning, the commissioner's decision to terminate Wright could not be related to his medical
condition or FMLA when they had no knowledge of his medical condition or of his FMLA request.
Further, as Ada County asserted and was correctly determined by the Court in its Swnmary Judgment
Memorandum (pp. 19-20), Ada County's decision to eliminate Wright's position as part of a
reorganization and to terminate his employment was unrelated to the FMLA. (Def s Statement of
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Undisputed Facts,~~ 7-9, citing to deposition testimony.) Accordingly, Ada County demonstrated
that the reason for the Wright's termination was unrelated to the FMLA and established its complete
defense to Mr. Wright's FMLA claim.
There is no evidence to show that Ada County's stated reasons for discharging Mr. Wright
were actually related to FMLA. Mr. Wright still seems to contend that Ada County's reason for
discharge was not "legitimate;" however, as firmly established by Ada County, as a matter of law
under the FMLA, a legitimate reason is any reason unrelated to the FMLA. ( Def s Reply Memo, p.
11.) Mr. Wright still does not offer any legal authority to dispute this principle.
Accordingly, the Court properly determined that "the undisputed evidence shows that [the
decision to termination Mr. Wright and Mr. Wright's request for FMLA leave] were unrelated."
Summary Judgment Memorandum, p. 10. This determination alone, is sufficient to support a grant
of summary judgment on the FMLA claim. Therefore, the Court's grant of summary judgment and
dismissal of Count II was proper and supported in both law and fact.

B.

Dismissal of the FMLA Claim was Also Supported By Wright's Failure to
Establish a Prima Facie Case of Interference.

The Court was correct in its conclusion that Ada County did not interfere with Mr. Wright's
request for FMLA leave when it paid his full salary and benefits for the period of leave that Mr.
Wright had requested. A plaintiff bears the burden to come forward with evidence to establish each
element of his claim for interference. Sanders, 657 F.3d at 778. This requires the plaintiff to
establish, in part, that "he was eligible for the FMLA' s protections," "he was entitled to leave under
the FMLA" and that "his employer denied him FMLA benefits to which he was entitled." Id., see

also, (Memo in Opposition to MSJ p. 11 ).
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Here, the evidence in the record shows that Mr. Wright's FMLA leave was designated for
a period of intermittent leave for December 20, 2012 through February 28, 2013. (Affidavit of
Kirtlan G. Naylor in Support of Defs Motion for Summary Judgment, Exh. H, ADA 501.) The
record also shows that Mr. Wright was paid his salary and benefits for this same period of time. (Id.
at ADA 498-499.) Thus, the Court correctly found that Ada County accommodated Mr. Wright's
FMLA request and that_ Mr. Wright had "the benefit of his FMLA request" because after learning
of Mr. Wright's application for FMLA, Ada County extended his salary and benefits through
February 2013, the period of time designated for FMLA leave. (Summary Judgment Memorandum,
p. 10. ) These findings are supported in the record. Therefore, the Court properly concluded that
there was no interference with Mr. Wright's FMLA request.
Mr. Wright does not dispute that he received his full salary and benefits for this period of
time. Rather, Mr. Wright now asks the Court to reconsider its position based on potential future
leave. However, the Court did not err in law or fact when it determined what benefits Mr. Wright
was entitled to under the FMLA in disregarding the fact that Mr. Wright could have requested
additional leave.
Initially, Mr. Wright impermissibly tries to shift the burden of proofregarding whether Mr.
Wright was entitled to any additional benefits under the FMLA. Mr. Wright is required to establish
that he was entitled to an additional period of leave after his designated period of leave ended on
February 28, 2013. He is required to provide evidence, not that his medical need would cease (see
Memo in Support of Reconsideration, p. 14), but rather that he affirmatively was entitled to leave
in the future.
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This means that Mr. Wright had to provide evidence, as elements of his prima facie case, that
in March 2013, Mr. Wright would have had a serious health condition, that he requested recertification for an additional period of leave, and that his medical provider, based on the
circumstances and his condition at that time would have re-certified his leave as medically necessary.
As argued in Ada County's Reply (pp. 12-13), this is too tenuous to affirmatively demonstrate that
Mr. Wright was actually entitled to additional leave.
Additionally, Wright never communicated any intent to seek re-certification of his FMLA
request. This was admitted to by Plaintiffs counsel at the hearing on the Motion for Summary
Judgment when asked directly by the court what would be required for re-certification. Plaintiffs
counsel stated he would have to get another letter from his medical provider, and then she admitted
that he never got that letter for re-certification.
Ultimately, a mere scintilla of evidence or only a slight doubt is insufficient to withstand
summary judgment. Corbridge v. Clark Equipment Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87 (1986). The non-moving
party cannot rest its case upon mere speculation. Finolt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 897 (2007). At
most the record shows that if Mr. Wright had been an Ada County employee, he would have had an
opportunity to request another period of leave; this is insufficient to prove that he was actually
entitled to and denied a specific period of future FMLA leave.
Thus, the Court did not err in its determinations that there was no evidence of any
interfere~ce with Mr. Wright's request for FMLA leave and that Ada County established its defense
to Mr. Wright's FMLA claim. Accordingly, Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration should be denied.

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 16.

000409

3.

The Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim Was Properly Dismissed Because
Ada County Did Not Breach a Duty It Owed to Mr. Wright.
As noted by the Court, a prima facie case for the negligent infliction of emotional distress

requires, among other things, evidence that there was a legally recognized duty and a breach of that
duty. Summary Judgment Memorandum, p. 11, Bollinger v. Fall River Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 152
Idaho 632, 642 (2012). Although, Mr. Wright contends that the Court's dismissal of the Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress claim was dependent on the dismissal of the Whistleblower claim,
the Court actually independently dismissed the claim.
The Court noted that "there is no evidence of a breach of a duty owed by the defendants to
their at-will employee, Mr. Wright." Summary Judgment Memorandum, p. 11. This recognizes the
well-established principle of law that an employer does not breach a legal duty to an at-will
employee simply by terminating him without cause. Bollinger,

152 Idaho at 642.

Accordingly,"[s]ince there was no breach of a duty," the Court dismissed the claim. (Summary
Judgment Memorandum, p. 12.) This legal basis is not refuted, and therefore, the Court must deny
the Motion for Consideration.
Further, as Ada County fully addressed in its Memorandum in Support of Summary
Judgment and its Reply Memorandum, even if the Whistleblower Act claim had survived, it cannot
be used to also try to establish an additional duty under a Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
claim. (Memo in Support of MSJ, pp. 27-30; Reply Memo, pp. 14-15.) In short, in order to supplant
a common law duty with a statutory duty of care, "the statute or regulation must have been intended
to prevent the type of harm the defendant's act or omission caused." Nation v. State Dept. of

Correction, 144 Idaho 177, 190 (2006). The express remedies enumerated in the Whistleblower Act
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do not include non-economic damages, such as emotional distress. LC. § 6-2106. The Whistleblower
Act does not allow for any other type of relief than the enumerated remedies. Consequently, the
Whistleblower Act is not intended to prevent emotional distress and cannot be used to establish a
duty under a claim for emotional distress. Thus, even if the Whistleblower Act claim survived,
summary judgment on the Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress claim was still proper. Hence,
Mr. Wright's Motion for Reconsideration on the Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress claim
should be denied.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, in the Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment, and Defendant's Memorandum in Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court should uphold its prior dismissal of all of Mr.
Wright's claims against Defendant. Defendant respectfully requests the Court deny Plaintiffs
Motion for Reconsideration in its entirety.
DATED this 30h day of January, 2015.
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,
Plaintiff,
-vsADA COUNTY, a political subdivision of the
State ofldaho, ADA COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,
Defendants.
_______________
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CASE NO. CV OC 1302730

PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES

COMES NOW, Plaintiff Richard Wright, by and through his counsel ofrecord, the
law firm of ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC, and hereby submits this Objection to Defendants'
Memorandum for Costs and Attorney Fees.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This case arises from the wrongful termination of Plaintiff, Richard Wright
("Wright"), by Defendants, Ada County and Ada County Board of County Commissioners
("Defendants" or "County"). The County filed a motion for summary judgment against Wright
which Wright opposed. On January 5, 2015, the Court entered a Memorandum Concerning
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Order granting the County's motion for
summary judgment. On January 16, 2015 Defendants file a Memorandum of Costs and
Attorney's Fee and Wright filed a Motion for Reconsideration, both are scheduled to be heard on
February 13, 2015. Wright now files this opposition to the Defendants' Memorandum of Costs
and Attorney's Fees. For the reasons set forth below, Wright respectfully requests that the Court
Deny Defendants Attorney's Fees in their entirety, and costs in part.
II. ARGUMENT

A.

Plaintiff's Claims Did Have a Basis in Fact and Law.

Based upon the arguments in Wright's memorandum in support of his motion for
reconsideration, which will not be rehashed in its entirety here, Wright did have a reasonable
basis in both fact and law for pursuing the present action .

•

A loss of a lawsuit alone is not sufficient to establish fees under Idaho Code§ 12117. Rather, "LC. § 12-117 requires a losing party to have acted frivolously or without
foundation before fees may be granted." City ofOsburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906,910,277 P.3d
353, 357 (2012). The Supreme Court of Idaho has previously held "where issues of first
impression are raised, attorney fees will not be awarded." St. Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Cent. v. Ada

PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES - 2 000414

County (In re Ferdig), 146 Idaho 862,863,204 P.3d 502,503 (2009)(citingKootenai Med. Ctr.

v. Bonner County Comm 'r, 141 Idaho 7, 10, 105 P.3d 667,670 (2004)). As the same language is
used in LC. §12-117 and LC. §6-2107, the same analysis should apply.
In the present matter there is no prior Idaho case law interpreting whether
participation in an investigation requires that the investigation be into a claim of waste or
violation or law, rule, or regulation. Also, there is no Idaho decision defining the extent of the
participation necessary for an individual to invoke protection under the Idaho Protection of
Public Employees Act, Idaho Code § 6-2101 et seq.

Finally, there is no prior Idaho

determination that violation of the IPPEA cannot support a claim for emotional distress.
Therefore, Defendants are not entitled to fees on any of these claims.
In a situation such as the present matter, Wright's interpretation of the statue in
question was certainly not unreasonable, and as such Defendants' attorney fees incurred in this
matter should be denied.

B.

Fees Should be Limited to Those Specifically Attributable to t/ze Defense
ofEac/z Claim.

Should the Court determine that any of Wright's claims lacked a basis in fact or
law, only the fees specifically attributable to such claim(s) should be awarded. Defendants have
"divided" their fees by the number of claims asserted by Wright and then deducted one-third for
the FMLA claim. However, this does not accurately represent the time invested on each claim.
For instance, the claims for emotional distress were added by the Amended Complaint on July 2,
2014, some 15 months after the suit was originally filed. Additionally, a precursory review of
the pleadings, depositions, and written discovery in this matter indicate that a very minor portion
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of Defense Counsels' time was spent on the emotional distress claims.
Therefore, should Defendants be awarded fees on any claim, the Court should first
require an more accurate accounting of the time spent on each individual claim, rather than a
general one-third division that clearly does not reflect the division of time spent on each claim.

C.

Defendants' Request/or Discretionary Costs Should be Denied.

Plaintiff also respectfully requests that the Court deny Defendants' request for
discretionary costs. The items requested as discretionary costs are as follows:

a.
b.
c.

Mediation fees: $1,062.50
Rough Draft of Deposition D. Case: $197.25
Rough Draft of Deposition R. Wright: $124.50

The rough drafts of the deposition transcripts should be denied, as I.R.C.P.
54(d)(l)(C)(10)provides for "one (1) copy of any deposi~ion taken by any of the parties to the
action." Copies of the depositions of Mr. Case and Mr. Wright are already accounted for in
Paragraph 17 of Mr. Naylor's Affidavit. Awarding costs for an additional copy would be
contrary to Rule 54(d), and would represent a double recovery to Defendants. Additionally,
there is no showing that the costs of the rough drafts were "necessary and exceptional" pursuant
to the Rule.
Finally, Wright requests that the mediation fees be denied, mediation is a voluntary
process and there is no showing by Defendants that the mediation fees were "necessary and
exceptional."

D.

Defendants' Request/or Costs Should be Reduced

Wright does not dispute the majority of the costs enumerated by Defendants
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should they ultimately be deemed the prevailing party. However, Wright does object to the
payment for fees for "service" upon "S. Ullman," and for "Court filing fee for Utah/Foreign
Subpoena." See Affidavit of Kirtlan G. Naylor, p. 5. S. Ullman was never deposed in this
matter, and certainly was not deposed three times. Since this is a witness, upon whom service
was never actually accomplished, and for whom no deposition was ever taken, Wright requests
that Defendants' costs be reduced by the amount of $234.00.

E.

Should the Court Grant Wright's Motion for Reconsideration, the
Award of Costs or Fees is Untimely.

Currently pending before this Court is Wright's Motion for Reconsideration.
Should the Court grant Wright's motion, in whole or in part, the determination of costs and fees
will be untimely.

In the event the Court grants Wright's motion, we request that the

determination of costs and fees be delayed until such time as the prevailing party can be
determined.

III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court
reconsider DENY an award of attorney's fees to Defendants entirely, and reduce the costs be the
items discussed above.
DATED this

JO~

day of January, 2015.
ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC

By:
Kimberly L. Williams
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,
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-vsADA COUNTY, a political subdivision of the
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PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO ·
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

----------------)

COMES NOW, Plaintiff Richard Wright, by and through his counsel of record, the law
firm of ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC, and hereby submits this Reply to Defendants'
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration.

I. ARGUMENT
A.

PlaintifFs Participation in t/ze Investigations is a Protected Activity
Under t/ze IPPEA.
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The language regarding waste, or a violation of law, rule or regulation is specifically
spelled out under LC.§ 6-2104(1), and LC.§ 6-2104(3). That language was specifically omitted
from LC. § 6-2104(2). Had the legislature intended to use that language in subsection (2) it
could have, and would have, done so.
Obvious policy reasons for not using the same language in subsection LC. § 6-2104(2)
which deals with participation in investigations, as opposed to "reporting" or "refusal"
subsections. Should an employer determine that any situation rises to level of requiring an
investigation, the employer will expect any employee questioned or otherwise asked to
participate, to be forthright and honest in their responses and/or participation. The policy behind
protecting those who participate or provide information in an investigation is to ensure the
integrity of the investigation by encouraging honest, accurate, and complete participation and/or
information from the employee(s).
While one would hope that employees would always provide accurate and complete
information when called upon to do so, the reality is that if the employee is in fear oflosing their
job, livelihood, and/or ability to provide for their family for so providing the information, the
employee would be placed in a difficult position. An employee will generally have no input into
whether an investigation is conducted, and in many cases may not know the purpose of the
investigation, but should not have to stop and inquire into the reason for the investigation in
order to determine whether or not they will have job protection if they do participate.
So, if the employer wants to investigate the use of a parking space, they necessarily also
want full and accurate information from those participating in the investigation and shouldn't
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thereafter allow an employee to be terminated in retaliation for providing the information the
employer sought in the first place.
No incongruity arises from reading the statute as it is written. The clear difference
between the "participation" subsection and the other subsections is that the "reporting" and
"refusal" are proactive steps taken by the employee, when the employee has a reasonable belief
that something misconduct is occurring. An employee cannot make up any claim of wrongdoing,
and then expect to be forever protected from adverse employment actions. Likewise an
employee cannot refuse to follow directives that are legitimate and then claim protection under
the IPPEA. LC. §§ 6-2104(1) and (3) both contain language (also omitted from LC. § 62104(2)) requiring a good faith or reasonable belief that the conduct they are reporting (or
refusing perform) constitutes waste or a violation oflaw, rule or regulation. An employee who
self-reports or refuses to carry out a directive, must have a good faith basis for doing so.
Whereas under LC.§ 6-2104(2) there is no such language, once the employee is called upon to
participate or given information in an "investigation, hearing, court proceeding, legislative or
other inquiry, or other form of administrative review" the protection attaches.
LC.§ 6-2104(2) was clearly meant to be far more broad than LC.§§ 6-2104(1) and (3), it
contemplates more than just investigations, but legislative or other inquiry, and other form of
administrative review. Clearly such inquiries, investigations and reviews contemplate more than
just waste or violations oflaw, rule, or regulation. The language was intended to be broad, and
not to be limited in the same ways LC. §§ 6-2104(1) and (3) are limited.
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B.

Mr. Wright Participated in an Investigation that Ultimately Uncovered
Waste.

Plaintiff does not concede that an investigation would need to be regarding waste or
violation oflaw rule or regulation. However, should the Court determine that requirement does
apply to LC. §§ 6-2104(2), then the facts of this case demonstrate that the investigation did
uncover waste.
Defendant first reads a requirement into LC. § 6-2104(2) that doesn't exist, and then goes
on to interpret the non-existent language to exclude investigations where waste is found, but
wasn't the catalyst for the investigation. There is absolutely no legal authority to support that
position, it is simply Defendant's interpretation of language that does not exist.

Mr. Wright agrees he has not, and does not claim he "reported" waste. His claim is
merely that should the Court impose the additional requirements in LC.§§ 6-2104(2) from the
other subsections, protection still applies because the investigation did uncover waste.
Defendant tries to minimize the discovery of waste as a result of the investigation, but it
in the extent or severity of the waste that creates protection under the IPPEA. In Curlee v.
Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 224 P.d3 458 (2008), the Court held that

keeping track of personal conversations occurring at work was sufficient to invoke protection
under the reporting and participation subsections of LC. §§ 6-2104. The Curlee court did not
find, but clearly assumed that the conversations constituted "waste." It is noteworthy that the
analysis under LC.§§ 6-2104(1) included a discussion of good faith, whereas the analysis under
LC. §§ 6-2104(2) did not. Id. at 148 Idaho 398-400, 224 P.3d 465-67.
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The findings of the investigative report are no less waste than the conduct in Curlee, and
Plaintiffs participation in the investigation constitutes a protected activity under the IPPEA.
C.

Wright Participated in t/ze Farrens Investigation.

Plaintiff has not contradicted himself in regards to his participation in the Jim Farrens
investigation. In his deposition Plaintiff was not questioned about his participation in the Jim
Farrens investigation, but about his conversations with Dave Case regarding the Jim Farrens
investigation. See Affidavit of Kimberly L. Williams in Support of Plaintiffs Reply to
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration, Ex. "l." Plaintiff
maintained he was not aware at any time that Commissioner Case was upset about the
investigation and that he did not discuss the matter with Commissioner Case outside of executive
session. Id. When Plaintiff stated he did not take any official action outside of that meeting, he
meant he was not involved in any other such actions which have to be handled in executive
session. Had Plaintiff been questioned regarding his role in assisting the investigator, his
answers would be the same as they are in his affidavit, however that line of questioning never
occurred.
Additionally, Plaintiff was not aware at the time he filed the original complaint in this
matter that Commissioner Case had been upset about the Farrens investigation. It was through
the deposition of Commissioner Case that Plaintiff learned the Commissioner had been upset
about that investigation and believed Plaintiff to have been involved in the investigation.
Plaintiffs participation in the investigation of Jim Farrens constitutes a protected activity under
the IPPEA.
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D.

The Termination Interfered with Plaintiff's FMLA Rights

Wright has established a prima facie case of interference under the FMLA. He has
established he was entitled to benefits under the Act, the wrongful conduct of the Defendants
interfered with the exercise of his rights, and he suffered damages.

There is no intent

requirement under an interference claim. Defendants continually rely on the "reorganization" of
the Mr. Wright's department as their undisputed legitimate reason for terminating his
employment. However, Mr. Wright disputes the "reorganization" was in fact legitimate. Mr.
Wright contends that the "reorganization" was nothing more than a pretext for his unlawful
termination under the IPPEA. Causation is always in issue of fact for the jury and under the facts
of this matter, the jury should determine the cause for Mr. Wright's termination. Curlee v.
Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391,395,224 P.d3 458,462 (2008).
Defendants also try to state that Plaintiff has not established any damages because he
cannot prove that he would have continued to qualify for his FMLA leave. Defendant points out
that he never attempted to re-certify for FMLA leave. However, by the time re-certification
would have been possible, Mr. Wright's employment had been terminated and it was impossible
for him to apply for re-certification as there was no such vehicle available for a non-employee of
Ada County. "'The most elementary conceptions of justice and public policy require that the
wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the uncertainty which his own wrong has created."' 0 'Dell v.
Basabe, 119 Idaho 796, 812-13, 810 P.2d 1082, 1098-99 (1991) (quoting Bigelow v. RKO Radio
Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 265, 66 S.Ct. 574, 580 (1946)). In the present matter, there is
evidence from which a jury could determine an amount of damages for Mr. Wright. 0 'Dell, 119
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Idaho at 812, 810 P.2d at 1098.

E.

The IPPEA Supports a Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
Claim.

Defendants' termination of Plaintiffs employment in violation of the IPPEA constitutes a
breach of a legally recognized duty. Once Plaintiff has established a breach of a legal duty, the
damages for his emotional distress are proper. Violation of the IPPEA establishes an element of
Plaintiffs emotional distress claim. Following which damages can also be proven.
Additionally, in Brown v. Cityo/Caldwell, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143552, the court held
that nothing in the Idaho Whistleblower Act "restricts plaintiffs from seeking non-economic or
other special damages." Id. at 3.

III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court reconsider its
Memorandum Decision and Order granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and
deny Defendants' motion.
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Wright v. Ada County, et al.

retaliation.
Q.

Was there anything

any reason keeping

3

you from contacting him prior to December 5th with

4

an e-mail like this?

5

6

Go ahead.

7

THE WITNESS:

8

Q.

9

10

Object; asked and answered.

MR. ROSSMAN:

There was no reason to.

(BY MR. NAYLOR) But there wasn't

anything preventing you from e-mailing him as well,
correct?

11

MR. ROSSMAN:

Object; asked and answered --

12

THE WITNESS:

No.

13

MR. ROSSMAN:

-- three times.

14

Q.

15

(BY MR. NAYLOR) Do you remember the Jim

Farrens investigation?

16

A.

I do.

17

Q.

And did you ever have a conversation

18
19

20
21

with Commissioner Case about that?
A.

Only in the confines of an executive

session meeting.
Q.

Okay.

Did he ever come to you in your

22

office and ask you who authorized the Jim Farrens

23

investigation?

24

A.

He did not.

25

Q.

You're sure of that?

[72]

Associated Reporting and Video Inc.
208.343.4004

000430

Richard Thomas Wright

February 11, 2014

Wright v. Ada County, et al.

1

A.

I am positive.

2

Q.

Was Dave Case involved in the

3

instigation of the Jim Farrens investigation?

4

A.

No.

5

Q.

That was with Commissioner Yzaguirre,

6

correct?

7

A.

The investigation regarding the Jim

8

Farrens situation came about as a result of some

9

public comments that were made to the media.

The

10

board called a meeting with myself, Bethany Calley,

11

the human resources manager, and wanted to know

12

what had happened and how to proceed.

13

Jim Farrens had submitted a letter to

14

the County, as I recall, making some claims that

15

were employment-related as well.

16

how

17

And that is

In that meeting, the executive session,

18

is where everybody sat around a table and

19

strategized as to how the Jim Farrens investigation

20

would be conducted and how we would respond.

21

I took no official action on the Jim

22

Farrens situation outside of that executive session

23

meeting.

24

Q.

25

Well, isn't i t true that you met with

Jim Farrens and Commissioner Yzaguirre about Jim
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Farrens' concerns?

2

A.

No, not to my recollection at all.

3

Q.

You met with Jim Tibbs and tape recorded

4

a conversation with him, correct?

5

A.

Correct.

6

Q.

And that was in -- I believe

7

January 11th, 2013?

8

A.

Probably so.

9

Q.

Okay.

Did he know that he was being

10

tape recorded?

11

A.

No.

12

Q.

And why not?

13

A.

Again, as I stated before, I was in

Why didn't you tell him?

14

protection mode.

15

Commissioner Tibbs to ask him to lunch so I could

16

begin to establish a relationship with him.

17

originally put on the calendar, and then it was

18

cancelled.

I had previously reached out to

19

Q.

Which meeting was cancelled?

20

A.

My lunch with him.

21

Q.

Which was scheduled for when?

22

A.

I don't recall the day.

23

It was

I do recall that Commissioner Tibbs had

24

asked Terri to reach out to department directors to

25

schedule meetings with them as he approached to
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1

A.

I don't recall.

2

Q.

Do you recall who delivered the Farrens

(

3
4
5
6

investigation to the board?
A.

It would have been Bart Hamilton, the

internal investigator.

Q.

Were you present when it was delivered

7

to the board?

8

A.

I believe I was.

9

Q.

Was Commissioner Case at that board

10

meeting when the report was delivered?

11

A.

I believe he was.

12

Q.

And when you were talking about

I can't recall.

13

roundtabling with the commission about the Jim

14

Farrens complaint, was Dave Case present at that

15

meeting?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

Was i t an executive meeting?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

And do you remember when that happened?

20

A.

I don't.

21

Q.

Did you ever participate on Sharon

22

Ullman's campaign?

23

A.

No.

24

Q.

Did you ever contribute money to her

25

campaign?
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good stopping spot.

2
3

February 11, 2014

Off the record.
(Lunch break taken from 11:46 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.)

4

MR. NAYLOR:

5

Eric is not here.

6

needs to ask any questions, that I leave the room.

May the record reflect that
I'll just make sure if Bruce

7

MS. WILLIAMS:

8

Q.

9

A.

(BY MR. NAYLOR) Do you remember when the

I don't.

I believe i t was before the

election.

12
13

Sounds good.

Farrens report was delivered to the commissioners?

10
11

Okay.

Q.

But do you remember i t being provided to

the commissioners?

14

A.

I don't remember the date.

15

Q.

No, not the date, but you remember the

A.

I don't really recall.

16

17
18
19

event?
I don't remember

the conclusion.

Q.

Okay.

Do you remember a time when

20

Commissioner Case was upset about the investigation

21

when i t was delivered?

22

A.

No.

23

Q.

You don't remember any time when

24

Commissioner Case was upset about the Farrens

25

report?

[99]

Associated Reporting and Video Inc.
208.343.4004

000434

February 11, 2014

Richard Thomas Wright

1

A.

No.

Wright v. Ada County, et al.

The only -- the only time I recall

2

the Farrens report even being discussed, the

3

investigation or its conclusions, was in executive

4

session.

5

Q.

6
7

Right.

And this would have been an

executive session.

A.

Uh-huh.

And I remember

8

Commissioner Case being concerned about the nature

9

of Jim Farrens' letter and the prosecuting

10

attorney's office recommendation that i t contained

11

human resources information and, therefore, should

12

have been determined to be an HR personnel

13

document.

14

And I remember the discussions also

15

surrounding around how or why Commissioner Case

16

let -- gave that letter to the Boise Guardian.

17

Q.

Do you remember a meeting with the

18

commissioners where Commissioner Case asked, "Who

19

ordered this investigation," on the Farrens matter?

20

A.

No.

It was -- i t was known.

When we

21

roundtabled in the very beginning, it was discussed

22

freely among all the commissioners that an

23

investigation was to be launched.

24
25

No one

I did not make that decision.

It was a

directive from the board, or at least two of the

[100]
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Was Commissioner Case involved in

3

directing that that investigation of the Farrens

4

complaint be investigated?

5
6
7

A.

I believe i t was just

Commissioner Yzaguirre and Commissioner Ullman.
Q.

So you're not aware of any time where

8

Commissioner Case expressed any concern that the

9

report seemed to be targeting him?

10
11

A.

Seemed to be targeting him as in

Dave Case or

--

12

Q.

Yes.

13

A.

-- Jim Farrens?

14

I remember in the meeting i t was

15

discussed how the media got a copy of Jim Farrens'

16

letter that was declared a personnel document.

17

18

Q.

Okay.

But wasn't the fact of the matter

,that Jim Farrens filed a grievance that he felt

19

that he was being harassed because the letter had

20

gone out to the public?

21
22

A.

That came after the letter was given to

the public

23

Q.

Correct.

24

A.

-- by Commissioner Case.

25

Q.

And i t was the grievance, Jim Farrens'

[101]
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grievance, that was then investigated, was i t not?
A.

It would have been a situation

Correct.

3

where anytime any employee claims harassment, the

4

investigation is launched.

5

Q.

understanding each other here.
So then Jim Farrens files a grievance.

8
9

10

So there

And I just want to make sure we're

6
7

Okay.

It is then submitted for an investigation, and you
were involved in that

11

A.

Correct.

12

Q.

-- correct?

13

A.

The whole board was, right.

14

Q.

But you and Chairman Yzaguirre met with

15
16

17

Jim Farrens about his grievance in September?
MS. WILLIAMS:
and answered.

18

Go ahead.

19

THE WITNESS:

20

Q.

21

22
23

I'm going to object as asked

I don't recall that meeting.

(BY MR. NAYLOR) Okay.

And then who did

the actual investigation?
A.

It likely would have been Bart Hamilton.

I don't specifically recall who did it as well.

24

Q.

Okay.

25

A.

But Bart Hamilton did all of those types
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of investigations.

Q.

So you really weren't a principal or

involved in that investigation, correct?

4

A.

No.

5

Q.

It was through HR?

6

A.

Correct.

7

Q.

Okay.

Then once that report of the

8

investigation was returned to the County

9

commissioners, were you present when the

10
11

commissioners discussed the investigation?
A.

12

I don't recall that I was.
Given the timing of when that would have

13

happened, I don't know that I was still employed

14

with the County at the time that Bart Hamilton

15

concluded the investigation.

16

Q.

Oh, i t was -- i t was September 20th, the

17

date of the report, so i t was while you were still

18

employed.

19
20

But I just -- so that's
I'm just trying to find out if you

recall that part of it?

21

A.

Then clearly I don't.

22

Q.

Okay.

So really, you didn't have any

23

involvement with the Farrens report.

24

talking about the investigation of his grievance

25

A.

And I'm

Uh-huh.
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Q.

-- not the disclosure of the letter

3

A.

Right.

4

Q.

2

and

5

6
7

Do you understand what I'm talking
about?

A.

8

9

10

any conversation dealing with that.

Yes.
Not to my knowledge, not that I can

recall.
Q.

Okay.

So once that report of that

11

investigation was returned to the commissioners,

12

you really weren't involved in that process?

13

MS. WILLIAMS:

14

THE WITNESS:

15

Q.

Asked and answered.
Correct.

(BY MR. NAYLOR) Okay.

Did anyone ever

16

report to you that Commissioner Case had been upset

17

about that investigation?

18

A.

Not to my recollection.

19

Q.

Okay.

20
21
22

(Deposition Exhibit No. 25 was marked.)
Q.
Exhibit 25.

23
24
25

(BY MR. NAYLOR) I'm handing you

Have you seen that before?
A.

I don't know that I have.

I don't know

who produced this.
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VERIFICATION
STATE OF

_I
___· __J_~_o__)
) ss.

COUNTY OF __A_o\_o......_ _ _ >
I, RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT, being first duly sworn on
my oath, depose and say:
That I am the witness named in the foregoing
deposition taken the 11th day of February, 2014,
consisting of pages numbered 1 to 164, inclusive; that I
have read the said deposition and know the contents
thereof; that the questions contained therein were
propounded to me; that the answers to said questions
were given by me, and that the answers as contained
therein (or as corrected by me therein) are true and
correct.

Corrections Made:

Yes

/

No

IGHT
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
day of

t'\'\o...v-ch

14:-\t..1-

.

, 2014 , at _ _B.___c-tA..e...
_______ , Idaho.

N o t a ~ f o r Idaho
, Idaho.
Residing at
~ 1
My Commission Expires:
1 v:n..o •

7-/ z/
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
STATE OF IDAHO

)
)
)

COUNTY OF ADA

ss.

I, ANDREA J. WECKER, Certified Shorthand Reporter and
Notary Public in and for the State of Idaho, do hereby
certify:
That prior to being examined, the witness named in
the foregoing deposition was by me duly sworn to testify
to the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth;
That said deposition was taken down by me in
shorthand at the time and place therein named and
thereafter reduced to typewriting under my direction,
and that the foregoing transcript contains a full, true
and verbatim record of said deposition.
I further certify that I have no interest in the
event of the action.
WITNESS my

and seal this 20th day of February,

2014.

ANDREA J. WECKER
RPR and Notary
Public in and for the
State of Idaho.

My Commission Expires:

2-14-17
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DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
)

RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,

)

CASE NO. CV-OC-13-02730

)

Plaintiff,

)
)

V.

)

)

ADA COUNTY, A POLITICAL
)
SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO,)
AND ADA COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY )
COMMISSIONERS,
)

MEMORANDUM
CONCERNING MOTION
TO RECONSIDER

)

)

Defendants.

)

The case is before the court on Mr. Wright's motion for reconsideration of the
order granting summary judgment and the judgment entered on January 5, 2015.
IRCP ll(a)(2)(B). The motion was argued on February 13, 2015. Mr. Wright was
represented by Rossman Law Group, PLLC. The defendants were represented by
Naylor & Hales, P.C.
The court has discretion to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration. The
court shall take into account any additional evidence presented by the moving party
that bears on the correctness of the disputed order. Barmore v. Perrone, 145 Idaho

MEMORANDUM

1
000442

.•
' '

340, 344, 179 P.3d 303 (2008). While Barmore involved reconsideration of an
interlocutory order, the court sees no reason for not reviewing additional material
facts brought to its attention on reconsideration of a final order or judgment.
It is an abuse of discretion to deny a motion for reconsideration if the record
shows that the original decision was incorrect in some significant way.

Mr. Wright has asked the court to reconsider its dismissal of his claim under
the Whistle blower Act. In support of his motion, he has presented additional
evidence of his actual involvement in investigation of various employee complaints.
Assuming, as Mr. Wright has argued, that there is evidence that he participated in
or gave information in various investigations, they were not the types of
investigations that implicated the Whistleblower Act's legislatively-enacted purpose
of "protecting the integrity of government by providing a legal cause of action for
public employees who experience adverse action from their employer as a result of
reporting waste and violations of a law, rule, or regulation." LC. Section 6-2101
(emphasis supplied). They were nothing more than investigations of non-sexual,
non-discriminatory, non-monetary conduct, conduct that clearly was lawful but
possibly overbearing, by a person or persons in supervisory county positions.
The investigations were not conducted with a view to exposing waste or a
violation of a law, rule, or regulation. Even if Mr. Wright's involvement in the
investigations may have resulted in uncovering incidental use of county time or
facilities to say unkind things about fellow employees, his conduct did not rise to the
level of protected "reporting [of] waste and violations of a law, rule or regulation" or

MEMORANDUM
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to the level of any protected conduct enumerated in the act. LC. Sections 6-2101, 62104. Furthermore, the language of the statutory legislative intent set forth in LC.
Section 6-2101 necessarily and logically limits the language of LC. Section 62104(2), on which Mr. Wright relies as the basis of his claim, even if those precise
words are not expressly repeated in Section 2104(2).
With respect to the court's dismissal of the Family and Medical Leave Act
claim and the dismissal of the emotional distress claims, Mr. Wright has not
presented additional evidence. He only has re-addressed what he originally argued
in opposition to the defendants' summary judgment motion.
After carefully considering the arguments and additional evidence submitted
by Mr. Wright, the court is left with an abiding conviction that its decision to grant
summary judgment in favor of the defendants was correct in all material respects.
As both the Idaho Supreme Court and this court previously have said, "It is well
settled that a mere scintilla of evidence or only a slight doubt as to the facts is
insufficient to withstand summary judgment." Corbridge v. Clark Equipment Co.,
112 Idaho 85, 87, 730 P.2d 1005 (1986).
Having reconsidered its original decision and having concluded that it was
correct, the court will deny any relief from its decision granting the defendants'
summary judgment motion and from its entry of judgment dismissing the plaintiffs
claim. The court will enter an order consistent with this memorandum.
Although this decision is unfavorable to Mr. Wright, the court does not intend
to demean in any way the very effective assistance he has received from his
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attorneys throughout these proceedings.

Dated this

MEMORANDUM
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1---day of February, 2015
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT~
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
)
)
)
)
)

RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,
Plaintiff,
V.

CASE NO. CV-OC-13-02730

)

)
ADA COUNTY, A POLITICAL
)
SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO,)
AND ADA COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY )
COMMISSIONERS,
)
)
)
Defendants.
)

ORDER
CONCERNING MOTION TO
RECONSIDER

It hereby is ordered as follows:
The motion for reconsideration of Plaintiff Richard T. Wright is granted, and the
court has reconsidered its decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the
defendants. Having reconsidered its decision and having determined that the
original decision was correct, the court hereby denies the plaintiffs motion for relief
from the court's entry of summary judgment and the plaintiffs motion for relief

-

from the court's entry of judgment dismissing the plaintiffs claims.
Dated this

ORDER

/

7

day of February, 2015
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
)

RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,

)

CASE NO. CV-OC-13-02730

)

Plaintiff,

)
)

v.

)
)

ADA COUNTY, A POLITICAL
)
SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO,)
AND ADA COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY )
COMMISSIONERS,
)

MEMORANDUM AND
ORDER CONCERNING
COSTS

)
)

Defendants.

)

This is an action brought by Plaintiff Richard T. Wright against the defendants.
In his amended complaint, Mr. Wright alleged the following claims:
1. Wrongful discharge in violation of the Idaho Whistleblower Act;

2. Wrongful discharge in violation of the Family Medical Leave Act;
3. Intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress.
The defendants obtained summary judgment dismissing all of Mr. Wright's
claims. Mr. Wright then moved for reconsideration. The motion was denied in a
separate order.
The defendants have moved for an award of costs, including attorney's fees. Mr.
Wright has objected. The motion for costs and the objections were argued on February
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13, 2015. Mr. Wright was represented by Rossman Law Group, PLLC. The defendants
were represented by Naylor & Hales, P.C.

COSTS INCLUDING ATTORNEY'S FEES
PREVAILING PARTY
In deciding who is a prevailing party, the court may consider:
... the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief
sought by the respective parties, whether there were multiple claims,
multiple issues, counterclaims, third-party claims, cross-claims or other
multiple or cross issues between the parties and the extent to which each
party prevailed upon each of such issues or claims. IRCP 54 (d) (l)(B).
The Court looks not only at the final judgment but also at the result of the
action in relation to the relief sought. The result of the action is not limited to the
judgment rendered at the close of the case. It may include a settlement precipitated
by the litigation. Compare, Chenery v. Agri-Lines Corporation, 106 Idaho 687, 682
P.2d 640 (1984). Furthermore, while the court has discretion in determining
prevailing parties and amounts to be awarded, it may not exercise its discretion by
withholding or reducing attorney fees to ameliorate the result of the litigation or "to
vindicate [its] sense of justice beyond the judgment rendered on the underlying
dispute between the parties." Evans v. Sawtooth Partners, 111 Idaho 381, 387, 723
P.2d 925 (Ct. App. 1986).
In this case the defendants were successful in obtaining dismissal of all of
Mr. Wright's claims. The court concludes that the defendants were the prevailing
parties.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

2
000448

COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT
The defendants have claimed a total of $4,154.96 as costs allowable as a matter
of right pursuant to IRCP 54(d)(l)(C). They include the following:
Filing Fees:
Service Fees
Witness fees and travel expenses for deposition witness
Reporting and transcribing depositions
One copy of transcripts and exhibits for depositions

$101.00
$349.00
$21.80
$1,295.85
$2,387.31

Mr. Wright has objected to a filing fee of $35.00 paid for a Utah/Foreign
Subpoena, apparently paid in connection with attempting to obtain the presence of
Ms. Sharon Ullman for a deposition. Ms. Ullman was a former Ada County
Commissioner. Mr. Wright also has objected to service fees totaling $299.00 incurred
in service or attempted service of deposition papers on Ms. Ullman in Utah and Idaho
on three occasions. Mr. Ullman never actually was deposed.
Costs paid for court filing fees and for service fees of any pleading or document
in an action are allowable as a matter of right. IRCP 54(d)(l)(C)(1)(2). Ordinarily
allowable costs may be disallowed if they are unreasonably incurred or if they are
incurred for the purpose of harassment or in bad faith or to increase costs to another
party. IRCP 54(d)(l)(C). The record does not show any such ulterior purpose. Just
because Ms. Ullman was not successfully served or was not deposed, if that is the
case, is immaterial.
All of the defendants' costs allowable as a matter of right under the rule,
including those to which objections have been made, are awarded.
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DISCRETIONARY COSTS
The defendants claim discretionary costs of $1,062.50 for mediation fees and
$321.75 for rough drafts of two depositions.
It is not the purpose of the cost rule to provide dollar for dollar
reimbursement for every item of costs expended by the prevailing parties. A limited
amount of costs are allowable as a matter of right. IRCP 54 (d)(l)(C). Additional
costs are allowed as a matter of discretion, but only if the prevailing parties show
that they were necessary, reasonably incurred, exceptional, and assessable against
the adverse party in the interest of justice. IRCP 54 (d)(l)(D).
The claimed discretionary items were routine costs associated with modern
litigation overhead. They probably were reasonable and necessary, but there was
nothing exceptional about their nature or amount.
None of the discretionary costs are allowed.

ATTORNEY'S FEES AS COSTS
'

The defendants claim a partial award of attorney's fees as costs under LC.
Sections 6-2107 for successfully defending the Whistleblower claim and under LC.
Section12-117 for successfully defending the emotional distress claims.
The court "may'' grant an employer an award of reasonable attorney's fees in a
Whistleblower case if the court "determines that an action brought by an employee
under this chapter is without basis in law or in fact." LC. Section 6-2107. The use of
the word "may" in the statute means that the decision to award a fee is permissive or
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..
discretionary but not imperative or mandatory. See, Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 848,
908 P.2d 143 (1995).
In this case the court decided that summary judgment dismissing the
whistle blower claim was justified by the record. This conclusion necessarily meant
that the court decided that the undisputed facts necessitated a judgment dismissing
the claim as a matter oflaw. It does not necessarily follow that Mr. Wright's action
was brought without a justiciable basis in law or in fact. While the court disagreed
with Mr. Wright's theory of the case, his arguments were not so unreasonable as to
require the court to impose an award of attorney's fees, especially since some of the
issues have not been definitively decided by an appellate court. See, e.g., Rincover v.
State, Department of Finance, 132 Idaho 547, 976 P.2d 473 (1999) (reviewing denial of

attorney's fee award under I. C. Section 12-117); Brown v. City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho
802, 229 P.3d 1164 (2010).
Mr. Wright alleged his emotional distress claims in the alternative, asserting that
the defendants "negligently and/or intentionally caused Plaintiff to suffer extreme
mental anguish ... " (Amended Complaint, Count Three, Paragraph 45). An award of
attorney's fees is mandatory and not discretionary under LC. 12-117, but only if the
court "finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or
law." LC. Section 12-117(1). The lack of a reasonable foundation means that the
losing party acted frivolously or without foundation. City of Osborn v. Randel, 152
Idaho 906, 910, 277 P.3d 353 (2013). The court does not find that the alternative

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

5
000451

...

I

'

.

..

•

emotional distress claims were alleged so frivolously or so without foundation as to
warrant an award of attorney's fees.
No attorney's fees are allowed as costs.

ORDER
It hereby is ordered that a supplemental judgment for costs in the amount of
$4,154.96 will be awarded in favor of the defendants and against Mr. Wright.

Dated this

/

7

V

day of February, 2015

George D. Carey, Senior District udge
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FEB 17 2015
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By MARTHA LYKE
DEPIJTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
)

RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,

)

CASE NO. CV-OC-13-02730

)

Plaintiff,

)
)

v.

)
)

ADA COUNTY, A POLITICAL
)
SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO,)
AND ADA COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY )
COMMISSIONERS,
)

SUPPLEMENTAL JUDGMENT

)
)

Defendants.

)

JUDGMENT HEREBY IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
The judgment entered on January 5, 2015 is supplemented to add the
following sentence:
Defendants Ada County and Ada County Board of County Commissioners are
jointly awarded a judgment for costs in the total amount of $4,154.96 against
Plaintiff Richard Thomas Wright.

Dated this

IJ

"--ciay of February, 2015

·ct Judge
SUPPLEMENTAL illDGMENT
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this 18th day of February 2015, I mailed (served) a true
and correct copy of the within instrument to:

KIMBERLY L. WILLIAMS
ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC
737 N 7TH STREET
BOISE, ID 83702
KIRTLAN G. NAYLOR
BRUCE J. CASTLETON
NAYLOR & HALES, PC
950 W BANNOCK STREET, STE 610
BOISE, ID 83702

SUPPLEMENTAL JUDGMENT
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:.~----'"~\ =
FEB 19 20fS
CHRISTOPHER 0. AICH Cle
By STACEY LAFFERTY
rk
DEPUTY

Eric S. Rossman, ISB #4573
erossman@rossmanlaw.com
Erica S. Phillips, ISB #6009
ephillips@rossmanlaw.com
Kimberly L. Williams, ISB #8893
kwilliams@rossmanlaw.com
ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC
73 7 N. 7th Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 331-2030
Facsimile: (208) 342-2170
Attorneys for Plaintiff
L

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,
Plaintiff,
-vsADA COUNTY, a political subdivision of the
State ofldaho, ADA COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV OC 1302730

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Fee Category: L-4
Filing Fee: $129.00

----------------)

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANTS, ADA COUNTY and ADA COUNTY
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, AND THE PARTYS' ATTORNEYS, Kirtlan G.
Naylor, Bruce J. Castleton, NAYLOR & HALES, P.C., 950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610,
Boise, ID 83702, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.
The above named Appellant, Richard Thomas Wright, appeals against the above
named Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Judgment entered in the above entitled
action on the 5th day of January, Honorable George D. Carey presiding.
2.

That the parties have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1
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•

judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant
to Rule 11 (a)( 1) I.A.R. as the Judgment was the final judgment, order or decree disposing of
all remaining claims against all remaining parties.

I

3.
That the issue Appellant intends to assert on appeal is: Did the district court err
I
in granting summary judgment to Defendants on the basis that Plaintiff had failed to establish
that he engaged in or intended to engage in protected activity under the Idaho Protection of
Public Employees Act, Idaho Code§ 6-2101, et seq.
I

4.
Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? YES,
pursuant to Stipulation and Protective Order of September 10, 2013, certain docurilents were
submitted under seal.

I

5.

(a)

Is a reporter's transcript requested? YES

(b)

The Appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the
reporter's transcript:
1.

The transcript of the entire hearing on Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment held on November 7, 2014.

2.

The transcript of the entire hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration held on February 13, 2014.

The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's
6.
record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.
(a)

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on October 10, 2014;

(b)

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,lfiled on
October 10, 2014;

(c)

Ada County's Statement of Undisputed Facts, filed on October 10, 2014;

(d)

Affidavit ofKirtlan G. Naylor in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment, filed on October 10, 2014;

(e)

Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary
I
Judgment filed on October 24, 2014;
j

(f)

Affidavit of Richard Wright in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment, filed on October 24, 2014;

f
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(g)

Affidavit of Kimberly L. Williams in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment, filed on October 24, 2014;

(h)

Defendant's Memorandum in Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on October 31, 2014;

(i)

Affidavit of Christopher D. Rich, filed on October 31, 2014;

G)

Defendant's Response to Inquiry Concerning Defendants' Status, filed on
November 10, 2014;

(k)

Inquiry Concerning Defendants' Status, filed on November 13, 2014;

(1)

Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment, filed on November 19, 2014;

(m)

Affidavit of Kimberly L. Williams in Support to Plaintiffs Supplemental
Memorandum, filed on November 19, 2014;

(n)

Defendant's Supplemental Brief Regarding Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress, filed on November 19, 2014;

(o)

Supplemental Affidavit ofKirtlan G. Naylor in Support of Defendant's
Supplemental Brief on Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, filed on
November 19, 2014;

(p)

Memorandum Concerning Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed
on January 5, 2015;

(q)

Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on January
5, 2015;

(r)

Judgment, filed on January 5, 2015;

(s)

Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration, filed on January 16, 2015;

(t)

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration, filed on
January 16, 2015;

(u)

Affidavit of Richard Wright in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration, filed on January 16, 2015;
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7.

(v)

Affidavit of Kimberly L. Williams in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration, filed on January 16, 2015;

(w)

Defendant's Memorandum of Costs and Attorney's Fees, filed on January 16,
2015;

(x)

Affidavit ofKirtlan G. Naylor in Support of Defendant's Memorandum of
Costs and Attorney's Fees, filed on January 16, 2015;

(y)

Plaintiff's Objection to Defendants' Memorandum of Costs and Attorney's
Fees, filed on January 30, 2015;

(z)

Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration, filed on January 30, 2015;

(aa)

Plaintiff's Reply to Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for
Reconsideration, filed on February 10, 2015;

(bb)

Affidavit of Kimberly L. Williams in Support of Plaintiff's Reply to
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration, filed
on February 10, 2015;

(cc)

Supplemental Judgment, filed on February 17, 2015;

(dd)

Memorandum and Order Concerning Costs, filed on February 17, 2015;

(ee)

Order Concerning Motion to Reconsider, filed on February 17, 2015; and

(ff)

Memorandum Concerning Motion to Reconsider, filed on February 17, 2015.

I certify:
(a)

That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the reporter.

(b)(l) That the clerk of the district court or administrative agency has been
paid the estimated fee for the preparation of the reporter's transcript.
(c)(l) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's or agency's record
has been paid.
( d)(l) That the appellate filing fee has been paid.
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~

(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to Rule 20.

DATED this

(

'\¥l

day

of February, 2015.
ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC

By:

IL
Kimberly L. Williams
Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the \ q+~day of February, 2015 I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing to be forwarded with all the required charges prepaid, by the method(s) indicated below to
the following persons:
Kirtlan G. Naylor
. Bruce J. Castleton
NAYLOR & HALES, P .C.
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610
Boise, ID 83702

Hand Delivery .
U.S. Mail
Facsimile 383-9516
Overnight Mail
Electronic Mail
kirt@naylorhales.com
bjc@naylorhales.com

.,/

I! .
Kimberly L. Williams

\\OFFICESERVER\Rossman Law\Documents\Work\W\Wright, Rich\Pleadings\Appeal Notice doc
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Kirtlan G. Naylor
[ISB No. 3569]
MAR O4 2015
Bruce J. Castleton
[ISB No. 6915]
Joan E. Callahan
[ISB No. 9241]
CHR!STOPH~R D. R!Crl, C!er!<
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.
8'.I TENiLLE r-~A9
c.:;::urv
Attorneys at Law
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 610
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516
Email: kirt@naylorhales.com; bjc@naylorhales.com; jec@naylorhales.com
Attorneys for Cross-Appellant Ada County

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,
Case No. CV-OC-13-02730
Appellant, Cross-Respondent

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL

--

C!)

cc

vs.

0

w

ADA COUNTY, political subdivision of the
State ofldaho; ADA COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS
Respondent, Cross-Appellant.

TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED CROSS-RESPONDENT, RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,

AND

ms

ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, ERIC

s.

ROSSMAN, ERICA

s.

PHILLIPS,

KIMBERLY L. WILLIAMS, ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC, 737 N. 7TH STREET,
BOISE, IDAHO 83702, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL- 1.
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1.

The above named cross-appellant(s) Ada County, Ada County Board of

Commissioners ("Ada County"), appeal(s) against the above named cross-respondent to the Idaho
Supreme Court from the Supplemental Judgment and Memorandum and Order Concerning Costs,
entered in the above entitled action on thel 7th day of February 2015, Honorable Senior District
Judge George D. Carey presiding.
2.

That the party has a right to cross-appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule
1 l(a)(l), I.AR.
3.

Cross-Appellant Ada County asserts the following issue on appeal:
A

Whether the District Court erred by not awarding Cross-Appellant Ada

County attorney fees under Idaho Code Sections 6-2107 and 12-117?
4.

Cross-Appellant Ada County does not request any transcripts in addition to those

requested in the original Notice of Appeal.
5.

Cross-Appellant Ada County does not request any documents to be included in the

clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.AR and those requested
in the original Notice of Appeal.
6. ·

I hereby certify that:
A

A copy of this Notice of Cross-Appeal has been served on the court reporter

(Cross-Appellant Ada County does not make any request for an additional transcript);
B.

The Clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for additional

preparation of the Clerk's Record (Cross-Appellant Ada County does not make any request for any
additional documents in the Clerk's Record);
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL- 2.
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C.

The appellate filing fee has been paid;

D.

Service of this Notice has been made upon all parties required to be served

pursuant to I.A.R. Rule 20.
DATED this

4th

day of March, 2015.
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C.

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL- 3.

000462

.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 4th day of March, 2015, I caused to be served, by
the method( s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon:
Eric S. Rossman
Erica S. Phillips
Kimberly L. Williams
Rossman Law Group, PLLC
737 N. 7thStreet
Boise, ID 83 702

x._ U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax Transmission: 342-2170
Email: erossman@rossmanlaw.com
ephillips@rossmanlaw.com
kwillliams@rossmanlaw.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Sue Wolf, Court Reporter
c/o Judge Carey's Chambers
200 W. Front St.
Boise, ID 83702-7300

x._

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Fax Transmission:
Federal Express

8745_63 Defs Notice of Cross Appeal.\vpd
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1

TO:

2

...

CLERK OF THE COURT, _IDAHO SUPREME COURT
451 WEST STATE STREET, BOISE, IDAHO
FAX
(208) 334-2616

3

RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,

)

4

Docket No. 42999-2015

)

Plainti-ff-Respondent,

)

Case No. CVOC-2013-0002730

)

5
VS.

)

ADA COUNTY, et al,

)
)

6
7

)

8

Defendant-Appellant.
_________
_______ )

NOTICE OF LODGING

)

'

9

10

NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT(S) LODGED

11

12

Notice is hereby given that on June 8, 2015,

13

I l?dged one

14

the following dates/proceedings:

(1)

transcript, totaling 43 pages, for

15
11-07-14

Motion for Summary Judgment

16
17

for the above-referenced appeal with the District Court

18

Clerk for Ada County, in the Fourth Judicial District.

19
20
21

Susan M. W~ ,
RPR, CSR No. 728

22
23
24
25
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TO: . CLERK OF THE COURT IDAHO SUPREME COURT
451 WEST STATE STREET, BOISE, IDAHO 83702

01::Pu;Gt:Nt:R'

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,

)Supreme Court No. 42999
)

Plaintiff-Appellant,

)Case No. CV-OC-2013-2730
)
)

vs.

)
)

ADA COUNTY, a political subdivision)
of the State of Idaho, ADA COUNTY )
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,
)
)

Defendants-Respondents,

)NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT
)LODGING
)

_________________ )
)

NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED
Notice is hereby given that on May 19th,. 2015, I
lodged the following transcript(s): Hearing dated: Feb. 12,
2015, of 63 pages, for the above-referenced app~al with the

District Court Clerk of the County of Ada, in the Fourth
Judicial District.

?f~:tticf!a

'I
Oate

. Certified Court Reporter
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. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,
Supreme Court Case No. 42999
Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross Respondent,
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

vs.

ADA COUNTY, A POLITICAL
SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, AND ADA COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,
Defendants-Respondents-Cross Appellants.
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of·
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify:
There were no exhibits· offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the
course of this action.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as
CONFIDENTIAL EXHIBITS to the Record:
1. Affidavit of Kimberly L. Williams in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment, Filed Under Seal, filed October 24, 2014.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal ·of the said
Court this 8th day of June, 2015.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,
Supreme Court Case No. 42999
Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross Respondent,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

vs.
ADA COUNTY, A POLITICAL
SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, AND ADA COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,
Defendants-Respondents-Cross Appellants.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of
the following:

CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
to each of the Attorney; of Record in this cause as follows:
ERIC S. ROSSMAN

KIRTLAN G. NAYLOR

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

BOISE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO

JUN OS 2015

Date of Service: - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

000467

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
RICHARD THOMAS WRIGHT,
Supreme Court Case No. 42999
Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross Respondent,
vs.

CERTIFICATE TO RECORD

ADA COUNTY, A POLITICAL
SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, AND ADA COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,
Defendants-Respondents-Cross Appellants.
I, .CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk ~f the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State ofldaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in
the above-entitled cause was compiled under my direction and is a true and correct record of the
pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules,
as well as those requested by Counsel.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the
19th day of February, 2015.
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